The Edenville and Sanford Dam failures in Midland County, Michigan are a classic example of a timeless problem in public utility governance: a unique sector with a patchwork of federal regulation, state oversight, private financial interest, and public health and safety. When multiple groups collide in systems like hydroelectric dams—which  provide not just power, but also waterways and reservoirs that are home to delicate ecosystems and loyal recreationalists—jurisdiction, funding, and the area’s human and natural welfare often get lost in the shuffle. 

        The story of this most recent disaster begins in 2004, when Boyce Hydro Power, LLC acquired the license for a 2,600-acre reservoir equipped with two 2.4-megawatt turbine generators. At the time, Boyce was made aware of non-compliance issues related to the spillway (overflow) capacity, which only met about 50% of the Probable Maximum Flood standard for the region. Further, that standard keeps growing; the EPA reports that the average annual precipitation in most of the Midwest has increased by 5-10% and rainfall during the four wettest days of the year has increased about 35% between 1966-2016. But the role of Boyce Hydro in the Edenville Dam failure is tantamount to the failures of governmental oversight in a system riddled with inefficiency, inconsistency, and competing priorities.

        Despite the sustained involvement by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission over a period of 14 years, the spillway inadequacies were never properly addressed by Boyce, who claimed insufficient funding for further investment and even turned to the public for financial support, which was unmet. FERC revoked Boyce’s power generation license in 2018, a process that then turned over regulation of the dam itself to the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes and Energy (EGLE). While a seemingly harmless move, the inconsistency in priorities between the two agencies quickly proved to be problematic. A flurry of court activity ensued, involving Boyce, EGLE, and the Four Lakes Task Force—a public authority working for Midland and Gladwin Counties delegated to oversee the dams and lakes—concerning water levels (from winter “drawdowns” to avoid ice formation) and the freshwater mussel populations living within the lakes. Boyce representatives have accused EGLE of being more concerned with the prevalence of the mussel population than the safety of downstream residents, given the blowback Boyce received from EGLE on their drawdown levels that negatively impacted the ecosystem. This conflict actually follows something of a pattern, under which responsibility for private dams - which account for over 56% of dams in the US - is divided among an unwieldy conglomerate of “federal agencies, non-federal agencies, and private dam owners” themselves.

        In the case of Midland County, unfortunately, record-setting rainfalls from May 17 to 19 pushed the dams and spillways past their limits before the Task Force could commence repairs on their recent $9.4 million expenditure to acquire and upgrade the 100-year-old infrastructure. The story is now marred with community tragedy, immense damages, imminent and sustained public health risks, and, in a darkly ironic turn, a return of federal tax dollars to Midland County, but in the form of FEMA relief, not hydroelectric dam oversight. 

        How many more infrastructure failures at the hands of federal-state-private responsibility issues have to occur before a cohesive effort that scientifically protects a clear lineage of priorities (e.g. public safety, aquatic ecosystem protection, recreation and tourism industry, etc.) is put into place? As Congress whittles away yet another session with “deadend” spending bills aimed at votes and power, not at actual change, crumbling water infrastructure continues to plague cities like New Orleans, Flint, and so many others at risk of pollution, toxic contamination, flooding, and drought. Moreover, often the improvement of these issues is largely in the hands of corporate interests like Boyce Hydro, the National Lead Company, and dozens of unregulated animal farming operations, all of which slip through the cracks of mismanaged governmental regulation among confusion over state vs. federal jurisdiction, and politically- or even financially-invested lawmakers. The executive branch has a well-deserved bad reputation for inefficiency and red tape, coupled with partisan appointments and political alliances, but in critical public health and safety issues like these, a clearer lineage of command and stricter enforcement of non-compliance would save countless lives, energy, and funding in the long run. It is time to transition from an “alphabet soup” of silo agencies acting independently to more collaborative, bi-partisan groups with smaller-scale priorities and science-based responses to private infrastructure management.

        So is the private sector really to blame? That is for the justice system to decide, so long as legislators and enforcers do their jobs correctly. As the national deficit mounts and inconsistencies in political party power continue to play out in vicious cycles, critical infrastructure implemented and managed by private entities is perhaps not the primary culprit, though this may be a fairly unpopular opinion given the Bryce noncompliance history. The fact of the matter is that for infrastructure, federal spending is fleeting; state spending is already stretched as thin as the lake surface ice on the last cool spring day in Michigan; and municipal funding for regional projects is far-fetched at best. Private sponsorship, bidding, and contracting should be incentivized and encouraged, in an effort to repurpose public funds to more critical spending areas, if and only if the disjointed, misaligned, bureaucratic oversight process is streamlined to designate power to collaborative, interdisciplinary teams with clearly denoted mission statements, agendas, and jurisdiction. It’s time for the executive branch to streamline its processes and consolidate to stricter oversight, allowing the outsourcing of project funding to successful markets like utilities and recreation. Under that paradigm, infrastructure failures will not only occur less frequently, but the mechanics of liability and responsibility will allow for faster, more cost-effective responses when they do occur at all.