Policing Gender at Work: Intersections of Harassment Based on Sex and Sexuality

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Abstract   Theorists have suggested that oppressions based on gender and sexual orientation are inherently linked. The present study aims to operationalize and test this proposition, by modeling relationships between sexual harassment and heterosexist harassment. Based on prior research in organizational and feminist psychology, we hypothesized a three-factor model of workplace harassment, comprising sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment. We then factor-analyzed data from 629 employees (both female and male, sexual minority and heterosexual) in higher education, finding this hypothesized model to be superior to three competing alternatives. Next came multiple-group analyses, which suggested this model to be invariant by gender, but not sexual orientation. Implications of these findings for research, theory, and practice are discussed.

Introduction

According to theory, harassing behaviors based on either gender or sexual orientation have common roots in maintaining traditional patriarchal gender roles. To date, however, empirical data on these issues remain scarce. As Kitzinger (2001) observed, "…despite acknowledgement of the intersections between gender and

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sexuality, there has been little attempt seriously to address the relationship between these theories of gender oppression and sexuality oppression…" (p. 277). We aim to redress such deficits in the literature by integrating sexual harassment research with scholarship on heterosexism, yielding a synergistic model of workplace oppression based on gender-role enforcement. We also bring data to bear on these issues, adding empirical findings to a rich body of theory.

Conceptualizing Sexual Harassment and Heterosexist Harassment

Sexual Harassment

Before developing an integrative framework for studying sexual harassment and heterosexism, we provide a brief overview of both as they manifest in the workplace. Studying *sexual harassment* (SH) from a behavioral perspective, Fitzgerald, Swan, and Magley (1997, p. 15) defined this phenomenon as "unwanted sex-related behavior at work that is appraised by the recipient as offensive, exceeding [one's] resources, or threatening [one's] well-being." SH is a significant problem in the United States, as it is estimated that between 35% to 50% of women and 9% to 35% of men have been the victim of SH, depending on the definition used (Gutek, 1985; USMSPB, 1981, 1988, 1995). In a recent meta-analysis of 55 probability samples, 58% of female participants reported having experienced potentially harassing behaviors (Ilies, Hauserman, Schwochau, & Stibal, 2003). Consequently, it is a research topic with vast applicability to many people's lives.

The last two decades of SH research have witnessed considerable advances in "mapping" the behaviors that constitute this construct domain. One of the earliest and most widely validated conceptualizations of SH is the "tripartite model" developed by Fitzgerald et al. (1988; Fitzgerald, Gelfand, & Drasgow, 1995). They posited that SH consists of three theoretically distinguishable but related categories of behavior. First, *gender harassment* refers to disparaging conduct not intended to elicit sexual cooperation; rather, these are verbal, physical, and symbolic behaviors that convey hostile and offensive attitudes about women. By contrast, *unwanted sexual attention* involves sexual advances that are inappropriate, unreciprocated, and/or offensive to the recipient (e.g., sexually suggestive comments, attempts to establish sexual relationships despite discouragement, unwanted touching). The third category is *sexual coercion*: subtle or explicit bribes or threats to make job conditions contingent on sexual behavior. Gelfand, Fitzgerald, and Drasgow (1995, p. 167) argued that these three categories "are necessary and sufficient to classify any particular incident of [sexual] harassment … they constitute the irreducible minimum of the construct as it is currently understood." Moreover, this 3-factor model has received greater empirical validation than any other SH model to date. Fitzgerald et al. (1988, 1995) also developed the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ) to assess these three dimensions of SH.

Whereas the Fitzgerald et al. (1988, 1995) taxonomy addresses the SH of women, Waldo, Berdahl, and Fitzgerald (1998) focused on men's experiences. Their model and resulting measure of the SH of men consists of five factors, two of which parallel Fitzgerald et al.'s (1988, 1995) previous conceptualizations of *unwanted*

sexual attention and *sexual coercion*. Further, Waldo et al. (1998) divide gender harassment into three subdimensions. Two of these subdimensions are self-explanatory: *lewd comments* and *negative remarks about men*. The final subdimension, *enforcement of the heterosexual male gender role*, was first identified as a type of SH by Berdahl, Magley, and Waldo (1996), and it refers to punishment that men face for failing to conform to traditional masculinity. Notably, men in Waldo et al.'s (1998) research appraised this final type of harassment as more "upsetting" than any other type of SH.

Pryor and Whalen (1997) also created a typology of sexual harassment, most of which echoed the Fitzgerald et al. (1988, 1995) tripartite model. What makes this typology unique is the fourth factor of *homo-anathema*. Pryor and Whalen defined this construct as "hostile attitudes and behaviors toward homosexuals," (p. 130), adding that it can involve verbally attacking other employees with slurs against sexual minorities, regardless of the actual sexual orientation of the targets. Their inclusion of homo-anathema in this typology raises the question of whether harassment invoking sexual orientation should be conceptualized as a form of SH or, conversely, should be understood as a separate (albeit related) category of mistreatment.

Heterosexist Harassment

As the empirical study of sexual minority (i.e., non-heterosexual) psychology is relatively new, researchers have not yet developed standard operational definitions for many constructs in this area of inquiry. This applies to the study of anti-sexual-minority behaviors. Croteau (1996) summarized the nascent research in this area (Croteau & Lark, 1995; Croteau & von Destinon, 1994; Levine & Leonard, 1984), and concluded that 25–66% of sexual minorities had encountered workplace discrimination due to their sexual orientation. As researchers theoretically and empirically refine the construct of discrimination and harassment based on sexual orientation, more precise prevalence rates should emerge.

Herek (1990, p. 89) broadly defined *heterosexism* as "an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship or community." The limited empirical scholarship on workplace heterosexism has addressed both *explicit* (e.g., targeting an employee with anti-gay insults) and *implicit* (e.g., failing to promote sexual-minority employees) forms of this abuse (Croteau, 1996; Levine & Leonard, 1984; Ragins & Cornwell, 2001; Ragins, Cornwell, & Miller, 2003). Other recent research (e.g., Deitch, 2002, unpublished doctoral dissertation; Waldo, 1999) has referred to *direct heterosexism* (i.e., anti-sexual-minority discrimination and harassment) and *indirect heterosexism* (behaviors reflecting assumptions that all employees are heterosexual, e.g., continually asking a coworker "why aren't you married?").

The current study focuses on *heterosexist harassment*, which we define as verbal, physical, and symbolic behaviors that convey hostile and offensive attitudes about one's actual or perceived lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity. Heterosexist harassment thus refers to negative workplace experiences that individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation, encounter as society mandates "compulsory heterosexuality"

(i.e., the notion that heterosexuality is the norm in patriarchal culture and individuals who deviate from this norm are subject to harsh punishment, Rich, 1980). This encapsulates both personally targeted experiences of harassment and discrimination (e.g., being fired from a job because of one's actual or perceived sexual orientation) as well as vicarious experiences or "ambient" hostility towards sexual minorities (e.g., overhearing coworkers laugh about anti-lesbian jokes). Note that because sexual orientation is not always a visible social identity (Badgett, 1996), heterosexuals may be mistaken for sexual minorities, thus making them vulnerable to personal, as well as ambient, heterosexist harassment.[1]

Policing Gender at Work

Although research on workplace SH and heterosexism has grown along separate lines, the extant theorizing about both suggests that they are not necessarily orthogonal. That is, both forms of oppression share common roots in the enforcement of traditional, rigid gender norms.

Gender Norms and Sexual Harassment

Several researchers have theorized that an underlying motivation for SH is maintenance of traditional, hierarchical gender structures (Berdahl et al., 1996; Franke, 1997; Stockdale, Visio, & Batra, 1999). Tangri and Hayes (1997) summarized that males and females are socialized to adhere to traditional gender roles in which "…men are expected to exercise, and are socialized for, dominance, leadership, sexual initiative and persistence, and self-interest. Women are expected to exercise, and are socialized for, submissiveness, nurturing, sexual gatekeeping, and self-abnegation" (pp. 120–121). Franke (1997) concluded that the enforcement of patriarchal gender roles penalizes men who fail to display the dominance prescribed by traditional masculinity. Women, on the other hand, are caught in a double bind: those who deviate from the submissive norm face social sanctions and questions about their heterosexuality, but the alternative—conforming to a traditional female role that strips them of power and reduces them to sex objects—is no more appealing. Similarly, in comparing men's and women's experiences of SH, Berdahl et al. (1996) theorized that men are punished for violating norms of male dominance in the workplace, and women are harassed to reinforce their subordinate status.

 In explaining the sexual harassment of men, theorists have also relied heavily on gender-role theory. For example, Stockdale (2005) echoed Waldo et al. (1998) in noting that the harassment men receive from other men often aims to enforce a heterosexist, hypermasculine gender role. The most vulnerable targets for such

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[1] Our conceptualization of heterosexist harassment does not include behaviors that are intended to be positive, but that erroneously assume heterosexuality ("indirect heterosexism" in Deitch [2002, unpublished doctoral dissertation] and Waldo's [1999] terms). We excluded such behaviors because, although important, they appear to be primarily motivated by ignorance of the presence of sexual minorities in the workplace rather than intentional malice. Due to the lack of hostility toward non-heterosexuality, these behaviors do not necessarily constitute "harassment" per se.

abuse are often "men who appear to be effeminate, gay, or in other ways not sufficiently masculine (e.g., young and inexperienced)" (Stockdale, 2005, p. 124). Examples of gender-role-based SH have also appeared in court cases. For instance, Waldo et al. (1998) describe the case of *Polly v. Houston Lighting and Power Company* (1992), in which the male plaintiff was taunted physically, sexually, and verbally by male coworkers because he was perceived as too effeminate. In other words, even though his experiences included some sexually offensive behaviors (e.g., he alleged that the defendants had grabbed his genitals, attempted to kiss him), it appears that the purpose of these acts was to bully him for his inadequate masculinity (Waldo et al., 1998).

Note that most perpetrators of SH are male. Feminist theorists have long argued that the underlying motivation for men's sexual aggression is one of power and dominance rather than a desire for sexual gratification (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975; Farley, 1978; Groth, 1979; MacKinnon, 1979). In the case of sexual harassment, Cleveland and Kerst (1993) suggested that there are three levels of power dynamics: societal, organizational, and personal. Even if men are in a subordinate organizational position (e.g., being an entry-level employee) or personal position (e.g., having weak interpersonal skills), as men in our patriarchal society they remain at a higher level of societal power. In other words, the diffuse or master status of gender may override organizational factors in empowering men to harass women (Fain & Anderton, 1987). As Stockdale (2005) noted, "sexual harassment is a problem rooted in male dominance. Men who harass use their social, economic, organizational, and physical power to define how gender is to be structured in an organizational setting" (p. 117).

Gender Norms and Heterosexist Harassment

Homosexuality may be viewed as an egregious violation of traditional gender norms. For example, according to Rich (1980), lesbianism directly challenges the patriarchal imperative that women be dependent on men for their survival. Moreover, Herek (1986) and Hunter (1993) noted that male homosexuality involves a relinquishing of male power and sexual dominance over women. Kite and Whitley (1998) further suggested that heterosexuals' negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians derive from beliefs about men, women, and their "appropriate" roles in society.

Conversely, transgression of gender roles is often assumed to indicate homosexuality. That is, individuals whose identities, behaviors, or appearances deviate from gender-normative prescriptions are subject to having their heterosexuality questioned. Garnets (2000, p. 173) elaborates on this point:

> Women and men who manifest characteristics inconsistent with those culturally prescribed for their gender, regardless of their sexual orientation, are likely to be labeled as gay….A woman may be labeled a lesbian if she exhibits autonomous or self-assertive behavior, fights for her rights as a woman, enjoys the company of other women, works at a nontraditional job, or says no to violence.

Similarly, Steinem (1978, p. 267) once argued that, "…sooner or later, all nonconforming women are likely to be labeled lesbians. True, we start out with the smaller punishments of being called 'pushy' or 'aggressive,' 'man-hating' or 'unfeminine.' But it's only a small step from those adjectives…to the full-fledged epithet of 'lesbian.'"

Heterosexism is therefore often interpreted as a punishment for violating gender-normative prescriptions (Herek, 1986; Kite & Whitley, 1998). As noted above, violators need not be lesbian or gay to fall victim to this abuse. For example, one heterosexual man, Hunter (1993), shared his experiences of being the target of heterosexist violence because others considered him a "sissy" for not conforming to traditional views of masculinity (e.g., for not engaging in misogynistic behavior). His victimization included physical assault while his attackers hurled anti-gay epithets at him. The function of this behavior is to keep in place a rigid societal structure that privileges heterosexual masculinity. As Franklin (1998) concluded, "the potential of being ostracized as homosexual, regardless of actual sexual attractions and behaviors, puts pressure on all people to conform to a narrow standard of gender appropriate behavior, thereby maintaining and reinforcing our society's hierarchical gender structure" (p. 8). Put simply by Kitzinger (2001, p. 277), "heterosexism…is one of the ways in which strict adherence to gender role stereotypes is enforced, and gender oppression maintained."

Toward an Intersectional Model

The theories reviewed above suggest underlying links between sexual harassment and heterosexist harassment, in that both function to enforce traditional gender roles. However, this connection remains untested. In fact, empirical research typically focuses on one or the other form of harassment, which does not permit attention to their interface. Questions therefore remain about whether SH and heterosexist harassment are fundamentally different or, conversely, closely linked or even overlapping forms of oppression. Here we attempt to develop an "intersectional" model of harassment, taking into account both gender and sexual orientation. This perspective follows from Crenshaw's (1994) pioneering work on the intersectionality between race and gender.

Based on the research of Fitzgerald et al. (1988, 1995; Waldo et al., 1998), one factor in our model entails *gender harassment*. This includes both *gender derogation* (hostility toward one's gender[2]) as well as *gender-nonconformity harassment* (negative treatment for deviating from one's traditional gender role). In alignment with feminist theorists such as Butler (1990), we posit that these two forms of gender harassment react to the performance of gender. In other words, gender is not something innate that we *have*, but rather, something we *do* (i.e., acting in accordance with the traditional gender role or creating an alternative role). Employees may face harassment for traditional gender performance (e.g., a

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[2] Fitzgerald et al. (1988, 1995) originally termed such behavior "gender harassment," but we use the more specific term of *gender derogation* (reserving the term "gender harassment" for the larger construct).

traditional woman takes a job at a factory, only to be harassed because femininity is seen as having no place in manufacturing), or they may be abused because their gender performance deviates from tradition (e.g., a feminist man is taunted for not acting "manly" enough). By expanding the gender-harassment construct to include punishment for deviation from traditional gender roles, we follow the precedent set by Berdahl et al. (1996) and Waldo et al. (1998) in their studies of the SH of men. Women like men can also be targeted with retribution for gender-role violation, as they may experience mistreatment for being too assertive, too dominant, or simply too present in traditionally masculine domains of work–i.e., for failing to adhere to the prescriptions of traditional femininity (Berdahl, in press; Fiske & Stevens, 1993; Franke, 1997; Maass, Cadinu, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003; Schultz, 1998).

We conceptualize *heterosexist harassment* as separate from (but related to) gender harassment. As noted above, this heterosexist abuse refers to behaviors that convey hostile and offensive attitudes about sexual-minority identities, regardless of whether or not the target actually ascribes to such an identity. In other words, this conduct denigrates lesbian, bisexual, and gay sexual orientations (actual or perceived). Again, this behavior penalizes individuals for violating traditional gender norms, which mandate heterosexuality. Any deviation from hyperfemininity in women or hypermasculinity in men may be taken as an indication of homosexuality, prompting anti-sexual-minority abuse. Due to the links with gender performance, we see heterosexist harassment as closely related to gender harassment. At the same time, we posit heterosexist harassment as a conceptually distinct construct, because it explicitly invokes sexual orientation (as opposed to harassment that targets a person's gender performance more generally, without referring to that person's sexual orientation). In other words, heterosexist harassment overtly conveys devaluation, rejection, and/or hatred of non-heterosexuality, whereas gender harassment does not (not explicitly at least). This separation of heterosexist harassment from gender harassment mirrors distinctions in the law: current federal law does not shield employees from hostility against minority sexual orientations, whereas workplace harassment based on gender is seen as a statutory violation.

Unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion represent a fundamentally different phenomenon of *sexualized harassment*, designed to engage the target in sexual contact. As Lim and Cortina (2005) note, the distinction between unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion is practical from a legal standpoint (falling into the separate legal categories of "hostile environment harassment" and "quid pro quo harassment," respectively), but from a behavioral perspective they show more similarities than differences. As noted above, unwanted sexual attention represents unwelcomed, unreciprocated behaviors aimed at establishing some form of sexual relationship (albeit an unhealthy one). Sexual coercion is a specific, severe, rare form of unwanted sexual attention, involving similar sexual advances coupled with bribery or threats to force acquiescence. Sexual behaviors can be perfectly normal— even in the workplace—but they become harassing when they involve an imposition of an unwanted relationship. This sexualized harassment represents gender-based oppression because it reduces women (and some men) to sex objects, replicating a gender structure that subordinates femininity.

Table 1 Definitions of the harassment dimensions in the hypothesized three-factor model

| Dimensions	Definition
Sexualized harassment	
Unwanted sexual attention	Behaviors such as sexually suggestive comments, attempts to establish a sexual relationship, and sexual touching that are unwanted, unreciprocated, or discouraged by the target.
Sexual coercion	Sexual bribes or threats that implicitly or explicitly make conditions of employment contingent on sexual cooperation.
Gender harassment	
Gender derogation	Verbal, physical, and symbolic behaviors that convey hostile and offensive attitudes about one's gender.
Gender-nonconformity harassment	Negative treatment for failing to adhere to the traditional norms of one's gender.
Heterosexist harassment	Verbal, physical, and symbolic behaviors that convey hostile and offensive attitudes about one's actual or perceived lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity.

In summary, we propose that harassment based on gender and sexual orientation falls into three factors: sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment. We conceptualize these dimensions as separate *but related*, as all three serve to legitimate and perpetuate a heteronormative gender hierarchy. Table 1 summarizes the concepts encompassed in each factor, and Fig. 1a depicts a graphical summary of their proposed relationships.

The Present Study

The primary focus of this study is an empirical test of the hypothesized harassment model appearing in Fig. 1a. We attempt to apply this model to the experience of a diverse sample of employees in higher education. In addition are tests of three competing factor models that present plausible alternatives to our hypothesized model; they appear in Fig. 1b–d.

A secondary question is whether this model of harassment varies according to the identities it targets. That is, does gender or sexual orientation of the target moderate the harassment process? Stockdale et al. (1999) suggest that the typology of SH may differ for women and men, but empirical data *comparing* genders have been sparse. Moreover, prior harassment models have generally not incorporated heterosexism. Thus, at this early stage of model development, an exploratory research question seems most appropriate: *does the structure of harassment differ between women and men?*

Moreover, few scholars have considered whether heterosexuals and sexual minorities differ in their experiences of heterosexist harassment (or SH), but this seems possible because heterosexist harassment degrades non-heterosexuality, which is most salient to sexual-minority persons. The embryonic state of this literature leaves open a second research question: *does the structure of harassment differ between sexual minorities and heterosexuals?*

Fig. 1 Four competing models of harassment. (**a**) Hypothesized three-factor model of sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment. (**b**) Alternative two-factor model of approach harassment and rejection harassment. (**c**) Alternative two factor model of sexual harassment and heterosexist harassment. (**d**) Alternative single factor model of harassment

Method

Participants & Procedures

Sample One

Faculty and staff at a public university in the northwestern region of the US were invited to participate in this study, as part of the second wave of a larger longitudinal investigation. Recruitment targeted university faculty and staff who were: (1) employed in February, 2004, (2) not student employees, and (3) if temporary, had been at the university for at least 5 months.

A total of 2,424 employees were contacted, and 1,349 participated, at a response rate of 56%. Surveys from 12 participants were excluded from analyses because they contained more than 50% missing data. The sample was fairly evenly divided by gender (55% female). Participants ranged in age from 19 to 74, with an average age of 45. Consistent with the geographic location of this university, participants were predominately European American/White (92%). Most participants (94%) identified as "completely heterosexual." Twenty-eight percent were faculty, and the remaining 72% were staff or administrators. Participants had worked at the university for an average of 11 years.

Participants received both an email and postal mail invitation from the university President to complete a survey online. Ten days later, they received a reminder/ thank you postcard in the mail from the President's office. Ten days after this contact, non-respondents received a paper version of the survey via postal mail. They also received two subsequent emails from the university President encouraging their participation. To increase response rates, participants had the opportunity to win gift certificates to a local department store. These strategies followed Dillman's (2000) recommendations to maximize survey response.

Sample Two

In order to recruit additional sexual-minority participants, we surveyed a targeted "snowball sample" of lesbian, gay, and bisexual university employees in states similar to the one in which Sample One was located. That is, we recruited participants from 20 states that are: (1) primarily rural, (2) predominantly European American/White, (3) majority Republican as indicated by votes in the 2000 Presidential election, and (4) without State legislation prohibiting discrimination against sexual minorities. Snowball sampling (asking participants to recruit others from within their social networks) is the most common technique for recruiting sexual-minority participants in social-science research (e.g., Harry, 1990; Sell, 1996). Because sexual minorities are a population with a fairly low base rate (Black, Gates, Sanders, & Taylor, 2000), standard procedures for representative sampling, such as random-digit dialing, are not recommended.

Following sampling techniques that have proven successful in recruiting sexual minorities in academia (Konik & Stewart, 2004), we recruited sexual-minority faculty and staff via the email listserves of Division 35 (Society for the Psychology

of Women) and Division 44 (Society for the Psychological Study of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Issues) of the American Psychological Association (APA). Participants were also recruited from university lesbian, gay, and bisexual faculty and staff organizations via email, using contact information provided on university websites. Potential participants received a paper copy of the survey via postal mail to complete and return in a postage-paid envelope. We mailed out 346 surveys and received 221 (64%) back from participants.

This supplementary sexual-minority sample consisted of more females (65%) than males (34%), which may be attributable to the greater presence of women than men in APA Divisions 35 and 44; the greater stigma attached to male homosexuality (Herek, 1986) may also have been a factor. Three participants did not identify as either male or female (e.g., identified as "transgender") and were removed from analyses due to their small numbers. Similar to Sample One, this sample was also predominantly European American/White (89%), and participants' ages ranged from 19 to 70, with an average age of 40. Twenty-seven percent were faculty and 73% staff. The average length of employment was not asked in this survey. All but two members of this sample self-identified as sexual minority, i.e., "completely lesbian or gay," "mostly lesbian or gay," "bisexual", or "other" non-heterosexual identity (such as "queer").

Measures

The survey included a number of multi-item scales. Most relevant to this article were measures of harassment experiences. Some scales have been shortened from their original versions to reduce the overall length of the survey and maintain high response rates.

Sexual Harassment

Items from the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ; Fitzgerald et al., 1988, 1995) assessed experiences of sexual harassment in this study. The response stem for this scale read, "During the past year, has any university faculty, staff, administrator, or student…," and it was followed by a list of fourteen potentially harassing behaviors. Response options were "never," "once or twice," and "more than once or twice." Eleven questions assessed *sexual coercion* (e.g., "Made you feel like you were being subtly bribed with some reward or special treatment to engage in sexual behavior"; coefficient alpha for this subscale = .53), *unwanted sexual attention* (e.g., "Stared at or leered at you in a way that made you feel uncomfortable"; subscale alpha = .61), and *gender derogation* (e.g., "Made sexist remarks about people of your gender"; subscale alpha = .80). The psychometric soundness of the SEQ has been widely reported, and it is one of the most frequently used SH scales in the psychological research literature (Arvey & Cavanaugh, 1995; Beere, 1990). Similar to the work of Berdahl et al. (1996), some items were revised to be inclusive of both women and men.

To capture the subdimension of *gender-nonconformity harassment*, three questions were created for this study: "Questioned your manhood (if you're male)

or femininity (if you're female)," "Treated you negatively because you were not 'masculine enough' (if you're male) or not 'feminine enough' (if you're female)," and "Criticized you for not behaving 'like a real man' (if you're male) or 'like a woman should' (if you're female)." We designed these items to be gender-neutral, allowing both men and women to indicate whether they had encountered harassment for not conforming to traditional gender norms. Cronbach's alpha was .79 for this subscale.

Heterosexist Harassment

To assess *heterosexist harassment*, we drew five items from Waldo's (1999) Workplace Heterosexist Experiences Questionnaire. In order to be applicable to all participants, questions from Waldo's original measure pertaining only to sexual minorities (e.g., "Ignored you in the office or in a meeting because you are gay/ lesbian/bisexual") were not included in this study. We also created three new items to capture experiences of heterosexist harassment that disregard actual sexual orientation (e.g., "Made homophobic remarks about you personally, regardless of your sexual orientation") or take place in the ambient environment (e.g., "Displayed or distributed homophobic literature or materials in your office"). To minimize the cognitive demands placed on participants, the response stem and response options were identical to those of the SEQ listed above. This scale had a Cronbach's alpha of .80.

Results

In order to have relatively equal groups for analyses, while maintaining adequate statistical power, we tested the hypothesized model of harassment using all 229 sexual-minority participants and a random sample of 400 heterosexuals. In total, this included 147 sexual-minority women, 82 sexual-minority men, 219 heterosexual women, and 181 heterosexual men.

Descriptive Findings

Sexual minorities encountered substantially higher amounts of all forms of harassment. Beginning with sexualized harassment, 39.7% of sexual minorities and 15.5% of heterosexuals experienced at least one incident of this mistreatment at least "once or twice" in the prior year ($\chi^2 = 45.51$, $p < .001$). Similarly, 76.9% of sexual minorities experienced at least one instance of gender harassment, compared to 30.0% of heterosexuals ($\chi^2 = 126.48$, $p < .001$). A greater percentage of sexual minorities (66.4%) also reported being targeted with at least one case of heterosexist harassment, compared to heterosexuals (15.5%; $\chi^2 = 166.00$, $p < .001$).

   No significant differences in incidence rates of harassment emerged by gender. Men and women were equally likely to encounter gender harassment (47.5% and 46.7%, respectively; $\chi^2 = 0.81$, *n.s.*), the most common form of SH. Sexualized harassment was experienced at least once by 26.2% of women and 21.7% of men

($\chi^2 = 1.61$, *n.s.*). Rates of at least one experience of heterosexist harassment were also similar for men (34.6%) and women (33.6%; $\chi^2 = 0.11$, *n.s.*).

We also tested for sexual orientation and gender differences in harassment frequencies using continuous scale-scores, rather than dichotomous incidence rates. Scale-scores were created by taking the mean of all items within each scale, so these scores ranged from 0 (no experiences of harassment) to 2 (more than one or two harassment experiences, on average). Because the three harassment scales were highly correlated, we began with a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). The sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment scale scores served as the dependent variables. Gender and sexual orientation (dichotomously coded as sexual minority or heterosexual), as well as their interaction, were the three independent variables in this analysis. The MANOVA revealed a significant effect for sexual orientation (Wilks' Lambda $= .75$, $F(3, 616) = 67.61$, $p < .001$) but not for gender (Wilks' Lambda $= .99$, $F(3, 616) = 1.66$, *n.s.*). The interaction between sexual orientation and gender also was not significant (Wilks' Lambda $= .99$, $F(3, 616) = 0.67$, *n.s.*).

Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that sexual minorities experienced greater frequencies of all three types of harassment [sexualized harassment ($F(1, 619) = 44.71$, $p < .001$), gender harassment ($F(1, 619) = 164.37$, $p < .001$), and heterosexist harassment ($F(1, 619) = 173.74$, $p < .001$)]. An examination of Cohen's effect size revealed that the differences in harassment means by sexual orientation were moderate ($d = .54$ for sexualized harassment) to very large ($d = .99$ for gender harassment; $d = 1.01$ for heterosexist harassment). Means and standard deviations for the three harassment scales by sexual orientation and gender appear in Table 2.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

By modeling covariance structures, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) allowed us to determine whether our hypothesized model approximated relations in the data. To recap, this model (seen in Fig. 1a) posited that sexual coercion and unwanted sexual attention both load on the factor of *sexualized harassment*, while gender derogation and gender-nonconformity harassment load together on the factor of *gender harassment*. It also proposed that *heterosexist harassment* loads on its own factor. Further, all three factors are correlated.

As noted by MacCallum (1995), it is important to consider alternative models that are theoretically plausible, especially when investigating new research domains. We therefore tested the hypothesized model against three competing alternatives. The first alternative is based on a "approach-rejection" model proposed by Stockdale (Stockdale, 2005; Stockdale & Motoike, 2000). This model posits that *approach harassment* comprises unwanted sexual attention and sexual coercion (designed to approach and engage the target in sexual behavior), whereas gender derogation and gender-nonconformity harassment constitute *rejection harassment* (designed to distance and denigrate the target). Following this logic, heterosexist harassment would also be a form of rejection harassment (see Fig. 1b). A second alternative model positioned all types of SH on one factor, with heterosexist

Table 2 Means and standard deviations for harassment scores as a function of sexual orientation and gender ($n = 629$)

Variable	Sexual minorities			Heterosexuals		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
Sexualized harassment						
Men	0.21	0.33	81	0.05	0.13	176
Women	0.20	0.31	146	0.08	0.21	217
Total	0.20	0.32	227	0.06	0.18	393
Gender harassment						
Men	0.42	0.35	81	0.10	0.19	176
Women	0.44	0.45	146	0.10	0.22	217
Total	0.43	0.42	227	0.10	0.21	393
Heterosexist harassment						
Men	0.34	0.34	81	0.07	0.17	176
Women	0.32	0.39	146	0.03	0.09	217
Total	0.33	0.37	227	0.05	0.13	393

Note: Means are on the same metric as the original item response options: $0 =$ No Experience of harassing behaviors, $1 =$ One or two experiences of harassing behaviors, $2 =$ More than two experiences of harassing behaviors

harassment on a second factor (see Fig. 1c). A final alternative included one global harassment factor on which all types of harassment load (see Fig. 1d).

Prior to model testing, we randomly assigned and summed individual questions measuring SH and heterosexist harassment into parcels (or subsets) of items. This is a standard procedure that helps correct deviations from normality while maximizing statistical power (e.g., Kline, 2005). Table 3 lists individual questions by parcel, and Table 4 presents correlations among these parcels. Because less than 1% of participants reported experiencing any sexual coercion, the two sexual coercion items were deleted from all analyses. Consequently, the only form of sexualized harassment tested in this study was unwanted sexual attention. Additionally, two items from the heterosexist harassment scale were also removed, as less than 1% of participants reported being physically assaulted due to their sexual orientation or having homophobic literature or materials distributed in their workplace. This resulted in a six-item heterosexist harassment scale.

We then computed covariances among the parcels and submitted them to maximum likelihood CFA (using LISREL 8.53; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1994), testing each model in turn. To assess the fit of each model, we relied on various indices that appear in Table 5. These included the normed fit index (NFI), non-normed fit index (NNFI, also known as the Tucker-Lewis Index or TLI), and comparative fit index (CFI). These "goodness of fit" measures compare the fit of the estimated model against that of a more restrictive model; they range from zero to one, and values above .95 imply a better fit. We also examined the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMSR) and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), which assess the extent that a model *fails* to fit the data; for these "badness of fit"

Table 3 Questions by parcel

Gender harassment	Heterosexist harassment	Sexualized harassment
Parcel one (GH1)	Parcel one (HH1)	Parcel one (SH1)
Displayed, used, or distributed sexist or suggestive materials	Told offensive jokes about lesbians, gay men, or bisexual people (for example, "fag" jokes)	Stared or leered at you in a way that made you feel uncomfortable
Told sexually suggestive stories or offensive jokes	Made homophobic remarks about you personally (e.g., saying you were abnormal or perverted) regardless of your sexual orientation	Made unwanted attempts to draw you into a discussion of sexual matters
Criticized you for not behaving "like a real man" (if you're male) or "like a woman should" (if you're female)		
Parcel two (GH2)	Parcel two (HH2)	Parcel two (SH2)
Made sexist remarks about people of your gender	Made crude or offensive remarks about gay people (for example, saying they're "sick")	Attempted to establish a romantic or sexual relationship despite your efforts to discourage it
Made crude and offensive sexual remarks, either publicly or privately	Made you afraid that you would be treated poorly if you were open about your sexual orientation	Touched you (for example, put an arm around you) in a way that made you feel uncomfortable
Questioned your manhood (if you're male) or femininity (if you're female)		
Parcel three (GH3)	Parcel three (HH3)	
Made offensive remarks about your appearance or body	Called you a "dyke," "faggot," "fence-sitter," or some similar slur	
Treated you negatively because you were not "masculine enough" (if you're male) or "feminine enough" (if you're female)	Called someone else homophobic names (like "dyke," "fence-sitter," "faggot," etc.) in your presence	

Table 4 Intercorrelations for harassment item-parcels ($n = 629$)

Parcel	SH1	SH2	GH1	GH2	GH3	HH1	HH2	HH3
Sexualized harassment 1 (SH1)								
Sexualized harassment 2 (SH2)	.496							
Gender harassment 1 (GH1)	.554	.341						
Gender harassment 2 (GH2)	.534	.326	.795					
Gender harassment 3 (GH3)	.486	.227	.553	.523				
Heterosexist harassment 1 (HH1)	.531	.292	.678	.678	.502			
Heterosexist harassment 2 (HH2)	.328	.212	.584	.639	.452	.736		
Heterosexist harassment 3 (HH3)	.438	.205	.516	.559	.517	.701	.620	

measures, values closer to zero suggest fewer problems of misfit. For model-comparison purposes, we also inspected the chi-square value for each model, as nested models can be compared statistically using a chi-square-difference test. For

Table 5 Confirmatory factor analysis fit statistics—full sample ($n = 629$)

Model	χ^2	df	NFI	NNFI	CFI	SRMSR	RMSEA
(Hypothesized) 3-factor: sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment	125.40	17	.97	.96	.98	.04	.10
2-factor: approach harassment and rejection harassment	312.15	19	.94	.91	.94	.05	.16
2-factor: sexual harassment and heterosexist harassment	207.83	19	.96	.94	.96	.05	.13
1-factor: harassment	403.73	20	.92	.89	.92	.07	.18

Note: NFI = normed fit index; NNFI = non-normed fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; SRMSR = standardized root mean squared residual; RMSEA = root mean squared error of approximation. For the NFI, NNFI, and CFI, values above .95 imply better fit. For the SRMSR and RMSEA, values closer to zero imply better fit

more information on these various fit statistics, see Hu and Bentler (1995) and Kline (2005).

As hypothesized, the best-fitting model consisted of three separate, yet correlated, factors: sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment. According to most fit indices, which appear in Table 5, this model demonstrated excellent fit to the data. The only exception was the RMSEA of .10 (90% CI = .08 to .12), which was a bit higher than desired. However, given the values of all other indices and the strong theory supporting this model, our proposed model still seemed quite reasonable. Figure 2 presents standardized factor loadings and interfactor correlations. Note the particularly high correlation (.84) between gender harassment and heterosexist harassment; we comment on this further in the Discussion.

The hypothesized three-factor model fit significantly better than the two-factor approach-rejection model (Fig. 1b), as indicated by a significant change in chi-square ($\Delta\chi^2 = 186.75$, $\Delta df = 2$). The two-factor sexual and heterosexist harassment model (in Fig. 1c) also showed significantly worse fit, compared to the three-factor model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 82.43$, $\Delta df = 2$). Finally, combining all of the harassment variables into one global harassment factor (in Fig. 1d) also yielded a decrement in fit, in comparison with the hypothesized three-factor model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 278.33$, $\Delta df = 3$). These analyses further supported our proposed three-factor model.

A reliability analysis showed reasonable to good internal consistency among the items comprising each factor in our model. For sexualized harassment (4 items), Cronbach's alpha was .61. For gender harassment (8 items), alpha was .82, and for heterosexist harassment (6 items), alpha was .80.

Multiple-Group Analysis

The next set of analyses tested whether the structure of harassment differs by gender or sexual orientation (i.e., does either gender or sexual orientation moderate this process?). Specifically, we conducted multiple-group CFA, testing whether the three-factor model fits equally well for women compared to men, and sexual minorities compared to heterosexuals.

Fig. 2 Standardized three-factor CFA solution—standardized coefficients for the full sample ($N = 629$). *Note*: All estimated parameters are statistically significant, $p < .05$. Individual items measuring SH and heterosexist harassment were collapsed into random parcels. Because less than 1% of participants reported experiencing any sexual coercion (a variant of sexualized harassment), items assessing this behavior were deleted from all analyses

We first divided the sample according to gender (female $n = 347$, male $n = 254$), and tested whether the model holds invariant between women and men. That is, do their models show the same pattern and strength of relationships? More specifically, we tested the three-factor model on both sets of data with equality constraints imposed on all factor loadings and factor correlations (residuals were allowed to differ between groups, as is standard practice; Kline, 2005). This equality-constrained model provided a reasonable fit to the data: χ^2 (45, $N = 347$ women, 254 men) = 229.27, NFI = .96, NNFI = .95, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .11 (90% CI = .10 to .14). Figure 3 presents within-group standardized factor loadings and interfactor correlations; it also presents the equality-constrained solution for these values. In sum, the three-factor model appears to approximate harassment experiences equally well for women and men.

Next, we divided the sample according to sexual orientation (sexual minority $n = 229$, heterosexual $n = 400$) and performed a similar multiple-group CFA. This time, the three-factor model with equality constraints did not fit well: χ^2 (45, $N = 377$ heterosexuals, 224 sexual minorities) = 390.99, NFI = .88, NNFI = .86, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .17 (90% CI = .15 to .18). Moreover, there was a significant improvement in model fit when we released the equality constraints: χ^2 (34, $N = 377$ heterosexuals, 224 sexual minorities) = 111.74, NFI = .96, NNFI = .96, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .085 (90% CI = .067 = .10). This implies that a common model did not capture heterosexual and sexual-minority experiences of harassment.

To explore the source of between-group differences, we next re-estimated the three-factor model, separately for heterosexual and sexual-minority employees. The model provided an excellent fit to the heterosexual data: χ^2 (17, $N = 337$) = 35.49, NFI = .98, NNFI = .98, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05 (90% CI = .03 to .08). Fit for the sexual-minority data was lower, but still in the acceptable range for most

Fig. 3 Three-factor CFA solution by gender—standardized coefficients for women ($n = 347$), men ($n = 254$), and the equality-constrained model. *Note*: All paths and correlations are significant, $p < .05$. Individual items measuring SH and heterosexist harassment were collapsed into random parcels. Because less than 1% of participants reported experiencing any Sexual Coercion (a variant of Sexualized SH), items assessing this behavior were deleted from all analyses. All estimated parameters are statistically significant, $p < .05$. Parameters for women appear in **bold** type, men's parameters appear in *italics*, and the equality-constrained solution appears in normal type

indices: χ^2 (17, $N = 224$) = 69.97, NFI = .96, NNFI = .94, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .12 (90% CI = .09 to .15).[3] Figure 4 presents standardized factor loadings and interfactor correlations, separately for heterosexuals and sexual minorities. Note that the correlations are considerably higher for sexual minorities, particularly that between sexualized harassment and heterosexist harassment (.61 for sexual minorities versus .36 for heterosexuals).

Discussion

The present work heeds Kitzinger's (2001) call to investigate further the intersections of gender- and sexuality-based oppression. That is, we proposed and tested an integrated model of sexual and heterosexist harassment. Our hypothesized three-factor model (sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment) was largely supported by the data.

The growing number of lawsuits based on same-sex sexual harassment (e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 1998) makes it critical that we understand the intersection between harassment based on gender and that based on sexual orientation. Interestingly, as Fig. 2 shows, we found stronger relationships between heterosexist harassment and gender harassment ($r = .84$), compared to relationships between sexualized harassment and gender harassment ($r = .68$); this

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[3] We also tested whether any of the alternative models provided a better fit to the sexual-minority data, compared to our hypothesized model. According to chi-square-difference tests, however, the fit was significantly worse for the 2-factor approach-rejection model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 41.94$, Δdf = 2), the 2-factor sexual-heterosexist model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 22.15$, Δdf = 2), and the 1-factor harassment model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 67.26$, Δdf = 3).

Fig. 4 Three-factor CFA solution by sexual orientation—standardized coefficients for heterosexuals ($n = 400$) and sexual minorities ($n = 229$). *Note*: All estimated parameters are statically significant, $p < .05$. Parameters for sexual minorities appear in **bold** type, and heterosexual parameters appear in *italics*

was true in the overall sample and all subsamples. This supports our contention that gender harassment and heterosexist harassment are linked at a fundamental level, both serving to punish deviation from traditional patriarchal gender norms.

Under current federal law, workplace harassment based on sexual orientation is permissible, whereas harassment based on gender is prohibited.[4] This suggests a certain independence between these two forms of abuse, which might not be quite accurate, according to the extremely high correlations between heterosexist harassment and gender harassment. Although these two domains of behavior may be empirically distinguishable, they are likely difficult to disentangle in real life. Where there is one, you will typically find the other. For this reason, employees seeking legal recourse for heterosexist mistreatment could perhaps bring cases not of sexual-orientation-based harassment but of gender harassment; the courts might be more likely to view the latter as a form of illegal "hostile work environment" harassment. More generally, the interface between sexual harassment and heterosexist harassment is an area that is ripe for further inquiry, from both a legal and a psychological perspective.

Additionally, the two varieties of SH (sexualized harassment and gender harassment) were also highly correlated. In other words, unwanted "come-ons" went hand-in-hand with hostile, gender-related "put downs," corroborating other research (e.g., Berdahl, in press; Cortina, Swan, Fitzgerald, & Waldo, 1998). This argues against the notion that sexual harassment is nothing more than innocent flirting, natural sexual attraction, or office romance, because healthy attraction and

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[4] As Waldo, Berdahl and Fitzgerald (1998) noted, this legal distinction may reflect a false dichotomy, because harassment based on sexual orientation *is* inherently gender-related. For instance, when fellow employees harass a male coworker for being gay, it is not because he dates men (which they find perfectly acceptable for female coworkers), but because he dates men *and he himself is a man*. This means that he is harassed because of his sex, suggesting that heterosexist harassment *should* be recognized as a form of illegal sex discrimination.

romance do not involve hostile, rejecting behaviors. We should also acknowledge the possibility that the high interfactor correlations simply reflect common method bias or a "sensitization" effect (with the experience of one category of behavior sensitizing an employee to another category). These are all important explanations for future research to consider.

Our three-factor model of harassment approximated experiences equally well for women and men. These empirical findings contradict assertions by Stockdale et al. (1999; 2005) that a common taxonomy cannot capture both the harassment of women and harassment of men. Importantly, though, we should note that these results emerged with the use of gender-neutral measures of SH and heterosexist harassment. Measures that include gender-specific items could very well yield different findings.

The three-factor model approximated harassment extremely well for heterosexuals, but the fit for sexual minorities was appreciably lower (although still in the acceptable range). There are several possible reasons for this. Stronger interfactor correlations among sexual-minorities suggest that heterosexism, sexism, and unwanted sexual advances co-occur more frequently for this group, compared to their heterosexual counterparts. It also seems likely that the experience of some harassing behaviors is fundamentally different for heterosexuals compared to sexual minorities. Consider, for example, the case of a heterosexual man making unwanted attempts to draw a female colleague into a discussion of sexual matters. If the target were a lesbian, she might wonder such things as: does he want to discuss my sex life because he finds lesbian sex erotic? Or does he want to engage me in a sexual conversation as a means of "setting me straight"? Or does he think that a sexually charged discussion with him might titillate me, not realizing my lesbian identity? These questions are unlikely to occur to a heterosexual woman faced with identical behavior. In addition, harassing conduct could have different implications for sexual minority compared to heterosexual employees, in that the situation may reveal a sexual identity that the former group wishes or needs to conceal. This could prove dangerous in certain employment contexts, given the lack of legal protections for sexual minorities in most jurisdictions.

Regarding descriptives, note that sexual minorities compared to heterosexuals encountered substantially greater rates and frequencies of *all* forms of harassment, including sexualized and gendered hostility that does not explicitly invoke sexual orientation. This differential targeting of SH, based on sexual orientation, further supports assertions that oppressions based on gender and sexuality are closely linked. It further demonstrates how sexual harassment often has little to do with sexual attraction or romance; by contrast, in this case it serves to punish those who violate traditional gender norms, including the mandate of hetero-normativity.

We found no gender differences in either the rates or frequencies of any type of harassment. Although contrary to older studies of SH (e.g., Gutek, 1985; USMSPB, 1981, 1988, 1995), this has become a common finding in recent studies using behavioral measures of SH. A different picture emerges in research that assesses not just the experience of specific behaviors, but also the target's subjective appraisal of that experience. This research finds that men who encounter sex-related behaviors at work often report that these experiences are not anxiety-provoking (Berdahl et al.,

1996), "bothersome," "stressful" (Berdahl, in press), or "upsetting" (Cochran, Frazier, & Olson, 1997; Waldo et al., 1998). In fact, many men report these experiences to be benign, trivial, or even welcome, fun, and flattering (Berdahl, in press; Gutek, 1985). This research raises doubts about whether the "sexual harassment" reported by many men should be classified as harassment at all. Thus, although it appears at first glance from our data that men are just as likely as women to face SH at work, we do not know whether these men's experiences were sufficiently offensive, threatening, or upsetting to constitute "harassment" per se.

Future Research Directions

By demonstrating the theoretical and empirical links between SH and heterosexist harassment, this study lays a foundation for researchers to explore further the commonalities among different types of harassment. This research can also help us understand other behaviors in the complex harassment process. For example, in studying how victims cope with sexual harassment (e.g., Cortina & Wasti, 2005; Magley, 2002), interesting differences in coping behaviors may emerge between individuals experiencing sexualized harassment and those facing gender harassment. Perhaps targets of sexualized harassment are more likely to seek organizational support to curtail the harassment, as these forms of SH tend to receive more attention from the media and workplace anti-harassment programs (e.g., Stringer, Remick, Salisbury, & Ginorio, 1990). On the other hand, victims of gender harassment may tend to deny or minimize the harassing behaviors, because gender harassment typically has no sexual overtones, and therefore does not fit common myths about what qualifies as "sexual harassment." Questions such as these merit further scrutiny in the research literature.

Our divergent findings based on sexual orientation suggest that further model development may be necessary to capture workplace harassment from the unique perspective of sexual minorities. For example, although the conceptual distinctions among sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment may hold, it could be that these forms of harassment manifest in different behaviors when sexual minorities (as opposed to heterosexuals) are the target. It could also be that sexual-minority employees face unique forms of harassment that would comprise factors not yet identified. Finally, we should also acknowledge the possibility that our harassment measures may be less optimal for sexual-minority respondents. This would not be surprising, especially for the SH items, which were developed based on the experiences of women who are, presumably, largely heterosexual. These will all be important possibilities for future research to explore. This speaks to the need for further scale development, taking into account the specific experiences of lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees.

We would also like to expand this work by exploring further the consequences of sexual harassment and heterosexist harassment. The negative effects of both forms of harassment have been documented in the literature (e.g., Deitch, 2002, unpublished doctoral dissertation; Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand, & Magley, 1997; Gutek & Koss, 1993; Schneider, Swan, & Fitzgerald, 1997; Waldo, 1999), but to date, no research explores the consequences of both abuses in tandem. It would be interesting

to investigate which types of harassment are most harmful, what exacerbates or mitigates that harm, and whether the harm varies by sexual orientation. For example, do sexual minorities compared to heterosexuals experience worse consequences from heterosexist harassment, because it degrades non-heterosexuality? Or do heterosexuals experience worse consequences, being unaccustomed to dealing with mistreatment based on their (presumed) sexual orientation?

Psychological theory could be advanced by building upon the harassment model supported in this study. As previously mentioned, both SH and heterosexist harassment are predicated upon the privileging of one gender master status (being male) and one sexual orientation master status (being heterosexual). It would be interesting to see how other master statuses, such as race and social class, influence experiences of workplace harassment. Perhaps membership in a higher social class or privileged race (i.e., European American in the US) could shield some individuals from harassment based on their gender or sexual orientation. An important next step will therefore be to examine additional points of "intersectionality" (Crenshaw, 1994), developing unified models of oppression that integrate harassment based on gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and other marginalized social identities.

Limitations and Conclusion

Like all research, this study has its distinct advantages and drawbacks. For example, our sampling strategy allowed us to recruit a large number of participants with diverse sexual identities. However, this sample was limited to employees in higher education. Perhaps working in an institution of higher learning provided a unique context for the participants in this study (e.g., they may have had greater exposure to diversity and cultural awareness programs than employees in other settings). Replicating this research in other employment contexts will be important for demonstrating the generalizability of these findings.

Our hypothesized 3-factor model showed strong qualities in terms of fit, parsimony, interpretability, and meaningfulness. Moreover, we found it to be superior to three competing alternatives. We nevertheless acknowledge that, even when one model fits well, others with different substantive interpretations are virtually always possible. The selection of an excellent model could artifactually result from failure to consider every possible alternative.

Though we theorized that sexualized harassment, gender harassment, heterosexist harassment are all perpetrated in an effort to police traditional gender norms, we did not test this idea empirically. This will require research into harasser motivation. From the target's perspective, it would also be interesting to explore the interplay between gender presentation and susceptibility to these three forms of harassment. Perhaps employees in gender nontraditional jobs, such as male nurses and female construction workers, are more likely to encounter not only SH (as demonstrated, for example, in Yoder and Aniakudo's 1997 study of female firefighters) but also heterosexist harassment. Further, people who physically present as gender atypical, such as small, effeminate men, may be more likely to be targets of this harassment.

In closing, this research found support for an integrative model of sexualized harassment, gender harassment, and heterosexist harassment. Our findings underscore the importance of considering the intrinsic links among gender, sexuality, and power. When investigating sexual and heterosexist harassment in isolation, research overlooks the interplay between the different forms of abuse, which represent various means of policing gender in the workplace. By understanding this dynamic, researchers and practitioners can help organizations protect all employees from the negative effects of gendered oppression, in all of its many guises.

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