COMMITTEE:
Weatherson, Brian (co-chair)
Moss, Sarah (co-chair)
Joyce, Jim
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria
Buss, Sarah
Hershovitz, Scott (cognate, Law)
ABSTRACT:
My dissertation defends the importance of epistemic norms on what I call ‘inquiring further.’ Inquiring further is a familiar practice we all engage in when we redeliberate, gather more evidence, or double-check our beliefs. Nonetheless, many philosophers have argued that norms governing when we should gather evidence or reinquire are at most practical or moral norms. Against this, I argue that norms on inquiring further are central to our conception of responsible epistemic agency. I do this by appealing to both the roles of epistemic evaluations and our practices of holding agents epistemically accountable. My dissertation thereby expands and enriches our understanding of epistemic evaluations and normativity.
Weatherson, Brian (co-chair)
Moss, Sarah (co-chair)
Joyce, Jim
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria
Buss, Sarah
Hershovitz, Scott (cognate, Law)
ABSTRACT:
My dissertation defends the importance of epistemic norms on what I call ‘inquiring further.’ Inquiring further is a familiar practice we all engage in when we redeliberate, gather more evidence, or double-check our beliefs. Nonetheless, many philosophers have argued that norms governing when we should gather evidence or reinquire are at most practical or moral norms. Against this, I argue that norms on inquiring further are central to our conception of responsible epistemic agency. I do this by appealing to both the roles of epistemic evaluations and our practices of holding agents epistemically accountable. My dissertation thereby expands and enriches our understanding of epistemic evaluations and normativity.
| Building: | Angell Hall |
|---|---|
| Event Type: | Other |
| Tags: | Dissertation |
| Source: | Happening @ Michigan from Department of Philosophy |
