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Department Colloquium: Regina Rini (York University)

Moral Disagreement is Special
Friday, October 11, 2019
3:00-5:00 PM
1171 Angell Hall Map
Most of the literature on moral disagreement is framed in strictly epistemic terms. I argue that this framing is misleading, as moral disagreement is unlike peer disagreement in other epistemic domains, owing to the special character of the moral domain. I defend the claim that disagreement with peers gives us reason to reduce confidence in disputed moral beliefs, but not for epistemic reasons. Rather, we have moral reason to do so. Reducing confidence in this way is morally required by recognition respect for the moral agency of the peer with whom we disagree.
Building: Angell Hall
Event Type: Lecture / Discussion
Tags: Philosophy
Source: Happening @ Michigan from Department of Philosophy