Social, Behavioral & Experimental Economics (SBEE): Persistent Overconfidence and Biased Memory: Evidence from Managers
Collin Raymond, Purdue University
Abstract:
A long-standing puzzle is whether and how overconfidence can persist in field settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using both reduced form and structural methods we find that: (i) managers make overconfident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly-positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomenon are linked at an individual level in a way consistent with models of motivated beliefs.
with David Huffman and Julia Shvet
A long-standing puzzle is whether and how overconfidence can persist in field settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each time. Using both reduced form and structural methods we find that: (i) managers make overconfident predictions about future performance; (ii) managers have overly-positive memories of past performance; (iii) the two phenomenon are linked at an individual level in a way consistent with models of motivated beliefs.
with David Huffman and Julia Shvet
| Building: | North Quad |
|---|---|
| Website: | |
| Event Type: | Workshop / Seminar |
| Tags: | Economics, seminar |
| Source: | Happening @ Michigan from Department of Economics, Department of Economics Seminars |
