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Economic Theory: The implementation duality

Larry Samuelson, Yale University
Friday, April 21, 2017
3:30-5:00 PM
301 Lorch Hall Map

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to obtain a general existence result for solutions to the principal-agent problem, to show that (just as in the quasilinear case) all increasing decision functions are implementable under a single crossing condition, and to obtain an existence result for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model.
Building: Lorch Hall
Event Type: Workshop / Seminar
Tags: AEM Featured, Economics, seminar
Source: Happening @ Michigan from Economic Theory, Department of Economics, Michigan Institute for Teaching and Research in Economics (MITRE), Department of Economics Seminars