Dear Friends of Michigan Philosophy,

Michigan Philosophy was very active last year. Here I report some highlights from academic year 2017-18.

**Department News**

We welcomed **Sonya Özbey** as Assistant Professor last year. Sonya holds a joint appointment with Asian Languages and Cultures, and is an expert in Chinese philosophy, with additional interests in early modern European Philosophy. The Department also successfully recruited **Maegan Fairchild** as a LSA Collegiate Fellow from University of Southern California. An expert in metaphysics who also has a spectacular record in diversity, equity, and inclusion, Maegan joins us this year on a two-year fellowship and will join the faculty as an Assistant Professor upon its completion.

Several colleagues won honors last year. **Gordon Belot** was honored as Benjamin Meaker Visiting Professor at the Institute of Advanced Study, Bristol University, and **Laura Ruetsche** enjoyed a Benjamin Meeker Visiting Fellowship at the University of Bristol last May. Laura also won a Michigan Humanities Award. **Sarah Moss** won a Sunderland Faculty Fellowship at University of Michigan Law School, which she is enjoying this year. **Elizabeth Anderson**—that’s me—was awarded a medal from the Society for Progress (run through INSEAD, a global business school in Fontainebleau, France) for my book, *Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t Talk about It)* (Princeton UP, 2017).

The Department has undergone a nearly complete turnover in staff. **Lori Scott**, our Chief Administrator, retired. **Kim Ramsey**, our Executive Assistant, **Nick Moore**, our Events Coordinator, and **Jean McKee**, our Graduate Coordinator, moved on to other positions at UM. Now we welcome **Kelly Campbell** as Chief Ad, **Shelley Anzalone** as Executive Assistant, and **Carson Maynard** as Graduate Coordinator. Welcome aboard!

**Special Events**

The intellectual life of the Department continues to thrive through extracurricular events. Our regular colloquium series brought out Linda Alcoff (CUNY), Agnes Callard (UChicago), Dan Greco (Yale), Elizabeth Harman (Princeton), Kieran Setiya (MIT), and Kok-Chor Tan (UPenn). Our Program in Ancient Philosophy featured Ricardo Salles (UNAM). Our Ferrando Family Lecturer in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics was Jon Grossman, who addressed challenges facing the labor movement in the U.S. today. Professor Emeritus **Allan Gibbard** delivered our Tanner Lecture, which doubled as our Bicentennial event, celebrating UM’s 200th year. His lecture, “The Intrinsic Reward of a Life,” reflected on the contributions of University of Michigan’s highly acclaimed mid-20th century moral philosophers **Charles Stevenson**, **Richard Brandt**, and **William Frankena**, as well as more recent colleagues, and considered how they influenced his thinking.

Allan’s Tanner Lecture/Bicentennial event provided a wonderful occasion to invite back former students and colleagues **Connie Rosati** (U Arizona; UM PhD ’89), **Sigrún Svavarsdóttir** (Tufts; UM PhD ’93), and **Stephen Darwall** (Yale; UM 1984-2008) as symposiasts commenting on Allan’s lecture. Professor Emeritus **Donald Munro** delivered his final lecture, "When Science is in Defense of Value-Linked Facts," with **Sonya Özbey** commenting. Ruth Chang (Rutgers) delivered the Law & Ethics Lecture, jointly sponsored by Philosophy and the Law School. Susan Neiman (Einstein Forum) discussed what Americans can learn from the Germans about working through the past. Our Spring Colloquium on Science, Values, and the Public featured Heather Douglas (U. Waterloo and MSU); Dan Kahan (Yale); Elisabeth Lloyd (Indiana U.) and Quayshawn Spencer (UPenn), with graduate student commentators.
Eduardo Martinez, Mercedes Corredor, Caroline Perry, and Sumeet Patwardhan.

The Department supports several working groups that sponsor talks. Robert Stecker (CMU) and Kenneth Walden (Dartmouth) addressed our Aesthetics Discussion Group. Boris Babic (CalTech; UM PhD '17), Kevin Elliott (MSU), Kris McDaniel (Syracuse), Tushar Menon (Oxford and UIC), and James Read (Oxford and UIC) spoke under the auspices of the Philosophy of Science working group. Chris Quigg (Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory); Porter Williams (Pitt); Bing Zhou (UM); and Tian Cao (Boston U) participated in our annual Foundations of Modern Physics colloquium. Our Race, Gender, and Feminist Philosophy group brought out Kate Manne (Cornell), Kristin Roupenian (UM English), David Smith (U. New England), and José Medina (Northwestern). Our Ethics Discussion Group featured Dan Jacobson, Steve Wall (Arizona), and Kyla Ebels-Duggan (Northwestern). Dan and our Freedom and Flourishing Postdoc Hrishikesh (Rishi) Joshi organized a panel on immigration at which Rishi, Reihan Salam (National Review), and Michael Huemer (U Colorado Boulder) spoke. Minorities and Philosophy sponsored talks by Sonya Özbey and Shelley Wilcox (SFSU).

Last year we also sponsored two conferences. Chandra Sripada organized the Society for Philosophy and Psychology Conference. Tad Schmaltz organized a Franco-American Workshop in Modern Philosophy.

Our faculty invited some special guests to enrich the classroom experience. David Baker brought Nebula Award-winning author Walter Jon Williams to discuss his story "Daddy's World" in his Science Fiction and Philosophy class. Laura Ruetsche had Michael Miller (U Toronto) visit her Symbolic Logic course. She also hosted James Fraser (U Leeds) in her Philosophy of Science seminar.

This list of events—all funded through generous donations—illustrates how much our alumni and friends promote the life of the Philosophy Department. And that's just the beginning. Your gifts do much, much more, including study sessions for students in Philosophy courses, student travel to undergraduate philosophy and PPE workshops, philosophy prizes for our students, fellowships, Tanner Library, Ethics Bowl, and support for graduate student editors of The Philosopher’s Annual, a collection of the best philosophy articles published in the previous year.

Farewell and Appreciation for our Alumni and Friends

This is my fifth and final year as Chair of the Philosophy Department. So this is also my last opportunity to write this letter for Michigan Philosophy News. I would like to report to you some initiatives I have been able to take with the generosity of alumni and friends of the Department. Your gifts to the Ilene Goldman Block Memorial Fund and PPE Fund have enabled me to establish internship programs for our Philosophy and PPE majors (see reports below!). Your gifts to the Louis Loeb Fund for History of Philosophy enabled me to establish a regular arrangement to fund language study for our graduate students in specializations that require additional languages. Your gifts to other funds enabled me to support outside speakers to visit undergraduate philosophy classes, create a graduate student prize for outstanding contributions to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in philosophy, establish our biennial alumni conference, and start an annual COMPASS workshop, which helps undergraduates from groups underrepresented in philosophy to prepare for graduate study and learn about UM’s Philosophy PhD program.

As I look back on my term as chair, I especially appreciate the many opportunities I have had to speak to alumni and friends of Michigan Philosophy, who have shown so much enthusiasm for what we do, and so much care and generosity in supporting us. We acknowledge those who donated to the Department in 2015-16 at the end of this newsletter. If you would like to donate this year, you may do so through our website at lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/. To all who have given or are soon to give, thank you.

Best,

Elizabeth Anderson
John Dewey Distinguished University Professor
Arthur F. Thurnau Professor
Chair, Philosophy
GRADUATE NEWS

by
Carson Maynard, Graduate Student Coordinator
and
Laura Ruetsche, Director of Graduate Studies

With both of us so new to our positions, overseeing U-M Philosophy’s graduate program has been a non-stop voyage of discovery. One thing we’ve discovered: how awesome our graduate students are! This report chronicles just some of their accomplishments over the past academic year (2017-18) — including prizes and fellowships won, papers presented and published, and many significant events organized on behalf of our local philosophy community and beyond.

Awards: University-wide: Sara Aronowitz, Zoë Johnson King, and Eli Lichtenstein won highly competitive Rackham Pre-Doctoral Fellowships for AY 2017-18. Mara Bollard won a Rackham Outstanding GSI Award for 2017-18. Departmental: Van Tu was awarded the Charles L. Stevenson Prize for excellence in a dissertation dossier. Johann Hariman won the John Dewey Prize for his outstanding teaching. Caroline Perry was awarded the Cornwell Prize for intellectual curiosity and exceptional promise of original and creative work. Van Tu was awarded the Weinberg Summer Dissertation Fellowship, and further Weinberg Summer Fellowships (for achievement in the second year of study) were awarded to Johann Hariman and Nick Serafin. Loeb Awards were given to Sherice Ngaserin Ng and Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou for summer language study. In addition to awarding the Pre-Doctoral Fellowships noted above, Rackham has recognized many of our students this year as deserving support for their summer research and for their travel to workshops and conferences: Mara Bollard, Kevin Craven, Guus Duindam, Joshua Hunt, Alice Kelley, Zoë Johnson King, Filipa Melo Lopes, Laura Soter, Angela Sun, and Elise Woodard. Van Tu was also awarded a Graduate Student Travel Award from the American Philosophical Association.

Our graduate students have travelled to present papers at a wide variety of conferences over the past year, often with Rackham or Departmental support. In October 2017, Mercy Corredor presented “Pragmatic Reflections on Anti-Democratic Conclusions: Public Opinion, Surveys, and the Instrumental Value of Things” at John Dewey and Critical Philosophy for Critical Political Times at University College Dublin. Joshua Hunt presented "Symmetries in Crystal Field Theory" at the Midwest PhilMath Workshop at the University of Notre Dame. Filipa Melo Lopes gave a talk entitled "Gender and Liminality: Explaining Social Anxiety About Gender Ambiguity" at the Peripheral Matters Graduate Conference at CUNY, and at the NY-MAPWorks Spring Workshop Series at Columbia University in April 2018. In November 2017, Kevin Craven presented a workshop entitled "Toward a Deontological Ethics of Concepts" at the Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks (AGENT). In December 2017, Rebecca Harrison presented "Against Epistemic Neutrality: On the Presumption of Innocence in Sexual
Violence Cases” for the University of Michigan Minorsities and Philosophy Graduate Panel, repeated in June 2018 for the Prindle Institute for Ethics Applied Epistemology Research Retreat in Greencastle IN. In January 2018, Van Tu presented “Mill on Ideological Conversion and Social Reform: An Interpretation of Mill’s Argumentative Strategy in The Subjection of Women” at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Savannah GA. Rebecca Harrison provided commentary on "Language Loss and Ilocutionary Silencing" by Ethan Nowak (UCL) during the meeting as well. In March 2018, Guus Duindam delivered "Process Control Voluntarism: Responsibility for Mental States" at the Texas Graduate Philosophy Conference at the University of Austin. Elise Woodard presented "Gaslighting, Implicit Bias, and Higher-Order Evidence" for the IIFS-UNAM Graduate Conference in Mexico City; she'll be repeating this talk as a Symposium Session at the Eastern APA in January 2019. Gillian Gray presented "Kant on the Moral Considerability of Individuals with Mental Disorders" at the APA-AAPT Teaching Hub Conference in San Diego. In April 2018, Emma Hardy co-presented "Individual Differences in Willpower? An Analysis of Data from Libet et al. (1983)" at the Western Psychological Association conference in Portland. Laura Soter presented "Metaethical Baggage and Moral Cognition" at the Great Lakes Philosophy Conference at Sienna Heights University. Angela Sun presented "Architects as Public Artists" at the American Society for Aesthetics Eastern Division Conference in Philadelphia; she gave this talk again for Aesthetics of Popular Culture at the University of Warsaw in May 2018, and the British Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting in September 2018. Van Tu presented two papers: "Restoring Aristotle’s Evaluative Theory of Deliberation" at the 18th Meeting of the Ancient Philosophy Society at Emory University, and "The Formless Soul: Phaedo 102a10-107b10" at the 2nd Asia Regional Meeting of the International Plato Society, at Chinese Culture University in Taipei. In May 2018, Laura Soter was invited to give a talk at Carleton College entitled "The Mislocation of Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias". In June 2018, Joshua Hunt presented "Modularization and understanding through symmetry" at Models of Explanation, the 11th MuST conference at the University of Turin. Kevin Craven presented "Identity, Autonomy, and Amelioration" at the Fourth Barcelona Conference on Gender, Race, and Sexuality; he repeated this presentation for the Princeton-Michigan Metanormativity Workshop in August 2018. In July 2018, Joshua Hunt gave a talk entitled "Symmetry and Degeneracy in the Hydrogen Atom" at Foundations 2018 at Utrecht University; Kevin Craven presented "Amelioration and the Ethics of Gender Ascription" at the 2018 meeting of the International Social Ontology Society at Tufts University; Mara Bollard presented a poster, “What Makes an Emotion Moral?”, at the Society for Philosophy and Psychology’s Annual Meeting here at U-M; and AJ Kuhr presented a research poster at the First Biennial Midwest Summer School in Philosophy of Physics held at the University of Chicago, on the topic of the pursuit of ways to empirically differentiate causal set theory from rival theories of QG. In August 2018, Rebecca Harrison gave a public lecture entitled "The Presumption of Innocence in Sexual Violence Cases" at the Melbourne Centre for Feminist Philosophy. Eduardo Martinez presented two papers: "Populism and Democratic Health" at the American Section of the International Society of Law and Social Philosophy (AMINTAPHIL) 2018 Conference on Democracy, Populism, and Truth at Boston University, and "Populism, Social Groups, and Democratic Health" at Social Ontology 2018: 11th Biennial Conference on Collective Intentionality at Tufts University. Mara Bollard won the Young Ethicist Prize at the Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress at the University of Colorado, Boulder, for her paper “Is There Such a Thing as Genuinely Moral Disgust?”, which she had earlier presented at the Central APA in Chicago in February. Four students presented at the Princeton-Michigan Metanormativity Workshop at Princeton University: Kevin Craven presented "Identity, Autonomy, and Amelioration", Zoë Johnson King gave a talk called "Don't Know, Don't Care?", Brendan Mooney delivered "Problems with Philosophy", and Elise Woodard’s talk was entitled "Against the New Pragmatists". Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou presented his work on Russell’s lectures in China during 1920-1 at the XXIV World Congress of Philosophy in Beijing. Several students attended additional conferences and summer schools during the past year. Mercy Corredor attended the 3rd Latinx Philosophy Conference at Rutgers University in April 2018, and the Transparency and Apperception Conference at Ryerson University in May, 2018. Kevin Craven attended the Foundations of Conceptual Engineering workshop at NYU in September, 2018.
Rebecca Harrison attended the Madison Metaethics Workshop in September 2017, and the American Association of Philosophy (APA) Central Division conference in February 2018. Johann Hariman attended the sixth annual Franco-American Workshop in Modern Philosophy in June 2018. In July 2018, Josh Hunt attended the Laws of Nature Summer School at Central European University in Budapest. Also in July 2018, Eduardo Martinez participated in the American Association of Philosophy Teachers (AAPT) Seminar on Teaching and Learning Philosophy, held at the AAPT Biennial Conference at North Carolina A&T University, and completed the Adam Smith Fellowship in Political Economy through George Mason University (2017-2018), which ended with a weeklong colloquium. Sherice Ngaserin Ng studied classical Tibetan at Rangjung Yeshe Institute in Nepal. Laura Soter attended two summer schools, the Sherwin B. Nuland Summer Institute in Bioethics at Yale University in June and July, and the Diverse Intelligences Summer Institute at St. Andrews University in July and August. In June 2018, Angela Sun and Elise Woodard attended Athena in Action: A Networking and Mentoring Workshop at Princeton University, at which Elise also gave comments on a paper by Chloe de Canson entitled "Salience & the Sure-Thing Principle". Elise Woodard additionally co-organized/chaired Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Group sessions at the Eastern and Central APAs, entitled "MAP: From the Chapter to the International", which focused partly on future collaborations with the APA Graduate Student Council and National High School Ethics Bowl.

Along with presenting at conferences, our students have also been publishing their research. Two students’ previously-forthcoming papers were published: Johann Hariman co-authored "What is an Ersatz Part?" with Kristie Miller in Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4) in October 2017, and Eduardo Martinez’s paper "Stable Property Clusters and their Grounds" appeared in Philosophy of Science 84 (5) in December 2017. In addition, Mara Bollard contributed to “‘Once a scientist...’: Disciplinary Approaches and Intellectual Dexterity in Educational Development,” published in To Improve the Academy: A Journal of Educational Development 37 (1) in February 2018. Emma Hardy’s paper "Stigma and the Shift from Asperger’s Syndrome to Autism Spectrum Disorder" appeared in volume 5 of the Undergraduate Research Journal of Psychology (URJP) at UCLA in spring 2018. Laura Soter’s paper "Collective Narcissism: Americans Exaggerate the Role of Their Home State in Appraising U.S. History", which she co-authored as an undergraduate, appeared in the June 2018 issue of Psychological Science. Three students published papers in July 2018: Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou’s paper "Russell’s Two Lectures in China on Mathematical Logic", co-authored with Bernard Linsky, appeared in Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38 (1); Guus Duindam published "Why critical realists ought to be transcendental idealists" in the Journal of Critical Realism 17 (3); and Filipa Melo Lopes authored a paper in Philosophical Studies 175 (7) titled "Perpetuating the patriarchy: misogyny and (post-) feminist backlash". Forthcoming papers: Guus Duindam’s proposed chapter, provisionally titled "Is Kant Why Everyone Hates Moral Philosophy Professors?", was accepted for publication in the upcoming Open Court Public Philosophy book The Good Place and Philosophy.
In addition to making their mark on the profession through their research, our graduate students are also engaged in remarkable professional service. Starting with service to our own department: the 2017-18 Graduate Student Working Groups (GSWGs) were coordinated by Kevin Blackwell, Mercy Corredor, and Eduardo Martinez. The Aesthetics Discussion Group (ADG), organized by Ariana Peruzzi, Angela Sun and Katie Wong, arranged a talk by Robert Stecker on October 20, and Kenneth Walden (in conjunction with EDGe) on March 12. The Ethics Discussion Group (EDGe), organized by Guus Duindam and Ian Fishback, organized four talks by Sherman Clark (October 6), Dan Jacobson (December 1), Steve Wall (March 23), and Kayla Ebels-Duggan (April 20). The Foundations of Particle Physics (FOMP) working group, organized by Jesse Holloway, Josh Hunt, and AJ Kuhr, held a workshop on March 10 featuring talks by Chris Quigg (Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory), Porter Williams (U of Pittsburgh), Bing Zhou (UMich Physics), and Tian Cao (Boston University). The Mind and Moral Psychology Working Group was revived by Laura Soter, now co-coordinated with Guus Duindam. The Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) working group, organized by Sara Aronowitz, Cat Saint-Croix, and Alvaro Sottile de Aguinaga, arranged a talk by Shelley Wilcox on April 12. The Philosophy of Language reading group was co-organized by Rebecca Harrison in Winter 2018. The Race, Gender, and Feminist Philosophy working group, organized by Eduardo Martinez, Filipa Melo Lopes, and Elise Woodard, hosted a visiting speaker series on dehumanization and racial and gendered violence featuring Elena Ruiz (Michigan State) on October 27, Kate Manne (Cornell) on January 9, David Livingstone Smith (New England) on April 13, and José Medina (Northwestern) on April 19, along with a panel discussion in March 2018 of Cat Person, featuring author Kristen Roupenian, with comments by Filipa Melo Lopes (Philosophy), Meena Krishnamurthy (Philosophy), and Sara Chadwick (Psychology/Women’s Studies).

In February 2018, Mercy Corredor and Eduardo Martinez co-organized the department’s Spring Colloquium on the topic "Science, Values, and the Public". The four visiting speakers were Heather Douglas (Michigan State), Dan Kahan (Yale), Elisabeth Lloyd (Indiana), and Quayshawn Spencer (Penn). In March 2018, Josh Hunt and AJ Kuhr organized the Foundations of Modern Physics Workshop on Particle Physics, and overhauled the website. In June 2018, Johann Hariman helped organize the sixth annual Franco-American Workshop in Modern Philosophy. In August 2018, Alvaro Sottile de Aguinaga and Elise Woodard co-organized the Princeton-Michigan Metanormativity Workshop. Published papers were organized and promoted by Nicholas Serafin, Josh Hunt, and Elise Woodard, who served as the graduate student editors of the Philosopher’s Annual over the past year. Mercy Corredor is working as a research assistant for Philosophers’ Imprint. Zoë Johnson-King continues to serve on the APA’s Graduate Student Council through June 2019.
Perhaps most meaningfully, our students have been making immense contributions in the development and implementation of outreach programs on behalf of our discipline as a whole. Elise Woodard continued as Director of MAP International, which now boasts 110 chapters throughout the world ("Woooo!" says Elise). Mercy Corredor, Kevin Craven, Ian Fishback, Eduardo Martinez, and Elise Woodard were last year’s organizers of the University of Michigan’s MAP chapter, which hosted talks and discussions of non-Western philosophy and issues related to race, gender, disability and other social distinctions. Our second annual Michigan COMPASS workshop, co-organized by Sumeet Patwardhan, Ariana Peruzzi, Joe Shin, Angela Sun, and Elise Woodard for students from underrepresented demographics considering graduate school in Philosophy, was held in September 2018. Mentors included Gillian Gray, Emma Hardy, Rebecca Harrison, Filipa Melo Lopes, Eduardo Martinez, Sumeet Patwardhan, Caroline Perry, Ariana Peruzzi, Joe Shin, Laura Soter, Alvaro Sottil de Aguinaga, Angela Sun, and Elise Woodard.

Making strides in our discipline’s outreach to younger students, many Michigan graduate students continue in their dedication to organizing outreach events in cooperation with A2Ethics, a local nonprofit organization promoting ethics and philosophy initiatives in local communities. Guus Duindam, Zoë Johnson King, and Caroline Perry co-organized the 2018 Michigan High School Ethics Bowl, which featured over 100 high school students discussing applied ethics case studies. Coaches for the February 2018 Ethics Bowl included Zoë Johnson King, Cat Saint Croix, Van Tu, Kevin Craven, Caroline Perry, Mercy Corredor, Rebecca Harrison, Angela Sun, and Katie Hoi Ching Wong. The Ethics Bowl committee (Kevin Craven, Mercy Corredor, and Angela Sun) won a $1000 grant from the Marc Sanders Foundation to expand the Michigan High School Ethics Bowl to underserved schools. Philosophy with Kids!, which involves teaching lessons to fifth-graders in Saline, MI, was founded by Laura Soter, who co-organized the event with AJ Kuhr.

In other news, Kevin Craven successfully completed his first escape room with Brendan Mooney, Elise Woodard, Zoë Johnson King, and a bunch of Princeton grad students.

On behalf of the faculty at Michigan, I would like to say that we are truly inspired by the work that our graduate students have done on behalf of the profession over the past year, and we are looking forward to appreciating many more of their great accomplishments in the year ahead!

Carson and Laura
Dinner following a successful first day of the First Annual Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, October 6, 2018

Michiganders at National High School Ethics Bowl, Wayne Memorial High School

Meet the next generation of Philosophers! COMPASS Grad Panel. Eighteen grad students fielded questions about grad life from the participants.

Annual Philosophy Department Picnic, Burns Park, Ann Arbor

A wonderful talk given at this year’s Spring Colloquium from Professor Dan Kahan (Yale)
Hello again, fellow Michigan philosophy alumni! I’m very pleased to report to you on the state of our undergraduate program—happy because the program continues to thrive.

I anticipate a note of protest from some readers in response to that last sentence. After all, you may have read with interest and dismay (as I did) a recent article in *The Atlantic* by Benjamin Schmidt, a history professor at Boston’s Northeastern University, titled “The Humanities Are In Crisis.” This article was especially noteworthy because five years ago Schmidt himself wrote a well-received blog post arguing that there was no good evidence of a crisis in the humanities, but subsequent developments have changed his mind. The number of majors nationwide in core humanities fields like history, English, and philosophy has fallen significantly in the intervening years.

And yet here I am telling you that our undergraduate program is in good health. You may wonder if this is blind optimism, a case of me fiddling like Nero while the humanities burn around me. Or perhaps this is simply feel-good propaganda to keep our alumni happy. Surely it couldn’t be that Michigan philosophy is magically immune to the crisis of the humanities.

In fact, we have been essentially immune to the crisis, insofar as it is a real crisis. But the reason isn’t magic. It has to do with two factors: interdisciplinary majors and course enrollments.

To begin with our interdisciplinary majors: in his “Humanities in Crisis” article, Schmidt points to the drop in classic humanities majors, including philosophy. Let me explain why this does not provide the whole picture, at least not where Michigan is concerned. Do we graduate fewer philosophy majors each year than we did a decade or two ago? Yes, by a small but noticeable margin.

But to note this number and move on is to ignore the many students majoring in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE)—a joint major administered by our department together with Political Science and Economics. It is also to ignore the many students who major in Cognitive Science with a focus on that major’s Philosophy and Cognition track. If we add all these students to our Philosophy majors, the total number of students majoring in a philosophy-focused curriculum administered by our department’s faculty is greater than it’s ever been before. Are these students majoring in “the humanities”? Not exclusively. But philosophy is a large and indispensable part of their concentrations.

There is another way in which the focus on Philosophy majors can be deceptive, which brings us to my second point: course enrollments. As Schmidt himself notes in his *Atlantic* article, “College degrees are a somewhat problematic metric: I’d rather see information about the type and level of courses that undergraduates take.” Indeed.
If the number of Philosophy majors reduces a bit, but the number of Biology and Psychology majors who take philosophy courses increases at the same time, is that really a “crisis” for philosophy? Hardly. We all love to nurture majors whose primary focus is philosophy, but the health of our undergraduate program is best measured by the number of students who want to take our classes, even if philosophy is not their number one specialty.

And when it comes to filling our classes, our program is indeed thriving. For Fall 2018, our introductory-level courses are 100 percent full, many of them with long waitlists of students who hope to get in. As a whole, philosophy course enrollments have seen a strong, steady upward trend in the past several years. This also includes our 400-level courses, some of which we’ve had to increase in size to accommodate as many as fifty students! It may well be that undergraduate education in philosophy is facing an overall crisis in the United States. But if it is, we are not seeing the signs here at Michigan.

None of this is to detract from the value of Schmidt’s *Atlantic* article, which I encourage you all to read. I hope you take away from it what I think is Schmidt’s most important point: by avoiding humanities majors, students are making a mistake. Philosophy majors meet with great success, on average, on the job market and in lifetime earnings, boasting higher mid-career earnings than students majoring in Marketing or International Studies, for example. Parents and students are largely unaware of which majors really correlate with financial success.

With that overlong diatribe behind us, let me fill you in on some specific news about the 2017-18 academic year in undergraduate studies!

This year we inaugurated internship scholarships for Philosophy and PPE majors, working in cooperation with the LSA Opportunity Hub. The scholarships provide funding for majors offered unpaid or poorly-paid summer internships, so that students can afford to accept these opportunities and gain valuable work experience. This year we were able to fund four students: Michael Makled from Philosophy and Cole Carnick, Megan Crane and Sabrina Inoue from PPE. You can read more about these students and their summer projects later in this newsletter.

The Opportunity Hub, whose mission is to connect students with internship opportunities and help them network with alumni and employers, has been a great help with this process. They’ve set up a nice system where students fill out a single application that matches them with all the internship funding sources they’re eligible for. The Hub is also very focused on connecting students with UM alumni for career advice and networking. We would love to see more philosophy alumni get involved. If you have any interest in mentoring (or potentially hiring) UM undergraduates, check out the Hub online at [https://lsa.umich.edu/opportunityhub/alumni-and-friends.html](https://lsa.umich.edu/opportunityhub/alumni-and-friends.html)

Last year I began my undergraduate news with an optimistic prediction about Meteorite, our undergraduate philosophy journal, and its energized and active new editorial board. I am delighted to report that...
my trust in these students was well placed. In May, a new issue of Meteorite was published, the first in five years. It features articles by undergraduate authors in three countries, with topics ranging from explanation in science to free speech and the nature of consent. Congratulations to these authors, and to our UM student editors: Aruran Chandrasekhar, Benjamin Chiang, Colton Karpman, Isabel Park, Joe Wisniewski, Scott Bouboulis, and editor-in-chief Jesse Kozler. I encourage you to check this issue (and previous issues of Meteorite) out online at meteorite.philosophy.lsa.umich.edu/editions/

The philosophy department has taken an active role in an exciting new “transfer bridge” program spearheaded by the College of Literature, Science and the Arts. This program aims at expanding and publicizing opportunities for students from Michigan community colleges to transfer to humanities programs at UM. Funded by a grant from the Mellon Foundation, the first three-year phase of this program will coordinate with Henry Ford College in Dearborn. This project is just beginning, so I am excited to update you with further developments.

As always, our 2018 graduation reception was an occasion to honor Philosophy majors who have earned honors and departmental prizes. This year we awarded honors for three senior theses:

- Andrew Beddow (advised by Jamie Tappenden with reader Peter Railton) “Kant on Private Property”
- Sebastian Betzer (advised by Sarah Buss with reader Meena Krishnamurthy) “Decent Humans: What we Can Learn from Moral Exemplars”
- Jacqueline Prosky (advised by Derrick Darby with reader Scott Hershovitz) “Reforming Prisons to Reduce Harm and Increase Wellbeing”

Each semester the Elsa L. Haller Term Prize is awarded for best overall performance in upper level philosophy coursework during that semester. This year we honored Florence Bacus with the Haller for her work in Laura Ruetsche’s Winter 2017 course in Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics; and Gabriel Schat for his work on the philosophy of art in my Fall 2017 Senior Honors seminar.

The William K. Frankena Prize for Excellence in the Philosophy Concentration goes to senior majors graduating with the highest distinction within the department. Most years we award a single Frankena, but this year we split the prize between two deserving candidates: Andrew Beddow and Jacqueline Prosky.
In 2017, LSA raised over $450,000 in just one day. Philosophy is always very grateful to all of our donors for all gifts received!

On Tuesday, November 27th, Giving Blueday, all funds designated to us today will go directly to the Ilene Goldman Block Memorial Fund in Philosophy, which provides resources that will enhance undergraduate students’ experiences in the department, including internships, conference attendance and related travel, research-related travel, hosting of guest speakers on campus, development of special events, special publication purchases, etc. The Fund also aims to support students who may be underrepresented in the field of philosophy.
The UNC-Duke Undergraduate PPE Colloquium brought together students from across the country who were studying some combination of philosophy, political science, economics, and law. It was a truly unique and rewarding experience, especially, since undergraduates are not usually granted the privilege of participating in an academic conference. The two-day conference illustrated the true academic breadth of PPE through this year’s topic of choice. Our notion of political economy was broadened through discussion of dense literature regarding how social norms dictate our behavior, judicial review, public choice theory, and an array of other topics. Issues were approached from pragmatic, social justice, libertarian, and practical angles. This academic marathon served as a way to push students to defend their beliefs while respecting others’ perspectives. Only at the end of each discussion block would the professors offer their own opinions, being sure to summarize our ideas while encouraging us to draw connections between the readings. Days ended with group dinners, where we noted our common professional goals: law, international relations, government work, non-profits, and research. We bonded over shared interests while exposing each other to new topics and future possibilities, creating connections that have lasted well beyond the conference weekend.

During our two days of discussion there was discourse and disagreement regarding who deserves to vote, whether laws or social norms more strongly dictate our behavior, how the central bank should function, and other topics ranging from mildly to incredibly controversial. This discourse often left students frustrated but intellectually stimulated. As representatives of UM, an institution that implores the importance of diversity, our greatest gripe with the conference was the lack of diversity among attendees and the professional staff who were facilitating the conference. The room had almost no people of color, yet we discussed issues that affect those groups particularly, including disenfranchisement. This served as a reminder that agents of change must strive to be more inclusive in order to improve the lives of minorities. We voiced these concerns during the conference and hope to continue using our voices to make the field of PPE and politics more inclusive and accessible to everyone.

Overall, the colloquium was constructive and pushed us to critically assess how philosophy, politics, and economics act as their own invisible hands, helping to dictate our behavior and thought processes. The overarching conclusion of the conference was, “things could be worse.” While this may be true, the PPE Colloquium helped identify areas for political, social, and economic betterment. We greatly appreciate the rewarding opportunity to participate in this conference and hope all the intellectually curious leaders we met throughout the weekend will take the lessons we learned and make our future better for all.
In addition to her attendance at the PPE Colloquium, Megan Crane had the opportunity to work with Michigan’s 7th Congressional District Candidate, Gretchen Driskell (D)

My time on Gretchen Driskell’s campaign this summer has been incredibly enriching and inspiring. The increase in activism from 2016 is heartening and gives me hope for the future of this country. I learned about the culture of the 7th Congressional District, and how important it is to immerse yourself in the communities you are trying to help. I appreciated the opportunity to develop a personal relationship with the candidate, and feel more prepared to enter the world of campaigns post-graduation, should this be the career path I decide to pursue.

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Playing With Blockchain - Not Legos

This past summer, Michael Makled, Philosophy Undergrad, interned with Katalysis, an Amsterdam based blockchain start-up

This summer I interned with Katalysis, an Amsterdam based blockchain start-up. Blockchain, although most commonly known as the technology underpinning cryptocurrencies, has a wide range of emerging applications. My startup is using the technology to power a micro-transaction platform for digital publishing, and is also working on a pilot project designed to improve the sharing of scientific peer review data with Cambridge Press, Springer Nature, and Taylor & Francis. Because of the small size of my company -- there were four employees, including me -- I had the opportunity to dip into a variety of different tasks, from web development and programming to GDPR compliance research and contributions to the company blog. My background as a philosophy major was a boon to me in my role not only as I did research and writing, but as I put critical thinking and problem solving skills to work in order to adapt to diverse tasks in a fast paced start-up environment.
Mr. Carnick Goes to Washington

PPE Major, Cole Carnick shares his summer 2018 experience in our nation’s Capital

Part of the appeal of studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics is the breadth of the curriculum. By drawing upon three fields of study that are essential to contending with the world around us, PPE has exposed me to an interdisciplinary approach of acquiring knowledge, something I hope will serve me well as I approach life after graduation.

This last June, though, I had the opportunity to use these skills as an intern in the commentary section of the Washington Examiner, a weekly magazine and online news source that focuses on politics in Washington D.C. As a commentary intern, I was primarily tasked with compiling the opinion newsletter, researching for other writers, and transcribing recordings. I also had the opportunity to write my own commentary pieces, which is where my background in PPE proved its value.

One of the first stories I covered was a Washington Post Live event hosting Gary Cohn, the former chief economic advisor to President Donald Trump. Cohn, who left the White House earlier this year over policy disagreements with the president, criticized Trump’s proposed tariff policies. While this wouldn’t be a difficult story to cover if I was just reporting the news, commentary pieces require some level of analysis. My prior studies in economics and political economy were particularly useful here, as I was able to parse out the issue at hand, identify why Cohn was leveling his criticisms, introduce relevant statistics and information, and articulate my own view on the matter.

While knowledge of political economy was relevant to my writing, my background in philosophy—particularly political philosophy—was equally important. Whether I was writing about U.S. involvement in the United Nations, the judicial philosophy of a Supreme Court nominee, or...
earmarked spending in Congress, I kept a few central questions at the back of my mind: What sort of values or political principles are at play? How are specific actions justified? What appeals to political authority or legitimacy are being made? By keeping these questions in mind, I was able to imbue my commentary writing with greater value, with the primary goal of benefitting the reader.

Drawing upon PPE in my writing was significant for me because my internship allowed me to use the knowledge I’ve gained from my studies in a non-academic context. While my education at the University of Michigan is meaningful to me in its own right, it’s rewarding to see the importance of my studies in a professional environment, specifically one that deals with the circulation of ideas and opinions.

Every day, writers and journalists pen articles that grapple with current events, advancing their own viewpoints while engaging with the perspectives of others. This process can be ugly, especially in our current age of media and politics, but it remains an indispensable feature of our civic life. After all, the ideas and opinions that are exchanged in newspaper headlines or TV news panels can have a decisive impact on decisions made by policy-makers and those in the general public. As I become increasingly drawn to the field of writing and journalism, I know my internship experience and education in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics would leave me well prepared to venture into the ever-important field of commentary writing.
This summer I had the opportunity of interning with the Los Angeles Center for Community Law and Action (LACCLA), a community based non-profit that organizes buildings and neighborhoods to push back against displacement of low-income residents from their communities by engaging in advocacy and providing free legal services.

During my time as an intern, I was able to work on several research projects, interact with the clients and surrounding community, witness hearings and attend a federal trial in its entirety. Through these experiences, I started to also think about the bigger, more overarching questions that this kind of work raises. For example, do people have a fundamental right to shelter?

Or, to rephrase this a little, should housing be viewed as an investment or a universal guarantee? In several of my philosophy courses, I learned about the concept of natural law, or the idea that there are universal moral principles that we ought to obey regardless of whether it is actual written law. In the US, we have the Constitution, which many argue has its source in natural law. My experiences during this internship led me to contemplate whether or not the right to housing should be considered natural law and be alongside our other constitutional rights.

Most of the clients that LACCLA has are tenants, so I’ll be discussing mostly landlord-tenant cases. The relationship between a landlord and their tenants can often be contentious, and many of the cases that LACCLA takes on have to do with habitability issues in which the landlord refuses to make repairs, or makes sudden and extreme rent increases; both are often tactics to get their tenants to leave. These actions are usually taken due to having rent controlled units that the landlord wants to raise the rent on (if a tenant leaves a rent controlled unit, the landlord can raise the rent of that unit to market rate) and wanting to make a larger profit on one’s investment, a perfectly logical reason since that is often the aim of any business owner.

However, the issue arises when these tenants are faced with a huge rent increase or uninhabitable conditions, and they are forced to leave and have nowhere else to go. As mentioned before, LA has a
housing crisis. Construction is not able keep up with the ever growing population. Tenants who are kicked out are often forced to scrape by and live with relatives in cramped conditions, take on extra jobs in order to pay a higher rent, or in the worst case scenario, face homelessness. When looking at cases such as this, it is difficult to say who is at fault.

On one side, the landlord has a right to do what they can to make a profit. After all, they have mortgage payments, and they themselves want to make a living. On the other side, the tenant has a right to quality housing, and not face huge rent increases with little warning. These sorts of cases made me consider whether either of these ‘rights’ should be a given.

During one of the community meetings that LACCLA holds each week, the question was posed of whether or not viewing housing as an investment will inevitably be exploitive. Answers were mixed, but most argued that exploitation is a common occurrence. A question that I myself thought of was, even if exploitation is inevitable, is it morally wrong? Do people have the moral obligation to not take advantage of others for their own personal gain? If asked this question, I would probably lean towards arguing that, yes, we do have the moral obligation to not take advantage of others for selfish reasons. But if left to our own devices, is this a natural law that we actually follow? I contemplated this question when watching a federal trial in which the owner of a building (the defendant) attempted to evict every tenant from their building after raising the rent to an amount that none of the tenants could come even close to affording. They claimed that they did so in order to make a profit, and to fulfill a legitimate business purpose, which was to convert the building to student housing. The plaintiffs’ side argued that they engaged in this practice knowing that their tenants would not be able to pay, thereby taking advantage of this fact, and their aim was to force them out, raise the rents, and thus make a significantly larger profit, regardless of the fact that their tenants would probably be left with nowhere to go. In the end, the defendant lost. However, in terms of being able to answer the many questions I posed above, I did not quite arrive at an answer. If people should not be allowed to knowingly take advantage of others, is this something that inevitably happens when an industry such as housing becomes a profit-seeking business, and if it is, then does that mean that housing should not be such an industry? I then arrive back at the question of whether housing is a right, and if this will always conflict with the fact that housing is viewed as a means for making a profit. As for now, I haven’t really arrived at a conclusion, but I have my internship to thank for giving me the experiences to deeply contemplate these questions, and I am grateful for my philosophy background to be able to analyze the arguments on each side of this debate.
Research Report

Normative Externalism
by Brian Weatherson

Early in *Hamlet*, Laertes departs Elsinore for Paris. As he prepares to go his father, Lord Polonius, offers him some paternal advice. He tells him to talk less and smile more. He tells him to spend all his money on clothes, since that’s how they roll in Paris. He tells him to neither a borrower nor a lender be, though the latter is presumably redundant if he’s taken the advice to date. And he concludes with this advice, destined to adorn high school yearbooks for centuries to come.

*This above all: to thine own self be true,*
*And it must follow, as the night the day,*
*Thou canst not then be false to any man.*

It isn’t completely clear what Polonius means when he advises Laertes to be true to himself, but it is plausible that he means something like this:

*Follow your own principles!*
Or perhaps something like this:
*Do what you think is right!*

And unlike the rest of the advice Polonius gives, many philosophers have followed him in thinking this is a very good idea.

In my forthcoming book, *Normative Externalism*, I argue against this idea. Following one’s own principles, or doing what one thinks is right, are not in general very good ideas at all. I call *normative internalism* the view that we should be guided by norms that are internal to our own minds, in the sense that our beliefs, and our (normative evidence) is internal to our minds. And I oppose that view, arguing for *normative externalism*.

Normative externalism is the view that the most important standards for evaluating actions, mental states and agents are typically external to the actor, believer or agent being evaluated. It can be appropriate to hold someone to a moral, or an epistemic, standard that they do not endorse, or even that they could not be reasonably expected to endorse. If one has bad standards, there need be nothing wrong in violating them, and there is nothing good about upholding them.

Being true to yourself, in the sense of conforming to the principles one has, or even to the principles one has reason to have, is just not that important. What is important is doing the right thing, being a good person, and having rational beliefs. If one has misguided views about the right, the good, and the rational, then there is nothing good about conforming to those misguided views. And this matters, because many people have views about the right, the good, and the rational, that are very misguided indeed.

There are a number of reasons that philosophers have been interested in internalist theses over the centuries. But a recent flurry of interest has come out of reflection on the fact that philosophy is hard. All of philosophy is hard. Ethics is hard; epistemology is hard; decision theory is hard; logic is hard. And all the rest of philosophy is hard too, but those four are particularly relevant to the story I’m interested in. They matter because they are all evaluative. Someone who violates ethical principles is immoral; someone who violates epistemological principles is irrational; someone who violates the principles of decision theory is imprudent; someone who violates logical principles is illogical. And to say that someone is immoral, irrational, imprudent or illogical is to negatively evaluate them.
But it is easy to feel uneasy with these observations. If it is so hard to figure out the truth in these fields, why should we negatively evaluate someone for failing to conform to these hard to find standards? Doesn’t fairness require that we only judge people by standards they can know about? I argue that this isn’t right—that to evaluate someone is necessarily to impose a standard on them, and they may not even know what the standard is. Indeed, they may not have any reason to believe the truth about what the standard is, and in extreme cases may have good reason to endorse a false standard.

The position I endorse is uncomfortable, since it is easy to feel the unfairness of holding someone to a standard that they do not accept, and could not reasonably accept. Many philosophers think that we should either supplement or replace these external standards with internal standards. An ‘internal standard’ here is one that the person being evaluated either accepts, or has good reason to accept. To supplement the external standards is to say that there are two ways to evaluate people. It is good to live up to the correct standards in ethics, epistemology and decision theory, and bad to violate them. But it is also, say the supplementers, good to live up to one’s own standards, and bad to violate them. The replacers say that conformity to one’s own standards is more important than conformity to external standards; in some deep sense (at least some of) the heroes of ethics, epistemology and decision theory are people who abide by their own standards.

In *Normative Externalism*, I press two kinds of problem against both these kinds of internal views. The problems are most pressing for the replacers, but they undermine the position of the supplementers too.

The first problem with the internal view concerns fanatics and ideologues. Every ideologue who thought that they had figured out the one true way things must be done and reacted violently against those who didn’t agree was doing well by their own lights. It’s not good, in any way, to be that kind of ideologue. We shouldn’t look back at the Reign of Terror and say, “Well, at least Robespierre and Saint-Just were living in accordance with their own values.” Aiming to fit the world to one’s own values is a dangerous game; it’s only worth playing if you’ve got the values right. When we focus our attention on ideologues who have gone off the rails, the idea that it is unfair to hold people to a standard they can’t see feels like something that’s a problem in theory but not in practice.

The second problem with the internal view is that it leads to a nasty regress. It is, to be sure, hard to tell what the true values are. But choosing some values does not end our problems. Morality is hard even once you’ve settled on a moral theory. This is a point familiar from, for example, Sartre’s discussion of the young man torn between duty to his mother and his country.

What could help him make that choice? The Christian doctrine? No. The Christian doctrine tells us we must be charitable, love our neighbour, sacrifice ourselves for others, choose the “narrow way,” et cetera. But what is the narrow way? Whom should we love like a brother—the solider or the mother? ... Who can decide that *a priori*? No one. No code of ethics on record answers that question. (Jean-Paul Sartre, “Existentialism as a Humanism”, page 31)

We can evaluate the young man by his own lights and still be in a way unfair to him. Perhaps the young man has decided to do the truly Christian thing, and it turns out that the truly Christian thing to do is to fight Nazis, but the young man concludes (reasonably but falsely) that it is to help his mother. And he does that. If we are moved by the unfairness of holding him to a standard he does not endorse, we should also find it unfair to hold him to a consequence of his own standard that he doesn’t recognise. But now what is left of the internal standard? It must be that it is good to do not what is best by one’s own lights, but what one thinks is best by one’s own lights. But perhaps one could even be wrong about *that*. (In the book I show how this is possible once we recognize that reasonable people can make mistakes about decision theory.) And the internal
view collapses into the view that we should evaluate people by what they think they think they think i.e.... their own views support.

This is all absurd, and it makes the problem with fanatics and ideologues even worse. Perhaps we could argue that some ideologues take actions that are incompatible with what they say their values are. But they do not act against what they think their own values require.

Perhaps we can motivate the importance of the internal point of view not by thinking about fairness, but by focussing on an analogy with reckless agents. If I fire a cannon down Fifth Avenue at peak hour, I do something morally horrible even if miraculously I don’t hit anyone. My action is wrong because it is reckless. Perhaps if I do something that is probably morally wrong, I am morally reckless in just the same way. And that’s true even if my action turns out not to be wrong. So what matters is not just what is right and wrong, but probabilities of rightness and wrongness.

Thinking about this analogy is a better way to motivate the internal point of view than just focussing on fairness. But ultimately it fails as well. The harder we look at individual cases, the more significant the differences between ordinary recklessness and ‘moral recklessness’ starts to appear. Much of the first half of *Normative Externalism* is spent outlining these differences. One significant difference concerns what kinds of things the good person will be motivated by.

Here’s why good people won’t fire cannons down Fifth Avenue—they don’t want to hurt people, and firing cannons will likely hurt people. But why should a good person avoid an action that they think might be wrong? It can’t be (I argue) that they just want to avoid hurting people, or violating their rights, or breaking promises, or anything of the sort. They have to want to avoid doing the wrong thing, whatever that turns out to be. And that, I argue, is a bad motivation to have. It’s the kind of motivation that leads back to fanaticism.

The first half of *Normative Externalism* discusses the significance of the internal point of view in ethics. The second part of the book turns to epistemology, and to the idea that one cannot reasonably have beliefs that one believes (or should believe) to be unreasonable.

Again, the issue turns on how important is conformity to one’s own standards. The most common philosophical view on this question is a kind of supplementing view, not a replacing view. It is important, say several philosophers, to have beliefs that are both actually reasonable and also reasonable by one’s own lights. And I’m going to push back against that. One reason comes from work by Timothy Williamson. What’s reasonable to believe turns on empirical facts about one’s situation. Since we don’t have God-like perfect access to our own empirical situation, we might not realise what is reasonable to do in our own situation just because we don’t know precisely what situation we are in. In such cases, it seems we should react to the situation we are actually in, not to our best guess about what situation that is.

There are two primary themes of part two of the book. One echoes the first part of the book. Sometimes we cannot know what it would be to be reasonable by our own lights. So adding a requirement that reasonable people are doing well by their own lights threatens to trigger a vicious regress. I argue that this threat is realised. The other theme is that the phenomena that philosophers have thought could only be explained by adding an internal constraint onto belief can be adequately explained by a more careful attention to the nature of evidence, and what it takes for one to have evidence and for that evidence to support a belief. I argue that such explanations are preferable to explanations in terms of internal constraints (such as only believe what you believe is reasonable to believe). This is in part because they avoid regress; in part because they avoid making implausible attributions about knowledge about one’s own situation; in part because they only commit us to things we are independently committed to; and in part because they explain a much broader range of cases than are explained by the alleged internal constraints.
The book ends on a somewhat ironic note. Internalism is often promoted as the theory that gives us moderation and caution. Some internalists in ethics describe their view as ‘moral hedging’. Internalism in epistemology is motivated by cases where the externalist is alleged to run foolish, even immoral, risks. But nothing in the internalist’s theory entails that they will always be on the side of moderation and caution. Indeed, a running theme of my book is that the internalist will end up taking the extreme position in any number of cases.

I don’t object to aiming for caution and moderation in one’s theory. But what I argue in the book is that if you want caution and moderation, you have to put them into your first-order theory. The internalists’ mistake is to try to put rules for moderation in the meta-theory (i.e., the theory about how to react to uncertainty about the first-order theory), which is precisely where they shouldn’t go. In the book I give some suggestions for how to make first-order theory more cautious. Roughly speaking, the suggestion is that we should be pluralists about ethical value, and have a very expansive conception of epistemological evidence. But I’m less committed to those particular suggestions than I am to the view that having a meta-theory that just says To thine own self be true, a meta-theory that’s friendly to the ideologue, is a way to promote moderation.

Amia Srinivasan ends her excellent paper ‘Normativity without Cartesian Privilege’ by noting that her view, one that I’d call externalist, “invites us to return to a more tragic outlook of the normative”. But that tragic outlook, she argues, can be beneficial; it helps focus on injustices in practice rather than injustices in theory.

The worldview motivating my book is very similar. Reflection on what makes tragic figures tragic is a good way to appreciate this worldview. (There is a reason I start the book by quoting Shakespeare.) And the misguided ideologue, the person who governs their thoughts and deeds by the theory they think is right, but in fact is off in one key respect, is one of the great tragic figures of modernity. What might have been a minor flaw in an average person becomes, in the ideologue, a character defining vice.

We should avoid that tragic end. We should live well and, if our minds turn to theory, we should have true beliefs about what it is to live well. If all goes perfectly, there will be a pleasing harmony between how we live and how we think one should live. But aiming for that harmony is dangerous, and changing our lives to guarantee it can bring more harm than good. And we should reject philosophical theories that draw conclusions about morality or rationality from giving that harmony too exalted a place.
When students take their first course in philosophical ethics, they are often impressed by the rigor with which philosophers investigate problems we all confront outside the classroom. At the same time, they are often dismayed by the fact that as they come to better understand what is at stake in a given debate—as they clear up confusions, and gain insight into what their own most basic assumptions presuppose and imply—they continue to discover new issues, new problems, new questions. I respond to this natural bewilderment in various ways. But all of my responses concede the point: like all serious inquiry, philosophical inquiry generates further lines of questioning; but it often does this in a way that leaves us without a decisive answer to our original question.

I thought about this feature of philosophical reflection when Liz asked me to write up a brief summary of what I have been working on lately. How, I asked myself, did I get to this place from the questions with which I began? The short answer to this question is that my early work on personal autonomy and moral responsibility led me to wonder about the relation between (i) the fact that we are capable of taking responsibility for our actions and (ii) the fact that we are obligated to treat each other “with respect.” This, in turn, led to work on a range of topics from the excruciating significance of childhood influences, and of the moral ignorance that sometimes results, to the relation between good morals and good manners.

At the same time, I was pursuing a different train of thought. What, I wanted to know, is the relation between (i) the fact that I am accountable for most of the things I do and (ii) the fact that what I do reflects my assumption that it makes sense to act this way? This led me to wonder: What is it to do things for reasons? What sort of mistake do I make when I behave irrationally? (Why) is it rational for me to attribute a special significance to my own happiness? Is it really possible for someone to do something intentionally, even as she is confident that she has overriding reason not to do it?

Of course, I was thinking about all these things with the help of the many philosophers who have been grappling with such questions since philosophy began. But, as I said, the answers they offered have not closed the questions. There are still many more things to consider.

In continuing to follow that second path, the things I have been considering have led me to reject several widely held views. I would be surprised if my arguments have convinced anyone else. And I will not try to convince any of you who are reading this newsletter. My aim, instead, will be to say just enough about a few of these conclusions to enable you to understand why someone might endorse them—and just enough to enable you to understand some of the ways in which the conclusions relate to each other. The issues I mention are not a complete summary of my recent preoccupations. They are, however, a representative sample.

Let’s start with incoherence. We can feel conflicted about all sorts of things in all sorts of ways. But most of these conflicts are not instances of irrationality. There is, for example, nothing irrational about the fact that I want to order a hot fudge sundae and that I also want to refrain from ordering a hot fudge sundae. It’s just that I think that eating this delicious rich dessert would be quite wonderful in some respects and not wonderful at all. But some conflicts seem more problematic than this. Think, for example, about having a strong desire to eat a hot fudge sundae even though you believe there is absolutely nothing desirable about doing so. (I realize that this may stretch your imagination!) Or think about being
committed to eating this, here hot fudge sundae right now and being committed to not eating this, here hot fudge sundae right now. Hasn’t something gone wrong? Imagine, more specifically, that you are convinced that you have overriding reason not to eat the hot fudge sundae even while you are deliberately shoveling a big bite into your mouth. Or imagine that you have decided to make a hot fudge sundae for dessert and—without changing your mind, and without having forgotten your decision—you do not form the intention to buy any ice cream.

The last two situations I have described are widely agreed to be paradigm cases of irrationality: weakness of will (or “akrasia”) in the first case, instrumental irrationality in the second case. Philosophers have struggled to make sense of each form of incoherence. I hope you can see why.

A few philosophers have also argued that it is simply not possible to be incoherent in these ways. I side with this tiny minority. Again, rather than review the arguments here, I will limit myself to stating my basic intuitions. I will then say a few words about the closely related problematic states of mind that I do think are possible.

Here, then, are those intuitions. I reject the possibility of the first alleged sort of incoherence because it seems to me that if we can explain an action in terms of a person’s choice to act this way, then she has not acted this way because the strength of some desire prevented her from doing what she thought it made most sense to do. And I reject the possibility of the second alleged sort of incoherence because it seems to me that to commit oneself to achieving a determinate end E just is to commit oneself to taking the means that enable one to achieve this end—even though, of course, one might not know what these means are.

What, then, is going on when I take that big bite of hot-fudge-coated ice cream (with the dollop of whipped cream on top)? In a nutshell: I have gone in for some pretty transparent rationalizing. “After all, it’s just this once.” “I’m just making an exception to my general commitment.” And even: “No one should be the slave of her reason all the time.” To which I might add (though, needless to say, this is rarely something I would consciously spell out): “My reason is hardly infallible.”

Such rationalizing takes advantage of the fact that we could not do anything for a reason if we needed to discover a reason for every assumption we make about what we have reason to do. When I take the fact that “it’s just this once” as a reason for not giving so much weight to the considerations against eating that hot fudge sundae, I am doing something I necessarily do whenever I reason: I am accepting a fact as a reason without discovering a further reason for so doing. Of course, in doing this, I am aware that there are reasons not to attribute so much importance to the consideration I take to justify my action. But I do not bother to review these reasons—just as I do not bother to review most of the reasons against most of the other assumptions I make. In short, on my account, akrasia is possible because a necessary condition for the possibility of reasoning is also a sufficient condition for the possibility of putting our reason to perverse use. As Donald Davidson notes, if it were not possible for reason to sabotage its own workings, the person who does something akratically would be doing it “in spite of herself.” But then she would not be doing it because she cannot bring herself to do otherwise. In short, what she does could not be attributed to the weakness of her will.

Rationalizations enable us to defy our own reason without defying our own contemporaneous normative judgments. It is also possible for someone to defy her own contemporaneous normative judgments without exhibiting a weak will. This happens when someone dissociates herself from her own agency—relating to herself as if she were just one person among others who is disposed to behave in various ways. Under these circumstances, her judgment that she does not have sufficient reason to behave as she does is like the judgment she might make about someone else’s behavior. Because this judgment is not her response
to a commitment to determining what to do, it does not conflict with any such commitment. And so, she disapproves of her behavior without being incoherent.

Of course, there is much more to say about this. But I hope you get the idea. And what about that decision not to buy the ice cream? The very short version of my story is that though we cannot wittingly do the sort of thing I described, we often do not understand the relations among our commitments. This means that it is possible for us to discover that we have unwittingly committed ourselves to doing something that prevents us from achieving our ends (or that we have failed to commit ourselves to doing what is necessary to achieve these ends). According to this story, formal principles of rationality spell out conceptual constraints on the combinations of attitudes we can wittingly attribute to ourselves—not normative constraints on what we have reason to believe or do. The principle of instrumental rationality, in particular, does not tell us either to take the means to our ends or to replace the ends. When it seems to you as if you are committed to achieving end E and that you are also committed to doing what will make it impossible for you to achieve E, you realize that the appearances are misleading: you cannot really be committed to doing what by your own lights is impossible. This forces you to reinterpret your commitments. In so doing, you will usually adjust the commitments themselves. (After all, believing that you have altered a commitment often suffices for really altering it; and altering a commitment is usually the best way to provide yourself with evidence that you have done so.) Nonetheless, the principle of instrumental rationality does not tell you to make any such adjustments—or to do anything else.

Even as I continue to consider the conceptual limits on incoherence, I have also been thinking about forms of incoherence that are not only possible, but desirable too. Can it really be a good thing to be in conflict with yourself? It can, I argue, when the alternatives are much worse. To help you see what I have in mind, let me call your attention to a basic fact about all of us: we are all committed to being good enough in a wide variety of ways. I, for example, am committed to being a good enough mother, wife, daughter, sister, philosopher, teacher, neighbor, friend, citizen, person. I am committed to being brave, kind, just, polite—brave, kind, just, polite enough not to qualify as a mean, rude, unjust coward.

Call these commitments our “personal ideals.” There are two things about these ideals that are really quite striking. First, they form a very heterogeneous group. Second, especially when we have not yet done much to try—as we say—to “live up to” them, they are pretty indeterminate. By this I just mean that there are many circumstances under which we have no idea what we would have to do in order to be good enough in the relevant ways; and there are almost surely many circumstances under which a personal ideal is such that there is simply no fact of the matter as to what would count as living up to it—or falling short.

To these two facts add the fact that each of us is a single person, living a single life, and you get some interesting challenges that, I argue, shed light on many interesting philosophical issues—including what is involved in doing things for reasons. In particular, the fact that each of us is only one person has important implications for the role that coherence considerations play in our refinement of our personal ideals; and this means that in order to understand what it takes to live up to any one of our ideals, we must rely on our rather dim understanding of what we must do in order to live up to the others.

A commitment to accommodating other ideals also seems to be an essential feature of some of the substantive ideals themselves. For some people, for example, the commitment to being kind just is (among other things) a commitment to being kind in such a way that one is also just. I argue that something similar is true for many of us with respect to the basic moral ideal of treating people “with concern and respect.” For many of us, this is the ideal of treating people with concern and respect, in such a way that one can live a meaningful life, promote one’s own interests, and realize any number of other ideals. I argue that this fact about the ideal explains why the demands of morality appear to be the demands of reason—why, that is, the discovery that we are not morally permitted to do something is, for many of us, the discovery that we lack sufficient reason to do it, all things considered. This is not, I argue, for the reasons that philosophers have often suggested: it is not because the demands of morality are grounded in some independent
demands of reason. Rather, it is because (again, for many of us) the basic moral ideal of treating people with concern and respect gains determinacy by accommodating (or incorporating) other—nonmoral—reasons.

Even as the commitments associated with our personal ideals are subject to coherence pressures, they also place constraints on coherence. This is because there is more to being good in the relevant ways than being a good enough responder to reasons. So—to simplify greatly, and to leave out a lot of interesting stuff—as long as we have substantive commitments, there is no way to ensure that every judgment regarding what we have sufficient reason to do will be relevant to what it is to be good enough in the relevant ways. It could be, for example, that you have overriding reason to do something even though doing it involves falling short of what a good enough friend, or mother, or teacher would do. In such a case, you have not discovered that there is a special circumstance under which acting this way is compatible with being a good enough friend, mother, or teacher. Rather, you have discovered that you have no choice but to betray one of your ideals. When this happens, your commitments are not fully coherent. Indeed, they are not fully coherent as long as there are circumstances under which this would happen.

Is this something to be regretted? I argue that, to the contrary, it is a necessary aspect of being more than a thin shell of a person. A certain measure of incoherence is the price we pay for having a significant number of commitments to being good (enough) in a wide variety of ways. To appreciate that this is a price worth paying is to gain insight into our own ideal of coherence and its relation to our ideal of rational agency. It is to appreciate that there is more to being a good enough rational agent than having a bunch of values, the ability to determine their relative significance, and the disposition to act accordingly. Not only is a good enough rational agent vulnerable to regretting that she cannot say “no” to the ice cream sundae and eat it too; she also has commitments—substantive commitments—which she may have to betray in order to do what she has most reason to do.

There is still much I would like to better understand about these and many related matters. Meanwhile, my interest in the coherence constraints on rational agency has led to a paper in which I challenge a popular account of reasons for action. And my interest in what is required to “live up to” one’s commitments has combined with thoughts provoked by the most recent presidential election to generate a meditation on what distinguishes rational accommodations to injustice from shameful, cowardly accommodations. More specifically: what distinguishes (i) cases in which when I accommodate injustice, I am to be commended for making the best of a bad situation (and here I am thinking of a situation in which there is no meaningful rule of law, and no one has any basic civil rights) from (ii) cases in which, like the infamous “good German,” in pulling my neck in and keeping my head down, I have betrayed the ideals I claim to hold dear?

In grappling with the painful realization that, when push comes to shove, I am likely to be very strongly tempted to mischaracterize the second sort of case as the first sort of case, I have been struck by how little mileage I can get from recognizing that all human beings are worthy of concern and respect. A commitment to moral equality is extremely important. But (I have provisionally concluded) when it comes to having the courage to see things aright in the sort of situation of interest to me in my post-election musings, it is even more important to maintain a sort of double-consciousness. One must somehow manage to care deeply about the paper one is writing, the health of one’s cat, one’s daughter’s piano recital, and so much more, while, at the same time, appreciating deeply the sense in which none of these things is all that important. This is not like seeing that something (e.g., a hot fudge sundae) is good in some respects and bad in others. It involves occupying a point of view (constituted by a wide variety of commitments), even as one occupies a different point of view (independent of these commitments) from which things look very different. Is this really possible? Is it a possible form of incoherence? Some philosophers think that the best we can do is to vacillate between these two stances. Others think that a sort of ironic detachment is the closest we can come. According to Kierkegaard, irony and humor can get us pretty close. But, he says, we cannot reconcile the two apparently incompatible perspectives unless we relate to ourselves by relating to God. (What I call a form of “incoherence” he prefers to call “paradox.”) I am not sure what to think about these proposals. There are still so many things to consider.
In her classic article, “Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and Their Fate in History” (1998), Eileen O’Neill (1953-2017) concludes by urging a re-writing of the history of philosophy that allows women to “escape being footnotes and flourishes to the history of philosophy—makers of nothing more than silk knots and little nothings” (43). And indeed, spurred on by O’Neill’s call to arms, scholars have shown an increasing interest in the contributions of women to the history of philosophy. In order to take account of this exciting development in recent scholarship, I have created a new course that follows O’Neill’s lead in emphasizing the role of women in early modern (roughly, 17th- and 18th-century) philosophy.

The course begins with a consideration of issues concerning metaphysics, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science in the writings of: Princess Elisabeth, sympathetic critic of Descartes’s views of the mind-body union, the passions and freedom; Margaret Cavendish, a creative materialist and critic of both Descartes and Hobbes; and Émilie Du Châtelet, translator of Newton and proponent of a unique synthesis of the physics of Newton and the metaphysics of Leibniz.

New work on women in early modern philosophy has emphasized not only their reception of the views of their male counterparts, but also somewhat neglected areas of inquiry where women took the lead. A second part of the course focuses on the latter in considering issues in moral/political philosophy and the philosophy of education in the writings of: Marie de Gournay, follower of Montaigne and author of a Pyrrhonian defense of equality; Anna Maria van Schurman, author of a scholastic defense of the education of women; Mary Astell, proponent of a new program for the philosophical instruction of women; and Mary Wollstonecraft, feminist scholar and both advocate for and critic of the French Revolution.

I must admit that many of the works featured in this course are new to me. I received a traditional training in early modern philosophy that emphasized the “greats”, all male: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz (the so-called “Continental Rationalists”), and Locke, Berkeley, Hume (the so-called “British Empiricists”). There simply was no mention of any role played by women. I look forward to working with my students to re-cover a more inclusive view of early modern philosophy, one in which “the woman question”—which had some prominence during this period—is not simply ignored.
Recent Graduates

Sara Aronowitz defended her dissertation, *Rational Structures in Learning and Memory*, under the supervision of Peter Railton. Her dissertation aims to disrupt an increasingly ubiquitous view of epistemology which claim that we can study rationality by considering a single belief at a single time. Sara has accepted a postdoctoral research associate position at Princeton’s University Center for Human Values.

Boris Babic defended his dissertation, *Foundations of Epistemic Risk*, under the supervision of James Joyce. His goal was to begin a conversation about the role of risk in the decision-theoretic assessment of partial beliefs or credences. Boris has accepted the Weisman Postdoctoral Instructor in Philosophy of Science position at Cal Tech.

Mara Bollard defended her dissertation, *What Makes an Emotion Moral?*, under the supervision of Daniel Jacobson. She explores what it means for an emotion to count as moral and which emotions count as the moral ones as these are issues in need of further elucidation. Mara is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor at Amherst.

Kimberly Chuang defended her dissertation, *An Account of Contributive Justice*, under the supervision of Liz Anderson and Peter Railton. She argued that contributive justice is concerned with what people owe as a matter of justice, rather than what is owed to them. She has joined UM Philosophy as a Lecturer.

Anna Edmonds defended her dissertation, *Epistemic Norms and the Normativity of Belief*, under the supervision of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Peter Railton. She argued and compared the questions, “What should I believe?”, frequently claimed by epistemologists, and “What should I do?” as asked by ethicists.

Zoë Johnson King defended her dissertation, *Trying to Act Rightly*, under the supervision of Brian Weatherson. Her research focused on the moral evaluation of people’s motivations. Zoë has accepted a postdoctoral position at NYU and a tenure track position at USC.

Shai Madjar defended his dissertation, *Emotional Assessment and Emotional Regulation: A Philosophical Approach*, under the supervision of Daniel Jacobson. His dissertation seeks to clarify the value and wisdom of emotion regulation in its various forms. Shai is currently a medical student at U-M School of Medicine.

Cat Saint-Croix defended her dissertation, *Non-Ideal Epistemology in a Social World*, under the supervision of Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Brian Weatherson. Her dissertation focuses on the effect of social idealizations, particularly those pertaining to salient social categories like race, sex, and gender. Cat has accepted a Postdoctoral position at Minnesota.
Philosophy Contributions

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Professor Tyler Cowen, Department of Economics, George Mason University
Friday, January 25, 2019
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2018-2019 Tanner Lecture on Human Values
Dr. Michael Lambek, Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto Scarborough
Wednesday, January 30, 2019
4:00-6:00 PM
Michigan League - Ballroom
and
Thursday, January 31, 2019
10:00 AM - 12:30 PM
Michigan League - Michigan Room

Spring Colloquium
Jennifer Carr, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of California San Diego
Jane Friedman, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, NYU
Clayton Littlejohn, Reader in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, King’s College London
Alex Worsnip, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, UNC Chapel Hill
Friday, February 8, 2019 - Michigan League
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Saturday, February 9, 2019 - 3222 Angell Hall

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