The Department of Philosophy in Recent Decades
(Jamie Tappenden 2013, with assistance from the members of the department)

The philosophy department at Michigan has flourished in recent decades. In the most widely recognized departmental rankings, compiled from a profession-wide survey of academic philosophers, the department has without exception ranked between 3 and 5 nationally. Though it is a mistake to rest too much on any rankings, it is surely not out of order to take some pride in consistent respect from professional colleagues. Department faculty have received many honors and awards, (there's only space for a handful below) many students have gone on to success in their chosen life paths, some of those have become accomplished professors themselves. In addition to the individual points of distinction, these historical notes will reveal how the department has collectively developed an intellectual and teaching personality that has attracted the individual members, and causes them to find the department a congenial environment for teaching and research. To appreciate this evolution of the current department personality, some stage setting concerning the past will be needed. (This prologue is a non-comprehensive high elevation overview since full details are available in prior department histories.)

Michigan Philosophy Back in the Day

Few details appear to have been preserved concerning philosophy in the period between the “Catholepistemiad” of 1817 and the 1837 charter of the university. A professorship (that became the professorship in Moral and Intellectual Sciences) was established and its first occupant was a Catholic missionary from France, Gabriel Richard. To be sure, Father Richard was an exceptional man of learning, courage, and diplomatic finesse who was an important figure in the history of the Michigan Territory. But concerning the chair in particular, it is not so clear what if any duties came with it. The first occupant of the chair known to have offered classes was the Reverend Edward Thomson (1843-44), who initiated a sequence of occupants conjuring visions of Stephen Leacock's fictional Dr. McTeague, “concocting a mixture of St. Paul with Hegel, three parts to one, for his Sunday sermon, and one part to three for his Monday lecture.” For example, upon the departure of the one professor in the sequence with serious philosophical training - President Henry Tappan (1852-63) - the Regents appointed the pastor of the local Presbyterian church, Lucius Delison Chapin (1863-68), a man with no apparent qualifications or training specifically in philosophy.

The exceptional representative of the period, President Tappan, was also trained as a clergyman. He had served as a Dutch Reformed pastor, and his faith informed his work in important ways. (An extended final chapter of The Doctrine of the Will, Applied to Moral Agency and Responsibility (1841) is devoted to showing that the conclusions of his philosophical dialectics are compatible with Divine Revelation.) But his training in philosophy was substantial, and he viewed philosophy as worth study in its own right, rather than as simply as ground-clearing for Christian apologetics. The difference in style is especially manifest in Tappan's writings on free will. As with his view of the University, Tappan transplants what he has learned in his European travels to American soil, with a distinctively American result. His dialectical opponent in this work is not a European thinker but rather the American theologian Jonathan
Edwards, a leader of the “First Great Awakening” of Christian evangelism in the early eighteenth century. Tappan's ultimate account of free will prefigures that of the later American pragmatist William James.

The first professor with genuine significance as a philosophical writer and teacher was George S. Morris (1870-89), who was made professor of Modern Languages and Literature and then (in 1881) Philosophy. Morris too had been trained as a clergyman, and like Tappan toured Europe. Unlike Tappan, however, he regarded the philosophy he learned in his travels—specifically a flavor of neo-Hegelian idealism—as necessary for a defensible interpretation of Christian belief. (His mature position on the subject is published in his 1883 Philosophy and Christianity.) Morris published original work on a range of subjects: British Thought and Thinkers (1880), Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Exposition (1882) and Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History (1887) are just a few of them. The slender volume Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1874) is an exposition of a little-known but historically important logician and scholar whose lectures in Berlin had inspired Morris. It remains perhaps the best source on Trendelenburg available in English.

It was as a teacher rather than a scholar that Morris may have had his most profound impact on the intellectual direction of the department. Most importantly, during an interregnum after 1880 during which he lectured for one term a year at Johns Hopkins, he met and developed the young John Dewey. Dewey joined Morris at Michigan in 1884 as an assistant professor and then as full professor from 1889 to 1894 (but for a one-year interruption). Following his teacher, Dewey began as an idealist, but under the influence of evolutionary ideas and functional psychology he gradually developed a signature doctrine: idealism engaged with and constrained by action and experience, which brought him recognition as one of the founders of American pragmatism. In his honor, the department awards an annual prize, funded by the James B. and Grace J. Nelson Endowment for the Teaching of Philosophy to a graduate student for excellence in teaching.

The decade that Dewey taught at Michigan was extraordinarily rich, and some of the best-known humanists and social scientists of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth blossomed in this environment, showing Dewey's mark. One example is the Michigan sociologist Charles Horton Cooley. (Cooley is remembered for, inter alia, his conception of the “looking glass self” which understands self-conscious reflection as made possible by the individual's recognition of the perceptions of others in society.) Another was James Rowland Angell (son of Michigan President James Burrill Angell) who finished an undergraduate and master's degree as Dewey's student. He would go on to develop the functionalist approach to psychology, in which mental processes are understood in terms of their functions in actively adapting the individual to the environment. Dewey taught Fred Newton Scott, then a Michigan undergraduate, later Michigan professor of English and Rhetoric; Scott cited Dewey's progressive ideas as shaping his own influential work on social rhetoric. Dewey's role as mentor extended to the junior faculty in the department, notably George Herbert Mead (1893-95) and James Hayden Tufts (1889–91), both of whom moved with Dewey to the University of Chicago and achieved considerable renown there.
Cooley and the younger Angell, both born and raised in Ann Arbor, bear witness to one aspect of the department's, and the university's maturation as loci of higher education. The department faculty up to the turn of the twentieth century had migrated from elsewhere, from France or Great Britain, or (most usually) the east coast of the United States, but they had created an environment where young men and women from Michigan and throughout the Midwest could find the conditions and guidance to grow into intellectual excellence. Michigan made it possible for them to fulfill their potential. In turn, the university was enriched, as many of these young scholars joined the faculty. Roy Wood Sellars (1905 - 50), the most eminent department member of the first part of the twentieth century, further attests to this.

Sellars was born in 1880 in southeastern Ontario and raised in the tiny town of Pinnebog, across Lake Huron at the tip of the Michigan thumb. After eight years the village school had taught him all they could, and he moved on to the Big Rapids Industrial School (now Ferris State University). His talent was evident to his teachers there, and after one year of study they directed him to Ann Arbor, where he entered as an undergraduate in 1899 and (with visits to the Sorbonne, University of Heidelberg and the Hartford Theological Seminary) earned his PhD in 1909, four years after he had begun teaching in the department. Sellars displayed a Deweyan spirit in that his thought was engaged with evolutionary ideas, immersed in the natural and social sciences, and involved a reaction to idealism, but unlike Dewey this led him to a form of materialist metaphysics he called evolutionary naturalism. A distinctive feature of his view was the importance it placed on emergent properties – features of an organism or process (or philosophy department?) that come to be only as it develops (for instance through increasingly complex and systematic interactions with an environment). In an essay describing his reluctance to use the label “materialism” for his own view, he noted that the label can be and had been taken to signify “an emphasis on stuff rather than organization” and that “matter, or stuff, needs to be supplemented by terms like integration, pattern, function”. (Other reservations he indicated with old-fashioned materialism were an overly simple mechanism about nature, and what he perceived to be a difficulty in finding a place for “the significance of values and ideals”.

Sellars is often identified with an anti-idealist, anti-pragmatist movement/school called Critical Realism, making common cause with other American opponents of idealism, including George Santayana and the historian of ideas Arthur Lovejoy. The family of overlapping views were presented in the influential collection Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge (1920). That realism was put forward as a response to the dominant idealism of the late nineteenth century was not unusual. The roughly contemporaneous “Oxford Realism” of John Cook Wilson and his students similarly responded to the idealism that dominated Great Britain, for example. What marked off Sellars's brand of Critical Realism was its embrace of the results and methods of the natural sciences and of scientific psychology for the study of perception and the mind, in contrast to the indifference and in some cases even hostility to natural science and scientific psychology of the Oxford counterparts.

One of Sellars's pedagogical innovations would have a profound shaping role on the department. He was the first to offer a course in what we now call the philosophy of science, drawing from (among other resources) the writings of the physicists Ernst Mach and Henri Poincaré and The Grammar of Science, an early textbook of scientific methodology, by the statistician Karl Pearson.
In addition to his research on knowledge and metaphysics, Sellars strove to articulate a non-Marxist democratic socialism in political philosophy and a humanist vision, broadly religious though rejecting supernatural revelation, to which he gave voice as a principal author of *A Humanist Manifesto* (1933).

During the 45 years that Sellars was a dominant presence in the department and in American philosophy, the department sustained a commitment to intellectual balance. For example, George Rebec (’91, Ph.D. ‘97) (1894-1909) studied aesthetics and its history, and R. M. Wenley (1896-1929) was an idealist broadly in the style of Morris. In 1935-37, as a sabbatical replacement, Alice Ambrose briefly joined the department, having just compiled the “Brown Book” of her mentor Wittgenstein's lessons to his students. (From the 1930s to the late 1950s this and another mimeographed notebook called “The Blue Book” were the only ways for philosophers outside Cambridge to learn the details of Wittgenstein's profound reflections, which would come to have a revolutionary effect in almost every area of philosophy when the details came to wide notice.)

In the early 20th century logic was transformed into a mathematical discipline with just a superficial resemblance to the theory of syllogisms that had remained largely unchanged since Aristotle. Responding to these changes, the department added a mathematical logician, Harold Langford (1929-60). Langford co-wrote (with C.I. Lewis) an influential textbook/research monograph *Symbolic Logic*, the first such work to include the logic of modality (i.e. of possibility and necessity), including a classification of modal logics in terms of characteristic axioms that is (in expanded form) still employed. As a research logician, Langford was one of the most important early contributors to what came to be called “model theory.” His most profound results are in connection with a now-standard method known as “elimination of quantifiers” for establishing a theory admits of mechanical techniques to decide if a sentence is a theorem of the theory.

With the addition of a second mathematical logician, Paul Henle (1937-46, 1950-62), and a third in Irving Copi (1948-69) the subject became a teaching strength of the department. (This development would be mirrored in the mathematics department, with Raymond Wilder, Roger Lyndon and John Addison supervising logic PhD's in the years 1940-64 creating a rich environment for the study of logic at the university.) A notable product of the logic cluster at Michigan was Arthur Burks, who completed a PhD under Langford in 1941, worked on the ENIAC computer project during WWII, and then with John Von Neumann at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, before returning to join the department Faculty. Burks became the founder and first director of the Computer Science program at Michigan (then called the Logic of Computers program, and subsequently Computer and Communication Science, and then Computer Science, before merging with Electrical Engineering) as its first director, and in 1959 he supervised Michigan's first Computer Science PhD, awarded to John Holland (who is still active as a Michigan professor of psychology and EECS, and 1992 MacArthur fellow.)

An indication of the attitude that had taken form in the department, was exemplified by a remarkable seminar in the academic year 1951-52. Organized by a group of department faculty led by Charles Stevenson (1946-77) with funding from the Rockefeller and Ford foundations and Rackham, the seminar drew among others the linguist Charles Fries, the linguist/anthropologists Dorothy D. Lee, Harry Hoijer and William E. Bittle, the statistician Joe Kennedy Adams, the
sociologist Eliot Freidson, psychologists Roger Brown, Donalson Dulany (two recent Michigan PhD's who would go on to distinguished careers) and Else Frenkel-Brunswik, the aestheticians Alexander Sesonske and Campbell Crockett, the classicist Eric Havelock the literary critic I. A. Richards, the theorist of aesthetics and symbolism Susanne Langer (who continued in 1954 as a visitor to the department) and philosophers of many specialties. Jointly, they explored how the mechanisms and structure of language affect perception, organization of experience, or culture. *Language, Thought and Culture*, a volume edited by Henle, contained papers by several department members plus the psychologists Brown and Dulany aiming to synthesize the diverse perspectives that had been presented in the conference. The papers reflect the richness of the conference that sparked them, but as one would expect after 60 years most are somewhat dated. But remarkably, a few remain valuable even today. Two papers by Stevenson - “Symbolism in the Representative Arts” and “Symbolism in the Non-Representative Arts” – remain among the best treatments of artistic expression from the point of view of a theory of meaning. Henle's “Metaphor” is a stunning example of how valuable a well-composed, broadly based survey paper can be. Henle acknowledges that he is stepping well outside his range of expertise, and that no particular thesis in the essay is original to him: he develops a classic position from Aristotle, represented in terms of the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Pierce. Yet the essay has become a classic reference due to its clarity, striking illustrative examples, and originality in the organization of the material. Some 20 years after its publication, Paul Ricoeur (a writer on metaphor with a background and approach as far from Henle as could be imagined) treated it respectfully as the best available presentation of the Aristotelian view, and more than a half-century later it is a standard choice in anthologies.

One way to capture one important element of what the department had become - undoctrinaire about disciplinary boundaries, eager to discover insight where ever it might be found - is just to note that it had evolved into a place where a project such as this conference and volume would seem to be a natural and desirable investment of its resources, and a place where such an intention could be carried out.

*The Contemporary Philosophy Department*

A natural boundary for the “present age” of the department is 1964, when Richard Brandt (1964 - 81) was hired as professor and chair. Brandt joined William Frankena (1937-80) and Stevenson, already veteran Michigan faculty, to constitute a formidable research cluster in ethics. Stevenson had already developed his “emotivist/expressivist” theory of moral judgment in *Ethics* and *Language* (1944) and many influential papers. (Stevenson extended the framework to aesthetic judgment, as noted above.) The emotivist theory fits the language of moral evaluation into a broadly naturalist world-view by taking moral statements to express attitudes rather than state facts. (“Naturalism” in this context indicates that only natural (rather than, for example, supernatural or spiritual) facts are legitimately invoked to account for ethical phenomena.) Frankena was notable for his profound immersion in the history of ethics, including Spinoza, Frances Hutcheson and Jonathan Edwards. Not unusually for one of Dutch descent raised in western Michigan, Frankena had a Calvinist upbringing, adding a distinctive richness to his thought harkening back to the department's first years. Though this is rarely an explicit point of reference in his writing, he did occasionally take up the topic directly, as in the illuminating
treatment of the concept of *agápē* in “Love and Principle in Christian Ethics” (1964). In addition to thoughtful and profound studies of a range of questions in ethics and the philosophy of education, Frankena wrote an exceptional elementary textbook *Ethics* (1963 and subsequent editions) which remained in wide use for decades. His standing in the profession was affirmed when he was elected head of the American Philosophical Association (APA) and was admitted as a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), among many other honors.

Brandt – like Frankena a fellow of the AAAS - was one of the most significant twentieth-century defender of the position called “rule utilitarianism”. The view is a variety of “consequentialism” - that the moral rightness of conduct derives from the value of their consequences. (For the utilitarian, these consequences are themselves evaluated in terms of human well being.) The qualifier “rule” reflects that consequences of the adoption of moral rules (or what Brandt called “moral codes”) rather than consequences of individual acts serve as basic in the account. In 1974 he gave Oxford's John Locke Lectures, which were the basis for his *A Theory of the Good and the Right* (1979). Though Brandt's thinking was a paradigm of the analytic style of contemporary English-language philosophy, it drew from a wide range of sources. His writings include *The Philosophy of Schleirmacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (1968) and an engagement with native American ethical reasoning in *Hopi Ethics: A Theoretical Analysis* (1954).

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In this generation, yet another intellectual dimension was represented by Jaegwon Kim, who made influential contributions to the mind-body problem and the clarification of mental causation in a more traditional style, drawing mostly on debates and principles internal to the philosophical community. Concerning the mind-body problem, Kim originally endorsed the theory that the mind and brain are identical, but then he became convinced that this could not explain the felt quality of mental experience. He subsequently refined his stance to distinguish classes of mental states that he holds to be reducible to physical states (in particular, beliefs and desires, which can be characterized in terms of systems that ultimately lead to actions) from felt conscious experiences that cannot be so reduced. Since he also rejects the thesis that the mind can act independently of physical actions he argues that mental events “supervene” on physical events though they cannot all be reduced to physical events. (Roughly, Events of type A supervene on those of type B if there can be no change in A-events without some corresponding change in B-events.) With characteristic precision, he found that metaphysical understanding of supervenience was too coarse to fit exactly the conception of mind-body relation he was striving to clarify, and his important work refining the concept of supervenience addressed that lack.

Other members of the department shared the outward-looking orientation. AAAS fellow Ken
Walton's (1967, Emeritus 2012) research in aesthetics, metaphor and representation, which produced inter alia the influential *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (1990), drew from his training in music. Walton's theory of make believe has not only had a great influence on artists, art critics, and philosophers of art; it has also inspired various “fictionalist” accounts of nonaesthetic phenomena. George Mavrodes's (1959, Emeritus 1995) philosophy of religion was engaged with Biblical criticism and Christian apologetics, Donald Munro's (1964, Emeritus 1996) research into classical Chinese and Neo-Confucian philosophy included attention to broader cultural and historical dimensions, and as noted department veteran Arthur Burks's research into causation and scientific method was informed by prior research in the analysis of computation, as part of a collaboration designing early electronic computers. Jack Meiland (1962-97) extended his early work on skepticism in epistemology to include an investigation of relativism about knowledge (cognitive relativism) drawing on anthropology as well as more familiar philosophical discussions. (His main contributions in this domain were aimed at defending cognitive relativism against a familiar charge that Meiland called “the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism”: the thesis is self-refuting since it cannot itself be justified if it is true.) In *On Being Free* (1977) Fritjof Bergmann (1961, Emeritus 1999) wrote a provocative and novel examination of freedom of the will as understood in terms of self-development rather than metaphysical causation. The reflections that informed the book included his scholarly engagement with Hegel, Nietzsche and Freud.

The department developed in these signature directions over the next two decades. As Frankena, Brandt and Stevenson retired, the department welcomed Allan Gibbard in 1977 and then, through the 1980s, Peter Railton, David Velleman, Stephen Darwall and Elizabeth Anderson. (The research environment in ethics was further enriched by the arrival of Donald Regan (PhD Philosophy ’68) to the law school.) To build on this strength, jointly with overlapping strong departments of the university, the department (with the energetic lead taken by Elizabeth Anderson) has recently joined with the Economics and Political Science to establish a program in Philosophy, Politics and Economics.
Much of Gibbard's work in ethics supported and developed prior work in the department. In particular, his *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment* (1990) is a tour de force realization and defense of Stevenson's emotivist/expressivist stance, widely recognized as a major advance and the definitive treatment of the topic. *Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics* (2008) arrives, as did Brandt, at a broadly utilitarian framework. In addition to this and other lasting work in ethics, Gibbard has made seminal contributions to metaphysics, the philosophy of language and social choice theory (including the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on strategic voting). Reflecting this breadth, Gibbard's membership in the AAAS is paired with a membership in the National Academy of Sciences: an unusual distinction for an academic philosopher. Gibbard's aim to account for moral values and the objectivity of judgments in natural terms is shared by his fellow AAAS member Railton. Like Gibbard, Railton favors a consequentialist theory of moral requirements. But unlike Gibbard, his naturalist account of reasons and values is a "realist" account: our judgments about what is right and good, he argues, are judgments about the way things are. More specifically, according to Railton, a person's good is a function of her attitudes; and what we are morally obligated to do is a function of which actions we can rationally endorse when we attribute equal significance to everyone's good. The highly influential papers defending these views are collected in *Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence* (2003). The shared naturalist outlook has supported important collaborations and parallel research on morality in light of biology and motivational psychology, among other empirical topics. (This included, for example, a popular graduate seminar on morality and evolution run by Gibbard, Railton and Chandra Sripada (one of the next generation of ethicists in the department, shared with the Psychiatry Department of the Medical School).

Darwall's work is less explicitly naturalist, and Kantian sympathies are more prominent, beginning with his account of the impersonal character of moral obligation, *Impartial Reason* (1983). Moral obligation is revisited in the more recent *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability* (2006), which articulates his novel idea of the “second person standpoint”: that our moral rights are grounded in our authority to make certain demands on one another. Like Frankena before him, his research draws deeply on the history of ethics, including such relatively neglected byways as Hutcheson and Adam Smith. (See *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740,* (1995) for an example.) Velleman's work centers on the concept of intentional human action, drawing especially from the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein's disciple Elizabeth Anscombe. His reflections on human motives and intellectual life draw also on Freud and classical psychoanalysis to clarify the role that self-interpretation plays in rational agency. Further informing this project are his studies of narrative as a style of explanation. Anderson (joint with Women's Studies, sometime adjunct at the Law School and also an AAAS fellow) is more directly engaged with political philosophy and questions of public policy in her ethical writings. In particular, she has developed profoundly illuminating reflections on the nature and importance of equality, as a mode of relating to others as equals (as opposed to superiors and inferiors), in contrast with egalitarian theories that focus on equality in the distribution of goods. Most recently this has borne fruit in her *The Imperative of Integration* (2010), examining racial integration through this lens. Here too the work has a historical dimension, informed by original scholarly work on Kant's practical philosophy, John Stuart Mill, and (a special nod to department tradition) the moral philosophy of John Dewey. Like Anderson, recent arrival Ishani Maitra (2012) examines ethical questions with direct
implications for public policy, drawing on her expertise in philosophy of language noted below to clarify questions surrounding the scope of freedom of speech principles, hate speech, silencing and responsibility for what one says.

With the departures of Darwall and Velleman a torch was passed to Sarah Buss (2007) and Dan Jacobson (2009). Buss works on many issues at the intersection of the questions addressed by Darwall and Velleman. Like the former, she has developed accounts of the nature and basis of moral respect. Like the latter, she has developed accounts of intentional action and personal autonomy. Like both Darwall and Velleman, she has joined Gibbard and Railton and their predecessors in the debate over the nature of reasons for action. Her account of personal autonomy challenges widespread assumptions about how someone must relate to her actions in order to be morally responsible for what she does. She has also offered novel accounts of weakness of will, reasons for action, the problem with incoherent intentions and beliefs, the nature and basis of moral respect, and the rationality of our concern for our own happiness. Jacobson's work in moral theory is, like Anderson's, distinguished by a deep immersion in the work of John Stuart Mill. His account of moral judgment is, like Gibbard's and Railton's, informed by a thorough study of the psychology of human sentiments and emotions. He relates this account to analyses of such nonmoral reactions as horror and amusement; and this work is closely tied to his important contributions in aesthetics. The scope of the examination of responses is not restricted to specifically moral ones, such as moral approval or blame, but rather extends to reactions of horror, amusement and assessments of beauty. This width of focus encompasses Jacobson's study of aesthetics, including historical work on the writings of Sir Philip Sidney. It is uncommon for a philosophy department in the English speaking world to have even one scholar in philosophical aesthetics. With Walton and Jacobson, joined by Daniel Herwitz (2002, joint with Art History and Comparative Literature) the Michigan department is in an unrivaled position. Herwitz's contributions are so wide ranging as to defy easy summary. They range from the Indian artist Husain, to the aesthetics of stardom and celebrity, to the philosophical issues raised by the opera Don Giovanni. For many years the department also profited from the broad learning of David Hills (1983–99) who made penetrating contributions to the study of metaphor.

Jacobson and Justin D'Arms of Ohio State have established an innovative program called the Science of Ethics Project, with the support of the Templeton Foundation, that is reminiscent in some ways of Henle's interdisciplinary seminar “back in the day”. The aim of the project is to bring together traditional a priori approaches to ethical questions with the more recent trend of ethical study drawing from empirical psychological study. Two summer workshops, “On Moral Psychology and Human Agency” and “Human Nature and Moral Knowledge,” have already been held. Two book projects: Rational Sentimentalism by Jacobson and D'Arms, and Self and Self-Control by Chandra Sripada, are being written, drawing from the insights developed through the workshops.

For metaphysics and theories of knowledge the 1980s and 1990s were decades of excellent, diverse research, though also some turmoil, with a sequence of exceptional researchers joining the department and then departing after more or less a decade. These included the logician/metaphysicians Kit Fine (1978-88) and Stephen Yablo (1986-98), the philosopher of language and logic Crispin Wright (1987-94), the philosopher of language and epistemologist Paul Boghossian (1984-92), the metaphysician and feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger (1992-
98) and (even more briefly) the philosopher of biology and language Ruth Millikan whose strikingly original approach to meaning in language engaged it with the concept of purpose in humans and animals. There was important work done in this interregnum. Fine worked out the foundations of modal logic (the logic of necessity and possibility) which supported a subsequent revitalization of the study of the concept of essence in modal metaphysics. Wright carried out the research on the concept of truth that culminated in the landmark *Truth and Objectivity* (1992). The core thesis of this book is that our patterns of argument and discourse do not require a concept of metaphysical truth as such, but only a weaker concept of robustly stable correct assertion that Wright calls “superassertibility”. Haslanger made deep contributions to abstract metaphysics of object-identity over time and the relation of laws of nature to the particular contingent facts they govern, and to feminism, including illuminating work blending the two domains, on the concept of “the natural” from a feminist point of view. Boghossian examined the concept of semantic content, which led to a searching examination of *a priori* and logical knowledge. Yablo’s eclectic work included a compelling study of mental causation and a striking example of a logical paradox in the application of “is true” that – unlike other, familiar paradoxes of that type – involves no self-reference.

With the 2000s, the department entered a phase of greater stability in metaphysics and epistemology, with two unifying themes. One advances on the trail blazed earlier by Sklar, drawing insight for philosophy from the research practice of natural sciences, broadly understood as encompassing statistics, mathematics and psychology. The other draws from philosophical logic and linguistics. The second group will be discussed after the first, which includes James Joyce (beginning 1991; courtesy appointment in Statistics), Jamie Tappenden (1997), Laura Ruetsche (2008), Gordon Belot (2008) and David Baker (2008). (This group is further enriched by Railton's work in scientific explanation and Anderson's in feminist philosophy of science and knowledge.) Ruetsche, Belot and Baker join Sklar in a remarkably rich concentration of philosophers engaged with contemporary foundational physics, rethinking many traditional methodological and metaphysical principles in that light. In *Geometric Possibility* (2013) Belot (a member of the Michigan Center for Theoretical Physics) revisited a centuries-old debate between the idea of space as a substance in itself and that of space as merely a relationship among objects with no additional reality beyond the relations, to ascertain what sense can be made of a range of conceptions of physical possibility in each context. Pairing Belot's research “in the large”, Ruetsche, in *Interpreting Quantum Theories: The Art of the Possible* confronts possibility “in the small”, fighting through the frightful complexities of quantum field theory. Baker's work also takes on quantum field theory, with a special eye toward understanding principles of symmetry (a concern shared by Belot).

Joyce's work concerns the foundations of probabilistic and statistical reasoning, and their consequences for our conception of rational belief. His *The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory* lays out a defense of an approach to rational decision in conditions of uncertainty that incorporates as basic the concept of one event causing another. (In contrast to previous approaches that attempted to make do with a more metaphysically parsimonious relation of one event being evidence for another.) His strikingly novel justification of the logic of degrees of partial belief (also known as the Bayesian approach to probability) develops a measure of accuracy of systems of partial belief (“Gradational Accuracy”) and proves that all and only beliefs that are accurate in the relevant sense satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. (This
stands in contrast to the standard pragmatic argument (the so-called “Dutch Book Argument”) that links beliefs satisfying the probability calculus to the acceptance of non-disadvantageous sets of wagers. Among the benefits to the department's intellectual horizons from Joyce's technical mastery have been joint seminars with colleagues outside the department on questions of methodology, including (in one memorable case) a Rackham seminar with colleagues in statistics and astrophysics addressing questions of method relating to dark matter and the formation of galaxies. Tappenden studies the role of less tangible yardsticks for evaluating concepts such as the “fruitfulness” of a concept or its “depth”, drawing from case studies in contemporary and historical mathematical practice, principally in number theory, algebraic geometry and complex analysis.

David Manley (2009) and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) approach metaphysics and epistemology in a more traditional philosophical style, with greater reliance on a priori methods and arguments. Manley's work includes both the analysis of specific metaphysical questions and investigations in broader methodology. Among the former are his penetrating contributions to the puzzling category of “dispositional property”. (These are properties such as “soluble”, that involve tendencies to behave in specific ways (for example: dissolve) in specific conditions (for example: immersed in a solvent)). His research in the latter domain has produced important contributions to the field of “metametaphysics” which investigates with what methods (if any), and in what respects traditional questions concerning the fundamental nature of reality can be meaningfully addressed. Lasonen-Aarnio has contributed insight to many debates in epistemology, among them recent discussions of “higher order evidence”. (This is information that does not directly support or undercut a proposition, but rather indicates that the techniques of evidence gathering and evaluation may be flawed. Perhaps a drug the believer is taking has an unanticipated mind-fogging side effect. Perhaps a scientific instrument a researcher has relied on is discovered to be less reliable in certain temperatures.) A recurring motif in her work is externalism: the view that the content of thoughts and the correctness of attributions of knowledge depend on conditions independent of the mind. (The contrast is with a view associated with René Descartes, holding that to know something is to be in a certain kind of mental state, all the relevant features of which are in principle discoverable just by self-conscious reflection.)

The current philosophy of language and logic circle began to take shape with the arrival of Richmond Thomason in 1999 (jointly with Linguistics and Electrical Engineering/Computer Science). Thomason's work spans a breathtaking range of subjects, including classic contributions to logics incorporating modality (necessity and possibility) and references to time, along with work in non-monotonic logic (reasoning with systems of default assumptions that may need to be withdrawn) and computational linguistics. A central goal of the work is the logical formalization and computer representation of the patterns of ordinary commonsense reasoning and discourse, with special attention in recent years to formalizing the meanings of complex words (e.g. words with morphemes such as –able and –er.) In the years immediately following, the department hired two more philosophers of linguistics and language, Jason Stanley (2000-04) and Peter Ludlow (2002-07 joint with Linguistics), and though both departed within five years, the concentration of scholarship made possible a framework of research and student support that persisted after their departure. (This includes a widely attended annual philosophy and linguistics workshop Thomason initiated, marking its eleventh year in 2013).
The logic/philosophy of language group was reinforced in the most recent decade with the appointments of Eric Swanson (2006, also a faculty associate of the Center for Russian, Eastern European and Eurasian Studies), Sarah Moss (2009), Brian Weatherson (2012) and Ishani Maitra (2012). (Also contributing to this research cluster are Tappenden on logical paradoxes, vagueness and negation, Manley on reference, and Gibbard on the semantics of expressive statements, as well as the semanticist Ezra Keshet (2012, jointly with Linguistics).)

Swanson studies linguistic meaning with reference to a wide range of operators such as “might”, “may”, “should” “must”, “would”, “could”, as well as those such as “believes” and “knows”, that have been more customary objects of study in the last half-century. Impelled by the subtle behavior of this broader lexicon, he has developed “constraint semantics”, which reorients the study of meaning from the study of propositions to that of broader constraints on attitudes that speakers can convey. (For example, a statement could convey/recommend belief in the truth of a proposition, but it could also just indicate that certain possibilities should not be ruled out.) Moss incorporates the philosophy of language within the project of “formal epistemology” in which beliefs are not taken to be just believed or not, as an all-or-nothing matter but rather held with degrees of credibility typically short of full certainty. The core insight and the basic principles of calculating probabilities that underwrite the evaluation of credences have been recognized for some time, but Moss's subtle work reveals that the range of attitudes that may be treated in this way is much broader than had been suspected. Among other advantages, this allows the study of operators like “might”, “may”, “could”, etc. to be subsumed within a much richer cognitive framework.

Weatherson's numerous, influential contributions to epistemology and philosophy of language share this penchant for synthesis between sub-disciplines. For example, Weatherson has argued that we should think of attributions of knowledge to be relative to our interests. (Generalizing and developing the basic observation that if someone believes a proposition that is to some degree uncertain, we might say the person knows the proposition if nothing significant hangs on the proposition being true, though we might deny he knew it if it were a matter of life and death.) Weatherson's development and defense of the view engages traditional epistemology with the technical theory of rational decision under uncertainty, which illuminates both subjects, often in unexpected ways. Other targets of Weatherson's searchlight have included vagueness, epistemological skepticism, the metaphysics of “naturalness” and the epistemological issues raised by the existence of disagreement. Maitra's research has covered assertion, context and testimony, with special attention to issues of ethics and policy (in addition to the work in ethics and the philosophy of law noted above).

Eric Lormand (1991) and Chandra Sripada (2009) work in cognitive science as well, though less directly engaged with issues of language and linguistics. Lormand has contributed important work on a range of topics relating to meaning and the mind, though he has a particular taste for topics that present challenges to the foundations of cognitive science: consciousness, the felt experienced quality of perception (sometimes referred to with the label “qualia”), and the characterization of the content and significance of perceptual illusions and of “inner sense”. Some of his research deals with “the frame problem”: the challenge - in both artificial intelligence and in the characterization of human “common sense” - of ascertaining the means by which a thinking system can avoid being overwhelmed by data through fixing what is “relevant” and what isn't.
Sripada's work, as noted above, addresses questions in ethics, specifically relating to concepts such as freedom of the will and norms of behavior, by engaging with empirical research in neuroscience and psychiatry concerning human motivation, self-regulation, and intention. Several faculty from philosophy and elsewhere, organized by Sripada are developing a joint program in cognitive science to take advantage of the overlapping strengths of several departments.

The flourishing of the study of cognitive science both in the department and elsewhere in the university is helped along through the Marshall M. Weinberg Fund for Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, established through the generosity of Marshall Weinberg (B.A. 50). The purpose of the fund is to foster connections and fruitful interactions among like-minded researchers in different corners of the university. To this end, the fund supports visiting professorships, joint interdisciplinary seminars and a yearly conference on some dimension of cognitive science sponsored on a rotating basis by different departments of the university.

From its first stirrings at Michigan the department has maintained a commitment to the study of the history of philosophy. In recent decades this has been a particular focus for Louis Loeb (1974), Edwin Curley (1993, Emeritus 2010) and Tad Schmaltz (2010). (Other department history scholars are the historians of ethics mentioned above - Darwall, Frankena, Anderson, and Jacobson, along with Tappenden, who has carried out research in the history of analytic philosophy, particularly the philosopher/mathematician Gottlob Frege.) Past president of the American Philosophical Association and AAAS member Curley is known for his edition of Spinoza's *Collected Works* (vol 1, 1985; vol 2 in progress) and many books and articles on Spinoza including the influential *Beyond the Geometrical Method* on Spinoza's metaphysics. In addition, Curley edited an edition of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, and he is the author of *Descartes Against the Skeptics* (1978), among the earlier presentations of a view now broadly accepted, that a 15th Century revival of ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism was a significant shaping factor in the development of early modern philosophy. Through his career he has sustained an interest in the emergence of religious toleration, exploring the topic in many publications and venues including the 1997-98 annual seminar (jointly with Stephen Darwall) at U of M.'s Advanced Study Center of the International Institute. He is currently finishing a book drawing together his views on the subject.

Loeb's research addresses philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including a highly regarded study on David Hume *Stability, and Justification in Hume's Treatise* (2002). The Hume research was of great interest even outside the confines of Hume scholarship, as shown by the invitation to deliver the American Philosophical Association's Patrick Romanell Lecture on Philosophical Naturalism for 2006-2007. His *From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy* (1981) is an eye-opening study in the history of ideas, charting the process whereby an over-simplified narrative of the modern period (as a clash between the world views of “the rationalists” Descartes/Spinoza/Leibniz and the “British Empiricists” John Locke/Bishop Berkeley/Hume) came to be fixed in place. Schmaltz's research centers on Descartes and his influence, with his *Malebranche’s Theory of the Soul* (1996) and *Radical Cartesianism* (2002) exploring the influence of Descartes’s writings on seventeenth century French intellectual life, and his *Descartes on Causation* (2008) exploring Cartesian metaphysics. Like Curley, he maintains an interest in the philosophical background to Descartes, though principally the “official” scholastic philosophy of the late Medieval period.
rather than the skeptic's intellectual rebellion. A further research interest is the relationship among the history of philosophy, the history of science and the philosophy of science, particularly with respect to developments in the course of the "Scientific Revolution" during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This interest is reflected in the volume he has edited with the historian of science Seymour Mauskopf: Integrating History and Philosophy of Science: Problems and Prospects.

Ian Proops (1998-2008) and Michele Kosch (2000-06) (as well as Bergmann, noted above) contributed expertise on the topics of late eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophy. During her time in the department, Kosch wrote Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard (2006), while Proops wrote papers on Kant's conceptions of deduction and analytic judgment. Proops combined his interest in Kant with research on the history of 20th century analytic philosophy, particularly Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein.

The department has also had a long-standing interest in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. The interest has not been so much in the history of ideas, as the study of how ideas succeed one another (as if they were on display in a museum), but rather in engaging historical texts philosophically to find and test their merit, by using the full armory of philosophical tools and classical scholarship. An early proponent of this approach was Julius Moravcsik (1959-68), who was trained at both Harvard and Oxford, and tried to show how many of the same questions raised by analytic philosophers, especially in the philosophy of language, could be found in Plato. His early article, “Being and Meaning in the Sophist” and later articles on the Meno often connected the texts to philosophers of language such as Frege, Chomsky, Kaplan, and Donnellan, among others. His successor, Nicholas White (1969-94), continued this tradition with great vigor, although focusing more on Plato's epistemology and metaphysics (Plato on Knowledge and Reality, A Companion to Plato's Republic, a translation, introduction, and notes to Plato's Sophist). He also wrote important articles on Aristotle's essentialism and conception of identity, as well as a number of forays into Stoic ethics (including a translation of Epictetus' Handbook), long before the later renaissance of interest in Hellenistic philosophy in the rest of the world. Towards the end of his stay at Michigan, the department hired a second specialist in ancient philosophy, Alan Code (1990-92), who has written many seminal articles on Aristotle's Metaphysics, with the aim of making Michigan a destination for graduate students wishing to study ancient philosophy from a philosophical perspective. Though White and Code's partnership was short-lived, the Departments of Philosophy and Classical Studies (which share the whole second floor of Angell Hall) remained committed to developing a strength in this interdisciplinary area, a natural aspiration given the national and international standing of both departments.

After a succession of junior hires — first, Stephen Everson (1994-99), who worked on Aristotle's philosophy of mind and perception, and Rachana Kamtekar (2000-04), who focused on Plato's moral psychology, ethics, and politics — the department brought in a senior scholar, Victor Caston (2005-present), with the express aim of forming a program in ancient philosophy. Caston's own research concentrates on philosophy of mind and metaphysics in antiquity, especially the problem of intentionality, from the Presocratics and Sophists down to Augustine and Boethius. His main publications are on Aristotle's philosophy of mind, including papers on the mind-body problem and mental causation; on intentionality and mental representation; and
consciousness. He has recently published a translation and commentary of the first half of *On the Soul* by Alexander of Aphrodisias, one of the most important Aristotelians in the later tradition, alongside Aquinas and Averroes. He is currently writing a monograph, entitled *The Stoics on Mental Representation and Content*, as well as a translation and commentary on the second half of Alexander's *On the Soul*.

With the hire of Matthew Evans from NYU in 2011, the department at last reached critical mass in ancient philosophy and began jointly with the Department of Classical Studies, a graduate Program in Ancient Philosophy. The program brings together six faculty members from different fields to form its core — in addition to Evans and Caston, it includes Richard Janko (Classical Studies), Sara Ahbel-Rappe (Classical Studies), Arlene Saxonhouse (Political Science), and David Halperin (English) — with seven other affiliated scholars, including the current chairs of both departments: Ruth Scodel (Classical Studies), who has published on Plato and has interests in the Sophists, and Laura Ruetzsche (Philosophy), who completed a BPhil at Oxford under John Ackrill on Plato’s *Timaeus*. Instead of offering a hybrid degree in the no-man’s-land between the two departments (as most other such programs do), Michigan decided instead to opt for a dual degree track, with students being accepted in one of the two programs for a PhD and simultaneously pursuing an MA in the other field. In this way, the traditional standards in each field is maintained, while giving students serious exposure to the methods and interests of the partner field.

The department gratefully acknowledges many benefactors who have contributed to an environment that fosters research, education and study. The interests and life paths that led the department's supporters to embrace philosophy and the department are available in more detail on the department's website. The Haller endowment is named for Dr. Elsa Haller, who earned a BA (1908), a philosophy MA (1922) and finally, at the age of 72, a philosophy PhD (1958). Established after her death in 1973, it supports financial awards for undergraduate essays of exceptional merit. The Denise Philosophy Endowment was established in honor of the late Theodore C. Denise (B.A., '42, Ph.D., '55), a longtime philosophy professor at Syracuse, by Malcolm L. Denise (B.A., '35, J.D., '37), and supplemented over the years by the Denise family and matching funds from Ford Motor Company. The endowment has enabled the Department to provide enhanced research support to faculty, especially assistant professors and other new members of the faculty. The Hough Fellowship was established in 1967, by bequest from Williston Hough (Ph.D., 1884), to support graduate students working in ethics or philosophy of psychology.

The James B. and Grace J. Nelson Endowment for the Teaching of Philosophy was funded by an initial gift in 1940 by James B. Nelson (LL.B., 1893) and supplemented over the years by Mr. and Mrs. Nelson and and Mrs. Julia-Jean Nelson Stokes. The Endowment funds a chair in philosophy (the Nelson Professorship) and supports the regular interaction with outside voices though the Nelson Philosophers-in-Residence and the Nelson Seminars in Philosophy and other support for visiting faculty, as well as providing support for the teaching and research programs of the Department. Exceptionally valuable for graduate students is the Nelson-fund supported annual Spring Colloquium, organized every year by the graduate students, on with the topic and speakers chosen by the students themselves.
A series of bequests that are particularly valued by everyone in the department are those from Marshall Weinberg (BA 1950), because they are part of a continuing lifelong engagement with philosophy that has made him a familiar, avuncular presence at colloquia and special events. After Weinberg's graduation from Michigan, he was briefly in a PhD program at Harvard before choosing a life in business. In addition to the cognitive science endowment mentioned above, the department annually awards the Frankena and Stevenson prizes for excellent student work from an endowment established to honor these excellent teachers. The Weinberg Professorship in Philosophy Endowment supports a distinguished senior appointment; the first, and current (2013) Weinberg Professor is Brian Weatherson. The Weinberg Endowment for Philosophy is a further, restricted endowment that is used to provide financial support to graduate students to remove obstacles to finishing their dissertations, by allowing them periods free of teaching responsibilities.

One series of gifts in particular have made a memorable contribution to the study and research atmosphere for generations of faculty and students. One of Brandt's first initiatives upon assuming the chairmanship in 1964 was to secure a library, which he regarded as indispensable to an excellent intellectual environment. Funding was supplied by Obert C. Tanner, a successful businessman, New Testament scholar and philosophy professor (University of Utah). (In addition to the trust that continues to support the library, Professor Tanner established the annual Tanner Lecture on Human Values.) Tanner's daughter had recently graduated with High Honors in philosophy. (The young woman who was then Carolyn Tanner did the department proud, as the Michigan degree was the first step in a life journey that passed through an Oxford M. Litt in philosophy, and a M. Div from the Virginia Theological Seminary. Ultimately the Right Reverend Tanner Irish became the Episcopal Bishop of the Utah Diocese, at the time only the fourth woman to be named bishop in the Episcopal Church.) Professor Tanner provided funds not just for the purchase of books and journals but also for interior design, creating a distinctive and comforting setting for research and reflection. The library opened in 1970 and was expanded in 1975, and again in 1996 to include the Annex – the room in which philosophy graduate seminars are held. Through these years it has remained at the location on the first floor of Angell Hall, now under the care of librarian, Molly Mahony, still serving as it has for generations of students as the warm and quiet place to do philosophy.