Dear Friends of Michigan Philosophy:

It is good to be in touch once again by way of Michigan Philosophy's annual newsletter and to update you on the Department.

The past year has been a wrenching one in higher education as the financial crisis caught up with leading public and major private institutions alike. The Department devoted much of 2009-10 to considering proposals for a series of possible budget reductions. We will need to trim back some luxuries in our programs, reconfiguring the first-year pro-seminar and the seminar for candidates so that they impose less on our ability to offer undergraduate courses. We also, regrettably, need to reduce the number of pure senior seminars, though changes in the graduate program should mitigate the impact. Graduate seminars will meet for longer hours and more systematically provide background, so that we expect fewer graduate students to enroll in 400-level undergraduate courses.

We also hope to achieve efficiencies in the teaching of introductory logic by utilizing computer-assisted instruction to reduce the demands on graduate student instructors in grading assignments and exams. The Department has some experience with computer technology in this area of the curriculum, suggesting that many students enjoy the immediate feedback and self-paced study computers allow. We hope at the same time to expand the traditional content of these courses (critical thinking and informal fallacies) to encompass additional topics selected term-to-term—for example, formal logic, probability and induction, statistics, counterfactual reasoning, and biases and heuristics. These steps should enhance the content of these courses and also help us meet the high demand for them.

As a result of these changes, tenure-stream faculty will be devoting a somewhat greater percentage of their effort to undergraduate teaching without attendant increases in class or discussion section size. (Final plans are not in place; we are implementing changes gradually and experimentally.) This is good news for undergraduates enrolling in the Department's courses at all levels. In addition, we are introducing exciting new courses, both introductory and advanced, that enrich our curriculum and keep it up-to-date. Please see below under “Undergraduate News and Curriculum.”


Ed is currently at work on a book focused on Spinoza’s *Theological-Political Treatise* and on completion of the final volume of his translation of Spinoza’s works for Princeton University Press. Ed’s translations, from the Latin and Dutch, are widely recognized as unsurpassed. He provides a wealth of scholarly and critical apparatus: textual, historical, and interpretive considerations bearing on controversial points of translation; copious footnotes engaging literature in five languages; commentary on critical editions; and a glossary-index of key terms. Historians of modern philosophy eagerly look forward to the second volume. Ed is also pursuing his interests in early modern political theory, with special attention to the development of the idea of religious toleration.
At Michigan, Ed has been a devoted undergraduate teacher. He served for many years, to good effect, as Chair of the Department’s Undergraduate Studies Committee. We will always remember his personal and intellectual courage in debating William Lane Craig on the existence of God before an audience of eight hundred in the Rackham Amphitheater in 1998. Ed began, “I have places I’d rather be tonight.” Even so, he felt an obligation to contribute to this sort of civic education. It is most fitting that Ed delivered the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts’ Thirtyth Distinguished Senior Faculty Lecture—“Is Religious Freedom a Good Thing?”—during his final year of active service. We are pleased that Ed expects to remain in Ann Arbor for the foreseeable future.

The Department is fortunate, notwithstanding the difficult economic climate, to have resources for new faculty recruitment. Our faculty is vital to everything we do and new colleagues reenergize our programs and the intellectual climate. Maria Aarnio and Tad Schmaltz join us this year.

Maria earned a B.Phil. and D.Phil. from Oxford University, where she held the Fitzjames Research Fellowship at Merton College. Her research has been primarily in epistemology, examining in particular misleading evidence that (putatively) has the force to destroy justification and knowledge. Her interests include modeling defeat and other epistemic phenomena within a formal framework. She has more than a half dozen papers, including “Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief?” (Erichsen) and “Unreasonable Knowledge” (forthcoming in Philosophical Perspective). Maria is also conducting research on peer disagreement. Her interests include metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of religion.

Tad has published articles and book chapters on various topics in early modern philosophy, especially early modern metaphysics. He has three single-authored books: Malebranche’s Theory of the Soul (Oxford), Radical Cartesianism (Cambridge), and, most recently, Descartes on Causation (Oxford). He is currently working on two edited volumes, a collection of essays on the history of the concept of efficient causation for the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series and a collection (co-edited with the historian of science Seymour Mauskopf) on problems and prospects for integrating history and philosophy of science. Tad also is continuing to work on receptions of Cartesianism, the influence of late scholasticism on early modern thought, early modern accounts of substance, causation and freedom, and the nature of the “Scientific Revolution.” He recently served a seven-year term as Editor of the Journal of the History of Philosophy. Tad comes to us from Duke. The productivity and record of distinction of ongoing faculty continues in ways we have come to expect, but that never cease to amaze. David Baker received the James T. Cushing Memorial Prize in History and Philosophy of Physics in recognition of his paper, “Against Field Interpretations of Quantum Field Theory,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2009. Dan Jacobson’s “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill” was selected for the 2009 Philosopher’s Annual as one of the ten best papers in the discipline published in 2008. Dan’s article originally appeared in the Philosophical Review. Laura Ruetsche has begun a term as Associate Editor of Philosophy of Science. Liz Anderson’s The Imperative of Integration (Princeton) appears this fall. David Manley’s co-edited Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford) came out last year. Oxford is publishing Ken Walton’s most recent collection, In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence, this fall. My collection, Reflection and the Stability of Belief: Essays on Descartes, Hume, and Reid (Oxford) appeared late summer. Linda Brakel, an Associated Scholar with the Department, has two recent books from Oxford: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and the A-Rational Mind (2009) and Unconscious Knowing and Other Essays in Psycho-Philosophical Analysis (2010).

Undergraduate News and Curriculum. JOSHUA GARDNER received the annual William K. Frankena Prize for excellence in the concentration. Josh will be teaching mathematics in Miami for two years in the Teach for America program. He was one of four undergraduates completing Honors theses—“Cost and the Demands of Morality” (Sarah Buss, faculty advisor). The others completing Honors projects were SAMUEL BURNS (at right), “Having Hands, Even in the Vat: What the Semantic Argument Really Shows about Skepticism” (Gordon Belot, faculty advisor); MATT MESSERSCHMIDT, “The Productive Conflict of Art and Philosophy in thus Spoke Zarathustra and the Prelude” (Jamie Tappenden); and THOMAS SCOTT-RAILTON, “Is Resistance Futile? The Emotional Foundation of Fictionality Resistance” (Ken Walton). The Provost’s Council on Student Honors has selected Sam to represent the University in competition for the Marshall Scholarship. Thomas and MAX FORKA also received Elsa L. Haller Prizes for Exceptional Achievement in Philosophy, a new award this year. Three students received our traditional Haller Prizes for essays of exceptional merit written in conjunction with intermediate or advanced courses: DYLAN VOLLANS, for “Resisting Expressivism” (in a seminar offered by Craig Roberts, visiting from OSU); Scott-Railton, “Compatibilism and Schizophrenia” (Knowledge and Reality, David Manley); and SHAI MADJAR, “The Practice of Referring” (Philosophy of Language, Eric Swanson).

The Undergraduate Philosophy Club held a half dozen meetings, on representative democracy, metaethics, personal identity, negative and positive conceptions of liberty, materialism, and moral relativism. Max Florka and Dylan Vollans, mentioned above, were among those who led discussions. The Secular Student Alliance and the Socratic Club also had a number of meetings during the year.

In activities outside the Department, JOSHUA FUNT is working with 826 Michigan—a non-profit organization dedicated to supporting students aged six to eighteen with their creative and
expository writing skills—to teach a philosophy workshop to young children. The class consists of reading children’s books and guiding philosophical discussion amongst the students. EDMUND ZAGORIN read a paper at the Third International Deleuze Conference, held in Amsterdam.

The Department has been active in adding new courses to the curriculum. These include two specialized introductions to philosophy in our 15x-series designed especially to engage topical interests of first and second year undergraduates. Science Fiction and Philosophy, to be taught by David Baker, will use science fiction as a springboard to discuss a variety of philosophical problems in metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of religion. David has taught a pilot for the course as a First-year Seminar. Chandra Sripada will introduce Experimental Philosophy, a rapidly growing field that applies survey and statistical methods derived from empirical psychology to philosophical questions. The course will focus on the structure of the concepts of knowledge and free will. Chandra’s fascinating survey of philosophical issues about willpower is the faculty article in this issue of MPN.

At the advanced undergraduate/graduate level, Tad Schmaltz will be introducing The Scientific Revolution, focusing on astronomy, physics, and biomedical science in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. This will be a marvelous compliment to our offerings in the philosophy of science and the history of philosophy. Also at this level, we are this Winter introducing a course devoted specifically to the philosophy of quantum mechanics; it will likely to rotate among members of our outstanding cluster of faculty in philosophy of physics. These courses come on the heels of Sarah Moss’s Formal Methods, a highly successful new offering last year. The course covers formal semantics, modal logic, conditionals, probability theory, and decision, game, and social choice theory together with recent philosophical literature that presupposes background in these areas. A number of other new courses are in the works.

Graduate News. We are gratified that graduate student placement continues to be strong, even in the highly adverse job market over the last two years. (This is not to minimize undeserved disappointments.) For information concerning recent placement, see the section on Recent Graduates.

Our continuing graduate students are collecting an impressive record of professional accomplishments. I mention some, with apologies for overlooking others. IAN FLORA, LINA JANSSON, and NEIL MEHTA were successful in a University-wide competition for Rackham Predoctoral Fellowships for 2010-11. Lina also received the Department’s John Dewey Prize for Excellence in Teaching as a graduate student instructor, and Neil the Department’s Marshall Weinberg Dissertation Fellowship. Ian, Lina, and NATE CHARLOW also served as co-editors of The Philosopher’s Annual. Nate received the Department’s Charles Stevenson Prize for excellence in a candidacy dossier. He spent four weeks this summer as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at St. Andrews, with additional support from a Rackham Research Grant. Nate also presented papers at the third Semantics and Philosophy in Europe conference and at the Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation at Amsterdam.

STEVE CAMPBELL, SVEN NYHOLM, and STEVE NAYAK- YOUNG organized the twenty-first annual spring colloquium, “Normative Reasons.” The external speakers were Tim Scanlon, Michael Smith, and Sharon Street, with the co-organizers serving as commentators on the respective talks. It was a splendid conference. Steve Campbell is among a handful of 2010-11 Dissertation Fellows at the Michigan Center for Ethics and Public Life. NAT COLEMAN is a Precandidacy Fellow at the Center for 2010-11. Nat presented “The Political Power of Sexual Preference” at the University of Cape Town, where he spent the summer as an International Affiliate researching interracial marriage in South Africa. He is also presenting a paper at the Manchester Metropolitan University Workshop in Political Theory. DAVID WIENS presented papers at annual meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association and the British Society for Ethical Theory. ALEX SILK and WILL THOMAS are also Precandidacy Fellows at the Center for Ethics. ANNA EDMONDS, DMITRI GALLOW, and DAN PETERSON received Weinberg Summer Fellowships during 2010.

SAM LIAO, with the support of a Rackham Research Grant, conducted empirical work on imaginative resistance and is co-presenting a paper on the topic at the Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Weekend. He also co-presented a paper on pornography for the European Society of Aesthetics and refereed for Philosophical Studies. Sam has co-authored (with Tamar Gendler) a review of philosophical and psychological literature on pretense and imagination. JON SHAHEEN presented at the 11th Szklarska Poreba Workshop and at the Paris-Amsterdam Logic Meetings of Young Researchers, and served as a referee for Review of Symbolic Logic. Jon also completed the requirements for the MSc in Logic at Amsterdam. DAN SINGER was a visiting student at Australian National University this summer with the support of a Rackham Research Grant. He presented papers at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, the Notre Dame/Northwestern Epistemology Conference, and the Princeton-Rutgers Graduate Conference. DUSTIN TUCKER’s paper on Ramsey’s Foundations of Mathematics appeared in the Review of Symbolic Logic. Dustin also presented a paper at a conference in honor of the 100th anniversary of the publication of Principia Mathematica and served as a reviewer for Journal of Philosophical Logic.

Special Events. Our calendar continues to be packed with talks, colloquia, and other special events and may be accessed by searching the appropriate date range at the News and Events section of our website. In addition to the Spring Colloquium (mentioned above), a few events merit attention here.

In November 2009, the Department sponsored “Logic, Linguistics, and Artificial Intelligence,” a conference exploring ideas inspired by Richard Thomasori’s work. Participants included some twenty philosophers, linguists, and computer scientists from Amsterdam, California-Davis, Edinburgh, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, MIT, Michigan State, Pittsburgh, Princeton, Rochester, Stanford, Texas, and Western Ontario, as well as Michigan. All reports—and the evidence of the group photos—indicate this was a very
successful event and a fitting tribute to Rich.

Frank Lewis (USC) and Robert Bolton (Rutgers) delivered talks as part of an active series of presentations in ancient philosophy, now in its fifth year. In March, Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University), a Michigan Ph.D., delivered the inaugural Tang Junyi Lectures, a series of four talks on Contemporary Confucian Virtue Politics. This lecture series, sponsored by Asian Languages and Cultures, is made possible by a generous grant from Don Munro, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Chinese.

Also in March, Philosophy sponsored another notable Tanner Lecture Program. Susan Neiman (Director of the Einstein Forum, Potsdam) delivered the Tanner Lecture on Human Values, “Victims and Heroes.” Neiman is the author of Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-up Idealists, one of the New York Times 100 Notable Books for 2008. Neiman is also author of Exile and Modern Thought and The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant. Philip Kitcher (Columbia) and Lorraine Daston (Committee on Social Thought, Chicago) served as commentators in the Symposium on the Tanner Lecture.

Of special note. MPN is unable to track the myriad accomplishments within the discipline of former Michigan doctoral students. Please search for “Umich Philosophy Placement” and begin with “pre-1990.” You will find a striking list of faculty positions, named professorships, and department chairs among Michigan Ph.D.s from this period.

There is an achievement outside the academy of special note. Last April, Barack Obama selected Anita Allen for appointment to the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (chaired by the political philosopher Amy Gutmann, President of the University of Pennsylvania). Anita, Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at UPenn Law School, holds a J.D. from Harvard and the Ph.D. in Philosophy from Michigan. She is widely recognized for her work on confidentiality in medicine, genetics and research, racial justice, and women’s health. She served on the original National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research and its Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Working Group in the 1990s.

These accomplishments remind us of the potential impact of the Department’s ongoing programs in normative ethics on informed discussion of pressing public policy issues. A number of intermediate level courses in applied ethics—Contemporary Moral Problems and Law and Philosophy—have been mainstays of our curriculum. At the same time, the Department has worked to strengthen our offerings in this area. In Winter 2007, Peter Railton introduced Moral Principles and Problems. This course, primarily intended for first- and second-year undergraduates, combines lectures on moral theory with discussion sections that focus on particular topics—for example, biomedical ethics and health care, environmental ethics, international justice, business ethics, and religion and morality. (See the Fall, 2006 MPN, available online.) This vehicle provides an opportunity for graduate students to expand their teaching portfolio in areas in demand at many hiring institutions, while affording Michigan undergraduates an opportunity for sophisticated engagement with normative issues early in their academic careers.

The generosity of donors makes possible many of the enhancements distinctive to Michigan Philosophy. The Marshall M. Weinberg Endowment for Philosophy funds the Frankena and Stevenson Prizes and the Weinberg Dissertation and Summer Fellowships—all mentioned above. The Weinberg Fund for Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences fosters the interdisciplinary cognitive science in the College. The Fund is supporting a marvelous conference, “Changing Minds,” this coming May. Karl Deisseroth (Bioengineering, Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University) will be the keynote speaker. Other speakers include Carl Craver (Philosophy, Washington University), Barry Dickson (Scientific Director, Research Institute of Molecular Pathology, Vienna), and Rachel Wong (Biological Structure, University of Washington). Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology, Psychology, and Philosophy are co-sponsoring the conference. We are grateful to Marshall for enhancements to both these endowments this past year.

Income from the Malcolm L. Denise Philosophy Endowment, honoring Theodore C. Denise, facilitates special efforts to recruit and retain faculty. We thank Patricia White and James Nickel for enhancing this vital resource. Thanks as well to Nathaniel Marrs for additions to a fund in his name that has been essential to special retention efforts. The Denise Endowment and Marrs Philosophy Fund have come to play an increasingly important role in maintaining a distinguished faculty at Michigan.

Jim Joyce served a remarkable term as Chair of the Department for the five year period 2005-10, including a one year extension of his term, without a leave or break. His final year, as the Department searched for ways to operate on a leaner budget without sacrificing the quality of our core graduate and undergraduate programs, was especially challenging. Jim’s affable good cheer was unflagging throughout this period, as earlier in his Chairmanship.

On his watch, Jim guided to fruition the two splendid faculty appointments for this year and ten faculty recruitments overall—representing approximately half our tenure-stream faculty! Sustaining this level of appointment activity requires enormous commitment. All the while, Jim taught our largest introductory course and mentored more than his share of graduate students. The Department and its students will long be in his debt.

Sincerely,

Louis Loeb,
Interim Chair
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF WILLPOWER*

Chandra Sekhar Sripada

Abstract
In this paper, I survey four key questions about willpower: How is willpower possible? Why does willpower fail? How does willpower relate to other self-regulatory processes? and What are the connections between willpower and weakness of will? Empirical research into willpower is growing rapidly and yielding some fascinating new findings. This survey emphasizes areas in which empirical progress in understanding willpower helps to advance traditional philosophical debates.

Consider the dieter who so much wants to lose weight, but when the dessert cart rolls by, succumbs. Or the lush who promises himself that he will have just one glass of wine, but in the end can’t resist having a second and a third. Or even the 10th year graduate student who is supposed to be writing her dissertation, but caves in when her friends pressure to her to go to the party. Folk practice explains the failure of these agents to achieve what they had originally set out to do in terms of the absence or insufficiency of willpower. But what exactly is willpower and how does it work? Asking this question immediately raises fascinating issues at the intersection of philosophy and a number of adjoining empirical disciplines including psychology, neuroscience, and psychiatry. This paper surveys four key questions about the nature of willpower that are particularly interesting from a philosophical perspective. Some of the questions posed in this survey are addressed in the current literature in only formative or tentative ways. Thus this survey of the literature also serves as an agenda for future research.

Question 1: How is self-control possible? How can the self control itself?
Common sense understands willpower as a form of self-control. An agent exercising willpower attenuates or suppresses one of her own desires, or in some other way prevents that desire from winning control over action. Willpower is a form of synchronic self-control. In this form of self-control, an occurrent desire is prevented from prevailing in action. Synchronic self-control can be contrasted with diachronic control, in which an agent seeks to prevent some non-occurent future desire from driving action. For example, suppose right now Charlie most desires to stay on his diet and he does not have a desire to eat a slice of cake. But he knows that were he to go to the pastry shop with his friends, the sight of the cherry chocolate cake would trigger a desire for the cake to which he is sure he will succumb. So Charlie decides to stay at home rather than go to the pastry shop with his friends, and in this way ensures that the desire to eat the cherry chocolate cake will not be triggered. But in preventing this potential future desire from becoming active and prevailing in action, Charlie does not exercise willpower. Willpower, as a species of synchronic self-control, requires that the desire that is rendered motivationally inefficacious be active at the very time willpower is exercised.

Some philosophers have found the idea of synchronic self-control (and a fortiori, exercises of willpower) puzzling. The starting place for this puzzle is the observation that there is a tight connection between what an agent most desires to do and what an agent will do. We can put this idea in a slightly more rigorous form:

(1) If an agent most desires to perform some action \( x \), and if she believes herself free to \( x \), then she will \( x \), if she does anything at all intentionally.

If we grant (1), then this leads to a dilemma about willpower that we can illustrate by means of another example. Suppose Charlie is on a diet, but one evening he goes to the pastry shop with his friends. Now he finds his strongest desire is to eat an enormous slice of cherry chocolate cake. If eating the cake is indeed his strongest desire, then how can Charlie exercise willpower to try not to eat the cake? Given (1), and given that exercising willpower is not what Charlie most desires, then Charlie will eat the cake and will not exert willpower to try not to eat the cake. But suppose then, and this takes us to the other horn of the dilemma, that eating the cake is not Charlie’s strongest desire. That is, Charlie has a strong desire to eat the cake, but the desire to stay on his diet remains his strongest desire. In this case, there doesn’t seem to be any need for willpower. Given (1), and given that staying on the diet remains Charlie’s strongest desire, then Charlie will stay on his diet. There is no special need to invoke the exercise of willpower to explain why Charlie stays on his diet and does not eat the cake.

One solution to this ‘puzzle of synchronic self-control’ is to deny that exercises of willpower are properly called actions. According to Jeannette Kennett and Michael Smith (Kennett and Smith “Frog and Toad Lose Control; Kennett and Smith “Synchronic Self-Control Is Always Non-Actional”), willpower consists in an agent’s dispositions to have certain thoughts – thoughts that highlight certain considerations while deemphasizing others, thus overall enhancing (or blunting) the strengths of the agent’s desires. For example, at the moment that Charlie most desires to eat the chocolate cake, suppose Charlie experienced thoughts that the cake is a large lump of fat accompanied by images of the fat curdling in his stomach. The occurrence of ‘desire-modifying thoughts’ such as these would weaken Charlie’s desire to eat the cake and in this way allow Charlie’s desire to stay on his diet to prevail. Now, if Charlie needed to act to bring about these desire-modifying thoughts, then the puzzle of synchronic self-control would arise anew and we might wonder how Charlie can be motivated to summon up these desire-modifying thoughts when his strongest desire is to eat the cake. But, according to Kennett and Smith, desire-modifying thoughts are not brought about by means of an agent’s actions. Rather, thoughts such as these are happenings, and they are disposed to happen in a particular agent at a particular time precisely to the degree that that agent is rational at that time. Because desire-modifying thoughts are not the products of actions that Charlie undertakes, Charlie can experience desire-modifying thoughts that counteract his motivation to eat the cherry chocolate cake, even when the desire to eat the cake is his strongest desire.

*This article originally appeared in Philosophy Compass, Volume 5, Issue 9, (September, 2010), pp. 793-803. We gratefully acknowledge Wiley Publishers for permission to reprint in MPN.
A potential problem for Kennett and Smith is that it seems perfectly possible for a person to intentionally call to mind desire-modifying thoughts at the time of temptation, and to do so for the deliberate purpose of attenuating the temptation-directed desire. Indeed, it is the hallmark of certain forms of psychotherapy (Beck; Beck et al.) that a person should deliberately challenge thoughts associated with problematic emotions and desires. A second approach to the puzzle of synchronic self-control that perhaps does a better job in making sense of active exertions of willpower is based in the idea that the mind is partitioned into distinct motivational compartments. While philosophers have historically pursued ‘divided mind’ approaches that are rooted in Platonic and Freudian (Davidson) thinking, an updated version of a divided mind view might be naturally developed using the resources of dual-process models in contemporary psychology (Chaiken and Trope; Kahnean); which are now well-accepted as explanations for how information processing in the mind/brain is organized in a host of domains (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly; Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman; Sloman; Stanovich and West).

In general form, a dual-process model postulates that information processing in some psychological domain is subserved by two distinct systems. One system (often referred to as ‘system 1’, the terminology is from Stanovich and West) is relatively fast, automatic, performs relatively simple associative operations, and has access to only limited information. The other system (often referred to as ‘system 2’) is slow, consciously controlled, uses linguistic/logical representations, and has access to much larger and more global stores of information. An additional feature of dual-process models is that they typically postulate that domain-relevant information is processed by both system 1 and system 2 simultaneously. Perhaps most crucial for our purposes, at least some kinds of dual-process models propose that when these two systems diverge in terms of their outputs, system 2 can exert regulatory control over system 1 (Gilbert). That is, the two systems are related by an inhibition mechanism activated by system 2 that overrides, suppresses, or modulates outputs from system 1.

Many theorists from diverse parts of the behavioral sciences have developed dual-process models of motivation in which, very roughly, emotions and urges occupy the role of system 1, while planning/practical reasoning systems occupy the role of system 2 (Bechara; Loewenstein; Metcalfe and Mischel; Sanfey et al.; Hofmann, Friese and Strack). If we accept these theorists’ suggestions that a dual-process structure underlies decision-making and motivation, then we have a natural way of addressing the puzzle of synchronic self-control. Suppose that two distinct motivational compartments within Charlie reach divergent motivational verdicts about what Charlie should do. The strongest desire within the ‘system 1’ compartment is that Charlie should eat the cake. The strongest desire within the ‘system 2’ compartment is that Charlie should stay on his diet. On this picture, willpower is naturally understood as the regulatory control mechanism by which the system 2 compartment suppresses or overrides the system 1 compartment. The divided mind model circumvents the puzzle of synchronic self-control because there is no single agent who both most wants to eat the cake and simultaneously most wants to resist eating the cake. Rather, within the system 2 compartment, the strongest desire is to stay on the diet, and this system initiates and maintains willpower. The desire to eat the cake is strongest only in a distinct motivational compartment, and this second compartment is not the agent that initiates and maintains willpower, but rather the patient whose motivational force is suppressed by willpower.

The idea that willpower is a mental action initiated by one part of a divided mind appears either explicitly (Loewenstein; Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice), or implicitly in much of the recent psychological literature on the subject. The divided mind picture is also attractive because it captures many common sense features of willpower, such as that in situations like Charlie’s the agent feels divided, there is an active inner struggle between parts of the agent, and willpower is an active performed for the express purpose of curtailing the wayward desire. But the divided mind view also raises many questions about how agency should be understood given such a picture. For example, if the divided mind view is correct, then exercises of willpower aren’t truly performed by the agent as a whole, but rather are undertaken by only part of the agent in which only a strict subset of the agent’s full set of desires are active. Common sense understands actions as typically brought about by the agent, not part of the agent, so the existence of ‘sub-personal actions’ of this sort requires a careful philosophical defense and explication. Another question concerns the notion of an agent’s strongest desire. While there are different accounts of how to understand this notion even on a picture of the mind that is not divided [see, for example, the discussion in (Mele Motivation and Agency Ch. 7)], an additional set of problems emerge on a divided mind picture. Since on this view there are two motivational compartments, there are hence two strongest desires (one in each compartment), and it unclear which of these desires should be regarded as the agent’s strongest desire.

Thus a divided mind picture, though attractive in some respects, surely raises as many questions as it answers.]

Question 2: Why does willpower fail?

It is plausible that some failures of willpower are due to insufficient motivation. Suppose Charlie and Marley both decide to go on a diet. Charlie’s desire to stay on the diet is very strong as he is deeply worried about dire health consequences that will occur if he fails to keep to his diet. Marley’s desire to stay on the diet is not so strong – he started the diet in a moment of vanity and while he wants to be a bit thinner, he has no other motivation for wanting to maintain the diet. One day both go to the pastry shop and each considers having a slice of his beloved cherry chocolate cake. Charlie puts vigorous effort into resisting the desire to eat the cake, with success – he leaves the shop with his diet intact. Marley puts only perfunctory effort into resisting the desire to eat the cake, and in the end, fails – he eats an embarrassingly large slice of cake. Here it is plausible that Marley’s failure in his attempt at willpower owes to the fact that his desire to stay on the diet is relatively weak, thus making him correspondingly only weakly motivated to exercise willpower in resisting a contrary desire.

The case of Charlie and Marley raises the question of whether in all cases in which willpower fails, the explanation can be traced back to deficiencies in the strength of the agent’s motivation to
exercise willpower. Suppose instead that our story above ends with Charlie too succumbing to temptation and eating a large piece of cake. Would the fact that Charlie succumbs to temptation permit the inference that, despite appearances, Charlie is in fact only weakly motivated, or at least insufficiently motivated, to stay on his diet? An inference of this sort might be blocked if at least some failures of willpower are due not to insufficiency in an agent’s underlying motivation to exercise willpower, but rather stem from relatively ‘fixed ceilings’ on the efficacy of the willpower process itself. Richard Holton offers a helpful analogy with a runner’s speed to help separate these two notions (Holton 132). If you want to know how fast a runner can run a mile, you will need to know the runner’s motivational state, since wanting to run faster usually translates into greater running velocity. But this relationship only holds over a certain range. Once a threshold of speed is crossed, additional motivation to run faster will not lead to greater speed. Even if the agent wants to run 100 miles per hour more than anything at all, his speed cannot exceed the ceiling established by the physical condition of his body. Moreover, this ceiling is relatively fixed, in that if it is changeable at all, it is only changeable through specific training processes that typically extend over long periods of time.

A broadly similar distinction may be applicable in the case of willpower. In particular, we must distinguish the motivational ‘inputs’ into the mechanisms that implement willpower from fixed ceilings in the efficacy of these mechanisms themselves. Motivation certainly provides part of the explanation for whether willpower will succeed or fail. Marley, who is only weakly motivated to resist his wayward desire is, other things being equal, more likely to fail at resistance than Charlie. But the mechanisms that implement willpower may also exhibit fixed ceilings in their efficacy that obtain independently of the agent’s motivation. Much like the runner for whom motivation alone will not permit speeds of 100 miles per hour, motivation alone may not permit an agent to resist a sufficiently strong wayward desire.

Some philosophers and legal theorists have been skeptical of the idea that there are fixed ceilings in the efficacy of willpower that hold, irrespective of the agent’s motivation to resist.

Strictly speaking no impulse is irresistible; for every case of giving in to a desire… it will be true that, if the person tried harder, he would have resisted it successfully… Human endurance puts a severe limit on how long one can stay afloat in an ocean, but there is no comparable limit to our ability to resist temptation.” (Feinberg 283)

Folk practice sometimes uses analogies with muscles, fatigue, and endurance to characterize how there might be fixed ceilings in the efficacy of willpower. For example, a person exercising willpower to battle a temptation-directed desire might say ‘It overpowered me’, ‘I could not fight it off’, or ‘I held out for a long time, but in the end it got the best of me’. In the passage above, Feinberg appears to reject this analogy, as he denies that limitations on willpower can be likened to the limits on endurance that are associated with muscular activity. However, recent studies in psychology suggest that the muscle analogy may in fact be an apt one. A number of researchers including Roy Baumeister, Todd Heatherton, Diane Tice, Kathleen Vohs and their colleagues have systematically examined a family of processes that they call “self-regulatory processes”, which are closely related to, but in many ways broader than the notion of willpower discussed in this paper (Baumeister and Heatherton). (The relationship between self-regulatory processes and willpower will be taken up in the following section.) According to these researchers, self-regulatory processes can be characterized in terms of a ‘strength’ model (Baumeister et al.). The basic idea behind the model is that like the strength associated with a muscle, self-regulatory processes fatigue when exerted for prolonged periods of time. With rest, however, these processes regain their effectiveness. Over longer periods of time, the regular use of self-regulatory processes can lead to enhancements in their efficacy.

These researchers explored various aspects of the fatigability of self-regulatory processes by performing a number of experiments that have a characteristic structure (Figure 1). Each experiment has two phases and the second phase occurs shortly after the first. In the first phase, one group of subjects is given a task that demands the use of self-regulatory processes. Examples of such tasks include inhibiting the tendency to read subtitles during a movie, regulating one’s emotions during a disturbing film, restraining the urge to eat a tempting food, suppressing thoughts with a certain content, resisting the urge to remove one’s hand from a tank of extremely cold water, and maintaining one’s concentration on a difficult- or impossible-to-solve puzzle. The second group of subjects is given a task matched in most respects to the task performed by the first group, but which does not demand the use of self-regulatory processes (for example, subjects might watch the same film as the first group, but be allowed to read the subtitles). Both groups then perform a second task (distinct from the first task) that demands the use of self-regulatory processes. A robust and consistent finding across dozens of these experiments is that in the second phase of the experiment, the first group of subjects performs significantly worse than the second group of subjects. The authors’ interpretation of this result is that the subjects in the first group deplete their self-regulatory capacities during the task in the first phase of the experiment, thus leaving them less able to exert regulatory control during the second task.

These researchers explored various aspects of the fatigability of self-regulatory processes by performing a number of experiments that have a characteristic structure (Figure 1). Each experiment has two phases and the second phase occurs shortly after the first. In the first phase, one group of subjects is given a task that demands the use of self-regulatory processes. Examples of such tasks include inhibiting the tendency to read subtitles during a movie, regulating one’s emotions during a disturbing film, restraining the urge to eat a tempting food, suppressing thoughts with a certain content, resisting the urge to remove one’s hand from a tank of extremely cold water, and maintaining one’s concentration on a difficult- or impossible-to-solve puzzle. The second group of subjects is given a task matched in most respects to the task performed by the first group, but which does not demand the use of self-regulatory processes (for example, subjects might watch the same film as the first group, but be allowed to read the subtitles). Both groups then perform a second task (distinct from the first task) that demands the use of self-regulatory processes. A robust and consistent finding across dozens of these experiments is that in the second phase of the experiment, the first group of subjects performs significantly worse than the second group of subjects. The authors’ interpretation of this result is that the subjects in the first group deplete their self-regulatory capacities during the task in the first phase of the experiment, thus leaving them less able to exert regulatory control during the second task.
If the strength model of willpower endorsed by these researchers is correct, then this would seem to put pressure on Feinberg’s claim that the capacity to resist a temptation is limited only by one’s motivation to resist, and never by fixed ceilings on the efficacy of the resistance mechanism. But we must be careful not to interpret the results of these ‘self-regulation’ experiments in ways that go beyond what the data can actually support. These self-regulation experiments only demonstrate that willpower has certain properties of a muscle – most importantly the property of exhibiting diminished efficacy immediately following sustained use. But if further research can deepen the analogy between willpower and muscular activity, and in particular can provide direct evidence that willpower too exhibits fixed ceilings in its efficacy that hold independent of the motivation to exercise willpower, then Feinberg’s claim would indeed be seriously challenged.

Question 3: How many ‘willpowers’ are there? What is the relationship between willpower and other self-regulatory processes?

In the experiments by Baumeister and colleagues described in the previous section, researchers used the term ‘self-regulatory process’ to describe a family of processes that exhibit a common structure: these processes, once engaged, cause some ‘target mental state’ to be attenuated, blocked or rendered inefficacious. Willpower, narrowly construed, is a species of self-regulatory process where the target mental state is one of the agent’s desires. Other self-regulatory processes attenuate or suppress a variety of other target mental states such as thoughts, emotions, urges, cravings, attentional distractions, and habitual or ‘prepotent’ responses.

A question then arises as to how willpower, understood narrowly as a capacity to inhibit one of the agent’s own desires, relates to the broader family of self-regulatory processes. One hypothesis is that these various different kinds of self-regulatory processes are each implemented by largely distinct, though perhaps partially overlapping, neural mechanisms. One method for testing this hypothesis involves studying a variety of tasks, each one relatively selective in engaging just one kind of self-regulatory process. By studying multiple such tasks, it might be possible to ‘parse’ self-regulation into component processes.

For example, the Stroop task (MacLeod) is often used to probe attention regulation mechanisms involved in suppressing distractions. In this task (Figure 2A), subjects are given a series of words and asked to state the ink color of the word. But the words themselves are names of colors, and the ink color and named color are often different. Hence, to perform successfully, subjects must avoid being distracted by the word’s meaning and instead focus their attention on the ink color of the word. In the delay discounting task (Myerson and Green; Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue), subjects are given choices between smaller, earlier or larger, later monetary rewards (Figure 2B). One influential hypothesis holds that choices for later rewards depend on the engagement of appetitive regulation processes that suppress the ‘default’ tendency to choose more immediate rewards. In emotion regulation tasks (Ochsner et al.), subjects are confronted with emotionally salient stimuli, such as a highly disturbing pictures, and asked to subjectively distance themselves from the picture (for example, they might be asked to take a detached third-person perspective towards a frightening picture, Figure 2C). This task is thought to engage processes specialized for attenuating responses to emotionally valenced stimuli. By systematically investigating performance in these three tasks, using a variety of methods such as reaction time, electrophysiology, or neuroimaging, it might be possible to determine interrelationships between the mechanisms implementing attention regulation, appetitive regulation, and emotion regulation. Overall, investigations aimed at parsing self-regulatory processing into component mechanisms (Ochsner and Gross; Friedman and Miyake; Nee, Wager and Jonides; Wager et al.) are still at the early stages, but this area of research is one of the most active in cognitive neuroscience and promises to yield exciting results in the future.

Figure 2: Examples of tasks that are hypothesized to selectively engage distinct self-regulatory processes. (A) The Stroop Task in which subjects must state the ink color of the word rather than read the name of the color; (B) The Delay Discounting Task in which subjects choose between smaller, earlier versus larger, later monetary rewards; (C) A picture from an emotion regulation task in which subjects use ‘distancing’ strategies to attenuate responses to the emotional stimulus.

Even if it is discovered that distinct neural mechanisms implement different forms of self-regulatory processing, these various and sundry mechanisms may nonetheless rely on a common energetic store. This hypothesis is supported by the self-regulatory experiments of Baumeister and colleagues. Recall that the range of tasks utilized in these experiments appears, at least superficially, to be quite heterogeneous. Nonetheless, subjects’ engagement in one kind of task reliably leads to poorer performance on a subsequent task. If the processes engaged in these varied tasks all draw upon a common energetic store, one could naturally explain why prolonged engagement in any one of these tasks leads to subsequent poorer performance in any other.

Suppose that all self-regulatory processes exhibit a fixed ceiling on their efficacy, perhaps due to their reliance on a common energetic store (see footnote 3), or perhaps for some other reason. This ‘single ceiling thesis’ calls into question certain arguments and distinctions that are frequently found in the philosophy and legal theory literature. For example, the legal theorist Stephen Morse has argued in a number of papers (Morse “Culpability and Control; Morse “Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility; Morse “Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People”) that persons addicted to drugs do not deserve an excuse for actions in violation of the law based on irresistible desires. Roughly, his argument is that the idea that one’s own desires ‘internally coerce’ one’s behavior, once carefully examined, cannot be made sense of. However, more recently, Morse has argued that addicts do deserve an excuse, not due to irresistible desires, but rather due to the manner in which addiction impairs one’s ‘rational capacities’.
...the addict, metaphorically, and in some cases perhaps literally, can think of nothing else but the desire to use the substance. One informant described the desire like “a buzzing in my ears that prevents me from focusing.” … There is only one tune or story in the addict’s head and nothing can drive it out... Fundamental components of rationality – the capacities to think clearly and self-consciously to evaluate one’s conduct – are compromised (Morse “Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility” 39).

In the preceding paragraph, Morse seems to be suggesting that addiction excuses certain behaviors in virtue of its generating irresistible thoughts, i.e., the addict can think about nothing but obtaining the drug and these thoughts are incredibly hard to redirect or suppress. But it is not at all clear why Morse thinks irresistible thoughts and irresistible desires are on such different footings, so that the former are a proper basis for legal excuse but the latter are not. For one thing, given Morse's careful and exhaustive enumeration of reasons to doubt that one's own desires are ever truly irresistible, one wonders why these very same arguments don't apply to thoughts, thus showing that one's own thoughts are never truly outside of one's own control. A second potential problem for Morse is that his argument relies on an implicit distinction between the psychological mechanisms that enable one to control one's thoughts and attention versus the those that enable one to control one's desires, such that impairments in the former are deserving of excuse but impairments in the latter are not. But it is unclear from Morse's writings in what this crucial difference consists. Indeed, if the 'single ceiling thesis' is correct that all self-regulatory processes (including processes that regulate desire as well as processes that regulate thought and attention) exhibit a common, fixed limit on their efficacy, then it stands to reason that these two categories of self-regulatory failure, though they may superficially appear quite different, should in fact be treated very much the same.

Morse's endorsement of mitigation for addicts based on impairments in rational capacities, but not on the basis of irresistible desires, reflects a widespread tendency for the law to treat irresistible impulses and other 'motivation-related' bases of excuse as less justified than putatively strictly 'cognitive' bases of excuse (Goldstein; Caplan). A fully fleshed out account of willpower that clarifies the relationship between willpower (which, per definition, is directed at regulating desires) and related processes directed at regulating thoughts and attention might call into question the 'single ceiling thesis' is correct that all self-regulatory processes or suppress. But it is not at all clear why Morse thinks irresistible desires are on such different footings, so that the former are a proper basis for legal excuse but the latter are not. For one thing, given Morse's careful and exhaustive enumeration of reasons to doubt that one's own desires are ever truly irresistible, one wonders why these very same arguments don't apply to thoughts, thus showing that one's own thoughts are never truly outside of one's own control. A second potential problem for Morse is that his argument relies on an implicit distinction between the psychological mechanisms that enable one to control one's thoughts and attention versus the those that enable one to control one's desires, such that impairments in the former are deserving of excuse but impairments in the latter are not. But it is unclear from Morse's writings in what this crucial difference consists. Indeed, if the 'single ceiling thesis' is correct that all self-regulatory processes (including processes that regulate desire as well as processes that regulate thought and attention) exhibit a common, fixed limit on their efficacy, then it stands to reason that these two categories of self-regulatory failure, though they may superficially appear quite different, should in fact be treated very much the same.

Morse’s endorsement of mitigation for addicts based on impairments in rational capacities, but not on the basis of irresistible desires, reflects a widespread tendency for the law to treat irresistible impulses and other ‘motivation-related’ bases of excuse as less justified than putatively strictly ‘cognitive’ bases of excuse (Goldstein; Caplan). A fully fleshed out account of willpower that clarifies the relationship between willpower (which, per definition, is directed at regulating desires) and related processes directed at regulating thoughts and attention might call into question the strong preference for cognitive bases of excuse currently embraced in the law and in legal thinking.

Question 4: What is the relationship between willpower and weakness of will and accounts of willpower. Watson presents three versions of a case in which a woman who ought not to drink because of some obligation, nonetheless drinks.

Watson argues that according to the ‘common sense’ account of weakness of will, the weak case is like the compulsive case in that the agent acts contrary to her best judgment. But the weak case is like the reckless case in that the agent has the ability to resist, but fails to exercise it. But given that the weak agent is strongly (if not decisively) motivated to resist, this motivation arising from her all things considered best judgment, and given that she is able to resist, why does she fail in exercising resistance?

Watson considers a number of candidate answers to this question, such as that the weak agent does not want to go through the trouble of resisting, or that the weak agent underestimates the effort that would be needed to successfully resist. In each case, careful analysis finds the explanation clearly wanting. Since no basis can be found for why an agent who is both motivated and able to resist nonetheless fails to make the requisite effort at resistance, Watson argues that we are entitled to conclude that the common account of weakness of will is in fact critically mistaken – the weak-willed agent, at the time that she capitulated to her wayward desire, was in fact unable to resist (pg. 338).

Watson’s skeptical view is certainly controversial, and other writers (Buss; Mele Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control; Tenenbaum; Mele “Akratics and Addicts”) have reached an opposed conclusion. It will not be possible to discuss all the arguments and counterarguments in this debate. Instead, here I want to focus on the observation that there is a strong tendency to find the Watsonian skeptical position simply unsatisfying as a resolution to the question ‘Is weakness of the will possible?, and the long list of authors opposed to Watson’s conclusion attests to this claim. Moreover, it is likely that this dissatisfaction is rooted in the fact that common sense not only holds strongly to the idea that weak-willed actions are possible, it in fact insists that they routinely occur. But why might common sense be so insistent on the truth of these claims? Alfred Mele provides a succinct answer.

Why do ordinary folks believe that there are (in this author’s terminology, not theirs) strict akratic actions? Presumably, largely because they take themselves to have first hand experience of such action and partly because some of their observations of others indicate to them they are not alone in this… It is possible that these ordinary agents are wrong about this, of course… But why should one believe that they are wrong? (Mele “Akratics and Addicts” 159)
Mele suggests that one important source of the folk belief that weak-willed actions occur is “first-hand experience”. It is not exactly clear what Mele has in mind, but one plausible interpretation of “first-hand experience” is in terms of the phenomenology associated with putatively weak-willed action. When a person caves in to temptation, the person experiences a distinctive suite of subjective experiences. For example, consider Charlie who is on a diet but feels tempted to eat a slice of cherry chocolate cake. As Charlie caves in to temptation, he experiences a characteristic phenomenology. His experiences typically include a feeling of attraction directed at the chocolate cake, a feeling of effort as he tries to resist eating the cake, and, eventually, the feeling of giving in to temptation. Most important for our purposes, as Charlie gives in to temptation, the resulting action is often accompanied by a ‘feeling of uncompelledness’. This feeling is difficult to articulate, but very roughly, Charlie feels the action is not forced on him by a source external to him. Rather, he feels that he is the author of the action, and the action is a consequence of his choosing. So one way of understanding Mele’s claim that the folk have ‘first-hand experience’ of weak-willed action is that people often have a feeling of uncompelledness when they undertake actions that contravene their best judgment. This feeling ‘depicts’ their action to themselves as free and intentional. In this way, people come to believe that there are weak-willed actions.

I think there is something right about the proposal that the ‘feeling of uncompelledness’ is the central underpinning for the folk belief that weak-willed actions routinely occur. But if this is so, then it points to an important goal for philosophical research into the nature of willpower. In particular, there is a pressing need to answer the question of whether the feeling of uncompelledness that routinely accompanies certain kinds of failure of willpower is veridical. That is, when an agent experiences a feeling of uncompelledness as she performs an action that contravenes her best judgment, is this feeling of uncompelledness accurate in the way that it represents the agent as acting freely, intentionally, and without compulsion?

One place to look in beginning to answer this question is the growing literature in philosophy and neuroscience about the subjective experience of willed action (Bayne; Bayne and Levy; Haggard). This literature is beginning to illuminate some of the brain mechanisms by which various experiences associated with agency (such as the experience of authorship, and the feeling of doing) become ‘attached’ to actions. A key lesson from this literature is that there are multiple ways in which the mechanisms that link actions with authorship experiences can misfire, so that some actions that the agent in fact authors are not tagged with authorial experiences, while other actions the agent does not fully author are inappropriately tagged. The feeling of uncompelledness associated with weak-willed actions may simply be the feeling of authorship. Or it may be a complex of experiences in which authorship experiences are only a component. But a better understanding of the brain mechanisms by which the feeling of uncompelledness is generated will be crucial to understanding the component structure, if any, of this experience, as well as whether, and under what conditions, the experience may fail to be fully veridical in depicting the agent as originating and authoring an action.

Suppose further investigation revealed that in paradigm cases in which the an agent acts in a putatively weak-willed manner, the feeling of uncompelledness is not veridical because the agent is in some important sense compelled to act as she does. This sort of finding would provide critical support for skepticism about weakness of will. A central reason for dissatisfaction with the skeptical position that weak-willed actions do not really exist is, as Mele correctly points out, that we seem to be acquainted with the fact of their existence through first-person experience. Thus, an account of why first-person experience might be systematically mistaken about the existence of weak-willed actions would do much to loosen the grip of common sense, and thereby would significantly temper the dissatisfaction with which the skeptical position is typically greeted.

In this paper, I surveyed four key questions about willpower: How is willpower possible? Why does willpower fail? How does willpower relate to other self-regulatory processes? and What are the connections between willpower and weakness of will? As we have seen, the topic of willpower is closely bound up with a number of important philosophical questions about human agency. While there is much we still do not know about willpower, there is also justified excitement these days that as empirical investigations progress, we are coming ever closer to reaching satisfying answers to at least some of some of the key questions posed in this paper.7

1 I thank Nishiten Shah for the helpful idea that the puzzle of synchronic self-control should be formulated as a dilemma.

2 Dual-process models are one of a number of empirically supported frameworks available in cognitive psychology that postulate that information processing is implemented by multiple interacting psychological compartments. In what follows, I illustrate the divided mind view of willpower using a dual-process framework, but recognize that alternative frameworks for partitioning the mind might have also been used.

3 I develop a divided mind account of synchronic self-control and address these, as well as other questions raised by the account, in The puzzle of resistance and the divided mind.

4 Recent studies suggest that self-regulatory processes are fueled by glucose (Gailliot and Baumeister), and prolonged engagement of these processes depletes glucose (Gailliot et al.; Masicampo and Baumeister). These studies are tentative and await corroboration, but they are a good example of the type of findings that would help deepen the analogy between willpower and muscular exertion, and would help support the view that there are fixed ceilings in the efficacy of willpower that arise independent of one’s motivation to resist.

5 I use the term ‘weak-willed’ in place of Mele’s term ‘akratic’ in what follows.

6 In ‘An error theory of weakness of will’, I more fully develop an account that holds that weak-willed actions don’t exist, and that proposes the error in common sense in believing they do exist arises from, inter alia, the misleading subjective experiences characteristically associated with exercises of willpower.

7Earlier versions of parts of this paper were presented at the University of Michigan Decision Consortium Group, the Moral Psychology Research Group (Pittsburgh, PA), and the ‘Philosophy and Science of Weakness of Will’ series at Amherst College. I am grateful to these audiences for their comments. Special thanks to Sarah Buss who provided invaluable comments on practically every aspect of this manuscript.
Works Cited


CHANDRA SRI PADA’s research concerns a range of basic questions in ethics and moral psychology about humans as agents and decision-makers—questions about our virtues and successes as well as our pathologies and failures. His work seeks to wed perspectives from philosophy with methods and results from the empirical sciences, especially psychology, neuroscience, and psychiatry. Chandra holds a joint appointment in Philosophy and Psychiatry, where he studies the neuroscience of decision-making and self-control, and breakdowns in these capacities associated with psychiatric disorders. In his philosophical work, he seeks to use novel findings emerging from the brain sciences to illuminate traditional philosophical questions. His recent papers and talks have explored the nature of intentional action, the neuroscience of self-control and its implications for weakness of will, the human ability for prospective cognition and its relation to free will, and the psychology and evolution of moral systems. His article, “The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments of Intentional Action” is published in Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 159–176. His philosophy articles have also appeared in Cognition, Biology and Philosophy, and in numerous collections. Chandra is beginning his second year as a member of the Department.
RECENT GRADUATES

KEVIN COFFEY, *Methodology, Reformulation, and Underdetermination: Essays on Realism and Interpretation in Foundational Physics*
Dissertation Committee: Gordon Belot and Laura Ruetsche (co-chairs); Peter Railton, Larry Sklar, and Anthony Bloch (Mathematics)
Current Position: Visiting Assistant Professor, Texas Tech

EDUARDO GARCIA-RAMIREZ, *Proper Names: A Cognitive - Philosophical Study*
Dissertation Committee: Eric P. Swanson (chair); Andrew Egan, Richmond H. Thomason, and Marilyn Shatz (Professor Emeritus of Psychology and of Linguistics)
Current Position: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (tenure track)

ELIZABETH GOODNICK, *The Role of Naturalistic Explanation in Hume's Critique of Religious Belief*
Dissertation Committee: Louis Loeb (chair); Elizabeth Anderson, Edwin M. Curley, and Adela Pinch (English Language and Literature and Women's Studies)
Current Position: Visiting Lecturer, University of Washington

MARIE JAYASEKERA, *The Will in Descartes' Thought*
Dissertation Committee: Ed Curley (chair); Louis Loeb, Victor Caston, and George Hoffman (Romance Languages and Literatures)
Current Position: Assistant Professor at Colgate University (tenure track)

IVAN MAYERHOFER, *Talk about Coming into Existence*
Dissertation Committee: Richmond Thomason (chair); Andrew Egan, Eric P. Swanson, and Acrisio Pires (Linguistics)
Current Position: Visiting lecturer at Colorado College, Fall 2010

DAVID PLUNKETT, *Locating Practical Normativity*
Dissertation Committee: Allan F. Gibbard and Peter A. Railton (co-chairs); Professor Emeritus Stephen L. Darwall, Scott Shapiro, and Frank C. Jackson (Princeton)
Current Position: UCLA Postdoctoral Fellowship in Law and Philosophy (2 years)

AMANDA ROTH, *Ethical Inquiry as Problem-Resolution: Objectivity, Progress, and Deliberation*
Dissertation Committee: Elizabeth Anderson and Peter Railton (co-chairs); Laura Ruetsche, and Jonathan Metzl (Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Women’s Studies)
Current Position: Center for Ethics in Public Life at University of Michigan

TIM SUNDELL, who held a Postdoctoral Fellowship at Northwestern for 2009-10, is taking up a tenure-track position at University of Kentucky

LEI ZHONG, *A Non-reductive Naturalist Approach to Moral Explanation*
Dissertation Committee: Peter Railton (chair); Allan Gibbard, Sarah Buss, and Robert Pachella (Psychology)
Current Position: Peking University (tenure track)
PHILOSOPHY CONTRIBUTIONS

The Department acknowledges with gratitude the following individuals who made contributions during the period of July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010.

Endowment and Special Fund Contributions


Nathaniel M. Marrs, A.B., ’93 for the Philosophy Recruitment/Retention Fund.

Tanner Library Cornerstones

for invaluable support of the Tanner Philosophy Library

Bruce and Merlee Bartman Memorial Fund

Right Reverend Carolyn Tanner Irish, A.B., ’62

Gary Miller, A.B., ’78, and Jasna Markovic, Ph.D.

Photo by Picturewerk, February, 29, 2008: creative commons license found on Flickr.com
Annual Fund Contributors

Aren Arendsen, A.B., ’97, and Sarah Arendsen
Amedio Al Armenti, A.M., ’52, Ph.D., ’59
Robert N. Audi, Ph.D., ’67
William D. Baird, A.B., ’92
Cyrus and Margaret Banning, Ph.D., ’65
Ari Berenson, M.D. ’92
James T. Bork, A.B., ’86
J. Noah Brown, A.B., ’81
James A. Brown, A.M., ’75
Lindsay D. Chaney, A.B., ’73
Pamela K. Chen, A.B., ’83
Gordon P. Clark, A.B., ’61 and Joyce T. Clark
Daniel Cohen, A.M., ’81, J.D., ’91 and Nancy Jeffrey
Roger Cole, A.B., ’53 and Ann Cole
Beth M. Coleman, A.B., ’88
Jack and Susan Couzens, A.B., ’74
David R. Cummiskey, Ph.D., ’88
Diane Czerwinski, A.B., ’63 and Terry Czerwinski
Michael S. Davis, A.M., ’68, Ph.D., ’72
Drubel Family Fund, Richard Drubel, A.B., ’73
Benjamin R. Dryden, A.B., ’04
Charles E. Dunlop
Richard B. Dyer, A.B., ’90
Steven and Alice Edwards, A.B., ’75 (Individ. Concentration)
Richard Eichmann A.B., ’85, A.M., ’91 (Econ.) and Laurie Bankhead
Roy Ellis, A.B., ’99
Elysian Realty, LLC
Alan B. Folz, A.B., ’90, BSEAS, ’90
Bruce S. Garber, A.B., ’71
John F. Gajewski, A.B., ’69
Jeffry A. Giardina, A.B., ’62
Seth Isaac Gold, A.B., ’77
Steven Graines, A.B., ’95 and Marisa Pick
Andrew E. Green, A.B., ’79 and Diane Green
Henry Greenspan Foundation
Louis M. Guenin, A.B., ’72 (History)
Ralph Haber, A.B., ’53 and Lyn Haber
Peter Hardy A.B., ’91 and Nina Rivers
Peter J. Harvey, Ph.D., ’75 and Donna L. Harvey
George Hauswirth, A.B., ’73 and Gail Hauswirth
Thomas Haw IV, A.B., ’74
Leonard W. Hersh, A.M., ’72
Timothy J. Howard, A.B., ’74 and Janice Howard
Robert C. Howell, Ph.D., ’67
Mark Jacobi, B.S., ’69 and Judi Jacobi
Mark Jarboe, A.B., ’72 and Patricia Kovel-Jarboe
John M. Jennings, A.B., ’85 (Economics)
Bradley Karkkainen, A.B., ’74 and Ann Mongoven
David A. Karns, A.B., ’63, Ph.D., ’72
Richard C. Kaufman, A.B., ’73
John Kelson, A.B., ’63 and E.B. Kelson
Ms. Lauren S. Kessler, A.B., ’06 (English)
William Kime, A.B., ’63 and Pamela Withrow
Martin Korchak, A.B., ’64
Robert A. Kraft, A.B., ’74
Aaron R. Krauss, A.B., ’88
Michael Kump, Ph.D., ’79, J.D., ’81 and Nancy Steitz
Dr. James Labes, A.B., ’54 and Mrs. James Labes
Daniel A. Lee, A.B., ’92
Joan Bryan Lerner, A.B., ’56
Margaret J. Livingston, A.B., ’75
Roger McCarthy, A.B., ’72, BSEME, ’72 and Jane McCarthy
Wayne MacVey, Ph.D., ’76 and Deborah MacVey
Masud I. Malik, B.S., ’91 CMB, M.D., ’95
Lynne Dorothy Mapes-Riordan, A.B., ’85 and Daniel Mapes-Riordan
Robert L. Marsh, (Edu Cert.) ’73; BSENE, ’79
Jeffrey A. Miller, A.B., ’93
Daniel Nathan, A.B., ’69 and Eileen P. Nathan
Kevin G. Nealer, A.M., ’75
Orville Nyblade, A.B., ’50 and June Nyblade
Angelina G. Overvold, A.M., ’74
Pak & Whang, LLC, Byong Chae Pak, A.B., ’80
William M. Plevan, A.B., ’96
Robert B. Ransom, A.B., ’85
Zubin J. Rao, A.B., ’03
Donald H. Regan, Ph.D., ’80 and Elizabeth Axelson
Robin Reiner, A.B., ’80
Ross S. Riddell, A.B., ’76, M.B.A., ’81
Judith M. Riley, A.B., ’67
Stephenie Lee Rosenbaum, A.B., ’67
Craig A. Rowley, A.B., ’76 and Sharon Rowley
David S. Salem, A.B., ’77
Nicholas and Catherine Schork, A.B., ’75
Dion Scott-Kakures, A.M., ’83, Ph.D., ’88 and Megan Scott-Kakures
Daniel Sedey, A.M., ’61, Ph.D., ’69
Barry H. Silverblatt, A.B., ’66
Michael A. Small, A.B., ’72
Rev. Emerson W. Smith, A.B., ’40
Theodore C. Stamatakos, A.B., ’87
Colleen A. Stameshkin, A.M., ’75, Ph.D., ’76 and David Stameshkin
Charlotte C. Steffen, A.B., ’96
Robert Stoloff, A.B., ’73, J.D., ’75 and Betty Stoloff
Terrence N. Tice, Ph.D., ’70
Stephen G. Van Meter, A.B., ’83
Kenneth A. Vatz, B.S., ’65
Virginia Warren, A.M., ’70, Ph.D., ’79
Samuel K. Weisman, A.B., ’79 and Nancy Crown
Cynthia Westerbeck and Roy Benton, A.M., ’77, Ph.D., ’85
Mr. Benjamin M. Whipple, A.B., ’01
Michael A. Zimmerman, A.B., ’63
## DEPARTMENT FACULTY 2010-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Research Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MARIA AARNIO</td>
<td>Assistant Professor; Epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELIZABETH ANDERSON</td>
<td>John Rawls Collegiate Professor; Moral and Political Philosophy, Feminist Theory, Philosophy of Social Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVID BAKER</td>
<td>Assistant Professor; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GORDON BELOT</td>
<td>Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARAH BUSS</td>
<td>Associate Professor; Ethics, Practical Reasoning, Moral Psychology, Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTOR CASTON</td>
<td>Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Classical Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLAN GIBBARD</td>
<td>Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor; Ethics, Social Choice Theory, Decision Theory, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIEL HERWITZ</td>
<td>Mary Fair Croushore Professor and Director, Institute for the Humanities; Continental Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Aesthetics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIEL JACOBSON</td>
<td>Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Ethics, Moral Psychology, Aesthetics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMES JOYCE</td>
<td>Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Decision Theory, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIKA LAVAQUE-MANTY</td>
<td>Associate Professor; Ethics, Political Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS LOEB</td>
<td>Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and Interim Chair; History of Early Modern Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERIC LORMAND</td>
<td>Associate Professor; Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAVID MANLEY</td>
<td>Assistant Professor; Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARAH MOSS</td>
<td>Assistant Professor; Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETER RAILTON</td>
<td>John Stephenson Perrin Professor; Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Political Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONALD REGAN</td>
<td>Professor and William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law; Moral and Political Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAURA RUETSCHKE</td>
<td>Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAD SCHMALTZ</td>
<td>Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; History of Early Modern; History of Philosophy of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAWRENCE SKLAR</td>
<td>Carl G. Hempel and William K. Frankena Distinguished University Professor; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science, Epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANDRA SRIPADA</td>
<td>Assistant Professor; Ethics, Moral Psychology, Mind, Cognitive Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERIC SWANSON</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMIE TAPPENDEN</td>
<td>Associate Professor; Philosophy of Language, Philosophy and History of Mathematics, Philosophical Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHMOND THOMASON</td>
<td>Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Logic, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics’, Artificial Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENDALL WALTON</td>
<td>Charles L. Stevenson Collegiate Professor; Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Emeritus Faculty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Research Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRITHJOF BERGMANN</td>
<td>Existentialism, Nineteenth Century Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Philosophy in Literature, Philosophy of Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDWIN CURLEY</td>
<td>Spinoza, History of Early Modern Political Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGE MAVRODES</td>
<td>Philosophy of Religion, Social Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DONALD MUNRO</td>
<td>Chinese Philosophy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>