Chair’s Letter

Elizabeth Anderson

Dear Friends of Michigan Philosophy,

The Department of Philosophy had an exciting year! As our field reports note below, we enjoyed smashing success in graduate recruitment and placement, and participated in the rapid growth of the interdisciplinary majors in Cognitive Science and Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, which now play central roles in our offerings. Here are some other highlights from 2014-15.

Faculty News

This year we successfully recruited two new tenure-track Assistant Professors. Meena Krishnamurthy comes to us from a faculty position at University of Manitoba to fill our new line in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. She has expertise in global justice and democratic theory, and has gained some fame as a public philosopher, particularly through her blog, Philosop-her (http://politicalphilosopher.net/), which features women philosophers. Janum Sethi recently earned her Ph.D. from UC-Berkeley, and fulfills our longstanding aspiration to hire a Kant specialist. Her work focuses on Kant’s philosophy of perception and aesthetics. I am pleased to report that both of our new colleagues also bring interests in Indian philosophy. Meena is currently conducting an international reading group in Indian political philosophy, via Skype. Janum plans to develop an undergraduate course in Buddhist philosophy. As globalization advances, the Philosophy Department is thrilled to be able to engage Indian philosophical traditions through Meena and Janum’s activities.

We welcome Hilary Greaves of Oxford University (Somerville College) as our Nelson Visiting Professor this year. Hilary began her career as a specialist in philosophy of physics, and has since turned her attention to ethics, with a focus on population ethics. Justin Tosi also joins us as our first Freedom and Flourishing Postdoc, having recently graduated from University of Arizona with a degree in political philosophy. With the addition of Meena and Justin to our roster of political philosophers, we have been able to double the number of students admitted to the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics major.

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio won promotion to the rank of Associate Professor with tenure this year. She has made major contributions to epistemology, and also has interests in metaphysics and environmental ethics.

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Our faculty won several honors this year. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio won the 2014 Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind for her paper, “I’m Onto Something! Learning About the World by Learning What I think About It,” forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy. Gordon Belot won the 2014 Lakatos Award for his book, Geometric Possibility (Oxford University Press, 2011) (following on Laura Ruetsche’s Lakatos Award the previous year!). Derrick Darby won a year-long ACLS Collaborative Research Fellowship with historian John Rumy of University of Kansas, to work on a book, The Color of Mind: Why the Origins of the Achievement Gap Matter for Justice. Peter Railton delivered the most moving and significant Dewey Lecture in many years at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings, reflecting on his career and personal experiences, and calling for reform of philosophical practice. I delivered the Tanner Lectures in Human Values at Princeton University, and the Presidential Address of the APA Central Division this year.

Two beloved colleagues retire on December 31: Allan Gibbard and Louis Loeb. Allan, the Richard Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, joined the Department in 1977. In the course of his career, he has made numerous major contributions to ethics and philosophy of language, and won many distinguished fellowships and awards, including election to the National Academy of Sciences, one of only two philosophers to have this honor. Louis, an Arthur F. Thurnau Professor of Philosophy, joined us in 1974. He is a leading scholar of early modern philosophy, particularly Hume and Descartes. He has won numerous teaching awards, and selflessly chaired the Department for 9 years, playing indispensable roles in promoting its high standing while he was chair. While Allan and Louis are retiring from University of Michigan, both are continuing active research programs. We offer them our best wishes.
Special Events
The Philosophy Department held many special events this past year. In November we celebrated Louis’ career with Loebapalooza. This two-day series of talks reflected on themes related to Louis’s work, including contributions from Jeff Kasser (Ph.D., ’99, now at Colorado State), Liz Goodnick (Ph.D., ’10, now at Metropolitan State U, Denver), Hannes Leitgeb (Ludwig Maximilian U of Munich), Ted Morris (Illinois Wesleyan), Don Garrett (NYU), Ken Winkler (Yale), Charlotte Brown (Illinois Wesleyan), and John Wright (Central Michigan), among others. Our Fall Workshop in Philosophy and Linguistics featured talks by Kyle Rawlins (Johns Hopkins), Barbara Abbott (Michigan State), Iitamar Francez (U Chicago), colleagues Ezra Keshet and Rich Thomason, and graduate students Daniel Drucker and Cat St. Croix. MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) sponsored a panel highlighting pragmatist, social democratic, and critical race theory perspectives on racial injustice, including Gregory Pappas (Texas A&M), Derrick Darby, and me. The Program in Ancient Philosophy, jointly run with Classics, brought out James Lennox (Pittsburgh) to address Aristotle on Method in a two-day event. Our annual Spring Colloquium, on the theme “Semantics: Mathematics or Psychology?,” was organized by graduate students Boris Babic, Cat St. Croix, Daniel Drucker, and Patrick Manzano. It featured talks by Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers), Jeff King (Rutgers), Zoltan Gendler Szabo (Yale), and Florian Schwarz (UofPenn). The Linguistics and Philosophy Working Group also brought out Fabrizio Cariani (Northwestern). The Foundations of Modern Physics Working Group sponsored a workshop on the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, with speakers Robert Barterman (Pittsburgh), Sheldon Goldstein (Rutgers), Larry Sklar, and Jos Uffink (Minnesota). The Mind and Moral Psychology group sponsored talks by Ami Harbin (Oakland University), Katrina Siffered (Elmhurst College), and Adam Pautz (UT Austin). Tina Botts lectured on “Multiracial Americans and Racial Discrimination,” and Derrick Darby rocked with a lecture on “Long Live Hip Hop! The Good, the Bad, and the Vulgar.” In our regular colloquium series, we hosted Dale Dorsey (University of Kansas) and Tarek Dika (UM Society of Fellows).

The Philosophy Department was honored by two very distinguished speakers last year. Agnes Heller, Holocaust survivor and distinguished Hungarian philosopher who defended human rights after the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, addressed the Department in September, in connection with her reception of UM’s 2014 Wallenberg Medal. Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (aka “The Notorious RBG”) delivered the Tanner Lecture in Human Values to a packed Hill Auditorium in February. Interviewed by her former law clerks Kate Andrias and Scott Hershovitz, she reflected on her life and work, and brought down the house with her suggestion that “I like to think most of my dissent will be the law someday.”

Appreciation
Now that I am in my second year as chair, I have better first-hand knowledge of the critical role that generous alumni and friends play in enriching the life of the Department. Your contributions help sustain Tanner Library, which has become one of the most popular study spaces for undergraduates on campus. They support our rich schedule of events, and our numerous working groups and reading groups. They fund our outreach activities, such as our graduate students’ engagement with high school students in the Ethics Bowl, reported below. They enable our graduate students to edit the Philosopher’s Annual. They help us support and recognize graduate and undergraduate students, through such funds as the Weinberg Endowment for Philosophy (which pays for our Frankenka and Stevenson prizes and graduate summer fellowships, among many other things), and the Candace Bolter Fund (which helps graduate students facing emergencies). They enable us to recruit and retain our outstanding faculty, through such funds as the Malcolm L. Denise Endowment in honor of Theodore Denise (which funds faculty research), the Nathaniel Marrs Fund (for faculty retention), and the Weinberg Professorship. Philosophy’s participation in interdisciplinary programs such as Cognitive Science and Philosophy, Politics, and Economics is critical to our future. Support from the Hough Fellowship in Psychology and Ethics, the Weinberg Fund for Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, the PPE Strategic Fund, and the Ferrando Family Lecture Fund (for PPE) play important roles in promoting our interdisciplinary engagement.

This year I would like to highlight 2 recently established funds. The Louis E. Loeb Fund for the History of Philosophy was established in honor of Louis, and recently enhanced with a generous donation from Marshall Weinberg. It supports speakers and other activities related to the history of philosophy. The Ilene Goldman Block Memorial Fund in Philosophy was established by Robert Sloan and Dauphine Sloan in the memory of their dear friend Ilene Block (’69), who cherished her experience as a philosophy major at UM. It has also received generous donations from Ilene’s husband Jerry, her son Jamie (’11, also a philosophy major), and their many friends. The Department has been using the Block Fund to support undergraduate activities, including travel to conferences and research assistantships in philosophy. Studies consistently find that such extracurricular activities play a central role in enhancing students’ engagement with their academic programs. We deeply appreciate the thought and generosity our donors have put into the funds that support so many diverse activities of our students and faculty.

We acknowledge those who donated to the Department in 2014-15 at the end of this newsletter. If you would like to donate this year, you may do so through our website at http://lsa.umich.edu/philosophy. To all who have given or are soon to give, we owe a huge debt of gratitude.

cheers,

Elizabeth Anderson
John Dewey Distinguished University Professor
Arthur F. Thurnau Professor
Chair, Philosophy
Graduate Report
By Brian Weatherson, Director of Graduate Studies

It has been a pleasure to work with the great graduate students in the UM Philosophy program over the last year. And I keep being impressed at how much they achieve while in graduate school here, and after they leave Ann Arbor.

Four of our students completed dissertations this year. Chip Sebens defended his dissertation - Locating Oneself in a Quantum World - under the supervision of David Baker and Laura Ruetsche. He is starting a post-doc at CalTech this year, then moving to a tenure-track position at UC-San Diego. Robin Zheng defended her dissertation - A Justice-Oriented Account of Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias - under the supervision of Elizabeth Anderson. She is now starting a research fellowship at Cambridge University, then is moving to a tenure-track position at Yale NUS. Chloe Armstrong defended her dissertation - Modality in Leibniz’s Philosophy - under the supervision of Tad Schmaltz, and is starting a tenure-track position at Lawrence University. And recently, Will Thomas defended his dissertation — How and Why Does the Criminal Law Punish Corporations? — under the supervision of Elizabeth Anderson. Will has accepted a position at Arnold & Porter, LLP in Washington, DC.

As well as these four new graduates, a number of our recent graduates found new academic positions. Six former students obtained tenure-track positions: Sven Nyholm at Eindhoven Institute of Technology, Jason Konck at Kansas State, Stephen Campbell at Bentley, Dmitri Gallow at Pittsburgh, Shen-yi Liao at Puget Sound, and Billy Dunaway at Missouri-St Louis. No philosophy department in at least the English speaking world had anything like this rate of success in placing its graduates into continuing academic employment over the last year.

Our graduate students won several departmental and Rackham awards. Jeremy Lent won the Charles L. Stevenson Prize, funded by the Marshall M. Weinberg Endowment for the Frankena and Stevenson Prizes, for excellence in a candidacy dossier. He also won the Wirt and Mary Cornelw Prize, funded by Mary and Alice Cornelw, for outstanding intellectual curiosity and exceptional promise of original and creative work, and a Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship. Zoe Johnson King won the John Dewey Prize, funded by the James B. and Grace J. Nelson Endowment for the Teaching of Philosophy, for excellence in teaching by a Graduate Student Instructor. Chip Sebens was awarded a Rackham Outstanding Graduate Student Instructor prize.


Jeremy Lent’s paper "Action Models for Conditions," co-authored with Rich Thomason, is coming out in the Journal of Language, Logic and Information. And, also co-authoring with Rich Thomason, Cat Saint Croix had her paper "Chisholm’s Paradox and Conditional Oughts” appear in the proceedings of the Deontic Logic and Normative Systems conference (held last year in Ghent). They have been invited to contribute a version of the paper to a forthcoming volume of the Journal of Logic and Computation.

Our students have also been prominent at major conferences. Annette Bryson was an invited attendee at the Madison Metaethics workshop, and Rohan Sud an invitee at the Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference. Patrick Shirreff presented a paper at the Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress. Van Tu presented a paper at the American Philosophical Association’s Central Division conference, and Nils-Hennes Stear at its Eastern Division Conference. Nils also collaborated with Robin Zheng on a paper presented at the Race and Aesthetics workshop at the University of Leeds. Ian Fishback presented at the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace. And Sara Aronowitz presented at the annual Decisions, Games, and Logic conference, which last year was held at the London School of Economics.

Our graduate students are no strangers to organizing conferences. Every year they organize a Spring Colloquium. Last year’s conference, on semantics, was organized by Daniel Drucker, Boris Babic, Cat Saint Croix, and Daniel Drucker, and featured visiting speakers from Yale, Penn, and Rutgers. Next year’s conference, on normativity, will be organized by Anna Edmonds and Daniel Drucker, and they have already lined up visiting speakers from Harvard, Brown, USC, and Texas. Mara Bollard organized the recent Princeton-Michigan graduate workshop on meta-normativity. She spoke at this, as did Zoe Johnson King, Annette Bryson, and Cat Saint Croix. Next year, the Decisions, Games and Logic conference is coming to Ann Arbor, as Sara Aronowitz is organizing it along with Boris Babic. This should be a major event on the academic calendar, drawing in researchers from political science, computer science, and economics as well as philosophers.

So much of what our graduate students do these days would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. As well as presenting papers, our students now also present conference posters. Paul Boswell had a poster in the Rocky Mountain Ethics conference, and Boris Babic had one at the Decisions, Games, and Logic conference.

And while Ann Arbor quiets down over summer, our students are busy attending workshops and schools in Europe. Caroline Perry went to the Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students in Munich. Jesse Holloway presented a paper at the International Summer School for Philosophy of Physics in the Black Forest. Ian Fishback attended the summer school on political psychology in Budapest. Also in Budapest, Paul Boswell attended the summer school on moral phenomenology.

Paul Boswell spent more time in Europe, thanks to his winning a Chateaubriand Fellowship that funded four months of study at the Institut Jean-Nicod in Paris with Uriah Kriigel.

Closer to home, Jeremy Lent spent two months working as a consulting bioethicist at the Federal Trade Commission in Washington, DC. He was working on ways to regulate advertisements for certain over-the-counter medications to ensure that consumers have an adequate understanding of the scientific support for the medications’ efficacy.
Even closer to home, a number of our students volunteered with local high schools to help them compete in the national Ethics Bowl. This was both a wonderful piece of philosophical public service, and amazingly successful. (The undergraduate program is already seeing benefits from this as the high school students involved become UM undergraduates.) Zoe Johnson King has a much longer report on this elsewhere in the newsletter.

While all these things feel very different for instance, my own experiences in graduate school, it is also pleasing to note that some traditions of being a PhD student are being preserved. Last summer there were two great conferences in St Louis: SLACRR (the St Louis conference on reasons), and FEW (the Formal Epistemology Workshop). So our graduate students got together, organized a good old-fashioned road trip, and headed down there in a convoy. Along the way they got to meet the families of students who lived around St. Louis.

We have a large incoming class this year of ten students. In part this is because of how successful our students have been at winning scholarships. We have our first two Rackham Merit Fellows in several years, and we have students funded in part by the National Institute of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. With all the excellent work the students already here are doing, and the wonderful students who are joining us, we are looking forward to another great year ahead.

Undergraduate Report
By Ishani Maitra, Director of Undergraduate Studies

Last year, I had the honor of serving as Director of Undergraduate Studies. When I took over this role, I had been on faculty at Michigan for about two years, and was already impressed with the dedication and hard work of our majors and minors. Being DUS gave me the opportunity to interact with many more of our students, and to talk to them not just about their current courses, but more broadly about their interests, concerns, and plans for the future. I was blown away by the passion our students bring to their studies, and the broad range of interests and backgrounds that motivate them to take up Philosophy.

Philosophy has a reputation as a particularly tough major – and I think that reputation is well deserved. We ask a lot of our students. In any given semester, a student majoring in Philosophy might find herself taking a formal methods class, studying logic and probability; a history class, looking at what the ancient Greeks had to say about a good life; and a class in contemporary philosophy of mind, considering whether machines can think (and how we might even begin to answer that question). That’s a lot of ground to cover, but that’s what we expect our students to do.

In talking to our students, it was clear to me that they were attracted to Philosophy both by its rigor and its breadth. And by the sheer variety of topics it covers. For many of a student, their interests within Philosophy usefully complement their interests outside it. Thus, we have pre-med students thinking about ethical issues, and engineers studying scientific method and objectivity. As several of my advisees noted, no matter what their other interests, there are always courses within Philosophy that are highly relevant, and that help build skills that will be useful in their future efforts.

An important recent development for our students has been the development of two inter-disciplinary programs closely related to Philosophy: Cognitive Science (which involves Philosophy as well as Linguistics and Psychology), and Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Both programs offer courses that are relevant to our students; and many of our courses are in great demand among students in those programs. The resulting interaction has been really valuable for our undergraduates, and has enabled them to take inter-disciplinary approaches to traditional philosophical questions.

Over the course of the year, we had several social events for our undergraduates. In keeping with our practice in recent years, we had a “Pizza with Prof” event each semester. There, students learned about our courses for the following semester, chatted informally with faculty and graduate student instructors, and of course, ate pizza. Additionally, the Tanner Philosophy Library had a reception for undergraduates in the Fall. And in the winter, we hosted a well-attended information session for prospective thesis writers and applicants to graduate study in Philosophy. That session was designed to help students get a sense of what is involved in further philosophical study. Providing this information to students early in their undergraduate careers allows them to plan ahead for these endeavors.

A particular highlight of the year was a lecture for undergraduates organized by our department’s chapter of Minorities and Philosophy (MAP). MAP is a national graduate student organization that aims to foster inclusion and diversity within Philosophy. In keeping with this mission, our departmental chapter invited Professor Derrick Darby to give a lecture to undergraduates. An abstract for Professor Darby’s lecture, which was entitled “Long live hip hop: The good, the bad, and the vulgar”, is below:

Rappers people love to hate tell tales of gangstas, thugs, pimps, and use the N-word with reckless abandon. They make critics wish for the death of hip hop. But rappers do more than just rhyme over beats. They think and reason too. Professor Derrick Darby argues that we can’t let rap music die no matter how vulgar, violent, misogynistic, homophobic, or irreverent it is. Why? Because rap challenges us to confront a lingering legacy of racial slavery and racial segregation in America—the denigration of black humanity. Professor Darby, a Queensbridge housing project native turned philosopher, reveals that rap critics on the right and left are complicit in sustaining this legacy when they overlook a basic truth: rappers are persons too. Taking this truth seriously requires a more charitable attitude toward hip hop, which is a crucial first step toward serious normative engagement with rappers as artists.

The lecture was a rousing success. Held in a large space in the Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, the event was standing-room-only. The audience included many familiar faces (our majors and minors) and just as many unfamiliar ones.
Our academic year closed with a graduation reception for our graduating seniors, both majors and minors. In advance of the reception, we asked our seniors to tell us a little about what they enjoyed about studying philosophy, and what they planned to do in the next five years or so. We also asked them to say something about how they expected to use their philosophical training in the years ahead. Their answers were remarkable: insightful, funny, and varied.

In reading our students’ responses, one thing that particularly struck me was the broad range of careers our graduates are contemplating. In the next few years, our seniors saw themselves graduating from law school or medical school, practicing architecture, getting a PhD in Philosophy, working in finance or aerospace engineering or public policy, and producing documentaries for public radio. (One mentioned plans to become a famous singer, if law school didn’t work out.)

Equally striking was the fact that, no matter what they planned to do career-wise, our students saw their philosophical training as fitting organically into their future efforts. I don’t have space here to quote all of the answers I received, but I’d like to list some of my favorites:

• “The training I’ve gained from philosophy—in critical inquiry and structured argumentation—is now as much a part of my identity as a part of my skill set. I’ll use that training in everything from haggling for used records; to composing lengthy but readable emails; to maybe even producing a podcast where professional philosophers can discuss their latest work for a public audience.”

• “I plan to apply my philosophical training to public policy, cultural criticism, and political theology.”

• “[I plan] to argue my way through life, law school, and a potential legal career.”

• “I think my philosophical training will improve the ethicality of my work [practicing medicine]. I also think I’ve developed greater sensitivity for others through it and will better serve patients as a result.”

• “[I plan] to construct strong and logical arguments in order to better the international community as a human rights lawyer (here’s to hoping!)… or to write songs about my epistemic crises.”

• “In every task I’ve approached in a work environment and in most all my conversations I’ve had since having begun philosophical training, the way I tackle problems or complicated situations is guided by the rigorous and structured analytical approach of Philosophy. I am deeply grateful for having a degree in Philosophy from this incredible department of thinkers. I know that the education I received will guide me through many decisions and evaluations I’ll be making throughout my career.”

In closing, I’d like to mention some of the honors and achievements of our undergraduates over the year. Some of our undergraduates presented at conferences and submitted papers to undergraduate philosophy journals. Three of our seniors wrote honors theses: Taiki Fujimori, “Moral Considerations in Interpreting Refugee Law” (advisor Professor Derrick Darby); Ryan Shinkel, “The Autonomy of a University” (advised by Professor Daniel Jacobson); and Seth Wolin, “Taking Normativity Quasi-Seriously: A Response to Indispensability Arguments for Robust Metanormative Realism” (advised by Professor Allan Gibbard). All passed their thesis defenses with flying colors.

During the year, we twice awarded the Haller Term Prize for the most outstanding undergraduate performance in upper-level Philosophy courses (including graduate-level courses) in the previous term. In the Fall, the Term Prize went to Katharine Greene (for her brilliant performance in a course on Existentialism and another on Plato on the soul in Winter 2014); in the Winter, the prize was shared between Armin Nikkah Shirazi and Jacob Brooks (for their excellent work in courses on the Scientific Revolution and on Kant, respectively, in Fall 2014).

Finally, at the very end of the year, we awarded the William K. Frankena prize for excellence in the Philosophy major. This prize is named after one of the most important figures in ethics in the mid-20th century, and a long-time chair of this department. Professor Frankena taught philosophy at Michigan for over forty years. During that time, he wrote many important papers and books on ethics, the history of ethics, and the philosophy of education.

The Frankena prize was endowed in honor of Professor Frankena by one of our former undergraduates, Marshall Weinberg. Marshall was a philosophy major here at Michigan in the late 1940s-early 1950s. He studied with Professor Frankena and had great affection for him. Marshall began Philosophy graduate school, but decided to transfer to Columbia Business School instead. He has maintained a lifelong interest in philosophy, and been a generous and steadfast supporter of our department, and of undergraduate education at the University of Michigan, over the years.

This past year, we awarded the Frankena prize to Seth Wolin. Seth has been a wonderful member of the Philosophy department. He’s excelled in a wide range of courses in Philosophy, including graduate-level courses. As I mentioned above, he wrote a senior honors thesis, taking on extremely difficult material about the nature of moral facts. He was a regular participant in the undergraduate philosophy club and served as editor-in-chief of our undergraduate journal, Meteorite. I hope you’ll join me in congratulating Seth on this well-deserved honor.
Research Report

Aristotle on Illusions, Hallucinations, and Dreams
Victor Caston, Professor

There are probably few ideas as fixed in philosophers’ shared consciousness as the idea that Aristotle is a realist. Exhibit A: the image of Aristotle in Raphael’s “School of Athens,” plastered on philosophy department websites across the internet, cautioning Plato with his palm outstretched downwards towards terra firma. It is not just that universals are present in concrete objects for Aristotle, but that through experience we have access to their nature or essence. Some have thought, in fact, that Aristotle’s realism might, in suitably strong doses, provide a tonic that would cure all sorts of modern ills.

Neo-Thomists at the beginning of the last century, for example, believed it provided the means to combat post-Cartesian subjectivism. We were never enclosed within the circle of our own ideas, they argued, because in cognition, we are not merely in touch with the objects we apprehend. In a certain way they come to be present within us. As Aristotle says in On the Soul we are not just affected by objects, but “receive” their forms or essences, taking them in “without the matter” (2.12, 424a17–24). A few chapters later he goes further, stating that our cognitive acts are “one and the same” as the object as cognized, though they differ “in being” (3.2, 425b26–28). To speak of the content of a cognitive act is no metaphor for Neo-Thomists. They take the object to inhere in us (inesse), not physically, but “intentionally.” This inherence is precisely what Franz Brentano meant when he spoke of intentionale Inexistenz: the object exists in the act, with what the Scholastics called esse intentionale or intentional being (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, II.i.5).

More recently, others (including Hilary Putnam at one point)1 have urged that the key to a sane, grounded realism lies in going back to Aristotle and in particular to a form of direct or even naïve realism. Aristotle was not worried about scepticism, they suggest, because he didn’t have to be. If you start from the right place, as he did, the scepter of scepticism never arises, because it gains no purchase on good, common sense. These contemporary philosophers appeal to the same doctrines that the Neo-Thomists did to show that in perception objects are simply present or manifest to us, and that while things might look the same in other experiences, there is no common, underlying mental state here. Perception is fundamentally relational in a way that the others are not. At best, we can only offer a disjunctive characterization of such phenomenal states.

Before we inhale these vapors too deeply, though, perhaps we should step back and take a breath. One of the issues disputed in these debates is how to handle the “bad” cases where veridical perception does not occur, such as illusions and hallucinations. If Aristotle is some kind of realist, what does he have to say about these? And how does it bear on his views of veridical perception?

It would be helpful first to get clear on terms. Although the distinction between illusion and hallucination is often associated with J. L. Austin, in Sense and Sensibilia (ch. 3) he actually distinguishes between illusions and delusions, where we are taken in by our experience. But we can separate out the issue of belief. Just as we often know that things are not as they appear in illusions — we know that the Müller-Lyer lines are equal in length or (to use Aristotle’s favorite example) that the sun is much, much larger than a foot — so too with hallucinations. It is possible to know you are hallucinating when you are hallucinating. Indeed, people who unwittingly take hallucinogens often do it with this expressly in mind. The relevant distinction between illusions and hallucinations can be found, though, in work of the French psychologist Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol, who argued in the early 19th century that illusions involve a misperception of objects that actually exist in our environment and are acting on our senses, while in hallucinations we seem to see objects that are not in fact there.

This existential conception of the distinction is not the only one. We could also formulate the difference in causal terms. In illusions, objects act on our senses in the appropriate way, but we still misperceive them because of the mechanics of our sensory apparatus, cognitive processing, or even external features of the medium and the environment, as happens with mirages, rainbows, and twinkling stars. It is for this reason, in fact, that illusions can be reliably reproduced in other subjects and that they are often unaffected by other things we believe or know. A hallucination, in contrast, is not the result of objects acting on us in the appropriate way for producing perception, even if it happened to turn out to correspond accurately to objects existing in our environment and so be veridical. More could be said here, but for our purposes this can suffice.

Can a similar distinction be found before Esquirol? It can be convincingly shown that ancient Stoics like Chrysippus designated specific terms to mark a similar distinction. But if it is the underlying concepts we are after, and not just terminology, I think we can go even earlier. Aristotle not only distinguishes the relevant kinds of experience, but offers theoretical explanations for their differences.

To begin with, he catalogues a wide range of perceptual illusions. In the second chapter of his On Dreams, he discusses light and darkness adaptation; afterimages; the river or waterfall illusion; auditory and olfactory fatigue; the apparent size of the sun; the crossed fingers illusion (also known as “Aristotle’s illusion”); and relative motion illusions. In all these cases, he thinks that we misperceive features of objects in our environment due to the interference of secondary after-effects of perceptual stimulation. Elsewhere he explains other illusions, like seeing double or sparks, and certain flavor and temperature illusions as due to the condition of the sense organ. And he thinks that external factors are responsible for other illusions, such as the apparent size and color of distant objects; the apparent color of the sun when seen through smoke or haze; and the apparent color of fabrics when seen in different combinations or in different lighting.

Aristotle also describes hallucinations: how a certain Antipheiron, for example, used to see faces ahead of him staring back; or how a person in bed with a high fever might see animals leaping out from the walls and cower or duck; or again how young children hide under the covers when they have hypnagogic visions. But in all these cases, he says, the explanation will be in terms of the same mechanism that underlies dreams (Dreams, 458b25–29). Both cases are to be contrasted with illusions, like the apparent size of the sun. In the latter case, he emphasizes, we perceive “something real,” just not what we take it to be, while

in dreams we don’t perceive anything (458b31–459a1). But sometimes instead of this existential conception, he favors a causal one. The whole aim of his essay *Prophecy in Dreams* is to show that while dreams might turn out to be true, in no case are we perceiving or witnessing what is dreamt.

The shift to dreams is not surprising. The sorts of sceptical scenarios that Hellenistic philosophers later raised by appeal to hallucinations are raised in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE in terms of dreams. In Plato’s *Theaetetus* for example, Socrates addresses worries that Theaetetus “has often heard asked” about whether we can distinguish between waking experience and dreams, and Theaetetus comments on their “extraordinary similarity” and how they “match each other in all respects” (157e–158c). Aristotle derives such worries as insincere and groundless in *Metaphysics* Gamma: no one in Libya, he says, sets out for the Odeon just because they dreamt they were in Athens (1010b3–11); and people who ask for proof that they are awake are like those who ask for proof of everything (1011a6–16). But his response is itself evidence of how current the objection was in the philosophy of his time. For Aristotle, then, hallucinations and dreams are experiences that are phenomenally similar to cases of genuinely perceiving (perhaps even indiscernible in some cases), but where the aetiology is such that we are not perceiving what our experiences are of.

What makes these experiences similar, according to Aristotle, is that different changes within the body can affect the central sensory organ — which he thought was the heart — in similar ways: “What accounts for being in error is that anything at all that appears [does so] not simply when the perceptible object produces the change, but also when the sense itself is changed, whenever it is changed in the same way as it is when it is affected by the perceptible object. I mean the kind of thing that happens when those aboard a ship believe that the coast is moving, due to their eye being moved by something else.” (*Dreams*, 460b22–27) In ordinary perception, an external object produces a certain type of change in a peripheral sensory organ such as an eye or ear, and this perceptual stimulation or *aisthéma* then travels through the bloodstream to the heart; and when it affects this, perception of the original stimulus occurs. But the stimulation of our peripheral organs also standardly produces echoes or traces, which he calls *phantasmata*. Being a similar sort of change, *phantasmata* can produce a similar effect on the central organ, resulting in experiences which are about the sorts of things perceptions are about. We don’t typically notice them while awake, because they are weaker than the fresh, oncoming perceptual stimulations. But in sleep, when our systems have quieted down, they produce dreams. Sometimes these *phantasmata* can be altered and distorted en route, resulting in dreams quite different from our earlier experiences. But they are still the same general sort of change and so can produce experiences like perceptions, whether actual or merely possible ones (*Soul* 3.3; *Dreams* 2–3).

Aristotle does not accept a merely disjunctive account, then. Phenomenally indiscernible experiences are explained by a common type of change in the central sensory organ, despite differences in their earlier aetiology. In the normal case, the stimulation of our peripheral organs is due to the effect of an external object and so, he says, we believe that we are seeing, hearing, or perceiving, because the changes affecting our heart stem from our peripheral organs. But this standing presumption is defeasible. If there is countervailing evidence from other senses or other beliefs, we will not believe what appears (*Dreams*, 461a31–b7). Even when we are asleep, sometimes we have lucid dreams and are aware that we are dreaming (462a1–8). But in the absence of collateral information, or when our judgement is impaired in certain conditions (like deep sleep, illness, or drunken stupor), we may believe we are actually perceiving when we are not.

Aristotle’s acceptance of this common core is confirmed by his analysis of mistaking a dream for a waking perception in chapter 3 of *On Dreams*. He says that the trace left behind from the original perceptual stimulation is able to produce such changes even after the original stimulation has ceased, and because “there are changes in our sense organs just like when one is perceiving,” we can mistakenly think a friend, Coriscus, is in front of us (461b21–30, esp. b28–29). Interpretation of this passage is complicated by the fact that he says that we mistake something similar for the real thing (echoing Plato’s description of dreaming at the end of Book V of the *Republic*), which might sound as though he believes we mistake an *image* for an external object; and if so, that he might also think that an image is involved in genuine perception, on the basis of which we perceive the external object, much as on Sense Datum theories. But since Aristotle thinks these changes are changes in the bloodstream (461b17–19) it seems unlikely that they look like external objects, much less sound, smell, taste, or feel like such objects. Instead of subjective resemblance, he may have in mind certain objective similarities that such changes bear to the objects they represent, as he suggests elsewhere (*On Memory*, 452b9–16). And in fact here he only says that it is *because* of this change (461b25–26) that we identify the external object itself as Coriscus in genuine perception, and not that we are somehow aware of it.

If that is right, then Aristotle is not committed to any form of indirect realism either. To use a scholastic distinction, these internal changes are not something awareness or any other intentional state is *directed towards* (id ad quem), but merely that *by means of which* (id a quo) our intentional states are directed toward something else. A sense datum theorist, in contrast, assumes that whenever we have an experience phenomenally like perceiving, there is something which we are directly aware of, and so in cases where there is no external object, there must be an ersatz internal one. But Aristotle does not make this assumption. Dreams are about external objects, just as perceptions are. But while they are phenomenally alike, Aristotle denies that we perceive or are aware of what we are dreaming in any way at all (*458b33–459a1*). It is as if we were aware of external objects. But we are actually aware of objects only when we perceive.

In fact, on the interpretation I’ve offered here, it seems that Aristotle can agree to a surprising amount of what direct realists say. In perception, what we are directly aware of are external objects and their properties, without having to be aware of something else: we are in “cognitive contact” with the things themselves, and not some “epistemic intermediary,” much less inferences that mediate perceptual beliefs. There will of course be causal intermediaries. But that is something virtually any realist should concede. For Aristotle, moreover, perception will not only be object-dependent, but “object-involving” and essentially relational: every perception consists in a pair of relatives, where each act of perceiving correlates with a perceptible object acting on it and bringing that perception about. Even if perception and dreaming are instances of a common type of experience, as I have suggested, what it is to have this experience is not the same as what it is to perceive. To perceive is to have this sort of experience of some particular object because that object has produced it in the relevant way. The object being perceived is therefore essential to perception in a way it is not for the other experiences. This is why Aristotle regards perception as the central case and explains the others in terms of it.
Ian Fishback, Graduate Student

What does this reading rule out then? It precludes a merely disjunctive analysis, as we have already seen, which some think is required for any realism worthy of the name (sometimes distinguished as “naive realism”). On such a view, the object is internal to the act of perceiving itself and hence partly constitutive of it. Some have thought there was support for such a view in Aristotle’s claim in On the Soul 3.2 that the activity of the perceptible object is one and the same as the activity of perception itself (425b25–27) and so present in the perceiving subject (426a11, cf. a3–4); and perhaps also in his highly suggestive claim at the end of Book 2 that perception is the ability to receive the perceptible forms of objects “without the matter” (424a17–24). But Aristotle explicitly resists such a view in chapter 6 of On Perception and Perceptibles. In rejecting the sort of subjectivism of sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias (see esp. MXG 980b9–14), he argues that many people can simultaneously perceive a common public, external object like a bell, frankincense, or a flame, and yet nonetheless each have an individual affection or modification (pathos) within them (446b17–26). This is the activity of the object mentioned earlier, its effect on the perceiver. His position thus stands midway between that of the subjectivism of the sophists and naive realism, which emphasizes the bare presence of the object in perception.

Perception does not simply consist in the object’s being present to us, as a constituent of the perceiving itself. It causes us to perceive it, by producing an effect on our senses, an effect which could be brought about in other ways, where it would no longer be a veridical perception. We should therefore think of Aristotle as a kind of direct realist, one who insists that we perceive objects directly, not through the awareness of some intermediary, but in virtue of the common mental state they produce in us — that is, the internal states or patterns of change that bear content and function equally in perception and in illusions, hallucinations, and dreams.

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Self-Defense, War, and Moral Judgment
By Ian Fishback, Graduate Student

I served four combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2002-2010, deploying back and forth from the relative tranquility at home to the violent chaos abroad. That transition eventually became familiar, but it always remained abrupt. I remember, at the outset of the final tour in Iraq, when my Special Forces detachment prepared to lift off from the Green Zone and depart for the Green Line, moving from one of the safest places in the country to one of the most dangerous. It was that point at which we left ‘peace’ and entered ‘war.’ As I boarded the Blackhawk helicopter, I pushed the complexities of our mission to the rear of my mind and focused on the relatively straightforward task at hand—getting from point A to point B safely. Seven years ago, on a different deployment, a helicopter in my sector was shot down, killing sixteen soldiers. Our best precaution to avoid such a fate in this instance was flying blacked out, under cover of nighttime darkness, where we might be heard but probably unseen. Nonetheless, if we were seen and engaged, we needed to be prepared to give as good as we got. As the aircraft lifted off, we scanned the ground below for signs of enemy activity, the green glow of our night vision equipment reflecting faintly off our faces. We glided over the earth, expecting violence to be perpetrated against us and preparing to perpetrate violence against others. Now we were at war.

We landed a little over an hour later, but we did never shed our psychological preparedness for violence. Our mental attitude was a good fit with the attitude of the Iraqi people we engaged, fought alongside, and lived with—people adjusted to a seemingly perpetual state of war. Every vehicle movement, every subtle instance of body language, and every spoken word was informed by the context of war and the threat of killing that it implied. Our mission, perhaps a paradigmatic symbol for naiveté, was to achieve a sustainable peace between the adversarial parties along the Hamrin Ridge, a series of mountains that cuts across Iraq and roughly demarcates the Kurdish controlled northern regions from the Arab controlled central regions. It was no small task. Two relatively recent events dominated the politics of the region: the Anfal genocide of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and the de-Bathification policy of the US-led occupation that our detachment supported. The genocide was Saddam Hussein’s brutal response to a Kurdish revolt, where he evicted the Kurds from the oil-rich Hamrin Ridge and subsequently repopulated the area with loyal Arab tribesmen. The Arabs governed the area until the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, at which point the Kurds, against US wishes, took advantage of the newfound Arab weakness and moved south, evicting the Arabs and reclaiming the land for themselves. Predictably, the displaced Arabs now provided men, material, and popular support for some of the most dangerous insurgent groups in Iraq. Implementing a deliberative process between the Kurds and Arabs, let alone settling upon a political solution that was palatable to both sides, seemed nigh impossible.
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges was adjudicating the understand-
ably strong moral judgments of the parties. Kurdish judgments of two
Arab generals were particularly striking, especially when contrasted with
each other. On the one hand, Kurds excoriated ex-general Hussein (not
Saddam; Hussein is a relatively common name in Iraq), for his role in
Anfal as lead planner and operations officer. The Kurds despised Hus-
sein and demanded retributive justice. His mere presence doomed any
multi-lateral project between Kurds and Arabs to failure. On the other
hand, the Kurds held a much more lenient judgment, even respect, for a
second general who also killed Kurds during Anfal, General Munim.
They did not morally blame him for his actions in war, let alone consid-
er him a moral villain, as they did ex-general Hussein. General Munim’s
participation and leadership in peacemaking greatly enhanced the
likelihood of success, in no small part because the Kurds regarded him
as a man of character.

The Kurds’ radically different moral attitudes towards ex-general Hus-
sein and General Munim are a paradox of sorts, I suppose. Both killed
many Kurds in an arguably unjust war, so why not judge them both
harshly? Kurds provided a simple and commonsense explanation: Gen-
eral Munim fought them in an unjust war, but he fought with honor.
General Munim abided by the principle of ‘distinction’, according to
which combatants, regardless of whether or not they fight for a just
cause, are permitted to intentionally kill enemy combatants and forbid-
den from intentionally killing non-combatants. He targeted their war-
rors but not their women and children, and because he killed exclusive-
ly in warrior-on-warrior combat, Kurds believed General Munim’s kill-
ing was radically morally different than ex-general Hussein’s. The
different judgments and the reasons underlying the contrast made sense
to me then, as they do now. Conventional morality enshrined in inter-
national law mostly coincides with such judgments as well.

The principle of distinction, however, is much maligned in recent philo-
sophical discourse. Contemporary literature on the morality of war
calls distinction into question and argues that soldiers fighting for an
unjust cause usually commit a severe moral wrong whether they kill
enemy soldiers or civilians. These arguments certainly seem plausible to
moral philosophers and those who read their work, for they seem to
coincide with the way we typically judge personal self-defense, where
there is a clear demarcation between culpable murder and innocent self-
defense. They typically have a structure in which the author constructs
a hypothetical case of self-defense, considers his or her own intuitions
about the case, and uses those intuitions to criticize conventional moral
judgments about war, such as the principle of distinction embodied in
the Kurds’ judgments of General Munim and ex-general Hussein.
These conclusions do not, however, coincide with the conventional
morality of war. So much the worse for the convention, say my philo-
sophical colleagues. It is supposedly clear that commonsense beliefs
about war are mistaken and ought to be revised in radical ways, includ-
ing jettisoning the principle of distinction.

I am not so sure that the arguments are as convincing as many of my
contemporaries take them to be. One cause of doubt is the contrast
between, on the one hand, Kurdish judgments of General Munim and
ex-general Hussein and, on the other, the moral judgments about war
espoused by some of my friends and colleagues who have limited experi-
ence with or knowledge of war. According to my philosophy col-
leagues, General Munim committed grave moral wrongs when he
fought against the Kurds. Perhaps these wrongs were not as severe as
those of ex-general Hussein, but that is supposedly like comparing
‘pedestrian’ murderers to ‘serial’ murderers, like Ted Bundy. All acts of
murder are wrong, even if some shock the conscience more than others.

Fair enough. The thing is, the Kurds’ consciences were not shocked by
General Munim’s actions at all. They understood why he fought and
killed their warriors. Perhaps most importantly, they respected him for
his actions in war. I am skeptical that the Kurds would be convinced
that General Munim made a moral mistake when he fought. Regard-
less, I am certain that the Kurds would not compare his actions to mur-
der and self-defense. Kurds would almost certainly dismiss such sup-
posedly analogical arguments as naive, perhaps even with some degree
of contempt. The hypothetical cases of self-defense prominent in con-
temporary just war theory, such as defenders with options to shoot out-
of-control drivers with ray guns and options to parachute off a cliff, are
just too far removed from the reality of war the Kurds experienced. The
hypothetical cases are not reflective of war, and their use arguably re-
ffects a misunderstanding of what war is. If so, why should they be used
to judge acts of war?

It is one thing to think that the Kurds would not respond to the argu-
ments. It is another thing altogether to claim that the arguments them-
selves are unreasonable. Perhaps the Kurds are being unreasonable, as
people are prone to be, or perhaps there is a communication gap that
can be overcome by re-formulating the argument in a different way.
This might be a rhetorical problem, rather than a philosophical one. I
am not so sure that the Kurds are being unreasonable, though. If any-
one should be biased to be overly critical of General Hussein in this
case, it seems likely to be the Kurds. After all, he killed their fathers,
brothers, and sons. It seems unlikely to be a rhetorical problem either.
The Kurds understand what war is, and they understand what self-
defense is. For them, contemporary just war theory does not seem to be
engaged with war qua war.

The contemporary just war theorist normally responds to such objec-
tions with the claim that there is one morality that exists in war and
peace. This, however, misses the mark, for one can believe that there is
one morality and the context of ordinary personal self-defense and war
are usually radically different in morally important ways. Capturing
that difference or arguing that there is no such difference should be one
of the principal tasks of the just war theorist, yet it is frequently done
haphazardly in today’s burgeoning literature, which hardly seems to
devote much effort to defining what ‘war’ is. Until this changes, the
Kurds and those serious about war have a good reason to be dismissive
of such arguments and their prescriptions. I, for one, share the Kurds’
skepticism. Whether that skepticism stands up to additional scrutiny is
yet to be determined, but it will certainly stand or fall in the context of
a thoroughgoing research concerning what constitutes ‘war’ and what, if
anything, sets ‘war’ apart from ‘self-defense’. I hope that if it does, the
Kurds, and others in the unfortunate circumstances of war, will find
that it makes sense of the reality they endure.

As I finish this short essay, I prepare to leave Hatcher Library, walk
across the Diag, and return to Angell Hall. In simple terms, I will move
from point A to point B, just as I did five years ago in my nighttime
flight across eastern Iraq. There are obviously significant

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1A notable exception is Michael Walzer, but he is the subject of ubiquitous criticism in contemporary debates. Other exceptions, such as Cheyney Ryan, are outliers.
differences, though. At no point do I expect violence to be done to me. The thought rarely, if ever, enters my mind. At no point do I expect to do violence to others. These expectations are warranted, and I have plenty of evidence for this fact. Rarely do I pay full attention to anything around me when I walk through central campus, as my deeper thoughts are hard to set aside. Even if I were able to give my absolute focus to my immediate environment, why should I? The most dangerous outcome is two similarly preoccupied fellows bumping into each other, completely understanding and sympathizing with each other, professing mutual apologies, and moving on with the day. The idea that one of them might attack the other is thoroughly nonsensical once one realizes that we have heartfelt conversations over whether it is morally acceptable to kill an injured squirrel in order to put it out of its misery. Even more tellingly, many colleagues would not be capable of the killing, even if they thought it was the right thing to do. I often marvel at this wonderful privilege made possible by, among other things, the security we enjoy. There is nothing wrong with this; indeed, it is admirable in many respects. But it is a privilege, and we should be careful to recognize the differences between the experiences of us fortunate few blessed to live in such an environment and the experiences of those in war. Outlining those differences it a task too large for this short essay, so I will leave it for my more rigorous academic writing. Here, it is enough to emphasize the possibility that self-defense for us is nothing like war for them, and our moral intuitions about the former are inappropriate for judging their behavior in the latter.

Brothers Karamazov 402

Eric Swanson, Associate Professor

I regularly teach an advanced undergraduate seminar on the relationships between language, causation, and responsibility in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The novel’s epigraph sets the tone for our discussions: “Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit” (John 12:24). We must use language if we want our intentions, goals, and values to come to fruition. But the novel shows how our uses of language sometimes bring forth too much fruit, or the wrong kinds. We are the authors of our words, but we are not the authors of their interpretations, and carelessness with or inattention to our words and context can foster interpretations that are devilishly hard to foresee.

Those familiar with the novel can doubtless think of many illustrative examples, but to avoid giving too many spoilers I’ll focus on an early case. In it, Father Zosima, the mentor of our “future hero” Alyosha, meets Alyosha’s brother Dmitri. Zosima’s gesture at this meeting is not linguistic, but is nevertheless replete with conventional meaning:

Kneeling in front of Dmitri Fyodorovich, the elder [Zosima] bowed down at his feet with a full, distinct, conscious bow, and even touched the floor with his forehead.

But the exact meaning of Zosima’s bow is at first radically unclear to the other characters in the novel, and to the reader. It leaves Alyosha deeply concerned: “The bow struck Alyosha terribly; he believed blindly that there was a secret meaning in it.” One acquaintance of Alyosha’s, Rakitin, cynically speculates that
“The old man is really astute, if you ask me; he smelled crime. It stinks in your family. ... So Father Zosima bunches his forehead on the ground, for the future, just in case. Afterwards they’ll say, ‘Ah, it’s what the holy elder foretold, prophesied,’ though bumping your forehead on the ground isn’t much of a prophecy. No, they’ll say, it was an emblem, an allegory, the devil knows what! They’ll proclaim it, they’ll remember: ‘He foresaw the crime and marked the criminal.’ It’s always like that with holy fools…”

Rakitin here accuses Zosima to be exploiting the fruitfulness of uses of language for selfish ends. In particular, Rakitin suggests that Zosima deliberately leaves the meaning of his bow unclear so that it will be possible to attribute a meaning to it, after Zosima’s death, that would be putative evidence of a miracle.

Zosima’s own explanation of his bow is complex. But he clearly indicates that the vagueness of his gesture matches the uncertainty of Dmitri’s future:

“I bowed yesterday to his great future suffering.”

He suddenly fell silent and seemed to lapse into thought. His words were strange. Father Iosif, a witness to the elder’s bow the day before, exchanged glances with Father Paissy. Alyosha could not help himself.

“Father and teacher,” he spoke in great excitement, “your words are too vague… What is this suffering that awaits him?”

“Do not be curious. Yesterday I seemed to see something terrible… as if his eyes yesterday expressed his whole fate. He had a certain look… so that I was immediately horrified in my heart at what this man was preparing for himself. Once or twice in my life I’ve seen people with the same expression in their faces… as if it portrayed the whole fate of the person, and that fate, alas, came about. I sent you to him, Alexei, because I thought your brotherly countenance would help him. But everything is from the Lord, and all our fates as well. ‘Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.’ Remember that….”

After Zosima’s explanation, Rakitin’s interpretation looks not only cynical but foolish. Zosima is indeed appropriately proportioning the meaning of his “vague” gesture to the extent of his knowledge. This is because while he knows of Dmitri’s “great future suffering,” he knows no more than that about Dmitri’s fate. So it’s not that Zosima “bumps his forehead… just in case”; rather it’s that Zosima is so moved that he must make some gesture of respect to Dmitri and to his “great future suffering.” But Zosima doesn’t know enough to make a gesture with a meaning more specific than that of his bow. Zosima also appropriately proportions the causal impact of his gesture to his knowledge. In particular, the solemnity of his bow (and of Zosima’s explanation, using the more formal ‘Alexei’) successfully conveys the seriousness of Dmitri’s plight to Alyosha. By contrast, Ivan Karamazov’s regrets, later in the novel, are about the causal consequences of his misuses of language. Without giving spoilers: Ivan misproportions his words’ meaning and causal impact to his knowledge of the situation, and thereby contributes to a great deal of suffering. Zosima is not the author of his words’ interpretations — and knows he is not — but he is careful enough that he manages to achieve his intentions nevertheless. Ivan, again by contrast, chronically overestimates his own degree of authorial control. He comes to regret it deeply.

My own research is now drawing on ideas I’ve worked out through teaching this course. In particular I’m developing an account of the force of slurring language — for example, language that uses conventionalized ethnic slurs or gender slurs — that imputes some of the force of that language to the social and historical context in which it is used. If a speaker is ignorant of or inattentive to that context — like Ivan Karamazov — then the causal effects of their language will often go far beyond their intentions. Irrespective of speaker intentions, social and historical context contribute to the harmfulness of slurs, and uses of slurs perpetuate ideologies that contribute to social and political injustice.

The students in my courses are not in situations like Ivan Karamazov’s, thank goodness — but they are and will be in situations where the causal impact of their words matters, and is again not entirely within their control. Our extensive discussions of their work in the seminar room help them experiment with the causal force of language in a controlled, cooperative setting. (The importance of this experimentation is especially vivid when the devout atheists and devout Christians always attracted to courses on Dostoevsky discuss the book with each other!) Many of these students won’t have an opportunity to have discussions quite like that again, but they will be spouses, parents, co-workers, friends, and citizens. I hope that their philosophical reflections on language at Michigan will help them appreciate the causal impacts of language in those roles.

These discussions have helped me appreciate the causal impact of my language, as well, making me more reflective about the nuances of effective teaching, and especially about the effects that my interventions have on the way students discuss each other’s work. And, gratifyingly, three of the strongest students who’ve been through this course are themselves planning to teach: one is now in the PhD program in philosophy at Yale; one is in the PhD program in philosophy here at Michigan (and combining those studies with the Medical Scientist Training Program in the Medical School, to pursue his interests in philosophy of psychology and medical ethics); and a third is pursuing her JD at Michigan Law, with the hope of eventually teaching in legal academia. With students like these I can’t help but feel a great responsibility and joy in my own teaching, and a great hope that someday they feel the same way.
Field Report

The Michigan High School Ethics Bowl
By Zoë Johnson King, Graduate Student

- Seven High Schools.
- Ten Teams.
- Epic Thoughts.
- Deliberation and Discussion.
- A Trophy.
- A Journey.
- Pizza.

2014-15 was a big year for outreach in the Philosophy department. Our annual event, the Michigan High School Ethics Bowl, took place at the Neutral Zone on February 8th. The event is now in its second year. But, despite its youth, this year’s Ethics Bowl program had the support of 13 graduate student volunteers, a local community organization named "A2Ethics", and an $8,000 grant from Arts of Citizenship — a Rackham subsidiary. The latter enabled us to expand our program outside of Ann Arbor and into Ypsilanti and Detroit, as befits the program’s aim to widen access to the skills of critical thinking and ethical and political analysis, especially to those from backgrounds traditionally under-represented in the academy.

Ethics Bowl is an extracurricular program designed to foster philosophical discussion and debate, which differs from other debate-based programs in its Platonic emphasis on productive, collaborative search for the truth as opposed to rhetorical point-scoring. In the competition, teams are posed challenging questions regarding a set of "case studies" — thought-experiments illustrating a contentious issue in applied ethics or in political philosophy — having had several months to prepare by analyzing and discussing the cases among themselves. Points are awarded for clarity of exposition, depth of analysis, recognition of arguments for a range of points of view, accurate and insightful application of ethical theory, and civil dialogue. Each participating school is supported by coaching from Michigan graduate students from September through February, in which we visit schools to introduce students to ethical and political philosophy and help them to develop empathetic and well-reasoned positions on each of the cases.

The National High School Ethics Bowl was established in 2012-13, by the Parr Center for Ethics at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, as a "finale" for competitions held in local areas. Michigan graduate students developed our state Bowl the following year. Our collaboration with the community group A2Ethics has enabled us to reach out to far more members of our local community than just the students and teachers at the schools we work with, which is really what makes the Michigan Bowl so unique; our "case studies" are real-life stories written by local professionals, and these same local professionals return to serve as judges for the competition, alongside staff and students from other Philosophy departments in Michigan. We have really enjoyed bringing Philosophy out of the seminar room and into the hearts and minds of people from across the state.

This year, the schools who participated in the Ethics Bowl were: Ann Arbor Pioneer High School, Huron High School, Saline High School, Greenhills School, Washtenaw Technical Middle College, Ypsilanti High School, and Henry Ford Academy: School of Creative Studies. The local winner was Pioneer High School, who traveled to North Carolina for Nationals and finished 7th in the country — despite being almost the only public school in the competition. Our primary coaches were Zoe Johnson King, Caroline Perry, Anna Edmonds, Chloe Armstrong, Kevin Craven, Nina Windgässer, and Paul Boswell. Ishani Maitra served as our internal reviewer for the Arts of Citizenship grant.

Two students from the Pioneer High winning team — Ellen Sauer and Brett Boehman — had their appetites for Philosophy so thoroughly whet by their experiences at Ethics Bowl that they changed their plans for College, and both started at the University of Michigan in the Fall of 2015, intending to major or minor in Philosophy. I invited them to speak at the department’s end-of-year party last Summer, and they delivered a moving address on how studying Philosophy has helped them to understand the world in a deeper way. Here is an excerpt from Ellen’s speech:

_I know I’m preaching to the choir when I say that I believe a knowledge of philosophy is absolutely essential to a fully informed human experience, but I’ll say it anyway: we NEED philosophy. Humans will always ask “why,” and philosophy gives us the tools to respond “maybe this, because this”. High school students don’t usually have access to these vital tools at all. Your efforts in helping us discover them are invaluable._

I am told that Brett also quoted the "very simple principle" from Peter Singer’s Famine, Affluence and Morality in his end-of-year speech as Pioneer’s class President.

Brett and Ellen are currently enrolled in Eric Swanson’s class, “Introduction to Philosophical Problems” (Phil 232), and are intending to go on to take some 300- and 400-level classes next semester.

Next year, all but Henry Ford Academy will be returning to the Bowl program, and we have two new schools joining us — Wayne Memorial High School in Detroit and Berkeley High School in Oakland.
Loeb Retirement Song
by Sarah Buss, Associate Professor

Song for Louis Loeb, sung at his retirement party
To the tune of “There Was A Farmer Had A Dog (And Bingo Was His Name — O)”

(Lyrics thanks to Sarah Buss)

’Twas two times twenty years ago
He to Ann Arbor came — O
L – O – U – I – S
L – O – U – I – S
L – O – U – I – S

And Louis is his name — O!

His work on Hume, and on Descartes
Brought him deserved acclaim — O!
L-O-U-I-S
ETC.

And Louis is his name — O!

Three-eighty-nine; two-thirty-two,
With teaching came more fame — O!
L-O-U-I-S
ETC

And Louis is his name — O!

Acclaim and fame are well and good,
But we’re here to proclaim – O!
You were always there
To — i - ling for our welfare,
No detail too small to spare.*
The keeper of the flame — O!

So we all know that when you leave
We’ll never be the same — O!
L – O – U – I – S
L – O – U – I – S
L – O – U – I – S

We’ll never be the same — Oh!

*This line is to be delivered slowly, with emphasis on each syllable, and a brief pause before the line that follows
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Derrick Darby - Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Social and Political Philosophy, Race, Inequality, Philosophy of Law

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