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## WHEN SCIENCE IS IN DEFENSE OF VALUE-LINKED FACTS \*

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*I went to China in 1973 as co-leader of a team of delegates from U.S. teacher organizations, such as the National Association of School Superintendents. Before the trip, most of them had been impressed by Maoism, aware of the removal of signs of rank from military uniforms, thinking China was going to be the first egalitarian society. I said, "Well, when you get there you can see for yourself." They were angry with me, thinking I was some right-wing type. When we crossed the border from Hong Kong, we were met by two Communist Party officials. One of the first things they did was ask me for my protocol list, so they would know who should ride up front in the Red Flag limousine and who should ride in the gray bus.*

### *Morality Tied to a Theory of Human Nature*

What first attracted me to classical Chinese philosophy was that it seemed to anchor morality not in the words of an anthropomorphic God but in some natural features of the human mind. Certain Chinese scholars say that orders from Heaven in the early Zhou period, later became orders issued through the individual mind, similar in content to the early orders from Heaven.<sup>1</sup> Heaven's role in human conduct is obscure. Rather than looking to rules from a transcendental Being, Mencian texts devote more space to certain social emotions, such as compassion and respect/shame as the basis of morality. This sets the origins of morality off from the Judeo-Christian ethics that is based on words from a willful deity. Mencius is willing to identify facts that flag these emotions as natural. He says, "Reason and righteousness please my heart in the same way that meat pleases my palate"<sup>2</sup> Another attraction of early Chinese ethics was the Mencian insistence that morality must be tied into a theory of human nature. In his case, this would derive from an innate sense of compassion, shame/ respect, and an evaluating sense of right and wrong. In this regard, early Confucianism takes a stand in opposition to what in modern Western thought is called "The naturalistic fallacy." The term comes from the English philosopher G.E. Moore (d.1958). In his book Principia Ethica he argued that we cannot infer something is good by referring to any facts about its natural qualities. In other words, we cannot learn how to behave from facts about the world. David Hume's position was, "No ought from an is." My own position is that this Western dichotomy between facts and values is part of the set of dichotomies not present in early Chinese thought, between reason/emotions, mind/matter, and subjective/objective. The Chinese thinkers do not believe that we can talk about knowing apart from the emotions, or that the mind is substantially different from matter. I believe in the relevance of scientific facts as they pertain to our ethical standards and choices. While accepting differences between the two entities in each above set of dichotomies, we do not need to view them as mutually exclusive. They are usually linked to each other.

Among current Western thinkers who oppose the position of Moore and his followers are Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Hilary Putnam.<sup>3</sup> Dennett argued that ethics must be mindful of human nature, which includes factual claims about natural human traits. Among other points, Harris discussed the dangerous impact on the value of human health of beliefs derived solely from “reason” or from intuition. An example is the belief in an immortal soul independent of the material influence of our genes or of the economic system in which a person finds herself. Putnam traces the fact-value dichotomy from Hume to the logical positivists, starting in the 1930s, such as Rudolf Carnap. These writers, he says, had an erroneous conception of “fact,” as just a sensible impression, without reference to predictive use. And they treated value statements as cognitively meaningless judgments. So, there are transcendental elements in the Biblical standard (Good is a character of God and His acts) and in Moore’s account of the Good. In contrast, in the case of Hume and Carnap, values are merely mental, subjective and unstable.

Along with the Nobel Prize honored economist Amartya Sen, Putnam views values and facts as entangled topics. This is the case when a person achieves capabilities that she values: Examples would include being well-nourished, having a sense of self-respect, and having a role in community life. In other words, these are capabilities that reflect “a concern for the character of a human life as a whole.” This standard can be applied to policies of economic welfare or the development of poorer countries.

In my essay that follows, where I use the term “values”, it includes what Putnam and Sen would call “capabilities.” I follow the early Confucians, and Putnam and Sen, in rejecting this so-called naturalistic fallacy. The following comments are meant to give contemporary examples in support of the position that when judging the goodness of an act, we will find that empirical facts can play a determining role. I treat these facts as different from, but often directly linked to values.

The Neo-Confucian position is more complex than the early one. The Song-Ming Confucians accepted the convergence of values and facts, that knowledge of the world includes both facts about natural changes and the moral obligations that follow from them: knowing the principle of life without cease, one knows the moral value of nurturance ( for the early Confucians, this includes water and fertilizer for plants, education and food for humans). But for Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, the moral values are intuitive as well as observational. Primarily they are not natural but immaterial, and only secondarily are they revealed in the real world, mixed with impurities.

Obviously, aggression is also a natural or biologically based behavior and may be immoral. So we cannot say that whatever is a natural regularity is good. What I offer in this paper is a naturalistic account of what features of an event make it good, as revealed in references to a study of human nature and the positive emotions that I will discuss. Confucians take note of regularities, but focus on the situational variations among them and the graceful quality of how we can respond to them, in short to make our response fit the time and situation.

G.E. Moore later agreed that we can give a naturalistic account of things that we call “good.” Those emotions to which I just referred are associated with individual brain structures implicated in perception or sensation. They both lead to motives to act, and at the same time, to those actions that the body flags as desirable. In other words, the emotions signal or respond to the *properties* that make events good: health (contentment and the avoidance of long term suffering), loving relations, and respect plus the avoidance of shame in cooperative activity. Some people

treat psychopaths and sociopaths as like color-blind people, who are not able to sense differences that others sense. They share some emotions with us (fear, pleasure), but may not feel empathy or shame or loyalty. Confucians would refer to them as “non-persons “ (非人)。 Both our justice system and early Confucianism have positions that, in these cases, are short on humaneness.

The same mental process is involved in identifying which emotions are involved with an imbedded value and which factual signs reveal that the body wants the actions. In one recent study, James Woodward says, “...we should be skeptical of the idea that reason and emotion are sharply distinct and mutually exclusive categories.”<sup>4</sup>

If by ‘emotional’ we mean structures that are affective, involved in evaluation (appraisal of what ought to be the case) and in motivation then structures like the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are indeed involved in ‘emotional ‘ processing, but this does not mean that they are nonrepresentational, impervious to influence from learning or by cognitive structures...<sup>5</sup>

Elsewhere I have written about “clustering” to refer the Chinese thinkers’ (early, mid-imperial, and modern) favoring a tight linkage of cognitive and emotional functions. This implies that our Western fixation (Platonic in origin) on differentiating them is one of the fundamental distinctions between our two legacies.

I share with Daniel Dennett the position that “ethics must be *somehow* based on an appreciation of human nature- on a sense of what a human being is or might be, and on what a human being might want to have or want to be.” Therefore, I support only a *workable* ethics, one that takes account of human motives and predispositions that have their origin, in part, in biology. *Ought* implies *can*. It is legitimate only if we can perform it. In referring to human nature, I refer to human nature as it exists now. Obviously the gene pool has been shaping and reshaping for a long time. “Ought” should not put highly unreasonable demands on a subject’s ordinary motives and attitudes. I have been troubled by various creeds being of little interest to anyone except the preachers, or, instead, dangerous.

Here are certain factors to which I believe many of our ethical intuitions are responsive. First, the health related sources of contentment and long term suffering. Second, patterns of kinship and social partnerships that have some relation to the emotion of love. Third, the human response to the hierarchy that is natural to human society, manifest in the importance to us of the emotions of respect or shame. This includes the harmony of those feelings and our other emotions with our group’s standards. Today, I would say that this condition may lead to the value of cooperation. I would explain the satisfaction we gain from cultivating a skill to the respect or sense of dignity within a group that we gain from it. This too is natural to most humans. There are known objective measurements of the respect/shame emotions. Consequences for human contentment and suffering are events that make something “right or wrong”. There are other

events that also make something right or wrong. So now I turn to the interrelated sets of values, emotions, and facts.

### *Health and well-being, Contentment and Suffering, Clinical and Subjective Facts*

First, among the emotions that embody the values of health and well-being are contentment and the absence of long term suffering, at the subjective level. I use the term contentment to refer to a sense of satisfaction, or tranquility, with my physical condition and my objective social situation. As such. It flows easily into “well-being.” My own health affects my family and some in my community. This provides content to the following definition of health care ethics from the Vermont Ethics Network: “At the core of health care ethics is our sense of right and wrong and our beliefs about rights we possess and duties we owe others.”<sup>6</sup> So I define right and wrong in this case in terms of the consequences in contentment or suffering for persons affected by an individual’s or group’s acts or policies. Most of the time we can assume that those consequences are morally good when they result in contentment and bad if in suffering. In the long run I would advocate emotional satisfactions that embody this value for all humans, but normally act to realize it at least in people with whom I have some bond and try to remain mindful of its consequences for those beyond my bonds.

Among the empirical facts by which the body indicates possible contentment or suffering and health are: temperature, tissue damage, hormonal activity (for example, dopamine), and blood pressure. Some have criticized the philosopher Sam Harris for treating “well-being” as both a physical and normative term, never giving it scientific content. Here is content: Facts that reveal the absence or presence of well-being are: negatively, inattention and stress; positively, attention and ease/tranquility. These have all been scientifically studied, for example in the work of Daniel Kahneman. Eye-tracking is one of the standard clinical tests for attention.<sup>7</sup> The Confucian content of well-being stresses tranquility (安心). Beginning with the *Analects* this subjective condition appears in various citations, such as, “The humane person rests in humaneness (仁者安仁).”<sup>8</sup>

I support equal worth before the law,<sup>9</sup> and expect the law to be consistent with thoughtful ethical principles. It may need to take into account the particulars of a situation, such as a person’s opposition to a law and the value it reflects (perhaps based a competing loyalty to a religious principle) or conventional rules about a relationship that require attention. The same challenge can affect an individual’s choices. For example, take determining if an instance of suffering is morally bad. A parent who takes a child to the dentist for a painful tooth removal can view the act positively in terms of the child’s subsequent oral health. A priest who encourages a Catholic parishioner to obey the dietary restrictions of Lent may argue that the mild and short term suffering from fasting produces a hearty acceptance by the parishioner of diminished worth accorded to material goods. Suffering can lead to strength. Further, the understanding about suffering depends on the relation of the person experiencing it to its audience. Family members understand suffering differently from a family physician. Those involved in organizational health care must know something about the objective differences between urban and rural health care.

Regarding the rural areas, these have been described as “closely-knit, isolated, tightly interdependent, small rural community settings,” with their own cultural and personal values.<sup>10</sup> The rural environment can influence how suffering is or is not experienced, including the reluctance of some people to reveal their symptoms. Distance from clinics may make some care unavailable. I am suggesting that *distance* may be a variable in a moral system.

### *Social Bonding, Love and Sympathy, Symbiotic Care*

Second, among the human emotions that embody the value of social bonding through relationships are love and sympathy, manifest in symbiotic relations of care. The natural origin of these values includes their emergence in the infant/care-giver bond and in the discovery of the link between it and subsequent altruism. Note the study, “Common Neuro-circuits Underlying Parental and Altruistic Caregiving.” The later revealed “a general *Caregiving System*.” Objective facts that reveal these values include degree of caring, friendships, formation of partnerships, and involvement in community matters.<sup>11</sup> When I look at the cooperative state of various organisms or cells involved in the evolution of life (see below), I am certain that aspects of any extreme form of the American ideal of independent or individual existence is a departure from one of nature’s claims: We are interdependent.

In contrast, the Confucian portrait from the earliest period, focuses on the community over the individual. The Confucian cultural content of love is compassion and care (关怀). These would be among the values sought through the practice (功夫) of ethical behavior. Practice is carried out through rituals as a way of leading the individual to a state in which such behavior is spontaneous and the person is tranquil in it. Confucius at age seventy is an example of this. Among living Confucians, the rituals were not always regarded as intrinsically sacred. Personal story: My teacher of the Chinese philosophical classics, (毓老师), a member of the Manchu royal family, told me that the ritual roles were often so bothersome that he ignored them when alone if he could get away with it. For example, he tried to avoid having to leave his room to urinate at night because of the various items of clothing he would have to put on to do so, various robes, belts, and strings with stones hanging from the belts.

Confucians also favored the emulation of models, actual persons or stories about such figures. These practices help bring awareness to values that are in part intuitive emotions and the intentions that follow. Model emulation or copying is a necessary part of learning from others, including learning right and wrong behavior. Chinese culture is remarkable for its early and lasting focus on this practice.

The early Confucians (Doctrine of the Mean) recognized that love can be an impediment to the ethical life when it creates a bias that ignores immoral acts by someone close to the actor.<sup>12</sup> Of course family bonding can become a basis for tribalism. This underscores the need for empathy toward people beyond the tribal boundary, to counter the in-group bias. Confucians advocated

extending humaneness (仁) to an increasingly wide target of people and living things. The defect in their position was to treat “extending” as a natural process, like plant growth, subject only to the educational and economic nourishment of the people who expand their care. Some modern humans discovered that laws and enforcement agencies are necessary to sustain that extension.

Today, the most persuasive consideration is that such out-group relations lead to cooperation, fostering increased survival and well-being for both groups. Part of contemporary scientific discourse involves the claim that the human diaspora out of Africa occurred when a new social behavior evolved in the sapiens species, “a genetically coded penchant for cooperation with unrelated individuals.”<sup>13</sup> Cooperation is sustained by such values as loyalty, reciprocity, fairness, and trust, and the emotions of pride and shame. Thus cooperation with non-kin is an important step in the evolution of humaneness in humans.

In the modern world, this cooperation and care for persons outside in-groups is sustained by legal codes and enforcement mechanisms maintained by the state, so long as the state is not largely controlled by some special interest group (such as the wealthy, who favor tax reduction) or a kinship faction.

The emotions can be directed not only to other humans, but also to animals genetically close to humans. Primatologists have found that their own emotions of empathy and sympathy give them a new perspective on how to study scientifically the behavior of chimpanzees. Thereby they learn what the behavioristic approach (studying individual animals in cages) had hidden. Practice of social bonding occurs not only among humans but among certain other animals as well, including primates. Even long after the death of the most famous American behaviorist, B.F. Skinner, unfortunately psychologists continued to study social deprivation among macaque monkeys. One reported that “We kept young, intelligent monkeys separate from their families and others of their kind, for many months in soundproof cages that remained lit 24 hours a day...”<sup>14</sup>

Frans de Waal reported that, “The maestro of observation, Konrad Lorenz, believed that one could not investigate animals effectively without an intuitive understanding grounded in love and respect.”<sup>15</sup> de Waal accepted such a perspective, which led him to appreciate the importance of group life to the chimps and to care for them in it. There are two steps here. The first is breaking the wall that separates the researcher from the primate. The second is studying the primate in its social setting.

Chimps themselves look after certain others in their group. This in turn underscored the need to study them in environments in which they could flourish in health and reproduction, namely group life in jungle-like settings in zoos. Thereby reducing their suffering, de Waal felt that he was acting ethically as he studied them. In the same spirit, the Japanese primatologist Imanishi Kanji studies the kinship ties and friendships of chimpanzees.<sup>16</sup> This simply underscores the importance of kinds of group attachments. I make no claim one way or the other that primates

experience the emotion of sympathy. But they do need and experience group life, involving caring and team work. This might not have been scientifically studied had the primatologists not allowed their own sympathy to extend to the chimps. Among other discoveries manifesting the chimp's team work,, de Waal and the staff at the Burger's Zoo in the Netherlands found that twenty-five apes trashed the zoo's restaurants. They had found a tree trunk too heavy for a single chimp to carry, formed a team, leaned it against the enclosure wall, and climbed over into the restaurant. <sup>17</sup>

It is not surprising to find that many other living things thrive in symbiotic situations. Not until the late 1920s did microbiologists begin to study microorganisms in a cooperative setting. After the petri dish was invented in 1887, scientists found that although some bacteria grew, many did not grow at all. A 1911 study estimated that huge numbers of the cells in the dishes would not form colonies. They called it the Great Plate Count Anomaly. The most recent work by Northeastern University's Slava Epstein showed that the bacteria are sensitive to where they are and who is with them.<sup>18</sup> Only when returned to their natural settings, in the earth, plant roots, or water, did most of them flourish, form colonies, and reproduce abundantly. They can be both parasites and symbiotic partners. Usually both.

*Harmonious (hexiede 和谐的) Adaptation to Hierarchy , Respect and Shame, Conformity and Potential Cooperation*

Third and finally, I believe that the value of harmony and the emotions of respect and the avoidance of shame are closely related to facts about hierarchy and for what today we call cooperation. They are in China. Hierarchy emerged in human social life first in chiefdoms (populations in the thousands), but in more complex forms in states (over 50,000 populations).<sup>19</sup> It was related to economic specialization, including food production and public works, such as irrigation projects . Cooperation in hierarchical groups was necessary in China for those food related projects, for dealing with aggressive threats, and for the officials in charge within the feudal states. Harmony (和) was the value signifying, among other things, those peaceful relations with those groups.

China was already hierarchical by the beginning of philosophy, about the 6<sup>th</sup> century BCE. Harmony (和) appeared from those days and onward as a term with a rich context. In some of those contexts it referred to a conciliatory relation between people of different ranks. It remains in the political philosophy of China's current leadership as the goal of Chinese society, in which there is to be a stressless or harmonious ( 和谐 ) relationship between the various social and interest groups, minorities, and officials, in contrast to the Maoist era of class struggle.

Harmony (和) emerged as a psychological and ethical principle as early as the Analects and the Confucian classic, The Doctrine of the Mean, which existed in the early Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-C.E. 220):

While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in a state of *equilibrium*. When these feelings are stirred, and they act in due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of *harmony* (和).<sup>20</sup>

Psychologically, it was the “..harmonization of one’s basic feelings in accord with the standards of the human community.”<sup>21</sup> The text of the Mean says that “The superior man does what is proper to the station in which he is.” But he also keeps true to his identity during this time of adaptation to different social environments. “Sincerity (诚) is that whereby self-completion is effected, and its way is that by which man must direct himself.”<sup>22</sup> There is a difference between morality and convention, and he remains true to his sense of right and wrong while adapting.

In terms of ethics, the state of harmony is achieved through self-education and instruction by teachers. This early idea of “self-education” was stressed by one of my mentors, Wing-tsit Chan of Dartmouth College. We are told that the superior man seeks a friendly harmony without being weak. The primary instruction tools in early Confucianism were the rituals (礼), which help to create harmonious emotions within hierarchical social groups. For them, music trains the feeling of unity and also promotes harmonious relations between people. Because things exist in relationships, each has the qualities of its social position. In most of the examples, the topic of harmony concerns people of rank, not common people. The early texts discuss harmonizing the differences between the views of a loyal minister and his ruler. In a passage in the Zuo Zhuan<sup>23</sup> the ruler may revise his position, determining that the minister was right. Harmony is compared to a broth in which various meats and vegetables are placed and blended properly.

As I will mention below, the idea of conformity is found in current social science terminology as part of the path to cooperation and its pride/shame control system. But it is not central in early Confucianism. An important distinction is made in the Analects. “The exemplary person pursues harmony (和 [thoughtful agreement]), rather than conformity (同 *tong*, agreement at any cost); the petty minded is the opposite.”<sup>24</sup> The term rendered here by Ni Peimin as “conformity” suggests reflexively thinking and behaving the same as another party, whereas harmony may be a blend of different voices, including one’s own.

It might be argued that the repetitive practice of the rituals leads to a form of conformance. The early Confucian answer would be that the student should also be mindful of the circumstances or situation calling for action. This means cultivating a sense of “timeliness.” The Mean says that the superior man, “in seeking the mean, is always appropriate in his timeliness (时中)”<sup>25</sup>. These human situations require that the actor take into account the clustered emotional and cognitive factors specific to the situation involving those likely to be affected. Then, she should proceed to choose to act in the way most harmonious to those factors.

By the Han period (206BCE-220CE) there arose a form of Confucianism that altered the focus of the Philosophical Confucianism (儒家哲学) of the Mencius and the Mean, with its difference

between the moral and the conventional. I call this new development State Confucianism (国家儒术), the legacy of Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒 179?BCE-104BCE). He proposed banning all other schools of thought and only venerating State Confucianism: 罢黜百家，独尊儒术. For him there is no distinction between morality and conformity to rules. Where the philosophical Confucians stressed self-education in matters of morality as well as instruction, for Dong Zhongshu, the emperor determines right and wrong for all, and the subjects conform. Loyalty to the emperor is the chief value. The people cannot improve without control by the ruler, because by birth they have only the beginnings of goodness. The world is a hierarchy of the three ranks: ruler over ruled, father over son, and husband over wife. The ideal is a grand unity of thought and conduct (大一统)。Conformance to outside rules is a virtue. Although Dong Zhongshu stressed harmony between one's likes and dislikes and those of existing human relations, he made a major shift from philosophical Confucianism. He rejected self-discovery or self-education by the individual on how to behave. It was replaced by conformance to authority, meaning Confucian teachers. This State Confucianism stands in contrast to the legacy of Mencius, which I call Philosophical Confucianism (儒家哲学).

In defense of Dong, as Robert Eno has stressed, his goal was to legitimize the Confucian officials' role as royal advisors, making the ruler a Sage King. The officials' role was to educate and restrain the emperor. I regard this as the beginning of what later evolved as the political goals of the Confucian quest for knowledge. Confucians based their claim to be honored as teachers on their educational responsibilities to the emperor and to the public. They taught the ways to rectify the mind (正心). Their "theories of knowledge" reflected the questions they raised: What is the goal of knowledge (the investigation of things 格物)? It is to rectify your own mind, and if you are a Confucian, be a teacher and help others rectify their minds. Their views on knowledge can seem to the Western reader as a kind of political epistemology.

Once the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130-1200) appeared, the matter of conformity had a new content that endured as long as his texts were orthodoxy for the civil service examinations. Zhu Xi maintained that there is a difference between the objective social rules or constant principles (经) and individual choices (权) based on a subjective interpretation of a situation. Only sages dare choose or weigh the alternatives in such cases and risk choosing behavior that is against the uniform code of the constant principles.<sup>26</sup> The scholarly elite may try to choose, and use the constant principles as guidelines in their search for sagehood and harmony. But ordinary people should conform.

In my own search for empirical evidence of the relations between hierarchy, relationships, and cooperation, I found a major study based in Sumatra by Daniel Fessler of the University of California at Los Angeles. He argued that the inner sense of possible shame can motivate the

value of conformity, thereby helping to foster the fact of cooperative behavior. A sense of automatic conformity did not appear in the early philosophical Confucian texts. Fessler studied communities where there is cooperation, and found that members are encouraged through the use of pride and shame. These are emotions to begin to conform and then end by cooperation. There was a logic to what Fessler found. The core was the individual's violating a rule and being aware of it, and also knowing that others are mindful of the violation. In addition, the emotion would arise when an individual is in the company of a superior. Fessler found that "Shame and Pride became the foundations for a system of social control premised on conformity to cultural understandings, and this allowed for enormous increases in both social and cultural complexity."<sup>27</sup> The benefits of cooperation follow. I think that State Confucianism would be consistent with Fessler's portrait.

However, from the standpoint of Western ethics, I would have to supplement the earlier Confucian philosopher's picture with a reference to guilt and dishonor, which do not require there to be public awareness of the transgression. In Philosophical Confucianism (儒家哲学), the Doctrine of the Mean reminds us that "the superior man is watchful over himself when he is alone."<sup>28</sup> Of course, even while alone, the moral person would try to conform to the ritual rules. The idea of guilt would have had a proper place here, but it does not. More on guilt below.

Shame ( *xiuchi*, *xiukui* 羞耻, 羞愧) is claimed to be efficient in China as a social control or socialization instrument in Chinese society. The Analects contrasts it with control of persons through fear of involving the police.

If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue [virtuous models], and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety [rituals], they will have a sense of shame, and moreover will become good.<sup>29</sup>

Being transformed internally is a part of self-education. I would add that such persons would more easily be a cooperative participant in a social situation.

In classical Chinese, honor ( *rong* 荣) is the external source of respect or pride, taking the form of titles, banners, stone markers, and privileges. Positive and negative human models have been used up to the present.

In a previous work, I differentiated between terms (embarrassment and guilt) that, informally or in everyday conversation, may be used interchangeably with shame.<sup>30</sup> Here, where precision is warranted by a discussion of cultural differences, I will make those distinctions again, though a neurological examination of the three might reveal considerable overlap. Shame is not embarrassment. It refers to diminished self-worth, derived from knowledge that other people know one has violated a rule. Some scholars identify the concept of shame in Chinese with "face" ( *mianzi* 面子 ) in traditional terminology or *lian* 脸 in current speech). "Face" concerns some

challenge to my social position. For example, if my daughter criticized me in front of my corporate workers, this might cause me embarrassment (loss of face), but not shame. There was no attack on my moral worth. Kwong-loi Shun suggests that the best English term to render the Chinese characters I have been calling shame, is disdain.<sup>31</sup> But there are differences. Disdain shows the contempt of an outside evaluator, whereas shame is an inner sense of humiliation due to loss of status.

Nor is “guilt” usually an appropriate substitute for shame. Some scholars say it is a breach of responsibility, others say it is lack of positive intent.<sup>33</sup> Some refuse to recognize it as appropriate in Chinese culture, where identity is defined relationally (mother, daughter, niece, of X village), not individually. Transgressions often involve breach of relational role obligations in a social group. Guilt in the West is often applied to individuals. So one may act against God’s words and experience “guilt before God” but the transgression not be known by other people. Shame requires that others know. In contrast, I believe there could be a place in early Confucianism for something like the idea of guilt, if there is a transgression discovered when “one is watchful when alone.”

There is a new work that studies the neural structures involved in moral judgments. It contains many essays by leaders in the relevant fields of philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. It is, S. Matthew Liao ed., *Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality* (Oxford University Press, 2016). In it there are references to outrage, disgust, fairness, and empathy. There are several references to guilt, but only two, brief mentions (no examinations) of the word shame in the entire 365 page book. In the West, for a long time, the most public display of respect or honor as values might have been as rewards for wealth attained through investment success. In contrast, public respect or honors have been central to social control in China and Japan for thousands of years.

This difference in emphasis illustrates the cultural difference between the Western contributors to the book (including the editor Matthew Liao) and the Chinese practices to which I have referred. However, given the efficiency that Chinese have found in cultivating respect and the avoidance of shame, these emotions and the values with which they are linked should be of interest to anyone concerned about cooperative activity. Some forms of conformity lead to cooperation. The cooperative emotions of respect and shame are adapted to social hierarchies.<sup>33</sup> These are factual matters. They can be measured. Trust is another value that, along with them, enhances cooperation, helping to involve empathy with the other person and predictions as to her behavior. Such cooperative behavior is pleasurable and can be measured through the study of oxytocin and dopamine levels among partners<sup>34</sup>

In conclusion, in each of the three patterns of values and related emotions, we encounter sets of facts that signal their respective presence. For health and well-being, the sets include the emotions of contentment and long term suffering, revealed externally in measurable states of body issue, temperature, hormone balance, and blood pressure. Subjectively they are present in attention or inattention, or tranquility or stress. Stress can be measured by biomarkers such as

cortisol reactivity in saliva. There are many ways to measure attention, some qualitative (questionnaires), some quantitative (participant feedback through button press, click. etc.). In the case of the value of love and sympathy, manifest in social bonding, the kind and quantity of care can be studied. Towns are wise to collect data on community groups and non-governmental organizations (YMCA, PTAs, ethnic groups, homeless shelters ) that look after neighborhood stabilities. In addition there is factual information about sensitivity to group life and to symbiotic settings, by the care givers or social partners. My wife is a long term member of the local NAACP chapter, which does precisely this. Finally, the value of harmoniously conforming to the standards of a hierarchical group, perhaps through model emulation, are embodied in the emotions pride/respect and the absence of shame. Facts about degrees of conformity, sustained by respect or shame, often lead to the additional value of human cooperation.

We should expect that, even at the level of popular “culture, ” as the Chinese State refers to religious groups, the values of the kind I have discussed will reappear. Ian Johnson has spent time with the many pilgrimage associations that, in this century, worship Our Lady of the Azure Clouds 碧霞元君, one of the most popular Daoist goddesses in north China. The pilgrim associations receive highly desired , small red velour flags symbolizing the honor of attending the temple event. The future goals of the pilgrims’ prayers are for “family, for safety, for community, for good health.”<sup>35</sup>

Donald J. Munro, September 22, 2017

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## NOTES

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21. Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality ,State University of New York Press, 1989, 8 and 28.
22. Doctrine of the Mean xiv.1 , xiv.2, and xiv.3 in Legge, Vol. 1, 395. The passage on sincerity is in the same text, xxv.1, 418.
23. Zuo Zhuan , Duke Zhao 20<sup>th</sup> year, in Legge , Vol. 5, 684.
24. *Analects* 13:23 in Ni Peimin, Confucius/The Man and Way of Gongfu , Rowman and Littlefield 2016, 83.
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