Greetings from Ann Arbor! As I begin my last year as Chair of the Michigan Philosophy Department, I am struck, once again, by the value of serious training in philosophy. Like many institutions, corporations, families and individuals, the ongoing financial upheavals, both in the Nation and (especially) in the State of Michigan, are requiring the Department to make hard choices about the allocation of resources. Facing these decisions has made us reassess our goals and values – to focus on “ends” rather than “means” – and, when thinking these difficult matters through, I often find myself relying on habits of mind that I acquired from a liberal arts education grounded in philosophy. The ability to reason clearly about questions of value, to focus on what matters in complex epistemic situations, and to sensitively assess benefits and costs of various courses of action – these are all skills that the rigorous study of philosophy can foster, and these are all skills that one needs in times like these.

While the financial challenges we face are substantial, we have been faring better than many philosophy departments across the country. While most programs have begun to contract and retrench, we continue to move forward. We still see more than one hundred majors and minors graduate each year, and an exit survey among graduating seniors this past year shows that the vast majority of the Department’s students were satisfied with the instruction they received. They seemed to appreciate the rigor of our classes as well as the Department’s welcoming atmosphere. We plan to meet the needs of our students even more effectively in the future by increasing the number of opportunities that first and second-year undergraduates have to interact with members of the tenure-track faculty, and by revamping some of our introductory courses to make them more accessible to beginning students. Our graduate program continues to produce top-notch Ph.D.s who can teach and carry out research at the highest professional levels. During the 2008-09 academic year we had eight students complete the Ph.D., and all of them landed academic jobs: five tenure-track, and three multi-year postdoctoral fellowships!
FACULTY NEWS: As usual, the Michigan faculty remains among the most productive and most respected in the world. This year’s list of awards and honors is remarkable. First and foremost, Allan Gibbard was elected to the National Academy of Sciences! This is a spectacularly high honor for a philosophy professor. To give you some idea of how high, let me list all the philosophers ever elected to the NAS: Charles Saunders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910), Josiah Royce (1855-1916), John Dewey (1859-1952), Ernest Nagel (1901-1985), Willard Quine (1908-2000), Patrick Suppes (1922-), Brian Skyrms (1938-) and Allan Gibbard. You may have studied some of these figures during your time at Michigan, and I suspect your children or grandchildren will study Gibbard! If you’d like to study him yourself, you might start with his most recent book Reconciling our Aims (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Peter Railton received the John H. D’Arms Faculty Award for Distinguished Graduate Mentoring. This award recognizes Peter’s tireless work on behalf of our Ph.D. students. (Last time I counted, Peter was a member of ten doctoral dissertation committees!) Eric Swanson received a Marshall M. Weinberg Grant to fund a graduate seminar in cognitive science that was co-taught with Ezra Keshet of the Linguistics Department. Ken Walton enjoyed a Research Fellowship at Sydney University in Australia, and during his time in the antipodes Ken gave lectures in Australia at Sydney, Melbourne and the Australian National University, and in New Zealand at Auckland, Victoria and Otago. He was also able to find time to be the keynote speaker at a conference on the philosophy of computer games in Oslo, and to participate in an author-meets-critics session on his book Marvelous Images at the American Society for Aesthetics. Ed Curley was chosen by the College of Literature, Science and the Arts to be this year’s Distinguished Faculty Lecturer. His public lecture ―Is Religious Freedom a Good Thing?‖—defended the surprising thesis that “a satisfactory argument that the government should leave people’s religious beliefs alone may require us to argue that some widely held religious beliefs are false.”

The Department had four major successes in recruitment this year! Daniel Jacobson, a moral theorist who received his Ph.D. from Michigan in 1994, joined the faculty this fall as a full professor. Dan is well known for his research on moral sentimentalism (some co-authored with Justin D’Arms, another UM alum), his scholarship on John Stuart Mill, his writings in the philosophy of art, and for his work on freedom of speech. Dan augments our strength in moral philosophy, and we expect that his appointment will cement our reputation as best place in the world to study ethics. Sarah Moss joined the Department as an Assistant Professor this fall. Sarah, who did her undergraduate work at Harvard and earned a B.Phil. at Oxford on a Marshall Scholarship, received her Ph.D. from M.I.T. early this year. Sarah works mainly in the “core” areas of philosophy – epistemology and metaphysics – but she has also already made seminal contributions to the philosophy of language, especially to our understanding of conditional statements. David Manley, who also took up an assistant professorship this fall, earned his Ph.D. at Rutgers in 2005 and then spent four years at the University of Southern California. David specializes in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind and language. He is known for his work on dispositional properties (like the property of being fragile or being irascible) and for his already influential papers in epistemology. He is at work, along with his co-author John Hawthorne, on a major monograph called The Reference Book, which offers a new account of the way that words and thoughts refer to objects in the world. David has had articles appear in Mind, Journal of Philosophy, Nous and Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, which many would judge to be four of the five best peer-review journals in the discipline. Chandra SriPada has accepted a quarter-time appointment as an Assistant Professor in Philosophy to supplement a three-quarter time appointment in the Department of Psychiatry in our medical school. Chandra, who holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from Rutgers as well as an M.D. from the University of Texas has been in Ann Arbor for the last four years as a resident in Psychiatry. His research focuses on basic questions about how the mind works and, especially, why it breaks down in cases of “loss of control.” He hopes to understand how affective states shape personality and behavior, and to use recent discoveries about the brain to resolve the traditional problem of free will and appreciate its implications for the nature of moral evaluations and beliefs. This is a fascinating new area of research in which neurology and psychology meet up with behavioral science to provide insights into traditional philosophical questions.

We reluctantlly bid farewell to four valued colleagues: Ian Proops, now holds a position at Texas; Andy Egan and Anthony Gillies left for Rutgers; Boris Kment moved to Princeton. We will miss all four of these philosophers, and thank them for their many contributions to Michigan and its students.

UNDERGRADUATE NEWS: Our undergraduate program remains popular and vital. In May we saw nearly sixty seniors graduate with concentrations in philosophy, and almost as many minored in philosophy. Another telling indicator of our program’s vigor is what I call the “pizza index”. The Department sponsors three undergraduate philosophy societies: the Philosophy Club, the Socratic Club, and the Secular Students Alliance. (Q: What do philosophy students do when they are not reading or writing philosophy? A: They argue about philosophy.) This year the Department purchased well over a hundred pizzas for these clubs! So, we have a lot of well-fed, highly engaged young philosophers around here!

We offered an uncommonly diverse slate of First Year Seminars this year. These small seminar-styled courses are open to freshman, and are usually taught by a member of the regular faculty. Here is a sampling of recent topics: “The Scope of Rights”; “Eating Right: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Food”; “U of M: A Moral Institution?”; “Science Fiction and Philosophy.”

Four students completed honors theses in the Department this year:

- **Zebediah Norman** (L. Ruetsche, advisor) “Understanding Matter Within the Framework of the Actual and the Potential Parts Debate”
- **Caroline Stover** (D. Baker, advisor) “Free Will and the Way Things Happen to Fall”
- **Benjamin Tozer** (E. Anderson, advisor) “The Duties of Religious Citizens and Justifactory Liberalism”

Rebecca Wolf also won the Frankena Prize for being the outstanding philosophy concentrator to graduate in 2008-09. The Prize is named after William K. Frankena a towering figure in moral philosophy, and member of the Michigan Philosophy Department for more than forty years. The Frankena Prize, along with the Stevenson Prize for graduate students, is funded by a generous gift from Marshall M. Weinberg, ’50.
GRADUATE STUDENT NEWS. The Ph.D. program is thriving. Our graduate students continue to win honors and to make names for themselves in the profession. Since a lot of students won awards this year, we have included a special section to list them all on page 10.

Overall, we are pleased with the state of our Ph.D. program. While admissions numbers have been up and down – four in 2007, ten in 2008, three in 2009 – we are consistently impressed with the applicants we admit. We have very little attrition, and nearly all of our students are ready to handle graduate work in philosophy right out of the gate. Indeed, I cannot recall a more active and committed group of Ph.D. students than the ones we have here now!

Our recent success in graduate placement suggests that we are doing something right in training the people we get. The Department saw eight of its students finish dissertations during 2008-09. Five ended up in tenure-track positions, and the other three hold prestigious postdoctoral fellowships! See pages 11-12 for more information on our recent graduates.

EVENTS: The Department hosted many events over the past year. You can get a full listing on pages 13-14, but let me mention some highlights.

Last October, the Department organized the Marshall M. Weinberg Conference on the Future of Cognitive Science that was funded by the Marshall M. Weinberg Fund for Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. The conference featured talks by six luminaries in the field: Cristoph Koch (Cal Tech), Marc Hauser (Harvard), John Anderson (Carnegie Mellon), Alison Gopnik (Berkeley), Zenon Pylyshyn (Rutgers), and Ned Block (NYU).

As always, the graduate students put on a tremendous Spring Colloquium. This year’s edition, which focused on philosophy of mind, was organized by Giacomo Mollo and Neil Mehta. It featured talks by Joseph Levine (UMass), David Papineau (King’s College, London), and David Rosenthal (CUNY). As is our custom, three of our graduate students – Mollo, Mehta, and Anna Edmonds – provided illuminating and insightful commentary on the talks. We are grateful to Giacomo and Neil for organizing this successful conference.

This year’s Tanner Lecture on Human Values was delivered by Uwe Reinhardt, the eminent health-care economist. His lecture, entitled “American Values in Health Care: A Case of Cognitive Dissonance,” provided a timely insight into the state of American health care.

You can view both the Tanner Lecture and the Weinberg Conference on our website!

In keeping with our custom, we have included a substantive philosophical article in this issue of The Michigan Philosophy News. This year, Kendall Walton offers us a fascinating and provocative look at the psychology of being a sports fan in his “Sports as Fiction.” Ken, the Charles L. Stevenson Collegiate Professor of Philosophy, is perhaps the leading aestetican of our day. I am sure you will enjoy his take on sports.

I would like to close by thanking all of those who supported the Department this year (see pages 17-18). In these times of scarcity, the Faculty is committed to doing whatever it can to keep Michigan Philosophy at the top. While some of the obstacles are daunting, I am confident that, with our fine faculty and strong support from the University and from our many friends, we will weather the storm and come out the other side even stronger than before.

I wish you the best for the coming year!

Sincerely,

James M. Joyce
Professor and Chair
SPORTS AS FICTION
Kendall L. Walton
© 2009 Kendall Walton

Sarah’s Dad is reading a scary story to her. She shows inordinate distress, so he reassures her: “It’s just a story.” A group of children are playing tag. Sam bursts into tears when he is tagged. “Don’t worry,” his Mom says, “it’s only a game”.

Sports and competitive games of many kinds—from tag to chess to baseball—are occasions for make-believe. To participate either as a competitor or as a spectator is frequently, if not invariably, to engage in pretense. The activities of playing and watching games have this in common with appreciating works of fiction and participating in children’s make-believe activities, although the make-believe in sports, masked by real interests and concerns, is less obvious than it is in the other cases. What is most interesting about tag and chess and baseball, however, are the ways in which the make-believe they involve differs from other varieties, from that of theater, for instance.

In watching a stage play you root for the hero and boo the villain. You “care about” characters you like and wish them well. Spectators feel badly when Romeo and Juliet come to their tragic ends; some even shed tears. Likewise, sports fans root for the home team, or for a team or player they “like.” Fans of the Boston Red Sox or the New York Yankees cheer their victories and bemoan their losses. Alumni follow the fortunes of their school’s athletic teams.

Romeo and Juliet don’t exist, and the spectator knows they don’t. How, then, can she care about them? This is a puzzle. Sports events do not present an equally pointed puzzle. The Red Sox and the Yankees exist and they really do win and lose baseball games. They are there to be cared about, and people do, sometimes, really care whether they win or lose.

There is a lot to explain about sports, however. Why should people care about the Yankees or the Red Sox? Their fortunes on the field have no obvious bearing on the welfare of most fans. Why does it matter whether the home team wins or loses? Life will go on afterwards just as it did before, regardless. But the spectators, some of them, scream their hearts out during the game, as though it is a matter of life and death. Some people pick which teams or players to “like,” which ones to root for, more or less arbitrarily, on whims—because they find the team logo or uniforms attractive, because a player’s name is the same as that of an old flame, whatever. Yet they may let themselves be carried away during the game, as though genuine and substantial values or self interest is at stake.

Are fans irrational? Do they believe, falsely but sincerely, that it really is a matter of life and death? Have they lost their minds? This hypothesis is no more attractive than the idea that readers of a story lose their senses, temporarily, and believe in goblins or hobbits or magic rings. Many sports fans, like many readers of stories, are otherwise sensible people who know what matters and what doesn’t. Some will tell you, if you take them aside and break the spell of the game, that it doesn’t really matter a whit who wins. Many forget the game quickly after it is over, much too quickly for people who care as much as they seem to care during the game—

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1 This is an abbreviated version of a paper titled “‘It’s Only a Game!’: Sports as Fiction,” forthcoming in my In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence (New York: Oxford University Press).
for people whose hearts leap to their throats as they spring to their feet to watch a long fly ball that may or may not be caught before it clears the fence. It is hard to resist comparing the avid sports fan to the playgoer who sheds bitter and voluminous tears over the tragic fate of Romeo and Juliet, and twenty minutes later has a jolly good time with her friends at an espresso bar. The fan imagines that the outcome matters immensely and imagines caring immensely—while (in many cases) realizing that it doesn’t actually matter much, if at all. She is caught up in the world of the game, as the spectator at the theater is caught up in the story. Afterwards, like the playgoer, she steps outside of the make-believe and goes back to living her life as though nothing much had happened—even if the home team suffered a devastating and humiliating defeat. It’s just a story; it’s just a game.

It isn’t always just a game, however, and sometimes it may not be a game at all. There remains the fact that, unlike Romeo and Juliet, teams and players exist and really do fare well and ill in competition. So we can genuinely care about them, and sometimes we do; sometimes it really matters. It usually matters to the competitors; the salaries and careers of professionals are on the line, and so are the egos of amateurs. Spectators also may care about the competitors’ welfare, especially if they are friends or classmates. And one might be of the opinion that a winning home team will shake loose large alumni donations to the fund that supplies one’s scholarship.

But these grounds for caring are often blatantly insufficient to account for the intensity of spectators’ reactions during the game. And considerations such as the prospect of alumni contributions are likely not to be on one’s mind while one is caught up in the game; they are likely not to be reasons one tells oneself for “wanting” the home team to win. Superimposed on a modest genuine interest in the outcome, there is, frequently, a pretense of much greater concern, and of concern which is not, in one’s pretense, of the kind one actually has. It is typically indeterminate in the pretense what kind of concern this is, why it matters who wins and why one cares; it is fictional just that it matters a lot and that one cares a lot. In games of tag, there is a pretense that being “IT” is undesirable, but there is no answer to the question what, in the pretense, is undesirable about being “IT.” This is another respect in which sports and competitive games differ from literary and other fictions. We can give reasons why, fictionally, Romeo and Juliet don’t deserve their fate and why we care.

A spectator’s actual interest in the outcome of a sports event and the interest she fictionally has in it, when both are present, do not merely coexist; usually they interact, reinforcing one another in various ways. The spectator is likely to experience sensations of excitement, pleasure, and disappointment as the game proceeds, because of her genuine concern, quite apart from any make-believe (although her participation in the make-believe also plays a role in generating such sensations). These sensations can then serve as props in the make-believe. She imagines them to be sensations of excitement concerning something that matters greatly, and in (probably unspecified) ways different from the ways it actually matters. Fans who place bets on the outcome make it really matter to them more than it would otherwise, and they probably let themselves in for more thrills and chills, or more intense ones, which then figure in their make-believe in the manner I described. Betting can be just business, like playing the stock market; one hopes to make a profit. But it can also be a way of enhancing make-believe, a way of making the make-believe more “realistic” (in one sense). If the bet is a large one, it may be true as well as fictional that the outcome matters greatly to
the fan, although he may imagine that it matters in a way that is not simply financial (even if there is no specific way in which it matters, in his imagination). His attitude may not be simply that of a cold businessman.

Our make-believe involvement with a sports event may itself give us a reason for genuinely wanting our favored team to win. We look forward to the pleasure of experiencing, in imagination, a victory of the good guys over the bad guys—whether or not we have a special interest in the egos or salaries of the competitors on one side or expect a windfall in alumni donations. Playgoers and readers of stories sometimes take a similar pleasure in the fictional victory of good over bad.

But tragic works of fiction have their appeal as well—and now we come to an especially striking difference between sports fictions and those of theater and other arts. Tragedies can be deeply moving, even satisfying, if not exactly pleasurable. So we sometimes want the bad guys to win, i.e. we want the work to have a tragic ending—even while we are, fictionally, rooting for the good guys. We may be pleased to be displeased in the world of our pretense. This is rarely our attitude concerning sports. I doubt that fans are often moved by their favorite team’s losses in anything much like the way people are moved by the deaths of Juliet and Romeo. The vaunted “Paradox of Tragedy” seems not to have much of an analogue in sports. Some of us are fair weather fans. We tolerate a few failures by our favorite teams or players, but after a few more we either change the object of our affection, find someone else to root for, or simply lose interest. It is convenient to be able to tell ourselves that it doesn’t really matter who wins and forget about the whole thing, or simply to step out of the make-believe, when we are denied the pleasure of experiencing, in imagination, victories of the side we favor. People do sometimes, in some moods, decline to experience tragic works of fiction, preferring fictions with happy endings. But for many of us, loyalty to fictional characters and willingness to feel with them empathetically, through thin as well as thick, far exceeds our willingness to stand by sports heroes.

In theatrical tragedies, it is partly because the good guy, the tragic hero whom we “root for,” comes to grief that the work is moving. We may appreciate sports events partly independently of who wins; a game in which our favored side loses can be enjoyable. But we don’t appreciate it because our guy lost.

Part of the reason for the absence of an interest in sports tragedies is probably the indeterminacy I mentioned. What makes tragedy moving is not just the fact that, fictionally, bad things happen, but also the fact that they happen for such and such reasons, because the tragic hero has such and such flaws despite being basically good, and faces circumstances of certain kinds. There is no answer, typically, to the question of why, fictionally, the competitors in a “tragic” sports event do or do not deserve the fate they receive, or to other questions concerning the circumstances surrounding the disaster.

In the case of theater and other works of art, a controlling author or artist typically decides who are the good guys and who the bad guys (and who are the ambiguous ones), and manipulates us into rooting for the former and against the latter. But sports fans are free to choose for themselves; each has his or her own personal heroes and villains. To root for Iago and revel in Desdemona’s death is to misunderstand

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Shakespeare’s play. But you are not getting anything wrong if you root for the Tigers instead of the Blue Jays, or the Blue Jays instead of the Tigers. If your choice suffers miserably in the competition, you may regard the event as something of a tragedy (though probably without appreciating it as such), but for other fans it will have a wonderful happy ending. Tragedy in sports is in the eyes of the beholding fan.

Sports events do not generally have anything like a controlling author or artist at all. They are not anyone’s creation in the way that Romeo and Juliet is Shakespeare’s, and they do not qualify as works in the sense that theatrical productions and other works of art do. Many sports events are not meant for audiences at all (dominoes in the park, tag, pickup basketball). But even in the case of spectator sports like professional baseball games and track meets, no one arranges the events of the game to best advantage for appreciation—at least no one is supposed to. The participants play to win, not to put on a good show. The resulting spectacle is largely a by-product of their competitive actions.

Some sports events do turn out to be “good shows,” however, and others do not. There are great games and sorry ones; ugly games and ones that are remarkable, wonderful, memorable, if not beautiful. But, the quality of the game—the game as a whole, as opposed to the play of individual teams or competitors—is something of an accident, not something that anyone can take direct credit for. A close score helps to make a game good or great; so do multiple lead changes, and a result that is deemed an upset. But competitors try to produce these circumstances only insofar as doing so serves their interest in winning. They will be eager to make the game close when they are behind, but once in the lead they aim for the opposite result—the pleasure of the fans, the opposing ones at least, be damned.

In the bottom of the twelfth inning of the sixth game of the 1975 World Series, probably the greatest baseball game ever played, Carlton Fisk … hit a long ball toward left field in Fenway Park. It seemed to curve foul, but Fisk gyrated his body, put some English on the air space between home plate and the arching ball, and bent its trajectory right into the left field foul pole—thus winning the game as he jigged around the bases.3

Fisk’s ambition was not to create a great game, for the amazement of the spectators and the wonderment of sports historians. Arguably it would have counted as even closer than it was, and even greater, had it gone to a 13th inning. And Fisk was not aiming for the foul pole.

Spectator sports are not quite show business, even if spectators pick up the tab. This of course is the way we want it, even when our interest in who wins is partly or largely make-believe.

Kendall L. Walton is perhaps the world’s most distinguished aesthete. His Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (Harvard, 1990) may be the single most influential book in the philosophy of art to appear in the last thirty years. Mimesis defends Ken’s central insight that the fictional world of a story, play, movie or painting can be subsumed into a larger “game of make-believe” in which the spectator is a character who generates fictional truths that are parasitic on the work itself. Ken’s views have significantly influenced both metaphysics and the philosophy of language, in addition to their considerable impact on aesthetics. He has also done groundbreaking work in the philosophy of music, and on the special aesthetic features of photographic art. The first volume of his collected papers — Marvelous Images: On Values and the Arts — was published in March 2008 by Oxford University Press. A second — In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence — will appear in 2010, again from Oxford University Press.

**AWARDS**

**Departmental**

- **Steve Campbell** was awarded the *Cornwell Fellowship*.
- **Ivan Mayerhofer** won the *John Dewey Prize for Outstanding Teaching*.
- **Eduardo Garcia-Ramirez** was awarded the *Charles Stevenson Prize* for having the outstanding candidacy dossier in his year.
- **Neil Mehta** won the *Patricia Susan Feldman Award for Excellence in Philosophy*.
- **Dan Singer, Jason Konek** and **Alex Silk** each won Weinberg *Summer Fellowships*.
- **Lei Zhong** won a Weinberg *Dissertation Writing Fellowship* for Summer 2009.

**Rackham**

- **Tim Sundell** was awarded the *Rackham Graduate School Outstanding GSI Award*.
- **Marie Jayasekera, Amanda Roth, and Dustin Tucker** won Rackham *Graduate School Pre-Doctoral Fellowships*.
- **Sven Nyholm** won a Rackham *International Students Fellowship*.

**External**

- **Chloe Armstrong and Steve Nayak-Young** each won a *SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship* from the Canadian Government.
- **John Shaheen** won a *Fullbright Fellowship*.
- **David Dick** won a *Charlotte Newcombe Fellowship*.


**PRESENTATIONS**

**Eduardo Garcia-Ramirez:**

- “The Wookie Problem” @ UT-Austin/UNAM Conference (Austin), and Brown University, Grad Conference (Providence)
- “Comments on Clapp’s ‘How to Disagree About Nothing’” @ UNAM-IIF, Relativism Workshop (Mexico City).
- “The Nominal Theory of Empty Names” @ 2nd Mexican Philosophers’ Conference (New York).
- “The E.D.U.’s Theory of Empty Names” @ *Universidad Complutense* (Madrid).
- “An Integrated Account of Substitution Failure” @ Ruhr-Universität (Bochum), and UNAM-IIF, Workshop on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind (Mexico City).

**Ivan Mayerhofer:** “The Semantic Dimensions of Disposition Ascriptions” @ Oxford Graduate Student Conference (Oxford, UK)

**Daniel Peterson:** “Beauty, Books, and Identity: A Response to Lewis’s Quantum Sleeping Beauty Problem” @ University of Western Ontario, Logic, Mathematics, and Physics Graduate Philosophy Conference (London, Ontario)

**David Weins:** “Toward a Pragmatic Moral Theory of State Sovereignty” @ Political Science/Political Theory (Ann Arbor)

**PUBLICATIONS**

**Lei Zhong:** “Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?” forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*

**Billy Dunaway:** “Minimalist Semantics in Meta-ethical Expressivism,” forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

**Amanda Roth:** “Second-Personal Respect, the Experiential Aspect of Respect, and Feminist Philosophy” forthcoming in *Hypatia*.
A Banner Year for Placement!

As usual, the Department saw an excellent class of students earn the Ph.D. Thanks to the hard work of our students and faculty, we did especially well in placement this year, despite the toughest job market in recent memory. He is a list of our recent graduates and their positions:

Aaron Bronfman:  *Coping with Imperfection*

Dissertation Committee:  Jim Joyce and Peter Railton (co-chairs); Allan Gibbard; Scott E. Page, (Political Science).

Current Position:  Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Vanessa Carbonell:  *Moral Saints Reconsidered*

Dissertation Committee:  Stephen Darwall and Elizabeth Anderson (co-chairs); Peter A. Railton; Mika Lavaque-Manty (Political Science).

Current Position:  Assistant Professor, University of Cincinnati

David Dick:  *Ethics and the Possibility of Failure: Getting it Right about Getting it Wrong*

Dissertation Committee:  Peter Railton (chair), Elizabeth Anderson; Sarah Buss; Mika Lavaque-Manty (Political Science)

Current Position:  University of Calgary, Chair in Business Ethics

Alexa Forrester:  *Choosing Wisely: The Purpose and Authority of Deliberation*

Dissertation Committee:  Elizabeth Anderson (chair); Sarah Buss; Stephen Darwall; Gregg D. Crane, (English).

Current Position:  Franklin & Marshall, Postdoctoral Fellowship (2 years)
**Dustin Locke: Quidditism**
Dissertation Committee: Jim Joyce (chair); Andy Egan; Allan Gibbard; Don Cameron (Classics)
Current Position: Assistant Professor, Claremont-McKenna College

**Eleni Manis: Distributive Justice for Democracies: A Needs-Based Sufficientarian Approach**
Dissertation Committee: Elizabeth Anderson (chair); Allan Gibbard; Mika Lavaque-Manty; Donald Herzog (Political Science).
Current Position: Assistant Professor, Franklin and Marshall College

**Howard Nye: Fitting Attitudes, and Practical Reason: A Theory of Normative Facts**
Dissertation Committee: Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton (co-Chairs); Stephen Darwall; Bill Gehring (Psychology)
Current Position: Assistant Professor, University of Alberta

**Tim Sundell: On Disagreements**
Dissertation Committee: Anthony Gillies and Peter Ludlow (co-chairs); Andy Egan; Samuel Epstein (Linguistics).
Current Position: Northwestern University Postdoctoral Fellowship
EVENTS (2008-09)

SEPTEMBER: Michael Tye (Texas) visited the Department as the Nelson-Philosopher-in-Residence. Professor Tye, an eminent philosopher of mind, delivered a major public lecture entitled “Attention, Seeing and Change Blindness.” As part of our regular colloquium series, Carrie Jenkins (Nottingham) spoke on “What’s Wrong with Incoherent Credences?”

OCTOBER: The Department held a major interdisciplinary conference on The Future of Cognitive Science, which was sponsored by the Marshall M. Weinberg Fund for Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Six experts gave fascinating talks:

- Alison Gopnik (Berkeley) “Rational Constructivism: How the Meeting of Philosophy of Science, Machine Learning and Cognitive Development will Transform Cognitive Science”
- Zenon Pylyshyn (Rutgers) “Object Tracking & the Mind-World Link”
- Cristoph Koch (Cal Tech) “The Neurobiology of Consciousness”
- Ned Block (NYU) “Consciousness and the Extended Mind”

These lectures can be viewed on the web at: http://www.lsa.umich.edu/philosophy

In October we also heard talks by Mark Schroeder (USC) on “Expressivist Truth,” Joseph Melia (Leeds) on “Counterpart Theory and Actuality,” and Dominic Scott (UVa) on “Rational madness in Plato’s Phaedrus” and “Aristotle on the virtues of slaves and women: Politics I 13.”

NOVEMBER: Rich Thomason organized a workshop, co-sponsored with Linguistics, on Implicature. Participants included: Nick Asher (Texas), Eliza Block (NYU), Wayne Davis (Georgetown), Robert van Rooij (Amsterdam), Larry Horn (UCLA), Barbara Abbott, (MSU), Ezra Keshet (Mich), Craig Roberts (OSU), Eric Swanson, (Mich), Zoltan Gendler Szabo (Yale), Mandy Simons (Carnegie Mellon), Christopher Potts, (UMass), Matthew Stone (Rutgers), Dustin Tucker (Mich, Ph.D. candidate) and Eduardo Garcia-Ramirez (Mich, Ph.D. candidate). Our November colloquium series featured: Huw Price (Sydney) on “Change We Have the Option to Believe In”; Daniel Nolan (Nottingham) on “Conditionals and the Curry Paradox”; Heidi Li Feldman (Georgetown) on “Reinvigorating Fiduciary Duty by Focusing on Fiduciary Virtues” and Dan Jacobson (then BGSU, now Mich) on “Demystifying Sensibilities.”

DECEMBER: Sean Kelsey (UCLA) spoke on “Socrates on Thrasymachus on Justice,” and David Sussman (Illinois) delivered a talk “On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness: Kant on Lies and Self-Defense.”

JANUARY: One of our major events every year is the Tanner Lecture on Human Values. This year’s Tanner Lecturer was Uwe Reinhardt, James Madison Professor of Political Economy, Economics, and Public Affairs at Princeton. Reinhardt, a leader in healthcare economics, delivered a terrific lecture entitled: “American Values in Health Care: A Case of Cognitive Dissonance.” Three distinguished health-policy experts commented on the Lecture: Norman Daniels (Harvard), Sherry Glied (Columbia), and Mark Peterson (UCLA).
MARCH: **Antonia LoLordo** (UVa) spoke on “How to Read Spinoza’s *Ethics.*” **Matt Evans** (NYU) gave two talks: “Mental Causes in the *Phaedo*” and “Lessons of the *Euthyphro Argument* (10a-11b).” Our Spring Colloquium was held March 20-21, with philosophy of mind as the topic. It was organized by two graduate students, Neil Mehta and Giacomo Mollo, and featured talks by **David Papineau** (King’s College, London) on “What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?”; **Joseph Levine** (UMass) on “The Objects of Conscious Awareness”; and **David Rosenthal** (CUNY) on “The Poverty of Consciousness.”

APRIL: With the help of the *Marshall M. Weinberg Fund for Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences*, Eric Swanson and Ezra Keshet organized a conference on *Discourse Constraints on Anaphora*. Participants included **Barbara Abbott** (MSU), **Alan Garnham** (Sussex), **Craige Roberts** (OSU), **Hans Kamp** (Stuttgart), **Hannah Rohde** (Northwestern), **Jason Stanley** (Rutgers) and **Matthew Stone** (Rutgers). In addition, the Department heard **Anton Friedrich Koch** (Tübingen) speak on the topic “Are Spatio-temporal Objects Mind-Dependent?”

MAY: The *Second Formal Epistemology Festival* – organized by **Franz Huber** (Konstanz), **Jonathan Weisberg** (Toronto), and **Eric Swanson** (Mich) – was held in Ann Arbor. The topic was *Causal Decision Theory and Scoring Rules*. In addition to the organizers, featured speakers included **Lara Buchak** (Berkeley), **John Collins** (Columbia), **Kenny Easwaran** (USC), **Branden Fitelson** (Berkeley), **Allan Gibbard** (Mich), **Chris Hitchcock** (Cal Tech), **Jim Joyce** (Mich), **Chris Meacham** (UMass), **Sarah Moss** (Mich), **Wolfgang Spohn** (Konstanz), and **Ralph Wedgwood** (Oxford).

We encourage those who are nearby to attend any of our lectures. You can contact the Department to be placed on our e-mail list, or check the department website for upcoming events

http://www.lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/

**THIS YEAR’S TANNER LECTURE**

On March 27, 2010, **Susan Neiman**, Director of the Einstein Forum in Potsdam Germany, will be the *Tanner Lecturer on Human Values* for 2009-10. Professor Neiman is the author of *Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-Up Idealists*, which was chosen as one of the *New York Times* 100 “Notable Books” in 2008.
Department Faculty
2009-2010

Elizabeth Anderson — John Rawls Collegiate Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Moral and Political Philosophy, Feminist Theory, Philosophy of Social Science

David Baker — Assistant Professor; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science

Gordon Belot — Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics

Sarah Buss — Associate Professor; Ethics, Practical Reasoning, Moral Psychology, Metaphysics

Victor Caston — Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Classical Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Edwin Curley — James B. and Grace J. Nelson Professor; History of Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

Allan Gibbard — Richard B. Brandt Distinguished University Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Ethics, Social Choice Theory, Decision Theory, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language

Daniel Herwitz — Mary Fair Croushore Professor and Director, Institute for the Humanities; Continental Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Aesthetics

Daniel Jacobson — Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Ethics, Moral Psychology, Aesthetics

James Joyce — Professor and Chair; James B. and Grace J. Nelson Research Fellow; Decision Theory, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

Louis Loeb — Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; History of Early Modern Philosophy

Mika Lavaque-Manty — Associate Professor; Ethics, Political Theory

Eric Lormand — Associate Professor; Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Epistemology

David Manley — Assistant Professor; Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Sarah Moss — Assistant Professor; Epistemology, Decision Theory, Philosophy of Language
Peter Railton — John Stephenson Perrin Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Political Philosophy

Donald Regan — Professor of Philosophy and William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law; Moral and Political Philosophy

Laura Ruetsche — Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science, Feminist Philosophy

Lawrence Sklar — Carl G. Hempel and William K. Frankena Distinguished University Professor; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science, Epistemology

Chandra Sripada — Assistant Professor; Philosophy of Mind, Action Theory, Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Eric Swanson — Assistant Professor; Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Metaphysics

Jamie Tappenden — Associate Professor; Philosophy of Language, Philosophy and History of Mathematics, Philosophical Logic

Richmond Thomason — Professor of Philosophy and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Logic, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence

Kendall Walton — Charles L. Stevenson Collegiate Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology

Emeriti

Frithjof Bergmann — Professor Emeritus; Existentialism, Nineteenth Century Philosophy, Social Philosophy, Philosophy in Literature, Philosophy of Mind

Stephen L. Darwall — Professor Emeritus; Ethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Theory, History of Ethics

George Mavrodes — Professor Emeritus; Philosophy of Religion, Social Philosophy

Donald Munro — Professor Emeritus; Chinese Philosophy

THE CUBE
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