Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of the Market’: Sasol from Parastatal to Privatisation

Stephen Sparks

To cite this article: Stephen Sparks (2016) Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of the Market’: Sasol from Parastatal to Privatisation, Journal of Southern African Studies, 42:4, 711-724

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057070.2016.1186787

Published online: 30 Jun 2016.
Between ‘Artificial Economics’ and the ‘Discipline of the Market’: Sasol from Parastatal to Privatisation

STEPHEN SPARKS
(Department of Historical Studies, University of Johannesburg)

This article explores the history of South Africa’s oil-from-coal project, Sasol, the petro-chemical company central to apartheid South Africa’s response to oil sanctions. Contrary to popular perception, South African interest in synthetic fuel pre-dates anti-apartheid sanctions. Anglovaal, a private mining company, acquired rights to the German Fischer–Tropsch process for converting coal into liquid fuel in the 1930s, and its subsidiary, SATMAR, converted torbanite into petrol and was an important precursor to Sasol. Like Germany, South Africa possessed no indigenous source of oil, and dependence on imports came to be seen as a strategic and economic vulnerability. Afrikaner nationalist reluctance to commit moneys to Anglovaal to build an oil-from-coal plant led to Sasol’s establishment as a parastatal. Even so, this article argues, the project possessed enough ‘Smutsian features’ to attract criticism from Afrikaner nationalists. The low cost of black labour in the early apartheid era was important to the project’s initial financial viability, but the article argues that it was the state’s interventions to regulate the fuel market, discipline the oil multinationals and massively subsidise oil-from-coal which saved the project from obsolescence. Energetic management also mattered: with low oil prices preventing oil-from-coal expansion during the 1960s, Sasol leveraged state support to facilitate diversification into the wider petro-chemical industry. After Sharpeville, Sasol spearheaded South Africa’s increasingly isolationist oil strategy, while, at the same time, Sasol managers became increasingly defensive about their dependence on state support. Sasol’s privatisation in 1979 was, however, precipitated by the need to fund two massive new oil-from-coal plants in the aftermath of the oil shock and Iranian revolution to meet the apartheid state’s strategic priorities. Sasol’s new hybrid identity as a company with private shareholders enjoying public subsidies continues to be controversial.

Introduction

South Africa was doubly out of step during the second half of the 20th century. Belligerently beating a white supremacist path in an era of decolonisation, it persisted with economically uncompetitive dependence on coal as a feedstock for fuel production in defiance of the global energy transition described by Timothy Mitchell.1 The two seem closely, perhaps causally, related. Two arguments falling under the rubric of a theory of South African exceptionalism come readily to mind. The first would explain South Africa’s energy adventurism by emphasising the survivalism of Afrikaner nationalists, who rose to power in 1948. In Saul Dubow’s words,

---

this elite was ‘determinedly insular and wholly focused on the survival of white South Africa’. The second, indebted to Harold Wolpe’s cheap labour thesis, underlines the importance of apartheid’s political economy – specifically, cheap black labour – in defining the character of South African sonderweg.

Renfrew Christie has stressed the importance of cheap energy derived from coal mined by hyper-exploited black labour in driving South African industrialisation. Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards have noted the frequent coded invocation of ‘South African conditions’ – a reference to Apartheid’s labour regime – in official explanations for the viability of technological systems under apartheid. Nancy Clark has insisted that, instead of challenging mining companies, the parastatals partnered the mines and replicated their dependence on low-paid, low-skilled black workers. Similarly, Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee have downplayed the contribution of the parastatals to industrial diversification, arguing instead for increased interpenetration of public and private capital as part of the growing conglomeration of the economy.

South Africa’s oil-from-coal project appears to be a clear demonstration of the arguments offered by this literature about the primitively exploitative basis of South Africa’s techno-industrial achievements. There were repeated references in the early apartheid period, in precisely the manner Hecht and Edwards have identified, to the importance of the low cost of mining coal to the viability of oil-from-coal in South Africa. This was, however, no longer the case by the 1970s, as a result of changes in the political economy of labour recruitment to the mines. We therefore have to look beyond a recapitulation of the revisionist cheap labour thesis for other explanations for why Sasol escaped the obsolescence many critics predicted.

Drawing on a range of archival materials drawn from national archives, Sasol’s own archives and interviews, this article traces South Africa’s oil-from-coal project from its pre-apartheid conception through to its privatisation in the late apartheid years. It argues that it was the state’s intervening to regulate the fuel market, discipline the oil multinationals and massively subsidise oil-from-coal that was decisive to the project’s viability, as was chemical diversification driven by Sasol’s energetic management. South African interest in synthetic fuel production reflects a ‘national capitalist’ prioritising of parastatals to diversify economic activities in the country away from its historic bases in mineral extraction. While some historians saw the parastatals as a ‘Hertzogite’ intervention, it makes sense, as Bill Freund has argued, to see them as a ‘Smutsian’ creation. This article challenges Tim Cross’s view of Sasol as uncomplicatedly in the grip of Afrikaner nationalists. Though many of Sasol’s senior figures possessed undoubted Afrikaner nationalist pedigree, these engineers and scientists were the inheritors of a Smutsian tradition running through H. van der Bijl and H.J. van Eck. Sasol became increasingly nativist as South

---

Africa became increasingly isolated, but the project also possessed unavoidably cosmopolitan aspects, which attracted criticism among hardcore Afrikaner nationalists.

Like its decolonising neighbours in southern Africa later in the century, white South Africa embraced parastatals as engines of modernisation. However odious Sasol’s involvements in apartheid, the execution of a project of synthetic fuel production on Sasol’s scale, in the absence of a significant pool of highly skilled labour, certainly does take on the appearance of an ‘exercise in courage’, if we keep in mind South Africa’s status in intellectual, economic and institutional terms before the building up of its major parastatals.

During the 1960s, however, oil prices remained low, which meant that oil-from-coal expansions were put on hold. Sasol instead leveraged state support to move aggressively into the South African chemical industry and, after Sharpeville, spearheaded South Africa’s increasingly isolationist oil strategy. At the same time that they were co-ordinating the apartheid state’s oil strategy, Sasol managers began to speak increasingly defensively about their dependence upon state support. When Sasol went private, starting in 1979 – half a decade before the privatisations following South Africa’s debt crisis – its managers spoke of a dream fulfilled. Sasol’s privatisation was in fact precipitated by the demands of funding two massive new oil-from-coal plants in the aftermath of the oil shock and the Iranian revolution. It was a case of privatisation by panic to meet the apartheid state’s strategic priorities. Sasol’s new hybrid identity as a company with private shareholders enjoying continued state support proved immediately controversial in the closing years of apartheid, and has continued to be so to the present.

‘Tailor-Made for South African Conditions’

Synthetic fuel derived from coal first emerged from experimentation in the laboratories of Weimar Germany, which, like South Africa, possessed no indigenous source of oil but had abundant reserves of coal. Once Hitler came to power – as anti-apartheid campaigners delighted in pointing out – these synthetic technologies were put into the service of Nazi autarkic fantasies. Synthetic fuel supplies sourced from oil-from-coal plants never rose to significant levels, and conventional refining remained cheaper, despite Nazi tariffs. Because of its association with Nazi military strategy, the German synthetic fuel industry was dismantled in the aftermath of the war. It was the Anglo-Transvaal Consolidated Investment Company (Anglovaal), a South

---


African mining house, that first took the lead in developing oil-from-coal in South Africa.\textsuperscript{15} Anglovaal discovered bitumen shales (torbanite) in Ermelo district of the Transvaal, and in 1934 established the South African Torbanite Mining and Refining Company Limited (SATMAR), producing petrol and bitumen from torbanite at a refinery on Johannesburg’s East Rand. Because of the presence of low-grade coal among the shales, the company acquired rights in 1936 to the Fischer–Tropsch process, one of the major German oil-from-coal processes. Like its successor, Sasol, Anglovaal’s torbanite operation depended on subsidy through elevated customs duty and rail tariffs on imported petrol.

Anglovaal employed H.J. Van Eck, future head of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), to investigate establishing an oil-from-coal plant in South Africa. On a visit to Germany in October 1936, A.P.J. Fourie, Minister of Commerce and Industries in the Fusion government, was taken by Van Eck and another Anglovaal consulting engineer, C. Feldmann, to visit one of the first Fischer–Tropsch factories established in Germany. Apparently impressed, Fourie promised government support for Anglovaal’s plans, but the notoriously headstrong Oswald Pirow, acting in Fourie’s post in his absence, unexpectedly lowered the cost of imported petrol raillage, which severely affected the economics of SATMAR’s torbanite operation and synthetic fuel production in general.\textsuperscript{16}

Additional requests by Anglovaal in the late 1930s for protection for an oil-from-coal factory – including a fixed petrol price and the allocation of a ‘portion of the market for petrol’ to oil-from-coal output – were rebuffed by the fiscally conservative Finance Minister N.C. Havenga, who said that the industry would have to ‘stand on its own merits as an ordinary profit earning business venture’.\textsuperscript{17} South African Railways and Harbours also objected, seeing oil-from-coal as a threat to its income because the transportation of imported petrol and refined products from Durban to Johannesburg on behalf of the oil multinationals was one of its most lucrative sources of revenue.\textsuperscript{18} Ministers were put off by the size of Anglovaal’s request for nearly £15 million from the state.\textsuperscript{19} Officials also correctly suspected that Anglovaal’s interest in securing financial support for oil-from-coal was driven by a desire to cross-subsidise its uncompetitive SATMAR operation.\textsuperscript{20}

Anglovaal brought Dr Franz Fischer, one of the developers of the Fischer–Tropsch process, to South Africa in 1938, where he was guest of honour at a Rand Club reception hosted by H.J. van der Bijl and attended by 40 representatives ‘of the mining houses and scientific and social circles in the Union’.\textsuperscript{21} After the war broke out, the company’s further approaches to government emphasised the military value of the project, arguing for ‘an explicit long term charter’ to ‘protect the company against changes in fiscal conditions and inequitable competition’. Anglovaal insisted that wartime conditions meant that ‘the economic factor could be ignored’. The government, however, remained reluctant to protect the company through ‘interference with the general market structure’.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, the oil price remained low; thus,
even though he had recently worked on oil-from-coal for Anglovaal, H.J. van Eck, writing as head of the IDC in 1942, admitted that ‘there’s a cheaper option, namely stockpiling and storage’. 23

Nevertheless Anglovaal persisted, acquiring the rights to a new American (and purportedly more advanced) version of Fischer–Tropsch in 1945. Sufficient official enthusiasm existed for the promulgation of the 1947 Liquid Fuel and Oil Act, empowering the granting of a licence by government for the production of petrol via oil-from-coal. Anglovaal was the obvious candidate, but the following year the South African pound was devalued, massively increasing the cost of importing materials for plant construction. Anglovaal’s attentions (and capital) were diverted to the opening up of the Free State gold fields. The company was unable to raise loan finance for oil-from-coal from overseas lenders, particularly after the victory of the Herenigde Nasionale Party in 1948. 24 In April 1950, Frans du Toit, industrial adviser to the state (and a Broederbonder), told van Eck that there was a ‘strong feeling in Afrikaans-speaking circles’ that the project should be state-controlled and funded through the IDC rather than with the involvement of a private company. 25

Sasol’s establishment in 1950 was celebrated in parliament as the birth of a strategically important enterprise ‘not controlled from abroad or by international monopolies and cartels but by the South African state’. 26 State ownership would have other benefits. The insurance company Sanlam’s Dr M.S. ‘Tienie’ Louw advocated full state ownership ‘to avoid the complication of reconciling the conflicting interests of the consuming public, who want lower prices, and a small group of private shareholders, who want higher dividends’. 27 The flipside to autarkic rhetoric was language framing the project in terms of its geopolitical value to the West in the event of ‘another global conflagration’, where the Suez Canal might be closed to shipping – in which case South Africa would be the ‘logical link between the West and the Middle East’. 28 Cold War defence priorities were increasingly invoked by nationalists, though often for instrumental purposes aimed at speeding up American imports. 29

Sasol was also presented as an important step in the development of a diversified industrial base in the country. In the words of Etienne Rousseau, its founding managing director, gold was ‘a wasting asset and it is important that the industrial structure be diversified in order that it may become independent of the gold mining industry as the latter peters out’. 30 For Dr A.J. Norval, Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries, Sasol’s appeal lay in the urgent necessity of the country exploiting its abundant reserves of low-grade coal ‘before atomic energy and alternative sources of energy make coal useless’. 31 Minister of Economic Affairs Eric Louw was less worried about impending competition from alternative sources of energy, boasting that the country had an inexhaustible supply of coal, or what he dubbed ‘oil-potential’. ‘We have enough coal’, he claimed, ‘to meet South Africa’s requirements for the next 500 years’. 32

---

23 Sasol Archive, 015/2 SATMAR, H.J. van Eck memorandum (24 March 1942) on SATMAR Proposition submitted to the government by Mr A.P. Faickney.
24 Sasol Archive, 002, Oil-from-Coal, E. Rousseau to J. van der Merwe, 10 July 1948.
26 Hansard, South African Parliamentary Debates, 10 April 1951.
27 Hansard, South African Parliamentary Debates, 10 April 1951.
28 Sasol Archive, 002, Oil-from-Coal, Telephone Conversation: Dr M.S. Louw’s Opinion, 11 September 1950.
29 SAB HEN, 3513/539, SA Coal Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol) General, D.P. de Villiers to F. du Toit, 29 October 1951.
30 SAB HEN, 3512/539, Sasol (General) E. Rousseau, ‘Considerations regarding the establishment of an oil from coal industry in South Africa’, 22 September 1951.
31 SAB Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs (hereafter AES) 7/2 A7/3, Sasol, Notes on informal discussion about Sasol and Aksyns with Dr Norval, F. du Toit and E. Rousseau, 22 March 1954.
32 Hansard, South African Parliamentary Debates, 10 April 1951.
While there was some reluctance within Sasol to bring its factory on line too hastily, plans were accelerated in 1951 because of rising oil prices and delivery problems from the Middle East, the source of all South Africa’s imported oil.

Sasol’s founding board of directors possessed an impressive Afrikaner nationalist pedigree, but it would be a mistake to overstate the extent to which the project was defined by Afrikaner nationalist interests, particularly in the pre-Sharpeville period. In his analysis of the ‘Afrikanerisation’ of the parastatals in the early apartheid period, Tim Cross presents Sasol as uncomplicatedly in the grip of Afrikaner nationalists, simply by virtue of its establishment after 1948. Contrary to Cross’s account, however, Sasol was criticised for the amount of English used within the parastatal, and for the paucity of Afrikaners employed in top technical posts, where English-speakers and foreigners featured prominently. Responding to these criticisms, Etienne Rousseau despaired at the lack of qualified Afrikaners, while defending the necessarily cosmopolitan make-up of Sasol’s staff. Rousseau was working in the context of a besieged Smutsian tradition. Writing to Minister of Economic Affairs Nico Diederichs – who had instigated investigation into the ‘Afrikanerisation’ of the parastatals – Rousseau recalled that when H.J. van Eck had joined the IDC, ‘his fellow-Afrikaners’ had written him off for working for Jan Smuts. Van Eck’s children attended Jan Celliers School in Johannesburg, where van Eck served on the school committee. His decision to work for Smuts led to him being pushed off the committee by other parents. He moved his children to an English medium school, and sent them to the University of Natal, such was the ostracism that association with the Smuts government provoked. Forlornly noting that he was now subject to similar treatment, Rousseau concluded:

one feels that the Afrikaans speaker who turns his back on a future in the wide business world to build up undertakings such as ISCOR, the Industrial Development Corporation and Sasol for the benefit of the country, will be criticised and even abused by the very people that he endeavours to serve.

More than ethnicity, what tied a number of Sasol’s early elite team together was the fact that they had worked together at SATMAR in the late 1930s; they were accustomed to working on those aspects of petrochemicals where special state support was necessary to ensure financial viability. On Sasol’s establishment, doubts remained about whether Sasol could avoid meeting the same fate as SATMAR, whose unravelling a number of senior Sasol figures had witnessed first-hand. Their response to this uncertainty is perhaps suggested by their repeated references during the opening years of the project to Sasol being ‘tailor made for South African conditions’, a reference to the comparatively cheap cost of labour (and thus of coal mining) at the time. As Gabrielle Hecht and Paul Edwards have noted in their analysis of apartheid-era technological projects, these kinds of formulations present intensely social-political facts in depoliticised terms, as if owed to the accidents of geology rather than political economy.

World Bank officials had repeatedly queried Sasol’s predicted labour costs during negotiations over a £15 million loan for the project. ‘They did not seem to appreciate that the whole South African economic set-up is vastly different from that of America’, Rousseau explained. Rousseau insisted that doubts about economic viability ‘do not apply to South African conditions’ because ‘low-grade coal can be mined at a very low cost’. However, ‘cheap coal’ applied only during the early apartheid period. From the early 1970s, Sasol’s coal-mine labour costs, together with those across the rest of the country’s various mining

33 Cross, ‘The Afrikaner Takeover, p. 123.
34 SAB Private Secretary to the Minister of Economic Affairs (hereafter MES) 218/H4/7, Sasol, E. Rousseau to N. Diederichs, 30 September 1959.
36 Hecht and Edwards, ‘History and the Technopolitics of Identity’.
sectors, rose significantly (by as much as 60 per cent) as decolonisation jeopardised regional southern African migrant labour supplies, forcing the ‘South Africanisation’ of mine workforces, coupled with increasing recognition of the need to lift wages to enhance labour productivity.\(^{38}\) If labour costs were only contingently important to Sasol’s economic prospects, what mattered most to the economics of the project over the long term was the role of the apartheid state in providing extraordinary financial and regulatory support for the indigenous production of fuel.

‘Artificial Economics and Government Protection’

For Sasol’s ‘founding fathers’, the sudden withdrawal of state support, which had hobbled SATMAR, underlined the importance of oil-from-coal enjoying subsidy that would be protected by law.\(^{39}\) They argued that Sasol was ‘of such national importance’ that the state should make big concessions to place the industry on a healthy economic footing. Anticipating poor financial results from the outset, Frans du Toit, Sasol’s chairman, had argued that ‘the profit motive will have to be subordinated for several years’, but that he wouldn’t be ‘the slightest bit panic-stricken if it makes a little more or less profit occasionally’.\(^{40}\) Oil-from-coal could not be regarded as a ‘normal undertaking’, Rousseau observed; the notion of ‘fair treatment’ – a reference to market competition – need not apply: ‘[i]t is entitled to and must get preference’.\(^{41}\) In an internal memorandum, Rousseau put this more baldly: ‘when we think of oil from coal we must think in terms of artificial economics and Government protection’.\(^{42}\)

From its start-up, Sasol was subsidised by a tax on consumers in the form of a fuel levy, and by tariff protection, which included an import parity price (IPP) arrangement, which meant that the company sold its petrol at the same price as the petrol of the oil multinationals. Because, *ceteris paribus*, producing a barrel of oil from coal was (and remains) more expensive than importing and refining crude oil at times of low oil prices (that is, before 1973), this IPP arrangement did what such instruments are designed to do: it subsidised an indigenous infant industry. When the oil price spiked, the IPP arrangement (which is still operative today) generated significant windfalls, of which Sasol was obliged to pay a portion to the state whenever the oil price exceeded US$28.50 per barrel. In 1995 this requirement was abolished. The windfall pay-back clause represented the Treasury’s answer to the problem of how to manage Sasol’s profit-generation at the expense of the fiscus.

‘Artificial economics’ proved essential, because Sasol’s factory in Sasolburg suffered severe, on-going technical problems from the moment it came on line in 1954 until the end of the decade. The government weathered a storm of criticism in parliament and the press over the amount of money it had committed to the project and Sasol’s failure to deliver on production targets. The state gave Sasol’s scientists and engineers the cover they needed to make the technology work.\(^{43}\) ‘If we had not had a very patient Government behind us on the financial side, we would have by this time been in very, very great trouble’, Rousseau admitted.\(^{44}\) A National Party representative’s comments in parliament captured the leeway that Sasol enjoyed: ‘the capitalists would not be prepared to bear the losses which the state must bear in order to tide this undertaking over its teething troubles’.\(^{45}\)

---

41 Sasol Archive, 303/2/19, Dortmund, E. Rousseau memorandum, 21 November 1951.
43 Interview by the author with Mark Dry, Cape Town, March 2009.
44 Sasol Archive, 314/2/1, Kellogg Unit, E. Rousseau to W. Smith, 1 September 1955.
The Market Geography of Oil-from-Coal

Once Sasol overcame its teething troubles, the parastatal could count on the state having intervened to secure oil-from-coal’s market in the interior. The site chosen for Sasol’s factory was a vast coalfield close to the Vaal Dam (to meet the water needs of the factory and company town), approximately 50 miles from Johannesburg, in the northern Free State. Due to the sensitivity of the economics of oil-from-coal to transport costs, proximity to coal was critical.46 Proximity to the Witwatersrand, ‘the most concentrated marketing area for petroleum and allied products’, was essential too, because of the necessity of keeping the cost of the transportation of petrol down. While it would have been more economical to pump product to markets in the interior from coastal refineries, government intervention secured the inland market for Sasol, ensuring that the oil-from-coal factory was ‘well protected from foreign competition because of its distance from the seaboard’ where multinationals landed their product.47 This geography underpinned the economics of the project; as far as Sasol’s managers were concerned, the interior was the company’s ‘natural market’.

Until 1950, South African petrol stations were multi-branded, selling the products of multiple companies, including petrol produced by SATMAR. When the ‘solus system’ (single or ‘tied’ brands) was introduced in 1951, the government warned the oil multinationals that it was ‘concerned about the position of the producers of indigenous fuel oil’.48 At this point, it intervened to secure an outlet for Sasol’s products. Sasol had inherited SATMAR’s marketing company and its petrol pumps on the Highveld when Anglovaal sold its Fischer–Tropsch rights to the state. It took over SATMAR’s pumps, and the state obliged the oil multinationals to replicate their arrangement with SATMAR so as to ‘uplift’ Sasol’s output and accommodate indigenous ‘blue pumps’ on their forecourts. This meant that Sasol did not need to ‘spend millions, just like the international oil companies, to establish a network of filling stations’.49 The SATMAR brand disappeared from the petrol market; remaining SATMAR-output petrol was mixed with Sasol’s product and sold under the latter’s brand.

As Sasol entered the Highveld market, it was wary of the fact that the oil multinationals provided station owners with soft loans for forecourt upgrades, and provided petrol pump attendants with free overalls and training. The multinationals paid station owners one penny for every gallon of petrol sold, an incentivising structure that worked against the sale of Sasol petrol so that station petrol tanks were often not filled with the parastatal’s product, which was frequently the case during the early years of the project.50 While the multinationals accepted that ‘they must play along with the state and Sasol’ by taking on synthetic fuel output, by the end of the 1950s Sasol was still reporting ‘resistance’ from garage owners to the installation of ‘bluepumps’ on their premises, or their deliberate placement of blue pumps in ‘the most inconspicuous places on their premises’ because of the multinationals’ incentive structure.51 And when Sasol was not able to keep the petrol flowing on the Highveld, product-sharing between it and the multinationals was unavoidable, posing certain technical complications.52

---

47 SAB, HEN, 3512/539, Sasol (General) E. Rousseau, ‘Considerations regarding the establishment of an oil from coal industry in South Africa’, 22 September 1951.
48 Sasol Archive, 15/6/1, Petrol Supplies, Importing oil Companies and SATMAR’s Imported Petrol, 28 January 1958.
49 Sasol Archive, 15/6/1, Petrol Supplies, E. Rousseau to Minister S.L. Muller, 24 November 1970.
50 Sasol Archive, 7/3/2, Monthly Reports, F. Du Toit to N. Diederichs, 10 July 1959.
51 MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen; Prys van Sasolpetrol: Notas vir Samespreking met Minister op 23 November 1960.
Just as standardisation allowed the pooling of grain in the Chicago grain market, described by William Cronon, so standardisation of petrol permitted product-sharing on the Highveld.\(^{53}\)

By the end of the 1950s, Sasol had made significant strides in overcoming its technical problems, chiefly because of the efforts of its newly established research department. The continued low oil price meant that the project was being spoken of as ‘uneconomic’ in government at the beginning of the 1960s, though for political reasons there could be no talk of closure.\(^{54}\) The economic fragility of the project was underlined by Sasol’s response to government pressure for it to relocate a proposed expansion to a site other than Sasolburg, in conformity with Verwoerd’s industrial decentralisation policy. Management warned that this would do ‘intolerable economic damage’ to the project.\(^{55}\)

‘The Possession of Coal is an Embarrassment, Like Having Colonies!’

In 1960, plans for oil-from-coal expansion were shelved because oil remained plentiful and cheap. Rousseau was reminded of South Africa’s outlier status on a 1964 visit to Europe, when an industrialist told him that ‘nobody really bothers about coal, the possession of coal is an embarrassment, like having colonies!’\(^{56}\) Sasol instead shifted its efforts in two new directions: spearheading South Africa’s strategic stockpiling of imported crude after Sharpeville, and the energetic diversification of its activities.

While oil-from-coal production trod water during the 1960s, Sasol moved aggressively into chemical production and the provision of gas. This was not unexpected: because the oil-from-coal process generated high amounts of methane, managers envisaged ‘a gas grid of the type which has been widely developed in the United States, England and Germany’ for the distribution of gas from Sasolburg to the Witwatersrand.\(^{57}\) The South African Gas Distribution Corporation (GASCOR) was established in 1964 as a subsidiary, distributing gas via high-pressure pipeline from Sasolburg to dozens of industries in the southern Transvaal. Chemical expansion was driven by the realisation that the chemicals derived from the Fischer–Tropsch process were economically more valuable than the petrol produced by the same process.\(^{58}\)

Diversification owed a great deal to the energetic management provided by Etienne Rousseau, an acute observer of the move among corporations towards ‘economies of scale’.\(^{59}\) The most obvious development in this direction in South Africa’s post-war chemical industry would have been a partnership between Anglo Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI) and Sasol. AECI was, however, regarded with suspicion in Afrikaner nationalist circles because of its association with monopolistic practices.\(^{60}\) Rousseau was impatient with such preoccupations. Speaking at the 1964 anniversary of the 1939 Volkskongress, he urged Afrikaners to put small-minded pettiness behind them and embrace the managerial revolution.\(^{61}\) Rousseau argued that parastatals stood to benefit from working with ‘monopolies’, as long as they were ‘careful not to fall into their grasp’.\(^{62}\) A merger with AECI was not on the cards, but the company (owned

---

54 MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, memorandum by F. Marais, 23 August 1960.
55 MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, 22 August 1960, Uitbreidingsvoorstelle van Sasol.
56 Sasol Archive, 15/17/2, Oil-from-Coal, J.W. van der Merwe to H.N. Hepker, 17 July 1964.
57 Sasol Archive, 19/6/1, Oil-from-Coal, E. Rousseau to D. de Villiers, 26 May 1958.
58 SAB AES AM 7/2 A7/3, Sasol, ‘Co-operation with other companies and a scheme for an integrated chemical undertaking in SA’, 14 January 1959.
60 SAB AES AM 7/2 A7/3, Sasol, ‘Co-operation with other companies and a scheme for an integrated chemical undertaking in SA’, 14 January 1959.
62 Sasol Archive, 3/6, Staatsondernemings en Sasol, Etienne Rousseau, memorandum to Minister of Economic Affairs, 19 March 1955.
by Anglo-American Corporation) set up a factory in Sasolburg to produce plastics and cyanide (for the mines) using by-products from Sasol’s factory.

This did not prevent Rousseau facilitating the development in 1967 of a ‘loose consortium’ of AECI’s rivals, named Sentrachem.\(^{63}\) Sasol’s leadership of the consortium would ensure it the position as key supplier of feedstock to the group. Sentrachem and Sasol jointly challenged AECI’s dominance of the chemical industry in the ensuing decades. Sasol entered into nitrogen production for fertiliser partly at the behest of the state. In so doing, it entered a growing market dominated by AECI, which channelled most production towards explosives for the mines rather than towards agriculture, where demand was massively increasing.\(^{64}\) Managers described Sasol as a ‘trusted instrument of the state in opposing monopolistic conditions’ in the petrochemical industry, and state intervention as essential to preventing the retarded development of the sector. The protectionist logic underpinning oil-from-coal was therefore extended to Sasol’s chemical expansions.\(^{65}\)

**‘The Government’s Instrument in the Oil Domain’**

As anti-apartheid sanctions became a growing threat after Sharpeville, Sasol moved increasingly to the centre of the state’s oil strategy, functioning as ‘the government’s instrument in the oil domain’.\(^{66}\) The contribution of oil-from-coal to the country’s overall petrol supplies remained comparatively small (approximately 30 per cent well into the post-apartheid era) but Sasol’s managers advised the state on oil strategy, managed the strategic oil reserve and facilitated oil procurement as sanctions pressures increased. After Sharpeville, it was Rousseau who advised the state to buy cheap petroleum on the spot market in bulk for stockpiling, rather than proceeding with further ‘uneconomic’ oil-from-coal expansion.\(^{67}\) It was Rousseau’s recommendation that the government establish the Strategic Fuel Fund in 1964, the agency tasked with acquiring oil for the strategic reserve, which also assumed responsibility for oil procurement (via the multinationals, but also from more dubious oil traders) in response to growing anti-apartheid sanction threats. Sasol administered the Fund and oil procurement until 1983.\(^{68}\)

So inauspicious were conditions for oil-from-coal expansion before 1973 that, in the mid-1960s, the state began to investigate the establishment of a conventional oil refinery in the interior rather than on the coast. The idea was that this refinery would supply a concentrated interior market (Sasol’s ‘natural market’) while enjoying protection from competition from coastal refineries.\(^{69}\) The multinationals had originally proposed building a pipeline from their coastal refineries in Durban to the Witwatersrand for the transportation of refined products. Sasol instead pushed the state to establish a pipeline for transporting crude oil to an inland refinery.\(^{70}\) Sasol managers convinced government that any inland refinery needed to be under state control, to defend their market from the possibility of the multinationals increasing production in an interior refinery under their control.\(^{71}\) Rousseau invoked SATMAR’s fate when he warned government that allowing the multinationals to establish an inland refinery

---

63 Sasol Archive, 18/1/15, Long Term Planning Committee, memorandum, 20 June 1964.
64 SAB, MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, E. Rousseau to N. Diedrichs, 2 August 1960.
65 SAB, MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, E. Rousseau to N. Diedrichs, 9 March 1962; Sasol Archive, 15/6/1, Petrol Supplies, Etienne Rousseau to Minister S.L. Muller, 24 November 1970.
66 SAB, MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, Etienne Rousseau to Min. of Econ. Affairs, 10 December 1969; See also Sasol Archive, 15/14/1, Strategic Oil Supplies, J. Stegmann to J.C. Heunis, 1 December 1976.
68 SAB, MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, S.I. Muller, Min. of Econ. Affairs to Dr H. Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 26 August 1971.
69 SAB MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, E. Rousseau to N. Diedrichs, 20 February 1962.
70 SAB MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, E. Rousseau to N. Diedrichs, 20 March 1963.
71 SAB MES 219, H4/7/1 Sasol Algemeen, E. Rousseau to N. Diedrichs, 20 February 1962.
would allow them to turn Sasol into the ‘bywoner of the oil business’. In 1967, Sasol entered a partnership with the local subsidiary of the French company Total – the least threatening of the multinationals, possessing no local refining capacity – and the National Iranian Oil Company to establish a refinery in Sasolburg, the National Petroleum Refiners of South Africa (Natref) to handle Iranian crude. The South African Railways and Harbours built the pipeline from Durban, which would transport crude to Sasolburg free of charge. A tariff structure (‘Natref at the sea’) ensured that the refinery was no worse off than it would have been had it been sited on the coast. Disposing of output from Natref, however, still required the co-operation of the multinationals, as with oil-from-coal output from Sasolburg.

The massive spike in global oil prices in 1973 created new economic conditions favourable to synthetic production. In response, the South African government commissioned Sasol 2, the parastatal’s second oil-from-coal plant, to be built in a new town called Secunda, on coalfields in the Eastern Transvaal. The oil crisis also proved less disruptive than it might otherwise have been, because the multinationals helped to secure alternative sources of oil to keep their refineries in production. While Prime Minister B.J. Vorster supported the idea of bringing an increasing percentage of the oil interests under state control, Sasol managers, and Vorster himself, recognised that the multinationals had to be kept happy: they remained essential to South Africa’s oil strategy, and so were compensated for taking on Sasol’s output on the Highveld.

Because Iran was the key source of the country’s imported crude oil, the fall of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in the Iranian revolution of 1979 represented a major crisis for South Africa’s oil strategy. The special relationship with pre-revolutionary Iran had been carefully nurtured by Sasol. The revolution ended the National Iranian Oil Company’s involvement in Natref, and, almost overnight, the state commissioned Sasol 3, a third oil-from-coal plant, which was an exact replica of Sasol 2 and built adjacent to the second plant. Like the first Sasol plant, the new plants would enjoy tariff protection, and were funded by fuel levies imposed on motorists. When Sasol 2 and 3 began operating in 1982, the multinational oil companies agreed to mothball 30 per cent of their production capacity so that they could absorb output from Sasol’s new plants, in exchange for compensation. It was the challenge of funding two massive new oil-from-coal plants in the difficult economic climate following the oil shock that precipitated Sasol’s turn to the private markets for additional financing, over and above what it received from state coffers – the first step in the parastatal’s privatisation.

‘The Legitimate Aspirations of the State Corporations’

Sasol managers were initially unapologetic about their dependence on state support, which they worked hard to secure. Managers and government officials could cite a general trend of ‘state involvement in oil industries’ in newly independent African states, as well as metropolitan precedent in the British government’s decision to buy into the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which later became British Petroleum. Certainly, from early on, key figures
in the project had entertained the possibility that Sasol might one day ‘cease being under
government control’.78 Evaluating anti-monopoly legislation proposed by the government
in 1952, Rousseau warned that it might foreclose ‘things which Sasol might very easily
have to do in the course of its natural development’, including investing in or partnering
private enterprise.79 Particular emphasis had been placed at key moments on the importance
of developing and maintaining a measure of independence from the IDC and the state more
generally.80 On a number of occasions during the 1960s and 1970s, managers expressed
frustration at perceived interference by the state and the restrictions being placed on them.81
Many of these tensions centred on Sasol’s desire to dispose of profits as it pleased; officials in
the Treasury were not always willing to give Sasol free rein in this area, prompting Rousseau
to complain on one occasion in the early 1970s of hostility within government towards what
he characterised as the ‘legitimate aspirations of the state corporations’.82 Needless to say,
the legitimacy of these aspirations were an on-going source of contestation in government
and wider public debate.

Over time, Sasol managers became increasingly defensive about their dependence on state
support. Some of this first exhibited itself in the context of early public criticism in parliament
and the press about the fact that Sasol’s petrol was not cheaper than imported petrol. Responding
to one such bout of criticism, Rousseau insisted that ‘Sasol is not a Government Department or
a monopoly, but is a business which has to compete with some of the most astute companies
of the world’.83 Rousseau wrote repeatedly to the editors of publications complaining about
articles that had questioned the economic viability of the project under normal circumstances,
dismissing one as a ‘write up for African Explosives and a scathing attack on the achievements
of Sasol’.84 In one instance, an article portraying the parastatal as a beneficiary of ‘socialist
economics’ – a common term of opprobrium –prompted an instruction to Sasol’s public relations
department to ‘see that this does not gain ground’.85

While Rousseau described himself as a rare breed of Afrikaner willing to forgo more lucrative
opportunities in the private sector for service in the public sector, he undoubtedly saw himself as
essentially a businessman. In 1958 he rejected proposals for increased parliamentary oversight
of parastatals, on the grounds that centuries of experience had taught that ‘shareholders money
is most effectively protected by a Board consisting of capable directors’, insisting that the
country’s parastatals had ‘been a success because from a managerial side of things, they have
been allowed to function like private undertakings’.86 When Sasol was awarded the the Rand
Daily Mail Business Achievement prize in 1975 – a symbolically important moment – the

---

78 SAB, HEN, 7/5/50, P.A. 11/2, Vorm en Finasiering van olie-uit-steenkool Maatskappy, F. du Toit to Min. of Econ.
Affairs, 17 November 1950.
79 Sasol Archive, 05/1 (105); Oil-from-Coal, Etienne Rousseau, memorandum to Board, 21 January 1952, Re: Anti-
monopoly legislation.
80 Sasol Archive, 05/1 (105); Oil-from-Coal, D. de Villiers to Chairman, Liquid Fuel and Oil Industry Advisory
Board, 28 September 1951; Sasol Archive, 05/1 (105); Oil-from-Coal, E. Rousseau to F. du Toit, 12 January 1951.
81 SAB MES, 218/H4/7, Sasol, E. Rousseau to N. Diedrichs, 11 March 1964; MES Sasol Algemeen, H 4/7/1, N.
Diedrichs to S.L. Muller, Min. of Econ. Affairs, 4 November 1971; SAB, RHN, Vol. 963, 92/12/1, N. Diedrichs
to S.L. Muller, 28 April 1971.
82 SAB, MES, 219, H4/7/1, Sasol, E. Rousseau to Min. of Econ. Affairs, 12 April 1971.
83 SAB, HEN, 3513, 539/3, Sasol: Manufacture and Sale of Products Customs and Excise Duties, E. Rousseau memo,
84 Sasol Archive, 19/6/4, Publicity, E. Rousseau to L.B. Gerber, 27 May 1964. Article in Chemische Industrie
86 Sasol Archive, 7/3/5, E. Rousseau to Chairman and Directors of Sasol, 2 December 1958, re Report of the
comments by Rousseau’s successor, David de Villiers, reflected the desire of Sasol managers to underplay the effect of dependence and protection by the state:

There is so much talk in South Africa about the dangers of creeping socialism. It is usually said if an organisation is state financed the discipline of competition is lacking and that leads to technological stagnation and general incompetence … this very business we are in has through the years subjected us to the discipline of market forces. In the same manner as any other company we had to develop a commercial approach of cost-consciousness, market competitiveness and a continuous striving for productivity.87

Conclusion

In 1979, in another important symbolic move, Sasol relocated its headquarters from Sasolburg to Rosebank in Johannesburg. This coincided with the decision to proceed with a public share offering on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). While the involvement of private shareholders had been explicitly rejected as strategically unwise at the project’s outset, in the closing years of the 1970s, senior figures in government – such as economic advisor P.J. Riekert – actively advocated share offering, and both government ministers and Sasol managers were evidently assuming the desirability of such a step.88 The putative discipline of the market was both a sore point for Sasol managers and possessed a certain lustre. It was the Iranian revolution and resultant panic, leading to the decision to proceed with the Sasol 3 plant in addition to the already approved Sasol 2, that precipitated the share offering.89 Sasol embarked on a two-fold, massive oil-from-coal expansion in the name of securing the apartheid state’s strategic interests, which aimed to exploit the fact that the oil price had skyrocketed after both the 1973 oil shock and the Iranian revolution. The cutting off of Iranian sources of imported crude oil because of the revolution was the straw that broke the camel’s back, so to speak: massive oil-from-coal expansion was now not only economically viable, because of the oil price, but strategically essential. A share offering was financially necessary; it would not have been possible for the public purse to carry the full cost of the two new plants in Secunda. Crucial private investment would supplement the new fuel levy and loans from the IDC, which the state would use to help fund the expansion. This made Sasol the first South African parastatal to be listed on the stock exchange.

The heavily oversubscribed listing on the JSE occurred ‘on terms very favourable to investors’ because the state remained committed to on-going subsidy via fuel levies, the IPP and the provision of continued ‘soft loans’ through the IDC.90 Sasol’s special strategic status meant minimal risk and guaranteed profitability for private investors. Despite public proclamations about Sasol shares being readily available to the ‘man on the street’ – a South African version of Margaret Thatcher’s fantasy of ‘people’s capitalism’ – the share allocation heavily favoured a ‘narrow base of shareholders/stakeholders’, primarily major South African conglomerates.91 This initial privatisation and its subsequent phases were featherbedded by continued state support, the majority of which was only belatedly removed in the post-apartheid era.92

87 Sasol Archive, 4/1/4, Publicity: Rand Daily Mail Business Achievement Award of 1975 acceptance speech by D.P. de Villiers, 24 November 1975.
88 ‘Riekert backs state handover to industry’, unknown, 1978; Sasol Archive, 15/14/1, Strategic Oil Supplies, Sasol en die land se oliebehoeftes, J.C. Heunis to J. Stegmann, 10 January 1977.
Stephen Sparks

Sasol’s hybrid identity as a company with private shareholders enjoying public subsidies proved immediately controversial. In January 1981, a member of a parliamentary committee asked:

[i]t is not clear in my mind what the method is that is adopted to ensure that the money which comes from the taxpayer toward the Sasol II project does not indirectly result in additional profits for the investor. Sasol now has private shareholders who benefit from the success of Sasol, but to some extent Sasol has been directly and indirectly financed by taxpayers money … I want to be quite sure that there is a distinction made between the two sets of funds and that the taxpayer gets his due in the same way that the shareholder will get his.93

Sasol’s history as a parastatal funded by taxpayers’ money, with an official regulatory regime heavily skewed to its advantage, has proven hard for the company to shake off. As it has increasingly turned its attention to global expansion and the New York Stock Exchange, it has been repeatedly reprimanded for engaging in anti-competitive practices, which unfairly leveraged advantages derived from apartheid-era state support.94 More than moral complicity with apartheid, it is Sasol’s historic dependence on significant financial support from the state that most often has the company on the back foot today.

In 2007, a task team appointed by Trevor Manuel, then Minister of Finance, recommended that the government institute a windfall tax on Sasol because of ‘excessive profits’ which Sasol had accumulated by leveraging the historic regulatory advantages it enjoyed under apartheid.95 It received a last minute reprieve, with the ministry deciding against implementing the task team’s recommendations. The IPP mechanism, which ensures that Sasol’s petrol retails at the same price as the imported refined product of oil multinationals, remains in place today, and it remains an on-going source of contention. In August 2013, Jeremy Cronin, Deputy General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, addressed the South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU) congress. After providing a thumbnail sketch of Sasol’s history of state support, Cronin directly invoked the fact that Sasol ‘sells at the pump at the import parity price’, despite the fact that the global price of oil was, at the time of his speech, above US$100 per barrel. ‘This means we are all subsidising super profits for what is now a privatised Sasol’.96 The alleged disciplining effects of the market remained elusive.

STEPHEN SPARKS

Department of Historical Studies, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 2006, South Africa. Email: sjwsparks@uj.ac.za

---

95 Task Team Report, ‘Possible Reforms’.