“Molecules all change”:
Memory, Mutability, and *Ulysses* as Body-Mind in “Scylla and Charybdis”

by

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For Patrick, who has always encouraged me to be curious,
and for Angelina, who has always helped me to be brave.
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Abstract

As early as 1930, critics such as Stuart Gilbert have approached James Joyce’s *Ulysses* as a book that resembles an organism; this tendency to analogize the book as a living body continues more recently through the work of such scholars as Sebastian D. G. Knowles (2001). However, viewing the book as a body, rather than a body-mind, has allowed scholars to ignore the interplay between *Ulysses*’s unusual physical “body” and the book’s own agency. This thesis looks specifically at the schemata, a set of charts accompanying the text whose authorial complexities and nonstandardized contents are often unaddressed in discussions of *Ulysses* as an organism, in conjunction with the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode, which is assigned the organ of “Brain” in the schemata and is therefore set up as a site of interplay between the physical and mental within the text. By reading the schemata and “Scylla and Charybdis” together through the lens of a posthuman understanding of distributed agency, this thesis explores how *Ulysses*, as a text with a body-mind, approaches the relationships between book, author, and reader as constantly under revision. Ultimately, “Scylla and Charybdis” shows that, in *Ulysses*, the self—whether it is a human self or an inhuman book-self—is a set of mutable forms held together by memory. Because of this, each “self” or “whole” is constantly being reinterpreted, leading to a breakdown of seemingly definite boundaries and a reevaluation of the nature of identity.

Key words: agency, authorship, body-mind, inhuman, James Joyce, modernism, posthumanism, schemata, “Scylla and Charybdis,” *Ulysses*
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Introduction

*Act. Be acted on.*
—Ulysses

In a letter to his friend Carlo Linati, James Joyce described his book *Ulysses* as “an epic of two races (Israelite-Irish) and at the same time the cycle of the human body as well as a little story of a day (life)” (Gilbert, *Letters* 146). This description emphasizes the strange, paradoxical qualities of Joyce’s book. *Ulysses* is simultaneously an epic and a “little story,” the tale of two races and the tale of a single body, the story of a day and of a life, incredibly large yet mundanely small. Moreover, Joyce’s description of the book as “the cycle of the human body” seems to have captured the attention of commentators. For example, one early Irish response to the book called *Ulysses* “a human book” in praise of Joyce’s attention to a certain realism in his portrayal of the “fundamental human attributes” (Deming 296). However, *Ulysses* is not only a psychologically “human” book but a book that emphasizes physiology. As this thesis discusses, the schemata are one particular aspect of the text that emphasize both *Ulysses’s* attention to the body and its overall strangeness as a book. Fig. 1 shows an early schema to *Ulysses*, as printed in Stuart Gilbert’s *James Joyce’s Ulysses*, originally published in 1930. This schema includes interpretive material as well as orienting information such as episode titles, the time of day each episode takes place, and the “Scene” at which the action occurs.¹ Most notably, Gilbert includes the “Organ” assigned to each episode. By assigning the book “Flesh” and “Blood,” Gilbert’s schema emphasizes *Ulysses’s* unusual attention to biology, an attention that is echoed within the text by the way the book morphs and grows, almost organically, from episode to episode. As I

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¹ I use the word “episodes” to describe the divisions of *Ulysses*; although some do refer to them as chapters, “episodes” is often used in acknowledgement of the fact that each episode is analogous to a part of the Homeric *Odyssey*. In a thesis so concerned with analogy, I find it best to keep *Ulysses’* most well-known analog in mind.
focus on in this thesis, the assignment of a “Brain” to “Scylla and Charybdis” suggests that
_Ulysses_’s psychological depth is couched in a physiological understanding of the body. Not only
are the characters in this book psychologically complex, but the book itself is given the organ of
thought.

Fig. 1. The original Gilbert schema from Stuart Gilbert, _James Joyce's Ulysses: A Study_, New
York: Vintage, 1955, p. 30

Envisioning Joyce’s book as a body has long been used as a mode of clarifying _Ulysses_’s
often confusing structure. As early as 1930, critics such as Gilbert were relating _Ulysses_ to a
living thing, in particular due to the schematic assignment of organs to the episodes of the book.
The schemata are, in many ways, an analogy machine, and as I discuss in this thesis, they are
often more confounding than clarifying; however, Gilbert uses the analogy of a “living
organism,” prompted by the schemata, as a way of understanding how the apparently disjointed
episodes of *Ulysses* function together (*James Joyce’s Ulysses* 29, note 1). More recently, Sebastian D. G. Knowles’ book *The Dublin Helix: The Life of Language in Joyce’s Ulysses* (2001) approaches wordplay in *Ulysses* as a mode of creating a living text: “In *Ulysses*, words are alive: Joyce reveals the inner life of words through puzzles, puns, riddles, acrostics, anagrams, and the occasional spelling test” (26). For Knowles, the interrelated episodes of the book are not the only feature that makes it resemble an organism; instead, language constructs the book as a living body. Applying the language of molecular genetics to his reading of the book, Knowles argues that “Letters carry language as a gene carries life, messengers for reproduction and representation” (26). Like Gilbert, Knowles approaches the book as a symbolic, metaphorical body in order to understand how the parts of the book function in tandem.

However, other scholars have presented more literal ways of looking at books as bodies. N. Katherine Hayles’ 2013 essay, “Combining Close and Distant Reading: Jonathan Safran Foer’s Tree of Codes and the Aesthetic of Bookishness,” notes that the rise of electronic reading has emphasized print books’ physicality: “Unlike information, print books have bodies” (226). Hayles draws attention to the importance of the physical book, what she terms the “book-body,” in how readers interact with and draw meaning from a text. Her primary example is Jonathan Safran Foer’s die-cut book, *Tree of Codes*, and she explains the die-cuts as a way of enhancing textual meaning but also of emphasizing the book’s physicality, noting that “Foer’s book-body has become a life-form, its holes acting as cellular structures” like those of a tree (230). Hayles uses this analogy to exemplify the importance of physical perceptions of art, illustrating that analogizing the book-body as a living thing is useful in coming to an understanding of how the reader’s body interacts with the book’s. In this thesis, I build upon Hayles’ essay in conjunction with Gilbert’s and Knowles’ work. Rather than look at *Ulysses*’s body as just a metaphor, I look
at the book as both a metaphorical “organism” and as a book-body. As this thesis shows, exploring the relationship between the book and the schemata in this way produces new questions about what a book’s body can be.

The current moment provides new ways of approaching *Ulysses* in terms of blurred boundaries: between the book and the schemata, for example, but also between author and text, subject and object, even human and inhuman. Posthumanism, which has grown increasingly prevalent in recent decades, suggests that the view of a book as “human” or “organism” should be interrogated in light of new ways of conceiving of agency. Accordingly, this thesis not only discusses *Ulysses* as a body, but puts that body in the context of its relationship to *Ulysses* as a text, specifically the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode. Hayles’ landmark text, *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics* (1999) explains the posthuman view of agency:

> the presumption that there is an agency, desire, or will belonging to the self and clearly distinguished from the ‘wills of others’ is undercut in the posthuman, for the posthuman’s collective heterogeneous quality implies a distributed cognition located in disparate parts that may be in only tenuous communication with one another. (3-4)

Posthumanism posits that the self and the “other” are not as separate as traditional models of agency hold them to be. Hayles proposes “distributed cognition” as a mode of envisioning the fuzziness of boundaries between agents; “The posthuman subject,” she says, “is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction,” and because of the constant renegotiation
of boundaries of the self-subject, agency must be evaluated as also under constant renegotiation 
*(How We Became Posthuman)*.

The idea that agents have mutable boundaries has direct implications for how art and 
artistry is conceptualized in a book like *Ulysses*. The anthropologist Alfred Gell argues that art 
objects—what he calls “indexes”—can be used as an extension of a person’s agency: “the index 
is not simply a ‘product’ or end-point of action, but rather a distributed extension of an agent”
(ix). As I discuss in this thesis, a similar point is brought up in “Scylla and Charybdis” through 
Stephen Dedalus’ discussion of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*, in which Stephen conceptualizes 
Shakespeare as a “ghost” within his own text. Although Stephen gives the art/index itself a great 
deal of power, too, he describes art as containing a permanent imprint of the author, thus 
becoming an extension of the author in a way that closely resembles Gell’s agent/index 
relationship. Gell’s “distributed agent” and Hayles’ “distributed cognition” provide a mode by 
which to visualize the full implications of Stephen’s argument as a metatextual exploration of 
*Ulysses* itself. Questions about the relationship between author and text, and the agency of each 
in constant relationship to one another, become the central concern of “Scylla and Charybdis” 
when viewed in this light. This suggests that, while *Ulysses* may in some sense be a “human” 
text, it also anticipates many of the posthuman ideas of agency not raised by Hayles and Gell 
until half a century later.

Furthermore, this implies that scholars who have analogized *Ulysses* as a body in order to 
conceptualize the structural complexities of the text have missed, in their appraisal, important 
elements of what makes *Ulysses* as strange and confounding as it is. Specifically, the use of the 
schemata to clarify the text, rather than acknowledging how these documents blur the edges of 
the book, ignores an opportunity to interrogate how the theory of art latent in “Scylla and
Charybdis” and the peculiarities of Ulysses’s shape and textual history combine to reveal a view of agency as distributed and codependent, even while individual agency is acknowledged.

This thesis therefore takes up Hayles’ description of the posthuman subject as “a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” and applies it to the book. To do so, it is necessary to keep in mind that Ulysses is not simply an organism in terms of being a symbolic body or collection of cells but a “material-informational entity,” which I analogize as a body-mind out of respect to Ulysses’s insistence upon the organic, biological nature of both the text and those who encounter it. The OED defines “body-mind” (or its equivalent term “mind-body”) as “A living being which has both mental and material elements, or which is a composite of a mind and a body…. Also: mental and bodily processes considered as being causally interrelated” (“mind-body, n. and adj.”). Therefore, I use “body-mind” and not “body/mind” or “body and mind” to emphasize the interrelational nature of what is traditionally seen as a binary opposite of physical versus spiritual.

Many argue that “body-mind” is not a perfect term and that it in fact reinforces many of the binary ways of thinking that this thesis and, indeed, posthumanism generally seeks to combat. The introduction to Embodied Cognition and Shakespeare's Theatre: The Early Modern Body-Mind (2014) makes such a case:

[Even] the label body-mind, of course, bears traces of the two connected dichotomous assumptions that our contributors seek to combat: the ideas that mind and body each name a unified set of phenomena held together by unique properties, and that there is thus a single problem about how they relate or connect. (Johnson 1)
While I agree with this complaint, I find that, in Joyce and in *Ulysses* particularly, “body-mind” is actually a fitting term due to its own somewhat contradictory nature. As this thesis discusses, Stephen’s Hamlet theory explores art and artist as constantly playing with body, mind, and their relationship to one another. Joyce does not necessarily view the body or the mind as non-separable, nor does he by any means view them as completely separate: there is instead a highly permeable, constantly renegotiated barrier between the two. In this thesis, “body-mind” is not meant to indicate body and mind as mostly separate with one simple point of connectivity. Instead, “body-mind” can be seen as similar to one of Joyce’s many portmanteaus: elements of “body” and “mind” combine and thus are changed, yet at the same time, the echo of their separate meanings remains, perpetually confounding the combination of the two. It is this paradox between separateness and interdependence that this thesis sets out to explore.

Therefore, Chapter 1 begins by discussing the schemata as a set of documents. This chapter gives context to the schemata, including some history of their formations, the variance between versions, and how they are approached in early criticism and later discussions, such as those by Knowles, but the main function of this chapter is to discuss how the schemata emphasize the book’s physicality and construct the book as a body-mind. As this chapter shows, the schemata are not a straightforward guide to the text of *Ulysses* but an additional complicating factor in attempting to define the book’s boundaries.

From there, Chapter 2 moves to a discussion of Stephen’s Hamlet thesis in the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode. Stephen’s argument, which positions him in opposition to a Neoplatonic view of art, reveals a metatextual theory of *Ulysses* and its relationship to the schemata. To be more precise, Stephen’s argument envisions a theory of art in which the author is not simply a great mind producing work but a body-mind which produces an embodied text. Shakespeare’s
Hamlet, for example, is embodied through its enactment upon the stage, making the text a body-mind in the sense that it is both physical (in that the actors overtly give the text a body) and minded (in that the text is a collection of ideas). Furthermore, Stephen’s Hamlet thesis highlights that the author is mutable, held together into a single identity by memory. As I show, this argument suggests a reading of the relationship between book and schemata in which the schemata function as memory in relation to the book’s body-mind, holding the shifting physical forms of Ulysses together through an accrual of culturally remembered interpretive material. The body-mind is therefore not only presented as inseparable in relation to the author but also in relation to the text, and moreover, the body-mind is a mutable form.

In Chapter 3, I return to a traditional reading of the schemata, using the schematic elements to inform a reading of “Scylla and Charybdis.” Using the schemata as a guiding analytical tool, I discuss how “Scylla and Charybdis” approaches the book’s role in preservation and memory and constructs the book as a “thinking” agent that simultaneously depends upon and seeks independence from the author. While text and author are doubtlessly inextricably linked according to Stephen’s thesis, the relationship between the two is a complicated interplay that I suggest is akin to the firing of neurons in a brain. This relationship is such that both author and book are given leave to grow and adapt separately from one another, despite their bond, almost like a parent and child.

Ultimately, “Scylla and Charybdis” is a complex expression of the role of memory, both individual and cultural, in the construction of mutable “wholes”: people, authors, and texts. In Ulysses, memory functions as a primary point of linkage between agents who are changeable and separable, yet inextricably intertwined through an array of constantly renegotiated boundaries. As this thesis shows, long before posthuman theory, or even theories of the absent author such as
those presented by Barthes and Foucault, James Joyce was using literature as a medium by which to explore agency in a way that perpetually blurs the borders between author, text, and reader. Regarding *Ulysses* as a body-mind with a brain allows us to trace our way along these blurred edges, mapping *Ulysses* as part of an interrelational web of agency rather than as a lone agentic organism.
Chapter 1:

The Schema Problem

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Scene</th>
<th>Hour</th>
<th>Organ</th>
<th>Art</th>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Technic</th>
<th>Correspondences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Telemachus</td>
<td>The Tower</td>
<td>8 a.m.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Theology</td>
<td>white, gold</td>
<td>Hair</td>
<td>Narrative (young)</td>
<td>Stephen: Telemachus, Hesiod; Buck Mulligan: Antinous; Mentor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lotus Eaters</td>
<td>The Bath</td>
<td>10 a.m.</td>
<td>Genital</td>
<td>Botany, Chemistry</td>
<td>Eucharist</td>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lotus Eaters: Calabria; Commonwealts: Soldiers; Rumeche: Barter; Watchers of Crickets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hades</td>
<td>The Graveyard</td>
<td>11 a.m.</td>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>white, black</td>
<td>Caretaker</td>
<td>Insomniac</td>
<td>The 4 Rivers: Dodder, Grand and Royal Canals; Liffey; Styphus; Connaught; Carbery: Fisher; Hades: Caretaker; Hercules: Daniel O’Connell; Euphrosyne: Egnatism; Agamemnon: Parretti; Ajax: Mentor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7. Aeolus

8. Leas Cremans

9. Sveva and Chrysalis

10. Wandering Rocks

11. Siens

12. Cyclops

13. Nausicaa

14. Oront of the bun

15. Circe

16. Emusoros

17. Ithaca

18. Penelope

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II. ODYSSEY

III. NOSTOS

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Before turning in the next chapters to the content of “Scylla and Charybdis” and the particular relevance of this episode to discussions of a theory of literature, it is important to turn our attention to how *Ulysses* invites the reader to approach this book as an experiment in form and, particularly, as an inhuman body-mind. The way that the schemata construct *Ulysses* as an explicitly biological object allows the readings of “Scylla and Charybdis” that I present in Chapters 2 and 3 in which *Ulysses* is regarded as a biological product, almost like a child; that is, to read the content of “Scylla and Charybdis” as an exploration of art and authorship, we must first understand how *Ulysses* calls attention to its own authorial and formal irregularities.

Contrary to popular approaches to the schemata, in which they are viewed as explanations of or guides to the book, I show that the schemata actually confuse the authorship, boundaries, and physical form of the book. Ironically, although the schemata came about as a way of orienting readers in a dizzyingly complex text, they begin to defamiliarize the book upon closer scrutiny, making *Ulysses* even less book-like than one might expect. *Ulysses* is made into a body-mind whose edges are indistinct, making it difficult to approach this text as one would a more traditional book in which the boundaries, such as those between text and not-text or those between biological and artificial, are more distinct. The result is a book that questions its own status as “book” in anticipation of Stephen’s exploration in “Scylla and Charybdis.”

A schema, to put it very simply, is “a diagrammatic representation” or “outline” of something, in this case, a book (“schema, n.”). As fig. 1 and 2 show, the schemata of *Ulysses* are generally structured like charts, with each episode of the book given a numbered row and each category of information given a column.² For example, the schemata are where the titles of the episodes are recorded. Rather than being titled “Scylla and Charybdis” in the text of *Ulysses*

² See pg. 2 for fig. 1
itself, the episode I discuss in this thesis is referred to by this name because, in the schemata, the entry under the “Title” column for this episode is “Scylla and Charybdis.” Similarly, the “Scene” of the episode given in the schema shown in fig. 2 is “The Library.” A setting or “Scene” may be apparent from the text of the episode itself, but something like the “Organ,” which for “Scylla and Charybdis” is “Brain,” may seem to relate to an episode only tangentially, or as a symbol or analogy. The schemata can therefore be used as an “outline” to the book in the sense of a breakdown of its parts, but they also contain interpretive information.

These diagrams are approached as both an organizing framework and a key to understanding the complex symbolism of *Ulysses*, and various scholars choose to use them alongside other textual evidence or decide to set them aside entirely. Joyce himself said that the schemata were “a sort of summary—key—skeleton—scheme,” suggesting that the schemata are a framework but also an explanatory tool, and scholars and readers alike have used them accordingly (Gilbert, *Letters* 146). C. H. Peake, for example, argues that the “Organs” given in the schemata have limited usefulness in understanding *Ulysses*, which he likens to a portrait of Dublin:

> My own feeling is that the pattern of ‘organs’ (like that of the Odyssean parallels, though less importantly) does contribute to the total image of a city whose moral and intellectual life is diseased—with the reservation that, while some parts of the scheme operate powerfully and meaningfully, others (the ‘kidney’, for instance) are more ingenious than functional. (147)

In Peake’s view, the “Organs” serve a function to a limited extent; they remind the reader of the common analogy of a city to a body, thus suggesting that Dublin as shown in *Ulysses* can be represented by a (diseased) body. However, Peake acknowledges that not all of the “Organs”
correspond to a part of the body politic and implies that some organs do not enhance readings of the text when examined individually. In this way, he downplays the authority of the schemata: they are suggestions rather than rules, a convenient tool that can be used but can just as easily be set aside when it ceases to be useful. While it is certainly true that not everyone agrees on how much deference scholars should give to the schemata, Peake’s approach sets aside the schemata’s troublesomeness more neatly than I wish to. Part of his trouble, it seems to me, is that he handles the schemata as one might handle a summary or a guidebook, rather than a part of the book experience that should be interrogated as one would a part of a literary text.

Even when the schemata are used to read *Ulysses* as an organism, they are approached as evidence of a relatively straightforward analogy between *Ulysses* and a living body: Gilbert claims that “Together these [organs] compose the whole body, which is thus a symbol of the structure of *Ulysses*, a living organism, and of the natural interdependence of the parts between themselves” (*James Joyce’s Ulysses* 29, note 1). Gilbert sees the “Organs” as a way of thinking about the book structurally, which helps to clarify the apparent disjointedness between episodes; however, the footnote I have quoted here does not address the questions raised by the “Organs,” such as the problem of whether they actually compose a “whole body” (they do not, if by “whole” Gilbert means “containing all the organs a literal body would need to function”) or what the full implications of reading a book as a “living organism” are. Like Gilbert, Knowles notes that the Linati schema “hints that the book is to be read as a body and acts as an architectural blueprint for the three-dimensional mapping of the book” (28). Knowles’ idea of a “blueprint” implies that he, too, sees the schemata as a guide to the book’s structure (what he terms “architecture”) and, like Gilbert, he argues that the “Organs” suggest that the book is a body. Gilbert and Knowles both recognize that the “Organs” in particular suggest that *Ulysses* should
be read as an organism as well as an object, but their analyses use the schemata as a way of clarifying the book’s structure—for Gilbert, a mode of highlighting “the natural interdependence of parts” and for Knowles, a way toward a “three-dimensional mapping of the book”—rather than approaching the schemata as an additional puzzle, another play on form in a book rife with stylistic and formal inconsistency. By favoring the minutiae of the text or the schematic data over the questions raised by the existence and structure of the schemata themselves, Gilbert and Knowles ignore how these documents construct Ulysses as organism-like in a way that questions what a book can be. The schemata make Ulysses appear alien, so oddly formed that where the book begins and ends and even what it is can be called into question.

In fact, it is unusual that such documents exist at all in relation to a fictional work, and the way the schemata came into being is equally unusual. There are two major schemata, the Gilbert and Linati schemata, published under Stuart Gilbert’s and Carlo Linati’s names, respectively, and heavily based on correspondence between James Joyce and these men. Modern iterations may vary; if we compare fig. 1, the original Gilbert schema as published in James Joyce’s *Ulysses* in 1930, with fig. 2, the Gilbert schema as published in a 2008 edition of *Ulysses*, it is clear that the content of the schema is not wholly standardized.³ The 2008 version includes other information taken from Gilbert’s book, which was written as a comprehensive guide to *Ulysses*, in addition to the information in the original Gilbert chart. If one were to compare the Gilbert schema with the Linati version, one would find very similar information between the two, but differences in organization and some slight differences in the information included. Peake points out that various critics have expanded upon or revised the schemata over the years; for example, “the ‘Correspondences’ column [was] omitted by Gilbert” but supplied in

³ See pg. 2 for fig. 1 and pg. 10 for fig. 2
a text by Hugh Kenner (Peake 122, note 9). Thus, the schemata have grown like living organisms with each new addition provided by critics of the text.

Additionally, the schemata have not always been printed alongside *Ulysses*. The Gilbert schema, for example, was published in Gilbert’s book rather than with Joyce’s text, bringing the authorship of the schema into question; furthermore, for contemporary readers, commentary on *Ulysses* was often more available than the text of *Ulysses* itself. Joyce himself points out, in a letter to Frank Budgen, that books like Gilbert’s guide were becoming increasingly common by 1932:

> Now as regards your projected book, if Gorman and Louis Golding finish their biographies of me and if Harmsworth publishes Charles Duff’s J.J. and the plain reader with a preface by Herbert Read yours will be the seventh book mainly about a text which is unobtainable in England. (Gilbert, *Letters* 315)

Kevin Birmingham notes that the censorship of *Ulysses* was so severe that “The transgressions of *Ulysses* were the first thing most people knew about it. A portion was burned in Paris while it was still only a manuscript draft, and it was convicted of obscenity in New York before it was even a book” (3). In England and elsewhere, *Ulysses* truly was, as Joyce says, “unobtainable.” Yet, when *Ulysses* was still hard to come by in England due to censorship, a plethora of writing on the text—and the author—had already become available to English readers. Therefore, the historic relationship between schemata and book is particularly strange. Many readers encountered schematic representations of *Ulysses* before encountering *Ulysses* itself; suggesting that, while we cannot be sure that the schemata are truly part of the text of *Ulysses*, or even whether they are authored by the same person, they have nevertheless shaped receptions to the book since its earliest publishing history. For this reason, the schemata have earned a de facto
place as part of the *Ulysses* experience, and critical attention ought to be paid to how these unusual documents confuse the book’s shape.

*Ulysses*’s shape draws attention to the act of reading and thereby emphasize the reader’s interaction with the physical text; in this way, an odd addition such as the schemata can construct the book as an unfamiliar body. I have discussed Gilbert and Knowles’ approaches to the “Organs”; for both, the “Organs” are an invitation to read the book as a biological, embodied form. Gilbert likens the structure of the book to a “living body,” but Knowles goes further than this, arguing that the “Organs” support his reading of the book as a body and, specifically, of words and letters as chromosomes and DNA. Both Gilbert and Knowles focus on how the text constructs the book’s body, emphasizing, through reference to anatomy, that the book is a physically embodied form. However, the existence of the schemata as part of the book-body draws attention to the embodiedness of *Ulysses* as well. In “Combining Close and Distant Reading,” N. Katherine Hayles points out that “print books have bodies” simply by fact of their physical existence, and in Hayles’ view, these “book-bodies” are the book’s actual physical shape rather than a symbolic or human body (226). Hayles argues that “Texts that employ their bodies to create narrative complexity must be read not for their words alone but also for the physical involvements readers undertake to access their materialities” (231). As I have discussed, her example is Jonathan Safran Foer’s *Tree of Codes*, which employs die-cut pages as a method of manipulating the book-body and drawing attention to the embodied nature of the text. I argue that the schemata have a similar physical function. When printed in the same volume as *Ulysses*, the schemata are an appendage in addition to being a textual reminder of *Ulysses*’s unusualness as a book. The lack of in-text episode titles, for example, is highlighted by the schemata’s inclusion of these titles, and the fact that many readers find themselves flipping between
episodes and schemata to orient themselves means that *Ulysses* requires more handling than other books. Even in editions of *Ulysses* that do not include the schemata, their absence seems surprising rather than natural: are they not part of many (even most) readers’ experience of *Ulysses*? Where does the book (or, indeed, its body) end, exactly?

Joyce himself seems to have considered the schemata part of the book’s body, even if they were never published under his name. Joyce’s letters to Linati reveal how he conceptualized the schematic diagramming of *Ulysses*. He prefaces his inclusion of a schema in a letter to Linati, which I have quoted from before: “in view of the enormous bulk and the more than enormous complexity of my three times blasted novel it would be better to send you a sort of summary—key—skeleton—scheme” (Gilbert, *Letters* 146). As I have discussed, many scholars approach the schemata as a “key” to the book, but Joyce’s use of the word “skeleton” suggests a different nuance to the book-schema relationship. A “skeleton” is not only a framework but a part of the body, so by describing the schema in this way, Joyce implies that it has a place as an essential part of the book’s body.

Like the “Organs,” the skeleton-schemata draw overt attention to *Ulysses*’s anatomy. The schemata suggest that the book can be read both as a biological body—which is in itself unusual for a book—and as a book-body that draws more attention to itself and its fundamental difference from a biological body than many book-bodies do. (One must not forget that the “Organs” are in fact episodes, nor that there are not enough “Organs” to make a complete organism, or that the skeleton is a set of charts.) Instead of making the book more familiar or approachable, constructing the book as a body has the effect of confusing the book further: it is inhuman and inanimate, organism and object, living and unliving, a contradiction in itself. This distancing from the reader—who has grown to expect biological bodies to look like a human or
an animal and to expect book-bodies to be fairly standard—makes *Ulysses* itself appear less
book-like while simultaneously emphasizing that all books, and particularly this book, are extant
as physical objects as well as words on a page or language processing in the reader’s or writer’s
brain. As will be seen, this is in some ways a precursor to the argument Stephen makes in “Scylla
and Charybdis.”

To go a step further, the schemata also play on the body-mind relationship. The very
word “schema” plays with the interaction between physical and mental: not only is a schema a
diagram, a physical, visual representation, but it has also been used in psychology as early as
1920 to denote “an automatic, unconscious coding or organization of incoming psychological
stimuli” (“schema, n.”). In other words, while the schemata to *Ulysses* are certainly physical
objects, a schema does not have to be a chart printed on paper; it can be something held in the
mind. Even if Joyce was not aware of recently emerging psychological terminology at the time
of writing *Ulysses* or its schemata, the word he uses to describe these charts, “scheme,” indicates
a diagram or “a system of correlated things” as well, and like “schema,” it also carries
psychological connotations: “scheme” can be “a hypothetical construction, a theory” or a “plan,”
which implies a certain degree of thought and a more abstract existence than a physical diagram
(“scheme, n.1”). The schemata therefore highlight an intersection between mental and physical
and, through even such simple means as the word Joyce and others have chosen to call these
diagrams, they emphasize the idea that text does not exist simply in the physical or mental world
of the reader or writer but at a point of intersection where physicality, language, and
organizational processing continuously affect one another.

The schemata thus suggest something heretofore unexplored about how *Ulysses* is
constructed as an inhuman organism-object: the book does not only have a book-body but,
potentially, a book-body-mind. That is, Ulysses is not simply a book that has a physical body but a book that acknowledges its own psychology and, in doing so, implies the existence of its own agency. Moreover, as a body-mind, the book’s agency is intertwined with its physicality, making the book-body a necessary part of the book’s expression of agency. Limiting the exploration of the posthuman Ulysses to the book’s embodiedness ignores the book’s own consistent references to the psychological, and furthermore, as I show in the following chapters, regarding the book as a body-mind becomes a useful way of regarding the relationship between the book’s unusual shape and its status as agent. Reading “Scylla and Charybdis” in particular in light of my reading of the schemata both reinforces reading the schemata as I do and reveals the book’s own acknowledgement of the interrelational nature of authorial and textual agency.
Chapter 2:
The Revision of Hamlet

“Scylla and Charybdis” is the longest and most complex episode in *Ulysses* that focuses on Stephen Dedalus. Furthermore, this episode marks a turning point for Stephen; not only is it the first time that the schemata assign an organ to a Stephen-centric episode, suggesting that Stephen is undergoing some change, but, as Margot Norris explains, “Scylla and Charybdis” lays out a scene in which many of the conflicts in Stephen’s plotline have the potential to be resolved. “Scylla and Charybdis” therefore becomes a climactic moment. Stephen finds himself in the library with a group of men (all of whom were living and working in Dublin in 1904), most notably George Russell (AE) and John Eglinton. AE is particularly important; the historical AE was a leading member of the growing Irish literary renaissance taking place in Dublin at the time of the book’s events (Kain 15). With this audience, Stephen decides to present the theory on Hamlet that Buck Mulligan mentions to Haines in the first episode: “[Stephen] proves by algebra that Hamlet’s grandson is Shakespeare’s grandfather and that he himself is the ghost of his own father” (*U* 18). In essence, Stephen argues that the play *Hamlet* must be looked at in conjunction with the events of Shakespeare’s life, and Stephen plays out the connection between

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4 As C. H. Peake points out, the first three episodes of *Ulysses*, which focus on Stephen, are not assigned an organ. Peake suggests that this is because the organs represent the “body politic” and that the first three episodes “concern a solitary young man outside the city limits” (142-143). However, theories abound as to what prompts the introduction of organs after the third episode.

5 George William Russell (1867-1935), pseudonymously known as AE: “poet, painter, philosopher… [and] luminous center of the Irish Revival” (Kain 11-15). He was also well-known for his mysticism (15).

6 Pen name of William Kirkpatrick Magee (1868-1961): assistant librarian at the National Library, literary critic, involved in the Irish Renaissance (Ross 461).

7 *Encyclopaedia Britannica* defines this movement as a “flowering of Irish literary talent at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century that was closely allied with a strong political nationalism and a revival of interest in Ireland’s Gaelic literary heritage” (“Irish literary renaissance”).
Shakespeare and the character Hamlet such that he proves Shakespeare to be both King Hamlet and Prince Hamlet, making Hamlet/Shakespeare “the ghost of his own father.” This is an intentionally convoluted line of reasoning, meant to impress Stephen’s well-read audience, but the argument that unfolds is also carefully crafted to convey Stephen’s resistance to aligning himself too closely with the Irish literary renaissance. Through his *Hamlet* example, Stephen argues for a theory of art that goes against AE’s Neoplatonist model and draws specific attention to the artist’s body-mind, and this fundamental disagreement between AE and Stephen underlines Stephen’s struggle to forge a place for himself in the classist Dublin literary sphere. Stephen’s theory of art ultimately does two things: first, it gives Stephen a certain mutability as an artist that AE’s idealization of the artist might not, and second, it implies that *Ulysses* can also be seen as mutable. This flexibility towards identity and the stability of form suggests that the schemata can be read as part of *Ulysses*, regardless of the many critical problems I have outlined in Chapter 1.

To fully appreciate the importance of Stephen’s disagreement with AE, some background is needed. Norris points out that “Scylla and Charybdis” is a crucial moment for Stephen because it is possibly his only remaining chance to ingratiate himself with Dublin’s most influential writers (1). It is imperative to his career that he ingratiate himself to AE in particular, since the historical AE was a major figure in the Irish literary renaissance, and accordingly, the literary AE clearly wields influence in this library. Of particular importance is the fact that AE is creating a compilation of young poets’ work: “Mr. Russell, rumour has it, is gathering together a sheaf of our younger poets’ verses” (*U* 184). This is exactly the sort of publication in which a young, unpublished artist like Stephen would wish to be included. If Stephen, a relative nobody, challenges AE, he is essentially challenging a well-known, well-established Irish nationalist art
movement—probably not a popular stance to take in 1904 Dublin—and furthermore, he is hurting his chances of being included in AE’s publication, which would significantly aid his career.

Yet Stephen openly and fundamentally disagrees with AE as to the relationship between body and mind in art. Early in the episode, AE outlines his Neoplatonist position on the ideal of art: “Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences” (U 177). As humorous as AE’s idealization of art that reveals the “formless” is in a book that draws constant attention to its own physicality and form, AE’s position carries serious philosophical implications: that art reveals the “spiritual” yet “formless” and is therefore distanced from the body, seeking instead to describe a world of pure mind. He notes that “The painting of Gustave Moreau is the painting of ideas,” emphasizing again that art is meant to revolve around the mental: paintings, according to AE, depict ideas, not people or physical objects. In AE’s view, the existence of an idea behind or in the art is more important than the physical existence of the art or the artist. Rather than viewing the body and mind as equal or interrelational, AE elevates the role of the mind above that of the body, as if seeking to separate the two.

Although AE acknowledges the role of the artist, he focuses on the mental: “The supreme question about a work of art is out of how deep a life does it spring” (U 177). Certainly, “life” nods to the theoretical existence of a body, but the “deep life” that AE describes seems to be a deep mental life rather than a physical experience: “The deepest poetry of Shelley, the words of Hamlet bring our mind into contact with the eternal wisdom, Plato’s world of ideas” (177). “Deep” life may be ambiguous, but next to “deepest poetry,” defined as that which brings the reader’s mind into contact with a “world of ideas,” AE’s concern with the artist appears to be primarily a concern with the artist’s ability to think, to have a deep inner life. Therefore, in AE’s
view, and by extension in the view of the writers of the Irish literary renaissance, an artist’s worth might be measured by their ability to transcend physicality; the ideal of the mind is to escape the body, and the ideal of art is to be ideas produced by minds. Again, this focus on mind over body reinforces the idea of body and mind as separate rather than an intertwined body-mind.

Stephen quickly refutes AE’s position, taking up an Aristotelian stance of his own in which art is necessarily physical in addition to spiritual or mental. He opens his argument by presenting a scene in which Shakespeare plays the role of the ghost of Hamlet’s father on the Elizabethan stage: “To a son he speaks, the son of his soul, the prince, young Hamlet and to the son of his body, Hamnet Shakespeare, who has died in Stratford that his namesake may live forever” (U 181). Stephen thereby prefaces his argument with an assumption: a character, a creation of art, “the son of [a] soul,” is comparable to—and almost synonymous with—“the son of [a] body,” a biological child. This synonymy suggests that the character itself is a body-mind, rather than a disembodied vehicle for ideas, while also underlining that art is the product of both a body and a soul: the authorial body-mind. Additionally, Stephen draws attention to the physical reality of performance. This “son of [Shakespeare’s] soul” is also “Burbage, the young player who stands before him,” an actor on the Elizabethan stage (U 181). The son of the soul is thus rendered literally physical, in addition to being the product of a body. Rather than presenting Shakespeare’s art as founded only on ideas, Stephen emphasizes the enmeshment of ideas with physicality: a dramatic character can be made flesh and can be tied inextricably to the product of the artist’s flesh, and thus, the product of the artist’s mind can both be embodied and be the product of a body. Whereas AE emphasizes the mental production of an art that focuses on
“spiritual essences” and “ideas,” Stephen underlines the importance of the body-mind both in producing art and in the art product itself.

This line of thought carries over from a theory of art and art production to a theory of the artist. AE’s artist is removed, idealized, theoretical: he puts Shakespeare in the same category as Shelley and Gustave Moreau, both of whom are canonical artists of the type one might invoke if one were to conjure up the idea of a “true artist,” someone who has the respect of being universally regarded as a genius and who is consequently put upon a pedestal (U 177). The disconnect between body and mind in AE’s theory adds to the sense of idealization of the artist. Rather than allowing the artist a human body, AE envisions the artist as a larger-than-life “great mind.” Stephen makes fun of AE’s tendency to view the artist in this way in a moment of free indirect discourse a page later: “Through spaces smaller than red globules of man’s blood they [AE and the other men in the library] creepycrawl after Blake’s buttocks into eternity of which this vegetable world is but a shadow” (178). The “eternity” that Stephen references is presumably AE’s Platonic “world of ideas,” since the “vegetable” (or organic, physical, biological) world can only be a “shadow” of this place. The “spaces smaller than red globules of man’s blood” that one must crawl through to reach “eternity” implies that there is no room for “man’s blood,” what makes a person human, in this space. So, in Stephen’s mind, AE’s ideal necessarily leaves the human behind in order to grovel after “Blake’s buttocks.” Blake, like Shelley or like Irish literary renaissance writers such as Yeats and AE, is a mystic, yet Stephen has ironically pared him down to a mere set of buttocks—a part of the artist which, in AE’s transcendental view of artistry, should be irrelevant. Clearly, Stephen is mocking AE’s idea of the artist as a larger-than-life figure to be crawled after in veneration as if he were a god rather
than, as Stephen’s synecdoche points out, an assemblage of human parts. Stephen views AE’s tendency toward body/mind separation as unrealistic and even laughable in its impracticality.

Stephen’s thesis instead chooses to emphasize the human flaws of the author, taking Shakespeare off the pedestal and reinstating his humanity. As Norris points out, the artist’s body inserts itself into the cerebral artistic process in more ways than one: “poets are first of all living human creatures with hungers and thirsts and sexual and financial needs before they are creators of immortal words and art” (9). In other words, in Norris’ view, Stephen’s exchange with AE emphasizes Stephen’s awareness of the practical needs of the artist: their physical and economic necessities. Norris notes AE’s criticism of Stephen’s heavy investigation of Shakespeare’s biography, which AE calls “[p]eeping and prying into greenroom gossip of the day, the poet’s drinking, the poet’s debts’” and points out that “These lines perversely boomerang on Stephen, in a reversal of AE’s point, as he imagines them pointed against himself, his own poet’s drinking and poet’s debts—including the one owed to Russell himself” (qtd. in Norris 8-9, 9). Norris’ reading shows that while AE tends to disregard the shameful realities of the artistic body—drinking, debts, debauchery—Stephen is not only aware of these realities but actually emphasizes them, resisting AE’s philosophical tendency to discount the bodily experience of the author. According to Stephen’s Hamlet theory, the artist relies on body and mind in relation to one another to produce art, just as art itself engages with bodies and ideas in relation—like Burbage, the body enacting the ideas of Shakespeare’s Hamlet.

This suggests that, for Stephen and for Joyce, the Neoplatonist theory presented by AE and representative of the Irish literary renaissance’s thinking does not account for the full bodily experience of being Irish. The Irish literary renaissance was primarily led by mystics whose socioeconomic standing was higher than that of Stephen Dedalus, suggesting that Stephen’s
emphasis on the interrelational body-mind has class dimensions as well as aesthetic importance. W. B. Yeats, the most well-known member of the movement, was a senator and a Protestant; likewise, AE shows his socioeconomic privilege through his ignorance of the relevance of poverty to Stephen’s argument: “I mean when we read the poetry of *King Lear* what is it to us how the poet lived? As for living, our servants can do that for us, Villiers de l’Isle has said” (Ross 3-4, *U* 181). Stephen, a young Catholic who, as Norris mentions, owes AE money, is far from having servants to care for his day-to-day bodily needs, so AE’s argument falls a bit flat. Living—specifically, the bodily processes of staying alive—becomes much more important if one does not have the means to provide for oneself comfortably. A wealthy person might be able to afford to ignore their body, but a less well-off individual might not have that luxury. Thus, for Stephen, the role of the body in art is directly related to his ability, as a poor Irish Catholic, to be an artist. Stephen’s disagreement with AE therefore underlines the Irish literary renaissance’s classism and the irony that, in a country so impoverished and so affected by colonialism, the predominant literary movement is one that disregards the bodily experience of the writer and, in doing so, distances itself from young artists like Stephen who cannot afford to ignore their own bodies. Stephen’s insistence upon the role of the body-mind is therefore political, rather than simply an aesthetic disagreement, and these political undertones suggest that the stakes of this argument are higher than might initially meet the eye. He is, through his resistance to Neoplatonism, fighting for a place for himself within a relatively elitist movement. For Stephen, recognizing art and artist as entwining the physical and mental rather than ignoring one to focus on the other is absolutely necessary to fully articulating Irish art, but particularly his own Irish art.
In addition to containing classist undertones, AE’s theory of art is also remarkably stagnant in comparison to Stephen’s. Not only does Stephen’s Hamlet theory present a theory of art/artist as engaging in interrelated physical and mental action, in opposition to AE’s view, but Stephen uses this theory to construct his human artist-self as a constantly changing set of physical and mental forms. Such shifting between forms would be impossible in the Neoplatonist model, which emphasizes essential forms (“spiritual essences”). For example, as he thinks on the debt he owes AE, Stephen comes up with this excuse for not paying back the money: “Wait. Five months. Molecules all change. I am other I now. Other I got pound” \(U\ 182\). He hypothesizes that, if the self is the self because of physical form—the molecules that make one up—then his self has changed so radically that it cannot be called the same “I.” Of course, Stephen acknowledges the clear logical flaws in this idea, and amends: “But I, entelechy, form of forms, am I by memory because under ever-changing forms” \(182\). The causation here is particularly striking: “I… am I by memory because under ever-changing forms” \(emphasis\ mine\). The self maintains some unified form by memory, by being able to reflect on a past physical or mental state and recognize the change over time, and the self \textit{must} be anchored in memory because the body is constantly reformed. Every past and present physical state is therefore tied together through memory, a mental process that anchors the shifting forms across time. Of course, memory is not unchanging either; as memory expands and physical forms shift, identity is constantly being reformed. Stephen envisions himself not as a fixed form or essence, but as many forms of which memory keeps an index. Presumably, as I will elaborate upon later, Stephen’s view of the mutable “I” kept whole by memory could be applied to any subject—not just the author but the book, with cultural memory (or an index, like the schemata) standing in for personal memory.
This philosophy of mutability is further illustrated by Stephen’s contradictory views within his own thesis. It is tempting to read the Hamlet thesis as play-acting; as Peake puts it, Stephen’s thesis “is a mock literary argument, an attempt to overwhelm the audience with a show of learning” (205). Although Peake downplays the real thought Stephen puts into his argument, he is correct that Stephen’s thesis is presented very performatively. Throughout the episode, free indirect discourse draws attention to Stephen’s rhetorical moves. His speaking is often prefaced with a line such as “Local colour. Work in all you know. Make them accomplices” (U 180). This particular passage highlights Stephen’s (or the narration’s) consciousness of the way he frames his argument, attempting to make his combative audience “accomplices” to his own ideas. Through such moments, the episode is, in a sense, aware of its own creation and of the ulterior motives behind Stephen’s words. Furthermore, the episode eventually slips into the form of a drama, complete with stage directions such as “(Laughter.)” (U 200). This makes Stephen’s thesis literally a “show” of learning, although a consciously crafted and substantive show.8 Because this thesis is presented so performatively, with ample narrative attention to Stephen’s rhetorical moves, and with such a convoluted central claim, it certainly seems like an act rather than a sincerely held belief. Stephen himself suggests as much: when John Eglinton asks, “Do you believe your own theory?” Stephen immediately replies, “No” (U 205). This seems to prove that Stephen’s thesis is, as Peake says, a “mock” argument. However, Stephen’s musing on the nature of the physio-mental self has shown that he views form as “ever-changing.” In his explanation of his thesis, Stephen links this ever-changing self overtly to the artist-self: “As we, or mother Dana, weave and unweave our bodies … so does the artist weave and unweave his image” (186). While Stephen acknowledges that “mother Dana” may be what forms and reforms

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8 For an expanded exploration of the role of drama and performativity, see Chapter 3.
the body (a point I will return to but which, for the time being, can be simply understood to imply that some other power plays a role in the formation of the body), he implies that the artist forms and reforms their own image. If the artist is indeed constantly creating and recreating themselves, then the fact that Stephen rejects his Hamlet theory immediately after presenting it does not necessarily refute either the Hamlet theory or the theory of art implicit in it; instead, by resisting consistency, Stephen proves his point. He, the artist, is ever-changing.

By constructing himself as an artist in this way, Stephen implies that constant transformation is a necessary part of building artistic identity in a way that recognizes the role of the body. Whereas AE’s more rigid approach to form leaves little room for growth and change, Stephen’s emphasis on creation and recreation allows for both the growth of the artist and the reinterpretation of art. Stephen explains the creation and recreation of the self as “weav[ing] and unweav[ing]” (U 186). This is clearly a reference to Penelope in Homer’s *Odyssey*, the work after which *Ulysses* is named. Just as Penelope weaves and unweaves her shroud, the body or the artist’s image is woven and unwoven, promoting change and growth but also preventing the inevitable completion: of the body, through death, of the artist, through stagnation of ideas, or of a work such as Penelope’s shroud, through lack of reinterpretation. In a similar vein, Christine Van Boheemen notes that the final episode of *Ulysses*, “Penelope,” resists being an ending: “It is as if finality generated a certain anxiety in Joyce and had to be precluded. It evidently was related to the threat of death” (270). Throughout *Ulysses*, then, the image of Penelope is linked to an anxiety about completion, both of lives and of texts. Stephen’s implicit reference suggests that “ever-changing forms” applies to art as well as artist, anticipating some of the anxiety of the “Penelope” episode that Van Boheemen describes in her essay. Whereas AE’s view implies that there is an essential *Hamlet*, Stephen’s emphasizes that *Hamlet* is continually revised. For
example, Stephen stresses the actors performing the play—Shakespeare and Babbage—but
Shakespeare and Babbage are only actors in the early productions of *Hamlet*. In fact, as Leopold
Bloom notes much earlier in the book, a Mrs. Bandman Palmer had played the part of Hamlet the
night before *Ulysses* takes place: “*Hamlet* she played last night. Male impersonator. Perhaps he
was a woman” (*U* 73). The change of actors has caused Bloom to reevaluate the character: the
part of Hamlet is being played by a woman, a “Male impersonator,” so perhaps Hamlet was a
woman too. A play is by nature revised with each new actor, each stage, and each audience and,
as Bloom’s pondering shows, each re-embodiment of the work causes a reevaluation by the
viewer. Art is continually revised by shifts in cultural experience and interpretation. By making
his argument performative, then, Stephen leaves room not only for his own development but for
the development of his production independent of himself.10

Therefore, Stephen’s idea that we “weave and unweave our bodies,” that all people create
and recreate themselves in form after form, unified into an “I” by memory, also applies to art
itself (*U* 186). Specifically, if the artistic product is, like the artist, an embodied form as well as
full of ideas, making it analogous to a body-mind just as the author is a body-mind, then in
Stephen’s theory of art, there is an implicit possibility for art to create and recreate itself, or to be
created and recreated by “mother Dana” (186). The word “mother,” like Stephen’s attention to
Hamlet as the “son” of Shakespeare’s body, brings to mind parental ties. A mother weaves a
body through the gestation of a child. (How she unweaves a child is perhaps more unclear, but
Stephen’s mother has died before the events of *Ulysses* begin, so there is a possibility that this is
a nod to Stephen’s grief.) Dana, or Danu, is a Celtic mother goddess after whom the Tuatha Dé

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9 According to Jeri Johnson’s notes to the text, Bloom is referring to the real actress Millicent
Bandmann Palmer, who played the part of Hamlet in Dublin on June 15, 1904 (*U* 799, note
73.21).

10 This line of reasoning will be returned to and discussed in more depth in Chapter 3.
Danann (translated, “folk of the goddess Danu”), a tribe of gods, are named (“Tuatha Dé Danann”). Stephen’s reference therefore suggests that God or gods could be equally responsible for the “weaving and unweaving” of the individual, as much as the individual themselves. The fact that he references a well-known Irish goddess is in part a rhetorical flourish, acknowledging his audience’s nationalistic embrace of Celtic mythology, but Stephen is also familiar with Celtic myths and presumably knows that many goddesses in the Celtic tradition are linked to the land. The Modern Irish Éire, for example, is the name of a goddess of the Tuatha Dé Danann as well as a name for Ireland (MacKillop). “Mother Dana” can therefore be seen as many things: an Irish twist on a reference to God, a mother figure who weaves and unweaves bodies through gestation and birth, or the land Ireland, which shapes its inhabitants through their bodily experience of colonialism and Irishness. By acknowledging the role of “mother Dana,” Stephen implies, first, that to some extent, the person he is and will become, and perhaps the artist he is and will become, is out of his control and instead dependent upon circumstances such as divine influence, family, or nationality. Second, Stephen reinforces the suggestion that art may be, or become, out of the artist’s control: we weave our bodies, and our bodies of work, to a point, but some things are out of our hands. Ultimately, culture and circumstance can remake a work.

If Stephen’s theory can be understood to apply to the form of a piece of art as well as to the artist who creates it, then, like with Stephen’s “I,” there must be a mechanism keeping the formed and reformed art whole. In the same way that Stephen knows himself to be himself by memory, an index of the forms he has had, a piece of art may be understood to be “itself” by a collective cultural memory. Hamlet is still recognizably Hamlet, even with wildly different reinterpretations and reimaginings and totally new bodies playing all the parts, in part because reinterpretations tend to be conscious of the textual and interpretive history of the play.
Moreover, new works can build off older traditions—like, for example, *Ulysses*’s use of Homer, Celtic myth, and *Hamlet*—and be understood as separate works, but they still have the potential to reshape a reader’s response to the older work (as a female actor playing Hamlet causes Bloom to rethink the character, or as *Ulysses* could prompt a rethinking of Homer’s *Odyssey*).

The body-mind of *Ulysses* is therefore formed and reformed through interpretation and reinterpretation, but *Ulysses* is also made and remade internally as one goes through each episode’s stylistic changes. The schemata highlight this by including the “Technic” of each episode, which at times corresponds to a style or genre:11 “Nestor” is a “Catechism” in the Gilbert schema, whereas “Circe” is a “Hallucination” and “Eumaeus” a “Narrative” (*U* 734-735). However, stylistic differences between episodes are often apparent without schematic input: the “Aeolus” episode includes newspaper-like headlines (“WITH UNFEIGNED REGRET IT IS WE ANNOUNCE THE DISSOLUTION OF A MOST RESPECTED DUBLIN BURGESS”), whereas “Ithaca” is formatted primarily as questions and answers (“Why did absence of light disturb him less than presence of noise? Because of the surety of the sense of touch in his firm full masculine feminine passive active hand”), and many of the other episodes carry distinct stylistic markers as well (*U* 114, 627). *Ulysses* reinvents itself—its genre and style—with each new episode, weaving and unweaving its own identity or, possibly, being woven and unwoven by its author or circumstance. There is also a microcosm of this process within “Scylla and Charybdis,” as the episode begins as a narrative but includes, at various moments, snippets of poetry, a Gregorian chant complete with musical notation, and, as I have mentioned, a shift toward dramatic formatting later on. Like Stephen’s artistic yet human body-mind, “Scylla and Charybdis,” and on a larger scale *Ulysses*, is made and remade externally (by a “mother Dana,”

11 “Technic” can be defined as “A technical method; a scientific procedure” (“technic, adj. and n.”)).
whether that is culture, interpretation, or authorial parentage) but also seems to make and remake itself as it shifts between genres and styles, forcing the reader to reevaluate what the book “is” at any moment.

If one envisions *Ulysses* as a body-mind that can be formed and reformed—interpreted and reinterpreted, but also made and remade as one goes through each episode’s stylistic changes—then the schemata have played a role akin to memory in constructing *Ulysses* as a single entity. As I discussed in Chapter 1, Gilbert notes in *James Joyce’s Ulysses* that the organs in particular suggest “the natural interdependence of the parts between themselves” (29, note 1). The schemata, by providing frameworks that remain consistent across the episodes, emphasize the unification of the many forms of the book, indexing the genres (or “Technics”) that the book adopts. The fact that modern editors sometimes revise and reform the schematic content only adds to the sense that the schemata are an accrual of remembered critical information. Furthermore, because Stephen has outlined the possibility for art to form itself or to be formed by others who may not be the artist, the fact that the schemata are incredibly variable, or that they were not published under Joyce’s name, has little bearing on whether one sees them as part of *Ulysses*. Instead, the variations add to the impression of the schemata as a growing, changing accrual of remembered information. Just as a person’s memory expands and is altered over time, so are the schemata expanded and altered with each new version. Therefore, Stephen’s thesis provides a framework with which to envision the book as a mutable body-mind, and in this book-body-mind, textual growths such as the schemata are not only anticipated but accepted as part of the process of creating and maintaining a shifting text’s identity.

Ultimately, Stephen’s Hamlet theory is a deeply metatextual exploration of the mutability of art and artist, set against a staunchly Neoplatonist understanding of art in which the physical
world has hardly any role. Stephen argues for the importance of the authorial body-mind as opposed to a detached artistic psyche, thus attempting to forge a place for the impoverished and body-aware Irish artist in the Irish literary renaissance, and he also argues for a view of art as having partial autonomy from the author, all while emphasizing the instability of form of both the human artist and the work produced. As the next chapter discusses, the theory Stephen outlines in “Scylla and Charybdis” lays the groundwork for a complex understanding, not only of the role of the body-mind in the production of art, but of the ways in which the artist interacts with their art, and the limitations of artistic power over the forms art may take.
Chapter 3: The Thinking Book

In this chapter, I return to a more traditional approach to the schemata. As I have discussed in the previous chapters, readings of the schemata have the potential to be much more flexible than they have previously been, and using the schemata as part of the text reveals how *Ulysses* draws attention to its own strange shape, raising questions about the boundaries of the book and what the book “is.” Now, I again use the schemata as a “key” to the text—in this case, a key to “Scylla and Charybdis.” The schemata set up “Scylla and Charybdis,” which is a highly self-aware episode, to be the thinking center of the book by assigning it the organ “Brain.” This episode is where the book, in a sense, thinks itself through; the author-character Stephen ponders the relationship between art and artist as the book itself shifts forms as if to reflect his ideas, and the interplay between the schemata and the text underlines the central importance of Stephen’s Hamlet thesis to understanding *Ulysses* as a whole.

By listing the “Art” of “Scylla and Charybdis” as “Literature,” the schemata suggest that this episode in particular is thematically linked to theorization of “literature”—which I think has been made clear in this thesis thus far, but it is nevertheless relevant to note that the text itself underlines the link between this episode and “Literature” as an art form. This directness is part of what separates *Ulysses*’s self-awareness from that of other books. Many books discuss literature, directly or indirectly, and many books have an awareness of their status as literature, but the schemata point out the exact moment where Stephen, the author-character, presents his own particular theory of art. The schemata set up “Scylla and Charybdis” to be the episode in which the production and dissemination of literature is theorized even while, through the schemata’s very presence, confounding conventional ideas of what a book is and how it is
produced. Chapter 1 discussed the schemata’s own strange authorship, and Chapter 2 discussed Stephen’s theory of the artist as a human body-mind; in this chapter, I show how reading the schemata and “Scylla and Charybdis” together reveals Joyce’s exploration of impersonal or disappeared authorship, formulated long before Barthes and Foucault brought these issues to the forefront of literary theory. Ultimately, the theories Joyce/Stephen thinks through in “Scylla and Charybdis” emphasize the ways in which *Ulysses* acts and is acted upon in conjunction with, yet independent of, Joyce.

Fittingly, “Scylla and Charybdis” takes place in the National Library of Ireland (which the Gilbert schema refers to as “The Library,” as if it were an archetypal every-library). Stephen envisions this setting as graveyard-like: “Coffined thoughts around me, in mummycases, embalmed in spice of words” (*U* 186). To him, each book is a “coffin” of thoughts; thoughts form the body of the book in this metaphor, with the “spice of words” acting to mummify and preserve them. This, of course, implies that books—or at least the thoughts contained therein—are dead and that libraries are tombs of tomes.

This thought has implications for Stephen’s Hamlet thesis. If literature is viewed as an act of preservation, then *Hamlet* functions as a preserver of Shakespeare’s thoughts, but also his memories and experiences. As fig. 3 shows, Shakespeare’s lived experiences of his son Hamnet’s death inspires *Hamlet*, which then does two major things: first, *Hamlet* preserves the memory of Hamnet Shakespeare by reinterpreting and re-embodying him as Prince Hamlet, and second, *Hamlet* preserves its author as the ghost of King Hamlet. Stephen defines a ghost as “One who has faded into impalpability through death, through absence, through change of manners,” so when he calls Shakespeare a ghost in the context of *Hamlet*, he implies that the author will one day grow, change, die, or otherwise become absent; however, the dead contents
of the play (Hamnet, Shakespeare) are, as Stephen implies, preserved and, furthermore, the
dramatic process of acting, and the re-embodiment and reinterpretation implied by this act, keeps
Hamlet from becoming a completely dead text while simultaneously preserving a remnant of the
absent author (U 180).

![Stephen’s Dialectic Cycle](image)

Fig. 3. Made in PowerPoint 2016; Microsoft; Computer software.

The acts of preservation and revival are therefore central to Stephen’s thesis. As I have
discussed in Chapter 2, Stephen envisions himself, and by extension the author, as an “ever-
changing form” and notes that “I… am I by memory” (U 182). In that chapter, I argued that the
schemata act as memory in relation to Ulysses. However, whereas the schemata are in many
ways a shared memory of analogy—one might even say of criticism—the rest of Ulysses takes
on a function as memory in a different way. Ulysses and, indeed, any book is a physical site in
which thoughts can be “coffined” when they are “dead”: when the author has moved on, changed
form, perhaps even abandoned his thoughts as Stephen seems to abandon his thesis. The author
becomes “I by memory” in that they, as an author, are recognized by the body of work that preserves their thoughts.

However, the thoughts are only dead in a limited sense. Stephen continues, noting the books’ apparent lack of life: “They are still. Once quick in the brains of men. Still: but an itch of death is in them, to tell me in my ear a maudlin tale, urge me to wreak their will” (U 186). The “They” he refers to is ambiguous but seems to reference the “Coffined thoughts” of the preceding paragraph, which suggests that thoughts “Once quick” lose their life and liveliness when put to the page, becoming “still.” More puzzling is the phrase “Still: but an itch of death is in them,” which could be read in at least two ways: first, as saying that the books are “Still,” yet have “an itch of death,” or second, as saying that the books are “Still,” and have only “an itch of death” instead of a full death. Reading the phrase the first way seems contradictory. The thoughts are still yet given motion or sensation (the “itch”) through death, which would not make sense if it were not for the resonance between “tell me in my ear” and the section of Hamlet Stephen later quotes, “They list. And in the porches of their ears I pour” (188).12 Here, Stephen uses the reference to describe how he “pours” his thesis into his audience’s ears—“tell[ing] [them] in [their] ears,” as it were.13 The way the “still” thoughts “urge [Stephen] to wreak [their] will” is also reminiscent of the ghost of King Hamlet’s appeal to Hamlet, so perhaps the “still” thoughts entombed in the library act on Stephen as King Hamlet’s ghost acts on Hamlet from beyond the grave. This reading complements the second reading of “but an itch of death is in them,” which suggests that merely “an itch of death” is in the thoughts; they are, in some sense, alive in death, like a ghost, and they are shown to have agency—a “will”—of their own. A book, then, is not

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12 A reference to Hamlet, I. V. 63-4 (U 844, note 188.36).
13 The original context suggests (perhaps jestingly) that Stephen’s thesis is like poison to his listeners; this is not a wholly friendly debate.
only a physical place for mummified thoughts, nor simply a record of the author’s forms, but instead, the book becomes an agent with a degree of independence from the author. Specifically, at this moment, the “will” of the books around Stephen seems to be that he generate his Hamlet thesis; Stephen’s dual references to *Hamlet* link the library setting to the production of his argument.

Thus, the agency that books have independent of their authors works to produce new texts, and the books themselves have the ability to prompt production. “Scylla and Charybdis” therefore frames the library as a generative space. The writers gathered in the library are speaking of literary production and the bringing-to-life of art, both through their discussion of promising new poets and through the continual references to performance. As I noted in Chapter 2, one member of Stephen’s audience remarks that “Mr. Russell, rumour has it, is gathering together a sheaf of our younger poets’ verses” (*U* 184). Mr. Russell (AE), who is in attendance for part of the episode, is in the midst of producing a book, reminding the reader that libraries can be sites of production as well as entombment. Furthermore, as Norris notes, the production of this volume of young poets’ work may be part of Stephen’s reason for sharing his Hamlet thesis to begin with: “does he decide to deliver his views on *Hamlet* in the hopes of impressing this coterie and perhaps reversing the two disappointments in store for him: his exclusion from Russell’s planned book of verses and his exclusion from George Moore’s evening soiree?” (Norris 4). AE’s production of a book of verses is in some ways prompting Stephen’s production of his thesis, just as the library environment itself seems to be. This emphasis on creation, and the graveyard library as the seat of creation, reinforces the idea of books as having a “will” to
create: ideas beget new ideas, books beget new books, and the library is not only a graveyard of thoughts but a womb.14

Additionally, “Scylla and Charybdis” stresses the physical bringing-to-life of art. The Gilbert schema gives “Dialectic” as the “Technic” for the “Scylla and Charybdis” episode, and the dialectic as a genre renders thought physical through performance.15 In Platonic terms, “dialectic” refers to dialogue as a mode by which philosophy is created or disseminated (Meinwald). “Scylla and Charybdis” makes the dialectical form particularly overt through the way the book (and Stephen’s thesis) moves between prose-formatted conversation and moments of dialogue formatted as a play. As Peake argues, “The whole of [Stephen’s] speech in the library is a performance, as the style itself suggests” (205). This emphasizes the idea that Stephen’s conversation with AE is in fact a performative exploration of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian theories of art and artist and, furthermore, suggests that “Scylla and Charybdis” can be brought to life physically in a way similar to Hamlet. The writers talking in the library in this episode are based on flesh-and-blood living contemporaries of Joyce, which in itself is a nod to the life-death mediation of literature that Stephen’s Hamlet thesis describes: Hamnet is preserved in and made flesh through Hamlet, and AE and the others are preserved and, if they are not made flesh exactly, they have the potential to be once the episode morphs into a dramatic form. A

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14 The tomb/womb relationship is a theme throughout Ulysses; for example, in “Proteus,” Stephen muses on the phonetic relationship between the two: “Oomb, allwombing tomb” (U 47). However, in a thesis of this scale, I cannot fully explore this motif.
15 Only the Gilbert schema gives “Dialectic” as the “Technic” for this episode. That being said, Stephen himself mentions “Dialectic” in the episode, in reply to John Eglinton’s question, “What useful discovery did Socrates learn from Xanthippe?” (U 182-183). Thus, it seems that “Dialectic” has more of a tie to “Scylla and Charybdis” than many of the schematic elements have to their respective episodes. The Linati schema, on the other hand, lists the “Technic” of “Scylla and Charybdis” as “Whirlpools,” presumably in reference to Homer. I consider this yet another instance of the schemata confusing rather than clarifying the book—“Whirlpools” is a “Technic” tangentially at best—but I leave this particular discrepancy to the reader.
conversation between two people implies two humans with bodies; a conversation in play form implies two actors bringing thought to life. Shakespeare’s character Hamlet becomes flesh in the form of the actor Burbage on the Elizabethan stage, for example, making Hamlet both an idea produced by Shakespeare and a body put on stage by Shakespeare (U 181). Thus, both the content of Stephen’s thesis and the way Stephen’s thesis is presented draw attention to form (and the physicality implied by form) and mind in interaction: art becomes lived and acted, rather than simply dead and entombed. If the library is analogous to a womb, then the physical acting-out of art is akin to a birth.

Notably, the library in “Scylla and Charybdis” generates both the ideas of new art and the enactment of new art. Stephen’s thesis comes into being both theoretically and physically, and theory and physicality are created together, enjoined through the dramatic form. The schematic designation of “Brain” as the “Organ” of “Scylla and Charybdis” emphasizes this interplay between physical and mental while pushing the idea of books as agents to a unique extreme. The brain is an organ which is constantly negotiating the boundary between physical and mental; it is the physical site of thought. “Scylla and Charybdis” is therefore presented as the physical part of Ulysses where the book’s thinking is done, or at least where the boundary between book-body and book-mind is most blurred. In this episode that draws such overt attention to the agency of the book as medium, Ulysses seems to be thinking about itself, and the fact that Ulysses is capable of doing so—that it has gained a “brain” in addition to its book-body, which is autonomous of its author’s body-mind—brings the relationship between the book and the author into question.

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16 For more discussion on this, see Chapter 2.
Stephen’s theory explores the concept of the author as a ghost, but not only in the sense that Shakespeare plays a ghost in *Hamlet*. This ghost is invested in the art the author produces, reproducing a semblance of the author-mind within the work which can be understood as distinct from the live human author. Norris argues that

a larger and intriguingly metafictional point that Stephen’s Hamlet theory has…

made… is to identify James Joyce himself as Stephen’s ghost, as the author whose youthful wounds and lived life inevitably flow into the scene in the

Library, into the character of Stephen, into *Ulysses* as a whole. (16)

In Norris’ view, Joyce is Stephen’s ghost in the sense that Shakespeare is the ghost of Hamlet’s father, and Joyce has also embedded himself and his life into *Ulysses*, thus becoming a ghostly presence within the book. As I have discussed, Stephen envisions books as preservations of a form of the author, and Norris’ argument follows a similar line of reasoning, albeit in different terms.

Intriguingly, Norris describes Shakespeare, Hamlet’s father, and Hamlet as being “fluid incarnations” of one another (15). Norris’ use of the word “fluid” is a bit vague and could imply a wavelike, back-and-forth, wavering boundary between the three. I find the boundary Norris discusses is best imagined not as a wave but as a neural network (since “Scylla and Charybdis” is, after all, a brain). Douglas Hofstadter, a professor of cognitive science specializing in artificial intelligence, has written that “the familiar and stable-seeming fluidlike properties of thought emerge as a statistical consequence of a myriad tiny, invisible, independent, subcognitive acts taking place in parallel” (3). Human thought appears fluid because of many constant tiny firings of neurons, which Hofstadter envisions as “flickering clusters” in reference to “a well-known theory of water according to which H2O molecules continually make fleeting little associations…
if they happen to be passing close enough by each other” (2). In a similar vein, the relationship between Shakespeare, Hamlet, and the ghost of King Hamlet appears fluid only because of a myriad fleeting associations: the small interactions between author and text, each self-aware nod the book gives to itself, builds an apparently “fluid” relationship between text and author. While Hofstadter envisions neurons firing to create thought in a great fluid network, Norris’ phrase evokes a vision of the ever-changing author-text relationship as a similarly fluid set of actions that, in Stephen’s terms, produce “thought”—that is, the meaning contained by the book.

Norris identifies that, in the same way that Stephen shows Shakespeare’s life as part of the creation of Hamlet and part of the work itself, Joyce can be understood as being part of Ulysses in a way that, when set against Hofstadter’s explanation of fluid thinking, resembles the physical, neurological production of thought. Norris’s argument is not entirely new. Stephen has long been understood as a semi-autobiographical young James Joyce, so viewing this character as an authorial intrusion or, in Stephen’s terminology, viewing Joyce as a “ghost” incarnated via Stephen, goes almost without saying. Norris does not limit her conclusion to Stephen alone, however. Joyce is not just Stephen’s ghost, in the same way that Shakespeare is not just the ghost of Hamlet’s father. In Norris’ thinking, Joyce’s authorial ghost is present in “Ulysses as a whole” (16). One could also say that Joyce’s authorial ghost is made flesh through Stephen, at least within the world of Ulysses, or Stephen is made flesh through Joyce outside the bounds of the book; the history between the two is longer than Ulysses alone. Jeri Johnson’s introduction to the Oxford World’s Classics edition of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the Joyce work centering on Stephen’s childhood and adolescence, points out that “when Joyce published the first versions of three stories that, revised, he included in Dubliners, he did so under the pseudonym ‘Stephen Daedalus’” (xiii). The line between author and character is thoroughly
blurred. Although they can and must be viewed as distinct entities, they nevertheless have a fluid, permeable relationship: Joyce is simultaneously Stephen’s ghost and Stephen embodied, both the body-mind producing Stephen and the product of his own body-mind, who is Stephen.

According to the Neoplatonist ideal espoused by AE and even, seemingly, some of Joyce/Stephen’s earlier views, art transcends its human producer; however, *Ulysses* simultaneously emphasizes the presence of its author and the agency of the text. As I discussed in Chapter 2, AE’s artist is a great mind, someone with a deep inner life. This mind produces the work but, in AE’s view, the biography of the author is irrelevant, suggesting that the author himself becomes irrelevant through reaching a sort of Platonic truth of thought. Any critique of art, according to AE, should focus on the ideas contained in the work, and “All the rest is the speculation of schoolboys for schoolboys” (*U* 177). Stephen seems to present a similar idea in *Portrait*, specifically about drama:

The dramatic form is reached when the vitality which has flowed and eddied round each person fills every person with such vital force that he or she assumes a proper and intangible esthetic life. The personality of the artist, at first a cry or a cadence or a mood and then a fluid and lambent narrative, finally refines itself out of existence, impersonalises itself, so to speak. (*P* 180-181)

Here, Stephen argues that the artist’s self—their “personality”—fades gradually (yet actively, “impersonalis[ing] itself”). This implies something akin to AE’s view, in which the artist is a producer of a work but not necessarily involved *in* the work. Roland Barthes’ famous essay, “The Death of the Author” (1967), says something quite similar as well: “literature is… the trap where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that writes.” However, there is a difference between the artist becoming “impersonalized” in Joyce’s terms and the artist
losing “the very identity of [their] body,” and it is in this difference that the implications of Stephen’s argument in *Ulysses*, set against AE’s near-Barthesian disregard for the authorial body, become particularly striking. When the Stephen of *Portrait* remarks that the personality of the artist “refines itself out of existence,” he is not necessarily arguing that the personality of the artist becomes irrelevant or that the artist’s bodily experiences ought to be disregarded; instead, he implies something similar to the author-ghost I have been discussing. In *Ulysses*’s terms, the personality of the artist, by going “out of existence,” becomes a ghost. Let us return to Stephen’s definition of a ghost: “One who has faded into impalpability through death, through absence, through change of manners” (*U* 180). That which fades from existence falls into the category of a ghost through absence and, paradoxically, ghosts do actually exist in some sense. The artist may have “impersonalized” themselves, but they have not wholly erased themselves; rather than the irrelevance of the author that AE’s or Barthes’ arguments imply, the author is instead reconstructed within the work as a ghost of himself, or many ghosts, in fluid relation with the entire text.

In fact, Stephen’s stance in *Portrait* seems to be a rough draft of what he describes in *Ulysses*. In the same passage of *Portrait* I have just discussed, Stephen summarizes the role of the artist: “The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails” (*P* 181). This is perhaps a loftier view of the artist than the one Stephen presents in *Ulysses*. Like AE, young Stephen views the artist as akin to a god rather than emphasizing the artist’s humanity and physicality; however, the paradoxical existence yet lack of existence that Stephen describes in *Portrait* is just what the author-ghost of *Ulysses* represents. Furthermore, in *Ulysses*, the “indifferent” artist of *Portrait* seems to have grown into an artist who is not only human and
physical but who is incapable of a god’s indifference. The artist becomes a new form of themselves, moves on from their work, perhaps completely changes their mind without discrediting their previous assertions, and in turn, the work in some sense becomes detached from the author, but the two remain imprinted upon one another even after they part ways. The artist owes no attachment to prior works and is in that sense “indifferent” but is at the same time invested, so invested that they must always be “within or behind or beyond” the work.

At the same time, we must keep in mind that *Ulysses* is not entirely under the author’s control. This is true of any book. As I have discussed, books gain agency upon publication through their power to prompt new work and discussion, and the modes by which art is interpreted and reinterpreted are generally out of the artist’s control. However, Joyce is particularly aware of his own limited power. In a letter to Herbert Gorman, Joyce reportedly describes a dream in which his character Molly Bloom rejects her author with the words: “And I have done with you, too, Mr. Joyce,” suggesting that Joyce felt a certain anxiety that his own art was getting away from him (qtd. in Whittier-Ferguson 73). At the same time, Joyce constructs *Ulysses* as an easily adulterated text, as if encouraging the book’s growth independent of its author. The schemata, which Joyce initially drafted but which he immediately handed over to others for interpretation, are one such independence-encouraging feature. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the schemata are simultaneously a part of *Ulysses* and separate documents, with authorship that is only partially shared and a long history of revision and reinterpretation. The relationship between the schemata and *Ulysses* is not something over which Joyce had full control; much of the schemata’s importance to the book lies in the emphasis that readers and scholars have placed on them over the years, an emphasis that has fluctuated. By sending his
little “schemes” out to a few friends, Joyce invited other people to interpret his book while simultaneously supplying more documents to discuss, fueling the interpretative fire.

“Scylla and Charybdis” presents a view of the book and the author as simultaneously independent and interdependent. While Barthes and other later twentieth century theorists emphasize the text over the author, “Scylla and Charybdis” and, by extension, *Ulysses* takes a view of the text-author relationship as fluid. At some moments, text and author are inextricably linked: the author at the moment of writing is forever preserved in the work. Simultaneously, text and author diverge at certain points: the author grows, changes, and leaves behind only a ghost of their former self, while the book takes on a life of its own, both as an adulterated text and as the parent of new texts. In this way, the book, organism-like, grows and changes independently of its author, with agency—a “mind,” if you will—of its own. The book has a “will,” the ability to prompt new productions, as well as the ability to drive its own growth and change via external interpretation, but furthermore, as Joyce’s dream of Molly Bloom shows, the book itself can be envisioned as seeking its own freedom and insisting upon a certain distance between itself and the author. Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 2, everything that is woven and unwoven may be created and recreated by any number of things: “mother Dana,” a god, a parent, even a whole society goes into the original creation of a work as well as the continuous recreation of a work, so in a sense, *Ulysses* was never wholly Joyce’s doing to begin with. *Ulysses* is Ireland’s book, or Dana’s, or many other creators’, as much as it is Joyce’s. As “Scylla and Charybdis” comes to a close, Stephen reaches a similar conclusion, seeming to relinquish his thesis with the thought: “Cease to strive” (*U* 209). Stephen, like Joyce and like all authors, is unable to hold onto his work for any longer than the time it takes to create it. He has released his thesis into the world, and now he must cease to “strive,” meaning both “To contend, carry on a conflict of any kind”
(as in, cease carrying on his conflict with AE and the others, a conflict that has directly led to the production of the thesis) and “To struggle” with or against (as he ceases to struggle to maintain authorial control over his thesis) (“strive, v.”). The time has come for him to let go of the circumstances which gave rise to the thesis, move on, and become a new person, just as his thesis is left to the readers of “Scylla and Charybdis” to be interpreted and as the thesis itself, in a sense, relinquishes him in return.
Conclusion

Yea, from the table of my memory
I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
That youth and observation copied there,
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain
—Hamlet, Act I, Scene V, ll. 99-104

In the context of “Scylla and Charybdis,” the epigraph of this conclusion, taken from Prince Hamlet’s speech in response to the appearance of his father’s ghost, becomes an ironic reversal of Joyce’s episode. Hamlet, having been asked by his father to remember him, vows not only to remember King Hamlet but to forget all else, inscribing only the ghost’s will upon the “book and volume” of his brain. If Hamlet’s brain is indeed a book, then he has promised what we have seen to be impossible: that he should remember his creator and forget the “trivial” content of the past. As much as “Scylla and Charybdis” builds upon and plays off Hamlet, it also reverses the play: rather than a brain becoming a book, a book takes on a brain, and rather than a character vowing to remember his paternal (author) ghost, in Ulysses, the ghost is continually shrugged off, only to be picked up again, and collective cultural memories are kept, played with, even ingrained upon the book-body. Although the Gilbert schema as published in my Oxford edition of Ulysses lists Stephen as corresponding to Hamlet in the very first episode (see fig. 2), it seems that, by “Scylla and Charybdis,” Stephen has abandoned the loyalty to the father so characteristic of Hamlet—perhaps in a first step toward becoming the parent of a text himself.

This thesis seeks to prove that analogizing Ulysses as a bodied organism gives an incomplete view of the complexity of the text. By instead viewing the text as a body-mind, it becomes possible to see how authorship, text, and book-body interrelate. As Chapter 1 explored, the complex relationship Ulysses has with its author (or, if one includes those who published
and/or revised the schemata, authors) has shaped the physical forms the book takes. In Chapter 2, I discussed how the text of “Scylla and Charybdis” responds to and complicates questions of what a book and what an author can be, and, in Chapter 3, I argued that text and book-body together inform questions of authorship just as one’s readings of these aspects of *Ulysses* are informed by such questions. As many others have said, the complexity and strangeness of *Ulysses* makes the book seem like a living organism, but I assert that to use “organism” in such an analogy as only representative of a body is to deny the agency of the inhuman being, even when that inhuman being is in fact a physical object.

Furthermore, I hope that this thesis may complicate somewhat the discussions of the inhuman and of distributed agency in modernist studies at present. The September 2016 special issue of *Modernism/modernity* includes an introduction by Aaron Jaffe, who dwells heavily upon “the problem of modernity, the problem of too much information” (505). For Jaffe, the perpetual problem of modernism is a question of scale: what to do when trying to encompass vast expanses of time, or vast amounts of information: what to do when confronted by the constant onslaught of things allowed for by developing technologies. Jaffe tends to look at the modernist view of the “impossible whole” somewhat bleakly; the inability to see the forest for the trees, so to speak, is presented as a continual frustration and a source of collective anxiety (509). Readers of Joyce, I think, would probably agree that, rather than worry himself over this particular issue, Joyce seems to embrace it. If one were to view *Ulysses* itself as a tiny “impossible whole,” for example, the unifying structure of which has been a confounding question for many years, one might note that the shape and structure of the book does indeed often become confounded in the reader’s mind by the sheer overload of minutiae, and while I have attempted to clarify some of the framework of the book through my body-mind analogy, a thesis of this scale could not hope
to be more than a small gesture toward a comprehensive understanding of the complete book, whatever that is taken to mean.

Jaffe is correct to assert that scale, and the difficulty of impossibly large and complex wholes, is a question addressed in modernist texts, but his discussion of this facet of the inhuman in modernism, and particularly the way he links this issue to the tentacles of Cthulhu, suggests that the inhuman is somehow universally approached by modernists as alien, intrusive, and utterly unsettling. Yes, “probing, [being] probed by, and [being] propelled through an endless ooze of immaterial information” can be daunting but, at the same time, I would like to suggest that the endless connectivity can be quite beautiful, even necessary (Jaffe 509). “Scylla and Charybdis” makes this case in asserting that the artist alone is not responsible for art: art grows, adapts, and changes as new information is fed in by new critics and readers, art accepts new connections like synapses forming in a great brain, and art would not be possible without the constantly forged and reforged connections between people and the inhuman spaces and objects they encounter. For Joyce, the breakdown of the self-subject into constantly renegotiated and redistributed networks of agency is not a looming Cthulhu but an opportunity for creation and recreation.

Let us return to the title of this thesis, “Molecules all change,” which is taken from “Scylla and Charybdis” (U 182). This phrase is in many ways the key to how Joyce envisions questions of identity, mutability, and blurred boundaries. If molecules do indeed all change eventually, then there is no permanent “I,” no definitive boundary between the self and the other, no absolute body/mind binary, only constantly formed and reformed permutations of matter. As this thesis has shown, memory is a unifying factor, that which guards us against the complete loss of identity in the face of a boundless, constantly shifting universe. However, memory, like a
schema, is simply a way of organizing: an index of forms, which implies a link, but not an essential sameness, among those forms. That is, forms can be indexed in different orders or combinations with a different result and will still be an index of forms, linked through a logical organization into a “whole.” *Ulysses* embraces this inability to define the whole with its shifting forms and its many-versioned schemata. It is therefore unsurprising that the organism-like qualities of *Ulysses* are difficult to define. By viewing the text as a body-mind, I have at least been able to account for the interplay between the text as agent and the text as book-body, and by viewing the author as body-mind, I have been able to describe more precisely how details of the author’s physical existence permeate their apparently mental productions, but even this more complete analogy can only go so far. “Body-mind,” after all, also implies a closed-off system, a complete self that is, in *Ulysses*, more myth than reality. “Molecules all change” says, succinctly, what I have spent many pages trying to say: that in Joyce, everything and everyone is subject to change, reformation, and (re)connection. This attitude insists upon the mutability of identity, both of humans and of inhuman agents or objects, in a way that is not simply anxious but hopeful and exploratory. Whereas mysticism and other transcendental movements may focus on the interconnectivity of human souls, Joyce’s emphasis on the recreation of physical as well as spiritual identity shows that agents may share much more, down to their base molecular being, and that connectedness brings with it the possibility for production and life.
Works Consulted


