

Observations on an Economic Mind:

What Crusoe Can Reveal About Models of Consciousness

by

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Abstract

In Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, a Seventeenth century man sets to sea with restless motivations, and finds himself marooned on an island. Crusoe's impulse to categorize and accumulate amid the varying environments of the island presents a unique series of moments which can be used to explore Crusoe's mental processes. His views of the landscape, the caution he brings to every interpersonal encounter, and his reactions to the unexpected each open his character to an emotional and cognitive analysis.

By beginning with Ian Watt's foundational description of Crusoe as an economic individual and continuing with some of his scholarly disciples as well as contemporary cognitive theorists, a theoretical structure is created that draws out the implied emotional and cognitive assertions made by each. By taking methods from cognitive theory and applying them closely to moments of prose, commonly discussed traits of Crusoe's, such as his blindness to aesthetics, can be described in the context of a character who embodies the economic individual. I claim that Crusoe is a character who has traded many other pleasures and interests for his focus on economic gain, and these character traits can now be seen to interrupt or shape his consciousness in specific moments. With slow analysis of the text, one is able to see where Crusoe's perception skips over subtle and sometimes significant features of his environment and economically categorizes the wilderness in lieu of viewing it as a tree-spotted hill or a fully-described field.

Close reading, alongside Thomas Metzinger's model of consciousness as a set of sensations arranged into a world-model, play a large part in building evidence for how Crusoe's mind works. By continuing to examine Crusoe's cognitive life throughout the novel, it can be seen that his mind sometimes reacts to the world in troubling and unexpected ways. These moments present challenging questions about how limited his consciousness may be, and what may have shaped its boundaries. The answer to these questions lies in building on Watt's broad analysis of Crusoe with Metzinger's directing insight. Ultimately, we see an individual severely constrained by economic interests and terminally constricted within a view of the world that is literally cut only to fit these ends. In light of this, *Robinson Crusoe* reveals a hidden darkness; it is a cautionary tale of a man who lives his entire life under the dusky occlusion of his own pragmatism, severed from a never breached, and more comprehensive world experience.

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1. Introduction

Robinson Crusoe represents one of the first portrayals of a modern individual in literature. The way he works, plays, enjoys and reflects upon his experience embodies the values of modern individualism. We can gain insight into how his mind works with recent cognitive literary theory, and we can see reflections of a contemporary mind in how he thinks. These qualities and those of his narrative make him an ideal target for cognitive literary analysis.

The purpose of this essay is to use cognitive theory to examine Crusoe through ideas about consciousness that explain how the mind works and how it is portrayed in literature. These theories and the models they develop are used by scholars to explain moments of perception, cognition, and emotion in light of recent advances in cognitive science. These models, with some variations, can explain complicated moments in literature by referring to the underlying cognitive function of a person in the given situation.

At the same time, scholars in this field, such as Liza Zunshine, suggest that recent shifts in education and intellectual life have changed the nature of consciousness and the cognitive life of the individual. According to Zunshine, what's called the "cognitive environment" exists in a larger environment that involves education and the exchange of information. With this idea, a person's conceptions of the world around him or her can alter the nature of consciousness by altering or flavoring the cognitive environment.

A cognitive life and consciousness that is susceptible to change seems likely to be vulnerable to more than just the controllable changes that can occur in the education of a person. By following questions alluded to in current cognitive theory and models, I propose that consciousness in literature exhibits more plasticity and a greater number of elements than is typically discussed. Beyond the intellectual or more data-centered aspects of the mind, such as knowledge and memory, lie the emotional life and its impact upon consciousness. Emotions, even momentary ones, can play as big a role in shaping consciousness as knowledge and education can. Moments of duress in *Robinson Crusoe* exhibit the impact of extreme stress or joy on Crusoe's conscious mind.

Robinson Crusoe is the ideal novel to use to examine this cognitive environment and its elements, because Crusoe and his consciousness are at the intersection of so many social, economic, and personal forces. At moments, he is isolated or thrown into unexpected social situations. He retreats from these difficulties or governs the chaos around him to survive. Throughout his adventures, he experiences his world and his mind in a distinct way that raises difficult questions about how his cognitive life and consciousness work. His character and story have been visited by many scholars, and his tale presents much evidence that is useful in the cognitive literary discussion.

In the first chapter, I will examine the scholars relevant to this discussion who have worked with *Robinson Crusoe*. They cover area amongst more traditional Marxist theory, object theory, and recent cognitive literary theory. This first chapter

lays down the initial web of ideas and relates them to each other enough for later expansion. In the second chapter, I will introduce cognitive thinkers and scholars who shed light upon the argument while outlining a system to think about the consciousness. These cognitive thinkers are not strictly literary scholars, and their ideas complicate claims made within literary scholarship. The system outlined in this section is central to the argument, and it will directly or indirectly develop most of the ideas discussed in this paper. In the third chapter, I'll bring these ideas directly to the text and show the details and specifics of Crusoe's cognitive life. Carefully, we will look at each of his lived moments, and see how elements of his consciousness, both intellectual and emotional, come to shape what he sees and experiences. As Crusoe journeys through his world, so, too, will we stroll beside, and examine his thoughts and actions from our privileged perspective.

2. Review of Criticism

Robinson Crusoe is the story of a young and enterprising man who goes to sea driven by a set of goals and an excess of restlessness. He adventures through and survives the world he finds, and eventually becomes stranded on an island where he must draw on his own ability to build, to work, and to organize the world around him. This survival experience opens up an interesting window into his mind, and allows a reader to see an inner environment shaped by drives and circumstances. As Crusoe does what he needs to do, we see his experience emerge with a unique clarity.

Crusoe's individualistic self-reliance and productivity is a source of pride and strength, and these characteristics become primary attributes of his identity: "When I had gone through this work, I was extremely delighted with it" (Defoe 138), Crusoe comments as he beholds his own production, with words that echo many others in the book. Literary scholar Ian Watt, in a still often-referenced chapter on *Robinson Crusoe*, describes economic individualism as interdependent with other elements of life: "The primacy of individual economic advantage has tended to diminish the importance of personal as well as group relationships, and especially of those based on sex;" (Watt 66). Watt goes on to link this effect to more than just relationships: "The same devaluation of non-economic factors can be seen in Crusoe's other personal relationships. He treats them all in terms of their commodity value" (Watt 68). In Watt's view, economic individualism is an altering force which by its presence affects the substance of other experiences in the economic individual's life, and leaves this individual focused on and attached to his economic agency. I argue

that this focus is part of a deeper cognitive life, and that these economic priorities affect elements beyond external life. Watt goes on to describe Crusoe's closest relationships, and notes their economic nature, and then relates these elements back to the Protestant Christian elements of religious life, which emphasized the importance of labor and individual reflection, both characteristics which Crusoe repeatedly displays. *Robinson Crusoe*, Watt argues, is a novel which so extremely highlighted solitude, that novels afterward responded by more substantially exploring human relations and interactions (Watt 92). By looking at Crusoe's mind we can examine this solitude, and how Crusoe builds his own world in the absence of other people.

Literary critic Nancy Armstrong describes the emergence of the modern individualistic subject and the novel as being tightly related. In her book *How Novels Think; The Limits of Individualism from 1719-1900* Armstrong suggests that "the history of the novel and the history of the modern subject are, quite literally, one and the same" (Armstrong 3). In other words, the evolution of the novel is the evolution of individualism. So as Watt describes the rise of economic individualism, Armstrong describes the literary genre that embodies it. Armstrong posits that some of the characteristics of the novel arise from a need for authors to find a reason for the protagonist to embark on an individual, unconventional path (Armstrong 4). Watt's description of economic individualism implies a ready reason for this: individual economic gain emphasizes the "autonomy of the individual" (Watt 60). For Armstrong, the individual must integrate lessons and information, which then form the matured identity of the protagonist, which, Armstrong says, is

acquired through the bourgeois system of morals. This set of morals becomes a defining aspect of identity for Crusoe as a "misfit" protagonist (Armstrong 28). As a misfit, Crusoe finds in himself an "acute dissatisfaction with his [...] assigned position in the social world" (Armstrong 4). This is a characteristic which seems in line with Watt's idea that individualism emphasizes the autonomy of the individual, an emphasis which would drive some to seize something outside of their day-to-day experiences.

In her article "Crusoe's Misfit Things," Lynn Festa describes "heterogeneity," or the separation of humanity from the world by an act of language. Language relates to objects by attempting to appropriate them or by rejecting them if they do not obey the "wish of language" to describe (Festa 449). According to Festa, within this setting, Crusoe himself, as subject, does not seem to possess definite physical boundaries. Festa complicates this relationship by introducing a quote from David Marshall alongside her own ideas: "'compulsive autobiographical acts'—the 'accounts, journals, calendars, self-inscriptions, names called out by disembodied voices, and repeated representations and reflections of the self'—repeatedly prize the narrative from Crusoe's subjective stranglehold" (Marshall 75). The multiplication of accounts and of media—as well as the division of Crusoe into once and future narrators—converts the subject Crusoe into the object of description, recording the experiences undergone by 'my self' through devices and perspectives not fully his own" (Festa 465-466).

To Festa, the structure of *Robinson Crusoe* is complicated enough to constantly separate him from the present moment, forcing him to describe himself in these other acts. Festa invokes Frankfurt school theorist Georg Lukacs to elaborate on this: "The loss of the organic wholeness of the world of epic structures the relation of subject to object in the novel, as the hero must endlessly seek to overcome the hiatus between the immanent meaning of life and outer reality. Indeed, it is this hiatus or estrangement between the hero and his world that makes the individual subject possible" (Festa 445). To Festa, this prototypical economic man seems to lose his subjectivity in his attempts to record his existence. Ultimately, Festa sees these ideas as evidence that Crusoe, and humans, can manage to see the world without the clouding lens of subjectivity. I would instead argue that what Crusoe achieves is a different kind of cloudiness, with its own set of qualities.

Jonathan Kramnick is a cognitive literary scholar who also writes on object theory. In his article "Empiricism, Cognitive Science, and the Novel" he explains the congruency between Enlightenment-era representational and intentional conceptions of the mind and modern day cognitive science. He differentiates between the two, and highlights modern cognitive science's straightforward characteristics. Kramnick separates these two fields to dismiss and redefine the academic debate, a move which takes its motivation for new precedence from the revelatory nature of modern cognitive theory.

Kramnick describes Enlightenment-era empiricism as having baggage leftover from its "epistemic commitments." Kramnick continues to take apart older,

more conventional conceptions of mind until he can discuss the interior life in the same way that one would discuss the exterior, "In taking account of a person's actions, we ought to infer backward to some prior mental state in which that person stood in relation to an internal object in roughly the same manner that one stands before a thing one sees" (Kramnick 269). Using a similar concept, Kramnick relates emotions to an act of social communication where one person simulates and attempts to read another's inner state. If we consider Crusoe and how he interacts with the people he does meet, it is interesting to ask whether or not Crusoe is successful at reading those around him.

At one point in the essay, Kramnick paraphrases, in modern language, Adam Smith's description of seeing another's pain, "Smith's opening move is strangely familiar: mental states are by their nature perceivable only through some sort of inferential stance. Even if our brother is on the rack, we come by our sense of his thoughts indirectly, and even then it will only be a simulation generated by taking our system off-line and replicating his predicament in our mind" (Kramnick 277). Kramnick, as a matter of habit, scatters distinctly modern day wording in his articles, perhaps to his own disservice. His technological word-choice gives the impression that this instance of sympathy involves a complete turning off of one's own mind in order to attempt to perceive the experiences of another, when it is only one of many possible mental actions that may interfere with other cognitive processes without totally occluding them. In other words, this simulation may exist simultaneously with other actions in the mind. As we witness Crusoe attempting to read the mental states of those around him, we may see different processes at play

that what Kramnick presents here. Crusoe, at times, applies motives to other people that seem to not fully consider their situation or even their behavior. By examining how truly Crusoe can be described with a model like Kramnick's, we can pose new questions about the nature of Crusoe's cognitive environment.

Kramnick eventually relates the faculties of the mind back to the act of reading, as if reading a novel is an act similar to reading another person, and he, with an amount of elegance, sets his argument back within historical terms by relating the faculty of novel reading to the need of people to read each other's expressions in daily life.

The field of cognitive literary theory seeks to describe Eighteenth century literature through models of consciousness developed using cognitive science. This field of theory is useful for connecting aspects of Crusoe's economic individualism to an inner life that derives its aspects from various sources. Literary scholar Patrick Colm Hogan, in his article introducing a collection of cognitive criticism, "Literary Universals: Ideology and Universalism," contextualizes his ideas with a reference to linguist Noam Chomsky, "As Chomsky has emphasized one of the first tasks for researchers who study universals is to overcome habituation and to recognize how surprising universals are. We often 'lose sight of the need for explanation when phenomena are too familiar and 'obvious' (Language and Mind, 25)" (Hogan 37). Hogan references a scholar as prominent as Chomsky to relate his ideas to the perennial academic need to re-envision creatively a field, much as Chomsky's work in linguistics did in his time.

By bringing up Chomsky's name, Hogan is trying to place his literary theoretical task alongside ideas about the structure of the mind and open the door to writing and thinking with other disciplines. Hogan discusses literature within a "universalist" framework: describing literature through broad structural patterns and noting literary aspects that transcend cultures. By doing so, Hogan unites the ideas of cognitive theory with an egalitarian or relativistic impulse to view all cultures similarly. Hogan's unique writing style and his article's content seem to reveal an impulse within cognitive literary theory to appropriate ideas from other fields, which implies a need for cognitive theory to remedy some flaws in its own field by seeking new directions. These new directions may not require outside material, but rather just a consideration of the ideas already present in models of consciousness.

Cognitive literary theory continues along other paths in the writing of Lisa Zunshine. She describes "Theory of Mind" and how history and evolution have required humans to have a mind capable of discerning the internal states and intentions of others based on their outward expressions and behaviors (Zunshine 117). To Zunshine, novels frequently show characters attempting to infer the thoughts and inner states of other characters, but these attempts typically fail. According to Zunshine, the human body has become a "text" due to our evolutionary need to interpret the inner states of others through external hints. She analyzes novels and theater and the different ways that they handle these acts of interpretation and how characters deceive or display their inner states. According to Zunshine, theater creates a larger and more immediate area where the deceit of

attempted interpretation can be explored. Due to this, Zunshine argues, "... perhaps it is not a coincidence that when a novel endeavors to construct a continuum of embodied transparency, it turns to theater" (132). According to Zunshine, novels frequently use language borrowed from theater to describe the external deceit of characters who want to obfuscate others' interpretation of their motives. Zunshine closes her article with an observation about the alliance between the Theory of Mind and cultural studies: "both fields want to know why and how bodies perform minds" (133).

These theorists together help introduce us to thinking about Crusoe as an economic individual functioning cognitively. The relative newness of cognitive theory means that it is still grappling to find an interdisciplinary stance on either side of a blurry line between literature and cognitive science. Many of these scholars work at various points alongside that line, and nobody yet can describe the scientific or literary tendencies of the field as a whole, so that different scholars admit some cognitive scientific ideas while excluding others. What is needed is an examination of current theory which considers that although recent scientific findings give us an ability to see a picture of the mind, they also present a new set of conceptual problems and pitfalls. Work, in such a new field with so much new information, must inevitably start at a specific point and move forward, but what is implied by this academic path must be sorted through and understood.

3. Methodology

In his book of experimental cognitive theory, *The Ego Tunnel*, German philosopher Thomas Metzinger lays out a description of human consciousness that he calls the "Ego Tunnel." Human consciousness, he claims, is a system in place, "to allow a biological organism to consciously conceive of itself (and others) as a whole" (Metzinger 4). He continues this description, expanding it to encompass more of the experience of consciousness; "Whenever our brains successfully pursue the ingenious strategy of creating a unified and dynamic inner portrait of reality, we become conscious. First, our brains generate a world-simulation, so perfect that we do not recognize it as an image in our minds. This image includes not only our body and our psychological states, but also our relationship to the past and the future, as well as to other conscious beings" (7).

Metzinger most eloquently expresses the result of this idea, and the relationship thusly, "By placing the self-model within the world-model, a center is created" (Metzinger 7). From this model, Metzinger eventually admits that this system can be affected over time: "Many deep forms of conscious self-experience have become all but impossible due to a philosophical enlightenment and the rise of science and technology -- at least for the many millions of well-educated, scientifically-informed people. Theories change social practice, and practice eventually changes brains, the way we perceive the world" (17). He articulates this process more clearly later: "The more aspects of subjective experience we can explain in a hardheaded, materialistic manner, the more our view of what the self-organizing physical universe itself is will change" (40). What Metzinger is claiming

is that changes in intellect and knowledge over time can alter the system which organizes our universe for us. Ideas can shape our perception of the world.

Since the "Ego Tunnel" is a system which totally describes consciousness, and describes more than just the intellectual aspect of consciousness, it can be assumed that emotional, cultural, and social changes could also affect how the "Ego Tunnel" works. This effect is implied in another moment of Metzinger's theory:

"Consciousness is also not a unitary phenomenon but has many discernible aspects: memory, attention, feelings, the perception of color, self-awareness, and higher-order thought. Nevertheless, the essence of the phenomenon -- what I call the appearance of a world -- seems to be preserved throughout" (Metzinger 19). So consciousness is "preserved throughout" but also vulnerable to being affected by ideas, or by the "higher-order thought" that Metzinger mentions here. Since he suggests that thought can affect consciousness, he is implying that these other mentioned elements of its composition, especially feelings and attention, can also affect it. Thus, anything which would affect the function of the individual elements could also affect consciousness. Following this idea further, it seems that the environment, or culture, that shapes these feelings and this attention can almost directly impact consciousness.

It is interesting to consider this impact when reflecting on a description of individualism and capitalism in a chapter by Ian Watt on *Robinson Crusoe*, "The hypostasis of the economic motive logically entails a devaluation of other modes of thought, feeling and action: the various forms of traditional group relationship, the

family, the guild, the village, the sense of nationality -- all are weakened, and so, too, are the competing claims of non-economic individual achievement and enjoyment, ranging from spiritual salvation to the pleasures of recreation" (Watt 64). So, there is a reprioritizing of values and pleasures. What was once enjoyable or important is no longer so, and instead economic individualism replaces these, weakening ties to other activities and social institutions. Watt's quote is a description, too, of an altered emotional life. What was important before is now relegated to secondary status, and loses emotional potency and immediacy.

This reshaped emotional life described by Ian Watt's shift would have an effect on Metzinger's "Ego Tunnel" view of consciousness. New "hard-headed, materialistic" ideas of economic individualism would reshape consciousness, but so would a life, outside of these ideas, centered on individual economic gain. Consciousness would still be "preserved throughout," but as consciousness is defined as the "self-model within the world-model" it could retain this description while taking widely different shapes. As individual economic gain displaces the priority of other activities and institutions in the individual's life, it is also changing their place in the consciousness, and thus shifting consciousness's "discernible aspects." This change creates a vastly different shape to the consciousness, where the "essence of the phenomenon" of consciousness is an element that remains unaltered, but which composes only a portion of the whole phenomenon.

Considering this model of the consciousness, it is interesting to take Crusoe's first few actions on the island and question what these actions actually represent. As he first lands ashore and must take care of himself, he must necessarily gather the

supplies which will keep him alive. So, as Crusoe writes, of his second day of the island as, "From the 1st of October to the 24th. All these days entirely spent in many several voyages to get all I could out of the ship, which I brought on shore, every tide of flood, upon rafts" (Defoe 87). We naturally question to what extent a man can land on an island and almost immediately decide to spend three and a half weeks doing hard labor. But a question that also arises from this journal entry, is to what extent Crusoe's necessity to acquire and his enjoyment of material gain occupy his consciousness to the exclusion of all else? Surely he had moments of rest during this period of time, but to what extent was the task of gathering the sole object of his world and consciousness during this time? To what extent does the immediate state of his mind mimic, individually, the larger tendency that Watt describes to focus on economic gain to the diminishment of all else, and how does this impact his consciousness?

In an article entitled "On Being Moved," Patrick Colm Hogan works to reconcile conventional theories of emotion and thought, or, "'classical' cognitivist analyses" with modern ideas of cognitive theory. In this argument, he also addresses the relationship between thought and feeling. To this end, Hogan examines a Hindi film called "The Truth" and applies the ideas of psychologist John Bowlby's attachment theory to the film. Hogan summarizes "The Truth," and it relays the story of a girl who behaves unexpectedly at the sight of a funeral procession. In Hogan's article the story serves as an example of how people can show emotional diversity, or how they can act and feel very differently from how someone else would expect them to. Hogan explains that the girl is part of a family of undertakers,

and each time a funeral procession passes, she dances, much to the confusion of other people in the community (Hogan 252).

Hogan uses this film to describe the differences between attachment theory and emotional memory as methods to understand emotion (Hogan 252). Why does the girl dance when a funeral goes by? Can cognitive theory explain her behavior and emotions? As part of his argument, Hogan equivocates the emotional forms or types that attachment theory describes to the specific emotional responses of the girl in the film. Hogan states, "The [emotional] styles result primarily from different sorts of experiences in a critical period in early childhood" (250), or attachment theory determines how a person will respond emotionally due to experiences in this "critical period." Hogan seems to confuse the nature of these critical period experiences and the results. Hogan argues by saying that, if critical periods played a role in forming emotion, "We would also expect cultures to converge on inferences to connections between corpses and disease, inferences that recruit disgusting imaginations and emotional memories" (253). In other words, if critical periods were important, then cultures would exhibit remarkably similar and largely homogenous responses to common situations. Hogan builds this assumption on how he understands attachment theory and critical periods.

Bowlby's ideas are clarified by his disciple Inge Bretherton, who describes the formation of emotions in attachment theory as follows, "These component responses (among them sucking, clinging, and following, as well as the signaling behaviors of smiling and crying) mature relatively independently during the first year of life and become increasingly integrated and focused on a mother figure

during the second 6 months. Bowlby saw clinging and following as possibly more important for attachment than sucking and crying" (Bretherton; Developmental Psychology 765). As we can gather from Bretherton's words, the critical period of attachment theory is in very early childhood, and the experiences and behaviors described are primal, physical nurturing experiences that determine "attachment," or the quality and durability of long-term relationships; the theory does not venture to describe beyond this. Yet Hogan applies this theory as follows: "Suppose that disgust at corpses is not innate but rather the result of critical-period experiences. If this is the case, we would expect several things. First, we would expect that children will not acquire that disgust if they are raised in contexts where caregivers do not exhibit disgust at corpses" (Hogan 253). Attachment theory is not concerned with how children are taught behaviors during critical periods, but is rather about how early parenting establishes emotional structures and patterns that do not prescribe specific behaviors or taboos later.

Hogan's ideas of emotional memory, and his focus on their role in the instruction of emotion, also isolate the development of emotions from the comprehensive (not-directly-taught) characteristics of a culture. If emotions develop from emotional memories, then there would be little connection between the larger conditions of a population or civilization and the emotional life of an individual. What would matter instead would be certain moments and associated emotions that occurred at some point in a person's early life. What would not matter would be the more complicated conditions and interactions which contextualized and permeated these moments. Emotional nuances, the nature of relationships, and

cultural factors would become superfluous in Hogan's reasoning. With Hogan's idea, it would be difficult to argue that a phenomenon such as economic individualism even arose or that it affected social priorities as Watt described. Outside factors could not affect individuals or groups of individuals. With Hogan's reasoning, economic individualism could only instead exist as the cumulative, coincidental result of millions of people who happened to form serendipitously emotional memories that set the economic motive as a priority, instead of as a cultural shift which impacted this group of individuals.

The reason that I point out this inconsistency in Hogan's work is not to try to definitively challenge his idea, but rather to show that it ignores parts of attachment theory and other ways of looking at the mind that respect the role of emotion in cognition. Metzinger, like Hogan, insists that a cognitive and intellectual segment of the mind, in Hogan represented by memory being required for emotion, be given precedence in affecting consciousness, while other elements of the mind are prioritized behind this primary aspect. Attachment theory proposes a less specific set of emotional structures and processes that can broadly explain personality. Recall again how Metzinger describes a consciousness that has separate aspects: "memory, attention, feelings, the perception of color, self-awareness, and higher-order thought. Nevertheless, the essence of the phenomenon -- what I call the appearance of a world -- seems to be preserved throughout" (Metzinger 19). Metzinger is also saying that consciousness exists separately from or above these other elements. Were we to consider that the other elements may relate and interact on equal footing with ideas when determining consciousness, then we could

describe consciousness in a fashion that integrates these elements as significant aspects, aspects which shape it just as how new ideas might.

Lisa Zunshine introduces a hypothetical example of cognitive theory that allows us both to consider how reading affects the mind, and how reading can be used as a tool to impact others: "To use a well-known example, consider a child born into a culture built around reading. Her brain has to undergo a particular mutually contingent adjustment of several cognitive systems not required of the brain of a child born into a nonreading culture. Moreover, having learned to read will eventually enable her to affect the world around her in a variety of ways -- for example, by publishing a poem, starting a new blog, or inventing a new computer game -- which will, in turn, create a slightly different cognitive environment for other entering readers" (Zunshine 62). Zunshine ties the possible impacts of a culture on the child to reading, as it is a way to exchange ideas, and Zunshine believes, like Metzinger, that ideas can significantly alter the cognitive environment. If the cognitively-described mind is composed of various elements, then there is more that the mind can "read" than just the ideas of a poem or blog, there will be emotional, attentional, and other characteristics to the relationship between mind, media, and culture that reach beyond the intake of ideas.

This act of "reading" extends beyond poetry and blogs in the world of Zunshine's hypothetical child. There is the reading that the child does to discern her relationship to others in the world, measuring the nature and qualities of relationships and finding role models. She reconciles her own ideas with the ideas of others and the expectations placed upon her, selecting and discarding these ideas

based upon a prevailing culture or set of values. She may use her ideas to decide to develop an entire identity or merely adorn a social networking page and approximate an identity. Many of these decisions may depend upon whether economic individualism or another social form is dominant in her society.

To use words closer to Watt's, there are factors that would affect the emotional potency and priority of her poem and other elements in her world. And as we consider the emotional quality of these poems for Zunshine's child, we can again also consider how this question may be affected if she herself prioritizes economic gain before other pursuits, and with Metzinger in mind, also picture how the poetry may fit into the multi-layered model of the mind, so that as this child writes her blog and her poetry, we can see that the writings she produces may impact her and those around her on different levels and in different ways, dependent upon elements of their consciousnesses, or upon the potency and priority of poetry in their lives. So, she may affect the cognitive environments of those around her in subtle or complicated ways. In other words, how these poems impact the cognitive environment of those around her may vary with how the culture allows the poems to be interacted with, culture being a social environment which can influence the economically individualistic tendencies of an individual and thus influence the potency and priority of different elements in the child's daily environment. The poetry and its effect may be impacted as the economic motive would, "logically [entail] a devaluation of other modes of thought, feeling and action" (Watt 64).

What is explicitly stated in this last quote from Watt is that the economic motive and economic individualism devalue feeling, and thus if feeling is considered as an element of consciousness as is mentioned in Metzinger, then consciousness is being altered by this devaluation. Similarly, "other modes of thought" are being devalued, meaning that the cognitive environment as described by Zunshine is being altered by the prominence or presence of economic individualism in a society. Ideas that were at one time valued are no longer so in the presence of economic individualism.

In comparison to the protagonist of the film "The Truth," and the hypothetical child in Zunshine's example, Crusoe's behavior is taken out of the environment of his society, and revealed in the unexpected solitude of the island. His work and reflections give us a glimpse into his thoughts, and it is all the more advantageous that Crusoe is the "ideal" economic individualist who Ian Watt describes. We can, with Crusoe on this island, get a chance to see whether his emotions bear any relationship to his economic individualism, and the emotional priorities that it possesses.

Crusoe has not been taught to survive a desert island, nor has he had previous exposure which would condition any "emotional memory" he might have. He has never been truly marooned before, but has only had to survive pirates and the sea. So, while the protagonist of "The Truth" has had the opportunity to learn emotions and behaviors from her parents, and Zunshine's child was raised to read and exchange ideas, Crusoe is having a set of experiences far different from anyone

else in his home society. His solitude offers the ideal chance to reveal his thoughts, actions, and reflections in response to unanticipated circumstances. A consciousness composed of multiple and more dynamic elements can therefore best describe his thoughts and behavior.

Switching gears on the discussion of emotion and society, doctor, and author of book on cognitive science *Incognito*, David Eagleman explains the role of emotion in decision-making: "You can do a math problem without consulting your internal state, but you can't order a dessert off a menu or prioritize what you feel like doing next. The emotional networks are absolutely required to rank your possible next actions in the world: if you were an emotionless robot who rolled into a room, you might be able to make analyses about the objects around you, but you would be frozen with indecision about what to do next" (Eagleman 233). Eagleman's comments show emotion to be an essential part of the mind's operations. That these emotions are essential also leads one to question how they would play a part in forming the cognitive environment. When these emotions play a large role in leading the mind to make decisions, it follows that they also compose a discernible element of cognition.

Metzinger's "Ego Tunnel" model of the mind, and Eagleman's picture of emotions added on top of a rational mind are two somewhat different visualizations of the mind, but both of them admit emotions into the model of the functioning mind, either in operation or composition. Both of these could be seen as models which admit emotion into Zunshine's and other cognitive theorists' "cognitive

environment." Decision-making is also an action present in Watt's description of the economic individual, for what is the prioritization of the economic motive but a decision to place economic concerns first?

Crusoe's isolation places him in a position where he must make decisions in the way that Eagleman describes. Marooned on his island, there are many tasks he must immediately accomplish to survive, but after a period of time, he is given more and more latitude to make decisions. After he is established, should he build a kiln (Defoe 132) or a canoe (138)? On his island, he does not stand still like an emotionless robot, but is given free reign.

So, what is Crusoe's cognition like when a full picture of his emotions are viewed are a part of his consciousness? What happens when the aspects of the mind as described by Metzinger are considered a significant part of consciousness?

4. Readings

4.1 Individualistic Sight and Space

Before Crusoe sits down and begins his journal properly, he writes in a slightly different style that is a little more open than later entries. Crusoe's writing in this section allows uncertain expressions, those of panic and doubt, through to the reader. Crusoe himself, and how he sees and thinks, can be more easily seen by the reader in this section. We can see his perception as tied to his need for emotional stability, and there is a clear transition in style and structure as the journal begins, that appears to be a reaction to some of the uncertainty we see. This transition in style is a focus on accomplishments and projects that Crusoe uses to cope with his struggle.

Robinson Crusoe climbs to the top of a mountain to see what he can see, after having endured a day of discomfort, anguish, and fear of cannibals. He half-hallucinates seeing a ship on the horizon, but his view is perhaps only an imaginary fabrication derived from his strained vision. This frantic moment is presented in suspect wording: "...yet I could not forbear getting up to the top of a little mountain and looking out to see [sic] in hopes of seeing a ship, then fancy at a vast distance I spy'd a sail, please my self with the hopes of it, and then after looking steadily till I was almost blind, lose it quite, and sit down and weep like a child[...]" (Defoe 86).

There are a few curious moments of diction in this passage, not the least of which is the somewhat awkward stuttering of, "looking out to see [sic] in hopes of seeing a ship," which stands in contrast to the style of the rest of *Robinson Crusoe: a*

direct presentation of movements, goods, events, and spare descriptions of emotions and reactions. This repetition of the word "see" serves *two purposes* in this phrase: Firstly, It narrates, in time, what Crusoe is actually doing: Crusoe is first merely looking and taking in inadequate amounts of visual information, and then later actually fully processing, understanding, and reacting to an image, the same words representing two different kinds of viewing. This repetition elucidates the gap between looking and seeing, and in that space of time there is room for something to occur. This gap can represent the different parts of Crusoe's brain perceiving the different aspects of his vision, with his emotions reacting before his conscious and cognitive mind can distinguish the anomaly as not actually being a ship. Perhaps Crusoe's imagination is conjuring the fancied ship before the image is fully interpreted while his eyes adjust to looking at distant figments on the horizon. Secondly, the repetition of the word "see" hints at hesitation or uncertainty, and highlights the nature of what Robinson is actually doing at this moment.

Metzinger offers a perspective on what may be occurring in Crusoe's perception here: "In a more general sense, the principle is that the almost continuous feedback-loops from higher to lower areas create an ongoing cycle, a circular nested flow of information, in which what happened a few milliseconds ago is dynamically mapped back to what is coming in right now. In this way, the immediate past continuously creates a context for the present -- it filters what can be experienced right now" (Metzinger 31). In other words, different parts of the act of perceiving the ship were occurring within Crusoe's mind as he was staring out at the sea. This cognitive processing added an element of uncertainty to his visual

perception, so that he may have been, on a lower level, aware of what he saw before he was fully conscious of it.

Previously in the novel, Crusoe had related to the sea as something to be ventured into blindly. He literally follows the first person who can take him on a ship: "Being one day at Hull, where I went casually [...] and one of my companions being going [sic] by sea to London in his father's ship, and prompting me to go with them..." (Defoe 31). There was, first, a restless motivation for his own pursuit, as in keeping with his characteristics as an embodiment of Watt's economic individual, and in addition to this desire was the means he found to convey himself. He ventures shipbound into the Atlantic. Now shipwrecked, he takes perhaps his clearest and most honest look at the sea so far and beholds something that stretches beyond his senses. This is an overwhelming, disruptive experience that manifests itself only as a momentary, redundant expression of the word "see." At this point in the text, there have been few other instances of Crusoe applying his senses without there being an imperative on his mind to direct him, he has no construction project or goal as he gazes outward. Now, he looks to look and he sees, as close to the immediate present as he will get, unconstrained by plans and goals to work toward. There is no scheme of venturing to sea or escaping the island yet, and with this vacuum of purpose he feels overwhelmed. Where Crusoe had previously used his economic individualism and agency to form a plan for escape, wealth, or other goals, he is now at a loss in this situation.

He, additionally, loses the figment of a ship, and sinks down after what *seems* like a conspicuous failure of his senses to perceive the sail, having at first, on a lower level, perceived a figment, or a construction of his mind which failed to be clarified by his eyes. Eagleman explains the process of visual perception and interpretation: "billions of specialized mechanisms operate below the radar[...] combining information, making predictions about what is coming next, making decisions about what to do now. In the face of this complexity, consciousness gives you a summary that is useful for the larger picture" (Eagleman 53). Crusoe is to some extent anticipating any object on the horizon in terms of whether or not it would be useful. A ship would be useful, while a mirage would obviously not be.

At this point in the text, Crusoe has been tried by the elements, and failing to find something that he could place into a useful escape plan, he is reduced to weeping. His undirected, spontaneous gaze to the very limits of the horizon is met with broken hope and devastation. Crusoe reacts to this disappointment by beginning a journal, "But having gotten over these things in some measure [...] I began to keep my journal" (Defoe 86). After a moment of crisis brought on by an unrestrained gaze outward, Crusoe now turns inward, and from here on, Crusoe rarely, if ever, invests so much emotion in viewing any sensory thing exterior to himself. The climb to the mountaintop and the gaze toward the horizon seemed like an experiment undertaken spontaneously and anxiously, and having met with failed results, Crusoe retreats and directs his view toward the more controllable and rational page of his journal.

The journal, which begins the very pages after this, gives the date and a brief account of how Crusoe came to the island. He then states his despair in terms that succinctly describe his lack of stability: "I had neither food, house, clothes, weapon, or place to fly to, and in despair of any relief, saw nothing but death before me, either that I should be devoured by wild beasts, murdered by savages, or starved to death for want of food" (Defoe 87). This entry starts the journal off by orienting it in time, connecting it to a corresponding moment before it began, and giving a narrative context that is sufficient enough to continue. This entry also begins the journal with a clear outline of the obstacles and dangers present for Crusoe.

This moment is an act of mental orientation for Crusoe. He retreats from the irrational, hope-filled, and ultimately obscured stare toward the horizon and instead directs his effort toward conceptually restructuring his reality into factors which he is capable of contending with and describing. Looking back a brief moment, it becomes apparent that the word-choice used to describe his crushed hope at losing sight of the ship is terse and avoids a full description of emotion. After Crusoe "weep[s] like a child," (Defoe 86) he also immediately blames himself for this emotional pain, and he regrets that he may: "increase my misery by my folly" (Defoe 86). This instantly structures even uncontrollable emotions as something that he can work to bring under control. Though he has lost an element of his economic agency, and experiences the emotional suffering of that, he can now direct his agency elsewhere, and work toward new goals and organizing new areas of his life. The journal, in this moment, is orienting itself around the currently manageable factors in Crusoe's life.

The journal proceeds from day to day, describing accomplishments as much as is needed to portray the activities done. The second entry of the journal is a broadly descriptive entry, lacking any reflection: "From the 1st of October to the 24th. All these days entirely spent in many several voyages to get all I could out of the ship, which I brought on shore, every tide of flood, upon rafts. Much rain also in these days, tho' with some intervals of fair weather: but, it seems, this was the rainy season" (Defoe 87). The description sticks to the tasks accomplished, and describes locations only as points involved in the necessary task. It is as if Crusoe strives for a new definition of his reality in how spare this entry is, as if by constricting it only to the task of collecting, he can pretend that his reality is limited totally to that goal. Any additional description of these locations is not deemed necessary by the form of the journal. There is a shore which supplies are brought to, and there is rain which impedes the voyages. The amount of rain is described because it qualifies how difficult it is to accomplish the task. Further descriptors are removed from the writing. The entry summarizes a period of weeks, but gives almost no visual detail.

By writing in this sensorily-limited style, Crusoe withdraws from any action similar to the gaze toward the horizon. The entry is a withdrawal of senses from the world around them, and an enactment and description of linear tasks that remove threats and obstacles from Crusoe's existence, and reinforce what he has found to replace his economic agency. The supplies will aid him in defending against the clear threats outlined at the beginning of the journal, and the task of recovering the supplies protects him, by substitution, from the overwhelming sensation brought on by staring at the horizon, and seeing an expanse that lacks a goal.

After Crusoe removes as many supplies as he deems necessary from the ship, he must find a place to live, and this task directs his next movement: "I walked about the shore almost all day to find out a place to fix my habitation, greatly concerned to secure myself from an attack in the night, either from wild beasts or men. Towards night I fixed upon a proper place under a rock, and marked out a semi-circle for my encampment" (Defoe 88). Crusoe walks around an undescribed shore, with the threat of the already mentioned dangers more present for him than the shore itself. What is interesting about Crusoe's movement around the island at this moment is that it is described in a fashion similar to the rain from when he removed supplies from the ship. He walked about "almost all day," which is a descriptor that describes the difficulty of the task while also curiously lacking a visual description of Crusoe actually walking around. He could have moved over a small area over and over, or perhaps walked ten miles. It is not described either way. The only description of distance is in the word "about," a somewhat ambiguous adverb that could describe the walking as somewhat aimless and probably fixed to a general location (Oxford English Dictionary 2b). Crusoe, as a recognizable human form, seems almost absent from these tasks. He conveys, through the journal, how difficult the tasks are, but does not seem to sufficiently convey how taxing they are on his body or how emotionally draining they are.

A man stranded on an island in a state of despair and physical strain manages to spend twenty uninterrupted days unloading a ship. It is obvious that these twenty days could not possibly have been spent in uninterrupted activity, but had to have consisted of significant inactivity. No matter how robust Crusoe is, he could not have

washed ashore, vomited saltwater (Defoe 86), lost all hope (86), and then immediately gone into full labor mode. He pares these experiences down from their full, while he is sitting in his new abode. With his journal, he shapes his experiences retrospectively from their previously complete, and therefore nearly useless form. At this moment in his narrative, he is striving to reconstruct his identity as an economic individual, and does as much as he can to represent his world as one of resumed economic agency, to the point where he portrays only those aspects of his reality which reinforce his economic individuality, which are an essential part of him, which as Watt reminds us, "Crusoe's character depends very largely on the psychological and social orientations of economic individualism" (Watt 71).

So, there are plural pressures working on his perception of physical reality. The first is a need to withdraw from the external, unknown, and potentially damaging world represented by the spanning horizon. The other is a need to shape what is experienced into something that seems economically worthwhile upon later reflection (Watt 76), which is structured around his need to accomplish and stick only to the portrayals of those accomplishments. The action of creating the journal itself represents the need to shape an experience which is otherwise as overwhelming as the mountaintop, where the economically individualistic Robinson Crusoe feels he has no place.

4.2 Crusoe's Exploration

Crusoe's reactions to his environment and its economic qualities are insightful moments into his cognitive and emotional life. Crusoe, after taking care

not to perish from starvation, decides to more intentionally explore the island. He discovers the island's lush interior, and thinks about moving his home into this better country, so that he can benefit from the "fruitfulness of that valley and the pleasantness of the situation, the security from storms on that side of the water, and the wood," (Defoe 115). He becomes "so enamoured of this place" (115) that he spends much of his time there, and builds a "bower" (115). The area's utility is in how naturally sheltered it is and how many resources it contains.

Crusoe first discovers this area, seeing it with the wonder that a welcome surprise brings: "At the end of this march I came to an opening, where the country seemed to descend to the west, and a little spring of fresh water, which issued out of the side of the hill by me, run the other way, that is, due east; and the country appeared so fresh, so green, so flourishing, every thing being in constant verdure or flourish of spring, that it looked like a planted garden" (Defoe 113). The sight of this "delicious vale" is almost overwhelming to Crusoe, as we can see him concentrate and stumble, through written repetition, on the sheer verdance of the land. Beyond the descriptive inadequacy of the adverb "so," what seems clumsiest is the repetition of "flourish," and these descriptive stumblings drive home how struck he is by the sight. Lost in this description is any particle or specific of the environment, at least for the moment, as he can only survey and absorb an area that he did not expect to discover. This moment traces Crusoe's perception, too. He sees the spring, and his eye follows it to the lush grounds, which he describes unspecifically as "like a planted garden" (113). So, even as we know he is looking at this lush area, he cannot quite convey a full or specific description of it, for the moment.

As Crusoe encounters, more closely, the elements of this interior refuge, he sees it as property, and lists enter his mind, "to think that this was all my own, that I was king and lord of all this country indefeasibly [...] I saw here abundance of cocoa trees, orange, lemon, and citron trees;" (Defoe 114). As he can begin to think of it in terms of useful property, he can specifically describe the trees by the kinds of fruit they bear. There is an aesthetic poverty to his description of the land, or as Watt notes, "The natural scene on the island appeals not for adoration, but for exploitation; wherever Crusoe looks his acres cry out so loud for improvement that he has no leisure to observe that they also compose a landscape" (Watt 69). Crusoe cannot see the land beyond its utility; the land and the trees are described with no adjectives other than those that specify their useful traits. Lush land can promise abundance, an opportunity for improvement, and nourishment. As Watt further notes, Crusoe embodies the economic individual in these moments: "Crusoe's book-keeping conscience, indeed, has established an effective priority over his other thoughts and emotions;" (Watt 63). It seems as though this "book-keeping conscience" curtails Crusoe's ability even to notice things outside his necessity. In other circumstances, a view of lush land might inspire poetic descriptions of waving grass or rolling hills, but for Crusoe it inspires a list of available produce, and is organized as such.

With a few ideas that can clarify what is happening with Crusoe and this lush land, David Eagleman notes, "The brain doesn't need a full model of the world because it merely needs to figure out, on the fly, where to look, and when" (Eagleman 62). He elaborates further on this through a story, "When your partner

asks, 'How many lumps of sugar are left?' your attentional systems interrogate the details of the bowl, assimilating new data into your internal model. Even though the sugar bowl has been in your visual field the entire time, there was no real detail there for your brain. It needed to do extra work to fill in the finer points of the picture" (62). This "internal model" that Eagleman mentions is the same internal model that Metzinger describes as consciousness itself. So consciousness, at this moment in *Robinson Crusoe*, is represented by Crusoe's seeing the land and trees and turning them into an internal model. This internal model excludes what is not necessary to his emotional life: the details of his environment that are useless, anything beyond the land's raw abundance and the trees' fruit.

Metzinger claims that consciousness is a phenomenon preserved throughout, essentially enduring as its various elements change, but in this moment it is preserved in a form that is severely altered by Crusoe's economic goal. His internal model contains only those things that benefit him, and with his book-keeping conscience even more totally focusing him on the beneficial fruits, and turning them into a sort of grocery list, Crusoe's internal model seems cut down to only these things. Crusoe, whose economic individualism has prepared him to be a natural accumulator, and through which he has developed a book-keeping conscience, has likewise developed a consciousness that is largely limited to only those things around him which are economically useful.

4.3 Crusoe, Friday, and Cannibalism

As Crusoe and Friday first get to know one another, there are moments of serious adjustment, as each must accustom himself to the drastically different culture of the other. Friday must adapt to Crusoe's manner and react to his firearms and strange clothes, and yet Crusoe refuses to accept what he presumes to be Friday's desire to eat human flesh. The day after Crusoe rescues Friday by killing his captors, Friday seems to make it known to Crusoe that he would like to dig up these dead enemies and eat them. Crusoe responds with his best attempt at communication, "As we went by the place where he had bury'd the two men, he pointed exactly to the place, and shewed me the marks that he had made to find them again, making signs to me that we should dig them up again, and eat them; at this I appeared very angry, expressed my abhorrence of it, made as if I would vomit at the thoughts of it, and beckoned with my hand to him to come away, which he did immediately, with great submission" (Defoe 209). Crusoe readily interprets these signs as indicating that Friday wants to eat the bodies, but Friday may be trying to convey a totally different message. However, Crusoe interprets as he does and finds the act of eating human flesh absolutely unacceptable. It is an act with regards to death and the human body that he cannot tolerate and, as he reflects on his interpretation of Friday's gestures, feels great anger.

Crusoe's reaction in this moment can be related to a moment in the film "The Truth" that Hogan references in his article "On Being Moved." Both this film and this moment in *Robinson Crusoe* involve dead bodies, as well as a certain kind of

behavior toward the bodies that seems unusual when viewed from the perspective of another. To lend insight into this moment, it might be useful to compare the protagonist from "The Truth" to Crusoe himself. It might seem more natural to compare the character from "The Truth" to Friday, as they both ostensibly exhibit strange behavior toward dead bodies, but there is more to gain by examining Crusoe in light of the protagonist from "The Truth," as we get to know so much more about his mental processes.

First of all, Crusoe has had no exposure to cannibalism before he encounters the cannibals on the island, and his reaction to Friday's presumed cannibalism arises from something other than experience. Crusoe is merely aware enough of cannibalism's existence to apply a cannibalistic interpretation to Friday's gestures. He has never had to deal with a person who wanted to eat a human body before setting foot on the island. His reaction cannot be explained by Hogan's idea of emotional memory in the same way that Hogan explains the protagonist's reaction in "The Truth." Crusoe does not learn to associate cannibalism with any outcome or emotion, he does not experience this emotion as, in Hogan's words, "the response of dedicated neurobiological systems to concrete experiences," (Hogan 255). Anger in this situation arises in response to something else, something formed in response to a *new* situation. Crusoe does not merely create his emotion out of a learned knowledge or instructive memory that cannibalism is wrong, but rather reacts with anger because Friday's presumed cannibalistic tendency violates Crusoe's expectations of human conduct. Crusoe's anger originates from what he has been comprehensively imbued with by his culture, and what emotions he has invested in

life, death, the human body, and other things that must come together to create his reaction.

What Crusoe is experiencing is an entirely new situation which brings a new application of his anger. He is reacting to his new companion apparently trying to eat human flesh, and this unusual action forces Crusoe to pay attention to what his actual feelings about cannibalism are. Crusoe's interpretation abruptly disrupts and urgently brings attention to his own opinion about cannibalism, while also leaving him confused and overwhelmed. Crusoe notes, "at this I appeared very angry," as if he notices and describes his own anger from a third perspective rather than feeling it directly. This wording places emphasis first on the separation between Crusoe's feeling and his experience of emotion, secondly it emphasizes the process which creates that feeling, and it lastly emphasizes Friday's experience of Crusoe's anger: recognizing Crusoe's angry expression and then experiencing his own emotion.

The odd word construction that describes Crusoe's anger, and which distances and seemingly delays the experience of emotion, recalls how Metzinger describes the process of consciousness being integrated, "In a more general sense, the principle is that the almost continuous feedback-loops from higher to lower areas create an ongoing cycle, a circular nested flow of information, in which what happened a few milliseconds ago is dynamically mapped back to what is coming in right now. In this way, the immediate past continuously creates a context for the present -- it filters what can be experienced right now" (Metzinger 31). Here, the delay seems to be in Crusoe's experience of emotion, as if his reaction is being

integrated on different levels, so that his experience of the feeling needs to be described in an order that is interrupted and different from normal.

That this delay suddenly becomes conspicuous suggests the severity of the emotional shock that Crusoe suffers after Friday's supposed suggestion they eat the bodies. In contrast to Hogan's description of "emotional memory" in "The Truth," Crusoe's emotion seems to interrupt cognition and memory, rather than to arise directly from "emotional memory." This suggests that this experience of significant anger by Crusoe is crucial enough to the experience of consciousness to be able to disrupt it and cause a delay in the anger being integrated into a smooth conscious experience. Which, because of its significant effect on Crusoe's experience, reinforces the idea of a mutually constitutive relationship between emotion and consciousness.

Crusoe, obviously, is affected by Friday's supposed suggestion that they eat the bodies of their dead human enemies. He reacts with an anger that immediately humbles Friday. The anger is severe enough and the result of a surprising enough shock to Crusoe's sensibility that it seems to interrupt the normally smooth-running processes of emotion being solidly integrated into Crusoe's conscious experience. The description of the anger, "at this I appeared very angry" suggests that even Friday may have felt Crusoe's anger before Crusoe himself did.

Friday responds to Crusoe's anger with "great submission," and this word choice suggests how Friday's experience of Crusoe's reaction may have occurred. Kramnick explains this phenomenon in his article *Empiricism, Cognitive Science, and*

the Novel: "Third-person attribution on this account begins with a first-person simulation of the thoughts of someone else or oneself" (Kramnick 277). In other words, understanding the state and naming the emotion another person is experiencing requires imagining what they feel. Kramnick restates the same idea again, with more emphasis on the imagination: "One can never experience what is in another person's mind, but one can have a second-order inference of it by imagining oneself in that person's place" (Kramnick 279). So Friday is having a second-order inference of Crusoe's anger, and this inference is enough to quickly reduce him to "great submission," which means Crusoe must have been about as angry as he could get.

Friday's reaction to this indicates that this inference of Crusoe's emotion, or Friday's secondary experience of Crusoe's emotion, is enough to immediately subdue Friday. From this initial interaction, Friday's position as a subordinate is established and his reaction is shown to be an emotion that defies the explanation of emotional memory. He absorbs or creates within himself an emotion similar to what Crusoe is experiencing, which is something totally new and unexpected. By this, he must connect his newly inferred emotion to Crusoe's mistaken interpretation and cultural construction. What Friday experiences is a reprimand reinforced by Crusoe's powerful anger. If Hogan's emotional memory is a stable, durable way in which human emotion operates, extending forward from memory into similar present experiences, it seems totally interrupted here.

Crusoe's reaction in this instance seems to illustrate his inability to imagine Friday's state. Crusoe instantly assumes that Friday's gestures indicate a desire to

eat human flesh, but with such a new mode of communication between them, Crusoe could be mistaken. Friday could be gesturing to the activities of the dead men, and signaling that *they* were cannibals, or any number of possible alternatives. Again, Crusoe describes only what he thinks is relevant, and we don't get a thorough description of Friday's gestures. Crusoe jumps to a conclusion and fails to make a complete "second-order inference" to use Kramnick's words. This seems consistent with their relationship, Crusoe is the superior and Friday the subordinate. Friday needs to infer the emotions behind Crusoe's reactions to avoid upsetting him, but Crusoe can get by without having to infer Friday's inner state and without interpreting Friday's emotions.

After this exchange, Crusoe believes Friday still harbors a hunger for human flesh, "I found Friday had still a hankering stomach after some of the flesh, and was still a cannibal in his nature; but I discovered so much abhorrence at the very thoughts of it, and at the least appearance of it, that he durst not discover it; for I had by some means let him know that I would kill him if he offered it" (Defoe 210). Here again, Crusoe seems to not be fully aware of himself, indicating that he is not exactly sure how he instructed Friday, but that he did "by some means," and Crusoe also describes his own emotional process, "I discovered so much abhorrence," adding to the sequence of Crusoe's blurred, overwhelming emotion and cognition. Crusoe is experiencing such turmoil, that he must "discover" his own reaction. Friday, as described here seemingly exhibits the same desire to consume human flesh, but he too seems out of touch with this desire, at least from Crusoe's perspective, because Friday "durst not discover it;" with the "it" being his appetite.

Friday, as well as having to infer Crusoe's anger, seems, from Crusoe's perspective, to be confused about his own appetite and emotion, although this is likely just another misinterpretation on Crusoe's part.

Crusoe's relationship with Friday is one of master and subordinate. Watt notes, that in spite of Friday being a subordinate, "Crusoe regards the relationship as ideal. He is 'as perfectly and completely happy if any such thing as complete happiness can be found in a sublunary state'" (Watt 69). So, to Crusoe, this distant relationship with a subordinate seems to be the ideal relationship between two men. This characteristic of the relationship would help explain how well-integrated Friday is in Crusoe's mind: Crusoe is happy with finding the ideal friend and subordinate. Crusoe's joy with Friday aids Crusoe in bringing us the detailed description that he uses to introduce Friday. His emotion gathers and integrates the details into the conscious picture that Metzinger describes. Since the relationship is one of superior and subordinate, he can go into detail about the physical aspects of his friend in a way that he wouldn't with an equal.

Friday, as a subordinate, is closer to a possession than any of Crusoe's equals can ever be. Friday assists Crusoe constantly throughout their relationship, providing Crusoe with labor. Their ideal relationship turns Friday into a sort of walking economic gain, and with economic gain as Crusoe's primary goal as well as primary emotional outlet, Friday is the only person in the book described so thoroughly. Crusoe's father, mother, wife, colleagues, friends, acquaintances, and the other cannibals do not receive nearly so much physical description as Friday does in a single narrative moment. This comprehensive description, combined with

Crusoe's unwillingness to infer Friday's emotions makes Friday a truly objectified person. And yet, Friday is the most sensorily-integrated person for Crusoe and for the book.

When we consider how sensorily-integrated Friday is, and we consider that, to Crusoe, his function is mainly economic and their relationship is near Crusoe's ideal, we can see that Friday's level of sensory integration to Crusoe correlates with Crusoe's satisfaction with him. This characteristic of sensory integration then is a signal that Crusoe has an ideal and objectifying relationship with Friday. With the distance and subordination that Crusoe imposes on Friday, Crusoe feels a joy and satisfaction which work as integrating emotions to tie together Friday's characteristics in Crusoe's consciousness. This link between satisfaction and integration then highlights the truly misaligned and antagonistic nature of their relationship, for Crusoe can be perfectly satisfied with the objectified Friday while keeping him in a state of oppression, and this satisfaction seems exactly aligned with what Crusoe's consciousness needs to function.

4.4 Crusoe and His Colleague

Eventually, Crusoe rejoins his equals and colleagues back in conventional society, and with this he enters into a world where he has normal interactions with fellow citizens. Crusoe's return to civilization is completed when he meets with an old colleague, a Portuguese captain, whom he greets with restrained happiness: "[...]I soon brought him to my remembrance, and as soon brought my self to his remembrance, when I told him who I was. / After some passionate expressions of

old acquaintance, I enquired, you may be sure, after my plantation and my partner" (Defoe 275). The captain reunites Crusoe with a sum of money considerable enough to bring him back to affluence: "Upon this, he pulls out an old pouch, and gives me 160 Portugal moidres in gold;" (Defoe 277). At this action, Crusoe reacts thusly: "I was too much moved with the honesty and kindness of the poor man, to be able to bear this; and remembering what he had done for me, how he had taken me up at sea, and how generously he had used me on all occasions, and particularly, how sincere a friend he was now to me, I could hardly refrain weeping from what he said to me" (277-278). This moment in the text seems to justify Watt's description of economic individualism by the ordering of emotion shown. Crusoe first receives the moidres and in this moment his emotions come into play, revealing the full emotional depth of their relationship and shaping the operation of his consciousness.

The receipt of the Portugal moidres not only takes precedence, but also seems to regulate the rest of Crusoe's experience in this instance. Money comes first, then emotion, then with emotion comes the full memory of Crusoe and the captain's relationship, and finally comes Crusoe's cathartic weeping. In this moment, money has a greater impact than the sight of Crusoe's old business colleague. The meeting itself is not enough to allow full emotion to come through, with money itself seeming to take emotional precedence over the business friendship. As Watt notes, with regard to Crusoe, "Only money -- fortune in its modern sense -- is a proper cause of deep feeling; and friendship is accorded only to those who can safely be entrusted with Crusoe's economic interests" (Watt 69).

The intervening two pages between when Crusoe and his old business partner meet are largely taken up by the business partner detailing to Crusoe what has happened in the years that he has been absent: other people involved in their shared commercial and legal world have died, but a few responsible people have maintained Crusoe's assets. The details of these assets, including their final disposition with the captain, are related to Crusoe. Crusoe and the captain spend days conferencing over the assets and their legal disposition and location (Defoe 277).

So there is a focus almost totally on the assets, or the details of people's lives as they relate to the maintenance of these assets, for several days. During this period of time, emotions seem almost to lie latent, as if waiting for something to bring them to the surface. What draws them out is the emotionally potent moidres, the focus of Crusoe's economic individual. As he receives this loaded item, his memories then seem to flow, and with the memory more emotion. This instance justifies Watt's description of the economic individual placing high emotional value on economic gain, "The primacy of individual economic advantage has tended to diminish the importance of personal as well as group relationships" (Watt 66).

The money in this instance, as the emotional focus for Crusoe, seems to integrate the various latent emotions into one emotional image of the captain for Crusoe. Metzinger explains the role of the mind in integrating various aspects of reality, "The second important insight seems to be the notion of *integration*: Consciousness is what binds things together in a comprehensive, simultaneous whole. If we have this whole, then a world appears to us. If the information flow

from your sensory organs is unified, you experience the world. If your senses come apart, you lose consciousness" (Metzinger 26). Metzinger here is talking about the integration of sensory input into a coherent world image rather than the integration of aspects into one viewed figure or person, but the idea of integration of elements into an image underlies this scene.

Crusoe's awareness of the captain seems separated from their actual history as friends and colleagues until the moment he receives the moidres. Surely, we would not expect old friends to immediately weep with gratitude upon meeting again after so many years, but we might expect that something aside from a fistful of coins would trigger this release. Until this moment, the captain is only described with phrases such as "Portuguese captain," (Defoe 276) "ancient friend" and "old man" (277), which focus only on his general characteristics. As the captain is "integrated" by Crusoe's reaction to the money, the captain seems to gain characteristics he didn't possess earlier in the scene: "I was too much moved with the honesty and kindness of the poor man [...] how sincere a friend he was now to me, I could hardly refrain weeping at what he said to me[...] Every thing the good man said was full of affection," (277-278). The captain gains personal characteristics with Crusoe's receipt of the money, and his voice gains the characteristic of "affection." Until this point, the captain's voice is not at all described and personal attributes are not assigned to him. With Crusoe's receipt of money, he seems to form into a more whole image, something closer to a full human.

To Crusoe, the moidres are an economic goal which has diminished his enjoyment of many other goals and pursuits. They seem to displace other elements of his emotional life and act as an emotionally-charged substitute capable of, in this instance, carrying the emotional weight of his friendship with the captain. In light of the role of the moidres, we see Crusoe loading up these coins with the social need to re-establish connection to society. Crusoe knows how to operate economically, and he links the social and emotional spheres of his life to the economic sphere. Through this exchange, he makes a step to return from the years of separation from the conventional social world.

All this seems in line with how Watt's description of the economic individual, who seeks economic gain to the diminishment of all else. What registers in Crusoe's mind are the aspects of people that seem central to his source of joy: economic gain. Beyond these aspects, people are seldom noticed as more than blurry figures moving around the edge of Crusoe's consciousness. Friday, and the extensive description of him, seems to be a moment where Crusoe betrays an underlying need for a different kind of relationship, where the details stand in for a desire to know more about Friday than the quality of his teeth. However, as Watt states, "And he has an excess: his insubordinate egocentricity condemns him to isolation wherever he is" (Watt 86).

This inability of Crusoe's to more fully see and experience the people around him is perhaps the most significant imposition on his consciousness. He carries a reality, a model of sensory information sorted into an inner world, and humans

seem to be a limited aspect of this model. Crusoe, then lives bereft of this dimension. The figures around him speak and their words are interpreted, but ultimately they are points that exist along the way to other goals. They are sensory arrangements, visual collections whose aspects are inventoried. Crusoe's restlessness, his constant need for projects may come when he sits down at the end of the day, and with all his tools and records, finds that something doesn't add up.

5. Conclusion

Alexander Selkirk, the British sailor who served as an inspiration for Defoe's Crusoe, experienced the reality of being marooned on an island. He endured this state much differently than the fictional Crusoe did. In an account of his adventures that he co-authored with John Howell, Selkirk found on the island that, "it was with difficulty he could support his new situation. So great was his melancholy, that, to escape from himself, he often meditated suicide" (Howell 86). Much of this melancholy arose from, "the awful solitude which reigned around, to create, in those of a different cast of character, a depression of spirit amounting almost to despair" (86). As one reads Selkirk's account, there is a sense of his battle against this demoralization. He feels he will die on the island, and again and again Selkirk imagines his pets devouring his corpse. This is a picture of being marooned as insurmountable loneliness and fear. Selkirk endures these feelings with discipline and devout religion, but they are a huge part of his struggle.

To read Selkirk's account is to read an account of a person who actually endured Defoe's fantasy. Selkirk could not, like his fictional counterpart, take joy in

various projects, and note them down with satisfaction. Selkirk instead endures the psychological reality of being marooned and comes through it. That Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* chooses to sidestep this aspect of living on a desert island shows, to some extent, that Defoe is motivated to portray the island as an idealized example of a situation.

Cognitive theory, like *Robinson Crusoe*, seems invested in sidestepping a comprehensive consideration of the cognitive environment. It does not look to models of psychology for conceptual balance, nor does it slowly answer the many questions that arise along the way. Ideas that conflict with previous literary scholarship, or simply with an educated sense of how the mind operates, are seemingly excused from answering many concerns. This is a kind of focus that is needed in any new field for ideas to naturally unfurl, but it typically exists with a balancing tendency to contextualize, expand, and explain. It is interesting to consider if the field of cognitive theory is attempting to represent the cognitive environment as an idealized example of how the mind can work. The question is, what is this idealized picture and what may be motivating its construction?

To look at consciousness as constructed of multiple elements allows a deeper insight into Robinson that is more interdisciplinarily relevant, and does not require cognitive theory to stretch its premises to cloudily appropriate other fields in the manner that it does in Hogan's work. By asking again the nature of consciousness at work in *Crusoe*, we see something more familiar, something constructed in terms that have already been discussed and exchanged in seminal works. There is no need

to construct a new theoretical venture in strange terms, but only a need to more appropriately contextualize the questions of the cognitive inquiry.

By exploring emotion as an aspect which can determine aspects of literary consciousness, there arise opportunities to connect cognitive literary theory with other literary theoretical fields. Watt's descriptions of the changes in Robinson Crusoe's priorities and emotional life welcome a connection to cognitive theory through this premise. Viewing emotion as a significantly determinative aspect of consciousness, instead of allowing cognitive literary theory to appropriate other fields, allows cognitive theory to be integrated into existing theory. If such integration can be completed in the various fields of literary theory, it will result in a more consistent conversation that avoids revelatory dismissals of previous work.

Chomsky, an intellectual looked to by Hogan and many others, gives us an observation that can contextualize the departure of cognitive literary theory from other schools of literary thought: "there is a noticeable general difference between the sciences and mathematics on the one hand, and the humanities and social sciences on the other. It's a first approximation, but one that is real. In the former, the factors of integrity tend to dominate more over the factors of ideology" (Barsky 141). The Humanities are susceptible to ideology, and not just in the sense of a set of values held by a group, but to trends in thought and practice, and to more problematic and difficult to describe shifts that can occur when radical new evidence is introduced. The introduction of too much new evidence can rapidly alter the environment of arguments that the Humanities are composed of. Perhaps

cognitive scientific evidence is too new and too salient to be properly integrated into literary studies. Perhaps its rapid arrival alters how it is assessed and employed. Erudition would seem to be a natural guard against novelty and the excessive salience of new evidence, but when the evidence seems to require the dismissal of previous scholarship, a strangely new academic environment emerges. We may find ourselves on a sort of island, cut off from the rest of the academic world, and like Crusoe, we may just need a moment to reflect mindfully on the situation, "After I had solaced my mind with the comfortable part of my condition, I began to look round me to see what kind of place I was in, and what was next to be done" (Defoe 66).

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