

# DECENTRALIZATION CONFERENCE

Purdue University

May 2-4, 2003

*Preliminary Program*

***Friday, May 2, 2003***

## **Session 1: 1:30 - 3:10 PM**

**Rafael Rob, University of Pennsylvania**

“Long-Term Relationships as Safeguards; Can Dishonest Types Induce Honest Behavior?” (joint with Huanxing Yang, University of Pennsylvania)

**Thomas A. Gresik, University of Notre Dame**

“Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal” (joint with Eric W. Bond, The Pennsylvania State University)

***\* \* \* Break: 3:10 - 3:30 PM \* \* \****

## **Session 2: 3:30 - 5:10 PM**

**Steven R. Williams, University of Illinois**

“Equations on the Derivatives of an Initial Endowment-Competitive Equilibrium Mapping for an Exchange Economy”

**Michael Kirschenheiter, Columbia University**

“Representational Faithfulness in Accounting: A Model of Hard Information”

***Saturday, May 3, 2003***

**Session 3: 8:30 - 10:10 AM**

**Roberto Serrano, Brown University & Institute for Advanced Study**

“A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation” (joint with Rajiv Vohra, Brown University)

**Ichiro Obara, UCLA**

“The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions”

***\* \* \* Break: 10:10 - 10:30 AM \* \* \****

**Session 4: 10:30 AM - 12:10 PM**

**Marcus Berliant, Washington University**

“Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment” (joint with John Ledyard, California Institute of Technology)

**Dino Gerardi, Yale University**

“Putting your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication” (joint with Leeat Yariv, UCLA)

***\* \* \* Lunch: 12:10 - 2:00 PM \* \* \****

**Session 5: 2:00 - 3:40 PM**

**Dean Corbae, University of Texas at Austin**

“Experiments with Network Economies” (joint with John Duffy, University of Pittsburgh)

**Michael Peters, University of Toronto**

“Internet Trading Mechanisms and Rational Expectations” (joint with Sergei Severinov, Duke University)

***\* \* \* Break: 3:40 - 4:00 PM \* \* \****

**Session 6: 4:00 - 5:40 PM**

**Stephen Morris, Yale University**

“Robust Mechanism Design” (joint with Dirk Bergemann, Yale University)

**Tayfun Sönmez, Koç University**

“School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach” (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Columbia University)

***Sunday, May 4, 2003***

**Session 7: 8:30 - 10:10 AM**

**Paul J. Healy, California Institute of Technology**

“Is Nash Really a Better Predictor than Dominant Strategies? An Experimental Investigation of Public Goods Mechanisms”

**Yan Chen, University of Michigan**

“Sealed Bid Auctions with Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments” (joint with Peter Katuscak and Emre Ozdenoren, University of Michigan)

***\* \* \* Break: 10:10 - 10:30 AM \* \* \****

**Session 8: 10:30 AM - 12:10 PM**

**Artyom Shneyerov, University of British Columbia**

“Convergence of a Bilateral Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition” (joint with Mark Satterthwaite, Northwestern University)

**Sergei Severinov, Duke University**

“Does the Monopoly Need to Exclude?” (joint with Raymond Deneckere, University of Wisconsin, Madison)