Plato’s Moral Psychology

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR
OCTOBER 4–7, 2012
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Plato Meeting Schedule of Events

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4

3:00 - 5:00 PM
Michigan Union, Parker Room
Session 1A: Formative Issues I, Chair Michael McOsker, University of Michigan
   I) Daniel Drucker, University of Michigan, “How Satisfying is Conventional Satisfaction?”
   II) William H. F. Altman, E. C. Glass School, “Mankind without Women and the Physicalization of the
       Tripartite Soul; Parmenidean Pedagogy in Plato’s Timaeus”
   III) Ian McCready-Flora, Columbia University, “Plato’s Theorizing of Pathe and Emotion”
   IV) Sean Kelsey, University of Notre Dame, “Truth and τέχνη in Plato’s Philebus and Statesman”

Classics Library, Angell Hall 2175
Session 1B: Formative Issues II, Chair Ronald Baumiller, University of Western Ontario
   I) Jorge Francisco Aguirre Sala, Universidad de Monterrey, “Ethics of Pleasure: The Notion of hêdonê
       According to Plato”
   II) Jacob Stump, University of Toronto, “Coming to Care for Virtue”
   III) Gary Gabor, Hamline University, “Normative and Descriptive Statements in Plato’s Psychology”
   IV) Tushar Irani, Wesleyan University, “From Philologia to Philosophia”

English Department, Angell Hall 3222
Guest Session 1C: Chair Mary Margaret McCabe, King’s College London
   II) Melissa Lane, Princeton University, “Questioning Socratic Intellectualism: The Presuppositions and Practice of the
       Elenchus”

5:00 - 7:00 PM
Department of Classical Studies, 2nd Floor Angell Hall
Middle Eastern Dinner Buffet

7:15 - 9:45 PM
University of Michigan Museum of Art (UMMA), Stern Auditorium
Plenary Session I: Chair Richard Janko, University of Michigan
Welcome: Laura Ruetsche, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan
   I) Matthew Evans, University of Michigan, “The Blind Desires of Republic IV”
      Commentator: James Butler, Berea College
   II) Gabriele Cornelli, Universidade de Brasilia, “Plato Ethicizing the Immortality of the Soul: the
       Moralizing Project of the Orphic Metapsychosis in Plato’s Works”
      Commentator: Mark Ralkowski, George Washington University

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5

8:00 AM - 7:00 PM
Registration in the Kelsey Museum

8:00 AM - 8:30 AM
Breakfast in the Kelsey Museum Classroom
8:30 - 10:30 AM
Kelsey Museum Lecture Room
Session 2A: Method / Elenchus, Chair Emily Katz, Michigan State University
I) Yoon Cheol Lee, Seoul National University, “Socratic Elenchus in Plato’s Psychological Hierarchy”
III) Oksana Maksymchuk, Northwestern University, “Socrates’ Account of Knowledge as an Art of Measurement in the Protagoras”

Kelsey Museum Reception Area
Session 2B: Akrasia, Chair Eric LaRock, Oakland University
I) Kendall Sharp, University of Western Ontario, “What Sense of Akrasia Does Socrates Deny in Protagoras, and Why Does He Deny It?”
II) Howard Curzer, Texas Tech University, “Plato’s Account of Akrasia and Courage in the Protagoras”
III) Joshua Wilburn, University of Victoria, “Akrasia in the Republic: Does it Even Matter?”
IV) Robert Zaborowski, Polish Academy of Sciences, “Can Socrates’ Position Be Rightly Called Intellectualist?”

10:30 - 10:45 AM
Break

10:45 AM - 12:45 PM
English Department, Angell Hall 3222
Session 3A: Socratic Dialogues, Chair Corinne Painter, Washtenaw Community College
I) Annie Larivée, Carleton University, “The Subordination of the ‘gnôthi seauton’ to ‘epimeleia heautou’ in Alcibiades I”
II) Bryan Reece, University of Toronto, “Science Pure and Simple: The Possibility and Benefit of Sôphrosunê”
III) Christopher Raymond, University of Texas at Austin, “Shame and Virtue in Plato’s Charmides”
IV) Matthew Siebert, University of Toronto, “Plato on Courage”

Kelsey Museum Reception Area
Session 3B: Phaedrus, Chair Darci Doll, Delta College
III) Noah Chafets, University of Chicago, “Listening with a Lover’s Ear: Philosophical Receptivity in the Phaedrus”
IV) Suzanne Obdzalek, Claremont McKenna College, “Rational Madness: Philosophical Mania in Plato’s Phaedrus”

Kelsey Museum Lecture Room
Session 3C: Guest Session, Chair Henry Dyson, University of Michigan
I) Gail Fine, Cornell University, “Recollection and Innatism”
II) Iakovos Vasilyou, The Graduate Center CUNY, “To Know You is to Love You? Plato, Forms, and Moral Motivation”
III) Christopher Rowe, Durham University, “Why the Athenians defeated the Persians (Laws III, 699b-c)”

12:45 - 2:00 PM
Lunch in Department of Classical Studies, Angell Hall

2:15 - 4:15 PM
Angell Hall Auditorium B, First Floor
Plenary Session II: Chair Edwin M. Curley, University of Michigan
I) Rachana Kamtekar, University of Arizona, “Choosing Evil”
   Commentator: Umer Shaikh, University of Michigan
II) Mary Margaret McCabe, King’s College London, “Transformative Goods: The Nature of (Moral) Vision”
   Commentator: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, University of Michigan
4:15 - 4:30 PM
Break

4:30 - 6:30 PM
Classics Library, Angell Hall 2175
Session 4A: Republic, Chair Bruce Frier, University of Michigan
   I) Andrew Payne, Saint Joseph's University, “Justice and the Good of Others in Plato's Republic”
   III) Sung-Hoon Kang, Inje University, South Korea, “Compulsion, Persuasion, and Just Actions in Plato's Republic”
   IV) Anna Greco, York University, Canada, “Political Virtues and Their Powers in Plato's Republic”

English Department, Angell Hall 3222
Session 4B: Friendship and Erotic Love, Chair Hung Nguyen, Northwestern University
   II) José Lourenço, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, “Socrates on Being Good”
   III) Matthew Walker, Rutgers University, “‘Platonic Fantasy’ or Platonic Insight?: Wisdom and True Virtue in the Symposium”
   IV) Amber D. Carpenter, York University, U.K., “Pleasure as Complex, Pleasure as Temptress”

Kelsey Museum Lecture Room
Guest Session 4C: Chair Debra Nails, Michigan State University
   I) Lloyd P. Gerson, University of Toronto, “Rational Souls”
   II) Terrence Penner, University of Wisconsin; Antonio Chu, Metropolitan State College of Denver; and Patrick J. Mooney, John Carroll University, “Would Socrates have Erred Willingly Had He Tried to Seduce Charmides, Moved by Epithumia? or, Is the Knowledge that is Virtue a Motive-force?”

7:00 - 9:00 PM
Reception at the Kelsey Museum of Archaeology
Welcoming remarks: Ruth Scodel, University of Michigan

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 6

7:15 AM & 7:45 AM
COURTYARD MARRIOTT PICKUP POINT FOR CONFERENCE

7:30 AM - 4:00 PM
Registration in the Department of Classical Studies, 2nd Floor Angell Hall

7:45 AM - 8:30 AM
Breakfast in Department of Classical Studies, Angell Hall

8:30 - 10:30 AM
Latin Classroom, 2163 Angell Hall
Session 5A: Republic, Chair Chet McLeskey, Michigan State University
   I) David Morphew, University of Michigan, “Curbing the Rational Desire for Knowledge: A Challenge to Tripartition in Plato's Republic?”
   II) Xanthippe Bourlogianni, University of Crete, “Socrates' Argument for the Division of the Soul and Glaucan's Conception of Desire”
   III) Sara Jansen, Carleton College, “Reinterpreting the Irrational Part: What Book X's Division of the Soul Reveals about the Aesthetic and Psychological Theories of the Republic”
English Department, 3222 Angell Hall

Session 5B: Panel on the Reception of Plato, Chair Sara Ahbel-Rappe, University of Michigan
   I) Zina Giannopoulou, University of California Irvine, “Imprisonment and Liberation in Jose Saramago’s *The Cave*”
   II) Dana Miller, Fordham University, “Plato’s Response to Kwame Anthony Appiah’s *Honor Code*”

Classics Library, 2175 Angell Hall

Session 5C: *Gorgias* and *Phaedo*, Chair Mark Johnstone, McMaster University
   II) Allison E. Murphy, University of Notre Dame, “Human Desire and Philosophy”
   III) David Ebrey, Northwestern University, “Purification of Bodily Desire in the *Phaedo*”
   IV) Travis L. Butler, Iowa State University, “Desire and Beliefs about the Best in Plato’s *Phaedo*”

10:30 - 10:45 AM
Break

10:45 AM - 12:45 PM

Latin Classroom, 2163 Angell Hall

Session 6A: *Republic*, Chair Marcus Hines, Northwestern University
   I) Øyvind Rabbås, University of Oslo, “Why is Spirit the Natural Ally of Reason?”
   II) Yuji Kurihara, Tokyo Gakugei University, “Plato on the ‘Decent’ Person in *Republic* Book 10”
   III) James M. Ambury, Fairfield University, “Plato’s Conception of Soul as Reflexive Indeterminate Activity”
   IV) Guilherme Domingues da Motta, Universidade Católica de Petrópolis and Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro “Education as an Intervention in the Soul: An Interpretation of the Role of *Paideia* in Plato’s *Republic*”

English Department, 3222 Angell Hall

Session 6B: Intellectualism Controversies, Chair Jason Mask, Michigan State University
   I) Scott Berman, Saint Louis University, “Socrates, Complexity, and *Akrasia*”
   II) Thorton Lockwood, Quinnipiac University, “Do Lysis’ Parents Really Love Him?”
   III) Nicholas Riegel, Universidade de Brasilia, “Goodness as Beauty, Proportion, and Truth in Plato’s *Philebus*”
   IV) Robert Howton, University of Toronto, “Virtue as δύναμις in Plato’s *Hippias Minor*”

Classics Library, 2175 Angell Hall

Session 6C: *Phaedo* mostly, Chair Jeremy Kirby, Albion College
   II) Bryan Parkhurst, University of Michigan, “Harmony and the Soul in the *Phaedo*”
   III) Dan Werner, SUNY New Paltz, “Suicide in the *Phaedo*”

12:45 - 2:00 PM
Lunch in the Department of Classical Studies, 2nd Floor Angell Hall
Optional tour of the Papyrology Collection - the largest papyrology collection in North America
The Collection is housed in room 807 of the Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library

2:00 - 4:00 PM

Auditorium B, First Floor Angell Hall

Plenary Session III: Chair Herb Granger, Wayne State University
   I) Mauro Tulli, Università di Pisa, “Rhetoric and Psychology: the Power of the Word in Plato’s *Menexenus*”
      Commentator: Arlene Saxonhouse, University of Michigan
   II) Thomas C. Brickhouse, Lynchburg College, and Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis and Clark College, “Socratic Motivational Intellectualism”
      Commentator: Naomi Reshotko, University of Denver

4:00 - 4:15 PM
Coffee Break, Department of Classical Studies, 2nd Floor, Angell Hall
4:15 - 6:15 PM
English Department, 3222 Angell Hall

Session 7A: Republic, Chair Mark Moes, Grand Valley State University
   I) Richard D. Parry, Agnes Scott College, “Choosing What is Good”
   II) Eric Sanday, University of Kentucky, “The Metaphysics of the Decline of Regimes in Republic 8-9”
   III) Erica Holberg, Utah State University, “Pleasure, Power, and Appetite in Plato’s Republic”
   IV) Ikko Tanaka, Kyoto University, “The Structure of Sympathy: the Psychology of Poetic Experiences in Plato’s Republic”

Classics Library, 2175 Angell Hall

Session 7B: Philebus, Chair Daniel Herrick, Calvin College
   I) Emily Fletcher, University of Wisconsin, “Plato on False and Deceptive Pleasures”
   II) Thomas M. Tuozzo, University of Kansas, “The Pleasures and Pains of Plato’s Philebus”
   III) Georgia Mouroutsou, Humboldt Universität Berlin, “The Presence of Pure Pleasure in Philebus or Goodbye to ‘Filling Leaky Jars’”

Latin Classroom, 2163 Angell Hall

Session 7C: Laws mostly, Chair Hope May, Central Michigan University
   I) Audrey Anton, Western Kentucky University, “Knowing No Better: Plato’s Socrates as Blame Incompatibilist”
   II) Alex Rosenberg, Bowling Green State University, “Plato’s Consistent Pessimism: Metics and the Parable of the Family in the Laws”
   III) John Mouracade, University of Alaska, Anchorage, “Schizophrenia in Plato’s Laws”

6:15 - 9:00 PM
Conference banquet at Shalimar Restaurant

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 7

7:00 AM & 7:30 AM
COURTYARD MARRIOTT PICKUP POINT FOR CONFERENCE

7:30 - 8:00 AM
Breakfast in Classics Library, 2175 Angell Hall

8:00 - 10:00 AM
Latin Classroom, 2163 Angell Hall

Session 8A, Republic, Timaeus, Chair Terry Echterling, Michigan State University
   I) Dan Mailick, The Graduate Center CUNY, “The Embodied Soul of Plato’s Republic: Taking X into Account”
   II) Etienne Helmer, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras "Psychologie des riches et des pauvres chez platon: Sur la philokerdia et la philokhrématia”
   III) Eric Morelli, Emory University, “Just Thinking: Timaeus’ Pure Moral Psychology”
   IV) Carrie Swanson, Indiana University, Bloomington, “The Rotational Model of Mind in Plato’s Timeus”

Classics Library, 2175 Angell Hall

Session 8B, Philebus, Chair Craig Merow, Michigan State University
   I) Joseph Forte, Catholic University of America, “Explaining Hope in Plato’s Philebus”
   II) Rebecca Bensen Cain, Oklahoma State University, “Emotions and the Good Life as the Mixed Life in the Philebus”
   III) James L. Wood, Xavier University, “The Place of Pleasure in Plato’s Philebus”
English Department, 3222 Angell Hall
Session 8C, Late Plato and Later, Chair Erik Jensen, Michigan State University
   I) Johnathan Nelson, Saint Louis University, “The Ethical Aspects of an Ontological Problem in Plato’s Phaedo, Sophist, and Timaeus”
   II) Marilynn Lawrence, Immaculata University, “Tension in the Soul: A Platonic/Stoic Legacy in Plutarch and Simplicius”
   III) Michele Anik Stanbury, University of Notre Dame, “Plotinus’ Interpretation of Catharsis in the Phaedo and the Sophist”
   IV) Dimitrios Vasilakis, King’s College London, “Platonic Eros, Moral Egoism and Proclus”

10:00 - 10:15 AM
Break

10:15 - 11:15 AM
Angell Hall Auditorium B, First Floor
Plenary Session IV: Chair David M. Halperin, University of Michigan
   I) Luc Brisson, CNRS Paris, “Jealousy (phthónos) as a Philosophical Problem”
       Commentator: David O’Connor, University of Notre Dame

11:30 AM - 6:00 PM
Excursion by bus to Toledo Museum of Art
Meet in front of Angell Hall, lunch at the museum; on return the bus will stop at the hotels and at Angell Hall
ABSTRACTS

Jorge Francisco Aguirre Sala, Universidad de Monterrey
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Ethics of Pleasure: The Notion of hêdonê According to Plato

The "pleasure vs. virtue" dilemma presents the former in a pejorative and anti-ethical sense. It reduces pleasure to the sensitive and the intelligible basis only. But it is false when we find the connection between pleasure and virtue (Rep. 580), the intellectual properties of pleasure and the temporary ones of virtue (Rep. 584). We will review the notion of hêdonê in some previous dialogues of the Philebus, we'll study this one, and finally, bring our own interpretation; which reconciles joy with wisdom.

Dialogues preceding the Philebus: The Hippias Major (303 e) shows pleasure in an uncommon way: as a producer of good and not as a result of delightful actions. The Protagoras (353 c) exhibits something childish: pleasure is equivalent to good and pain to bad; but it allows virtue and pleasure to integrate in a whole. The Gorgias (479) shows a taxonomy of pleasure (useful, harmful, good and bad) and discredits the theory of Protagoras. Pleasure and virtue are eventually separated in the Phaedo: bodily pleasure is rejected and true enjoyment is reaffirmed only in virtue (114). This gives light to the ideas of the Symposium and The Republic: there is no contempt for the corporeal in neither of them, but it must be assumed in intelligible instances; thus, true pleasure is the authentic satisfaction conditioned to virtue (490). Following The Phaedrus (240 b-c) sees pleasure also as the most convenient and beneficial; however, it depends on original pain. This leads to the platonic rejection of the mix between pleasure and pain and the pursuit of enjoying the spirit: the delight of meaningful dialogue. Thus, it is possible to understand why the Timaeus sees pleasure as a reintegration of a normal-natural state of humans, and pain as an unnatural disturbance opposed to nature (64).

The Philebus: It argues that pleasure cannot be conceived within the ápeiron (41 d). Therefore, it possesses certain measures (peratôs) and intelligibility. So, pleasure is a mixture (poson) of intelligible and unintelligible aspects, with which human intelligibility relates to human becoming (32). Consequently, pleasure is genesis, and therefore cannot become the absolute good (53-54): it is not self-sufficient or infinite; at the most (even mixed with wisdom) it would be eligible for humans. In that sense, pleasure is a kind of cessation of pain; but it would be necessary to explicit the ontological condition as a loss of original nature (67 a). Thus, pleasure is a genesis that originates in and from the mixed, a hybrid of sensibility and intelligibility (53 c).

Our interpretation: First premise: genesis and ousia are not opposites; then the genesis is oriented toward ousia (24 d, 54 c). Second premise: the pleasure is genesis (53 c). Conclusion: the pleasure as a smart move towards a full and demanding archetype of integration (ousia). Therefore, real pleasure is a process of self-realization to recover the originality of the human being. This dissolves the dilemma and guides pleasure to virtue; that is, learning to enjoy.

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Mankind without Women and the Physicalization of the Tripartite Soul; Parmenidean Pedagogy in Plato’s Timaeus

In Plato’s Philosophers, Catherine Zuckert looks at Plato’s Timaeus with fresh eyes, implicitly reviving the thesis of A. E. Taylor that Timaeus does not speak for Plato. Taylor devoted his scrupulous 1927 commentary to making this case but it ran aground on the question about Plato posed ten years later by F. M. Cornford in Plato’s Cosmology (viii): “What could have been his motive?” In my paper, I will argue that Plato’s motive was both pedagogical and Parmenidean: just as the Goddess exposes the seeker to “the Way of Opinion” after the revelation of “Truth,” so also does Plato expose the reader to a poetic account of a sight-based cosmology—another κοσμὸς ἐπέων ἀπατηλός (Parmenides B8.52)—after the revelation of exclusively intelligible Platonic ontology in Republic V-VII. In addition to the evidence in Republic that the tripartition of the soul depends on the methods associated with διάνοια, not νοῦς, in the Divided Line, there are absurdities in the discourse of Timaeus that have escaped the criticism of Platonists eager to spare the master embarrassment. While the hypothesis of the Parmenidean provenance of Plato’s Timaeus still indica Timaeus’s successors an embarrassing failure to grasp the point of the dialogue, it finds in dialectical pedagogy a plausible motive for the master’s method. It is particularly noteworthy that Aristotle makes a similar mistake with regard to Parmenides: he not only takes the cosmology offered in “the Way of Opinion” as unequivocally representing his serious views but by falsely identifying the two cosmological principles of Parmenides as “fire and earth” (Physics
A.5), he points to yet another a link, recognized by Taylor (Commentary, 92 n. 4), to Plato’s Timaeus (31b6-8).

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Plato’s Conception of Soul as Reflexive Indeterminate Activity

The purpose of this essay is to unify two seemingly disparate conceptions of soul in the Platonic corpus. On the one hand, soul is an ontological principle of motion, a self-moved mover. It is the principle of life in all-living things, including the universe itself. Such a description we find primarily in the Laws and Phaedrus, but also implicitly in the Timaeus. On the other hand, in human beings the soul is also distinctly ethical, a self-ruler that organizes its desires so that it can truly love wisdom. In addition to the Laws and Phaedrus, we find the description of the soul as a self-ruler most clearly articulated in Book IV of the Republic.

I propose that both these understandings of the Platonic soul rest on the following definition: the soul, either ontologically or ethically, is reflexive indeterminate activity. The soul is an activity insofar as it is always in process, in flux, becoming. As such, the soul is also indeterminate. Soul possesses no particular configuration other than its being in process. Nonetheless, this activity is determinable on account of the soul’s reflexivity, or the capacity to make itself the object of its own determination. On account of its reflexivity, the soul can organize its own activity and thereby acquire a configuration it does not necessarily possess.

I divide the paper into two halves. In the first half, I articulate the view of soul as a self-mover and show that the principal texts make it clear that soul thus understood is reflexive indeterminate activity. In the second half of the paper, I show that the presentation of the human soul as a self-ruler presupposes the definition of soul as reflexive indeterminate activity. While it is clear that the ethical task of the human soul is to determine or rule itself and thereby establish proper order within itself, we find that such determination would not be possible without the structure that the soul exhibits ontologically. For Plato, ‘self-ruler’ is the ethical manifestation of the ontological self-mover. The consequence of my analysis is the conclusion that Platonic ethics is neither intellectualist nor dogmatic, but properly understood as being-well.

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Knowing No Better: Plato’s Socrates as Blame Incompatibilist

While the term “blame incompatibilist” is a contemporary one, the idea behind the term is an old one. Blame incompatibilists hold that it is perfectly consistent to maintain that virtuous people who cannot help but behave well are praiseworthy and responsible for their exemplary behavior while simultaneously holding that one who behaves badly and who cannot do otherwise is exempt from responsibility and blame. In this paper, I shall argue that Plato’s Socrates implicitly endorses such a claim, and that his form of blame incompatibilism rests upon both an epistemological and a motivational requirement, which are symbiotic.

In order to motivate the claim that Plato’s Socrates is a blame incompatibilist, I shall first refer to his various discussions of education and responsibility. For instance, in Apology, Socrates argues that if the charges he faces are appropriate, and if he has been behaving badly, then Athenians ought to rehabilitate him through education. However, if Athenians wish to punish Socrates for his present state of ignorance of the good, which has led to his corrupting the youth, they ought to blame and punish themselves as well, since youths are educated by a community and not just one man (24b-26a). While it is not explicitly drawn out, this argument is primed for becoming a reductio ad absurdum employing an infinite regress: If the youths are not to blame for their corrupt behavior since they were mal-educated by Socrates, then Socrates is not to blame for his corrupting ignorance, since he too must have been mal-educated. However, whoever mis-educated Socrates must have done so due to an improper education, ad infinitum. In short, it is absurd to blame anyone for bad acts that they do out of ignorance, since the justification for such practice yields an infinite regress.

So, for Plato’s Socrates, one must know that what one is doing is wrong in order to be deserving of blame. However, one must voluntarily do something wrong in order to be deserving of blame. But voluntary behavior is also teleological behavior whereby the agent aims to promote or preserve what appears to that agent to be the good. This is evident in many of Plato’s discussions where Socrates advocates a kind of strong motivational internalism: believing something to be best is sufficient for acting in order to promote it. In various discussions of akrasia, Socrates employs premises that are essentially the tenets of
strong motivational internalism. For this reason, Plato's Socrates is thought to have denied the possibility of akratic action.

In closing, I shall show that these two requirements (knowledge and motivation) are different sides of the same coin. The two together make Socrates an incompatibilist of sorts. In addition, Socrates' discussions of virtue suggest that the good man is to be admired for his virtue and happiness. Therefore, while it is perfectly fine to praise the man of virtue who cannot willingly do otherwise, the same is not true of anyone who behaves badly.

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Plato's Phaedo: The Nature and Powers/Capacities of the Human Soul

This paper gives a brief overview of the Phaedo. The dialogue has nine parts. Each part represents a different power or capacity (dunamis) of the human soul. 1) Introduction: obstacles to rational inquiry about the soul's immortality: family responsibilities, political persecution, pleasure and pain, and fear; 2) The Argument from Natural Cycles (The Ecologist's Argument): soul as energy; 3) The Mathematical Mystic’s Argument: the human soul's capacity for abstract mathematics; 4) The Argument from Dualism (The Theologian's Argument): the soul is what it does and the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; 5) The Interlude: misology and misanthropy: Socrates’ concern that no one understood his way of life and why it is best; 6) The Argument from Harmony (The Chemist’s Argument): soul as body chemistry; 7) The Argument from the Power of Mind (nous): the highest power of the human soul as mind; Socrates’ claim that all his actions were caused by the power of his mind; 8) The Biologist’s Argument: soul as the life force in a living body; 9) The Concluding Myth: a symbolic representation of the conversation; Socrates’ use of irrational drives—pleasure, pain, and fear—to stimulate the interlocutors to continue the pursuit of wisdom after he is gone.

Socrates’ greatest concern is that his way of life lives on after he dies. He cares about the immortality of philosophy, its continued existence after he is gone, not about his own personal life after death. He knows he has not proven the soul’s immortality because it cannot be proven. He is disappointed that his interlocutors seem to be ready to give up philosophical inquiry altogether if it means they will eventually be killed, unless the immortality of their individual souls is proven. The Phaedo is Socrates’ second defense of his way of life, as he says. Socrates’ first defense, in the Apology, was focused on political association. The dialectical activity of the Socratic gadfly is the ‘greatest gift’ to any free and open society. The Phaedo is Socrates’ defense based on the nature of the universe and of the human soul. The most fundamental principle or power (energia) in the universe is Divine Mind. The existence of Divine Mind made possible the evolution of a natural creature that possesses the power of mind, the power that can understand the basic principles of reality and knows it ought to use this power to guide every choice in all aspects of life.

Plato's system of education, as Socrates says in Republic VII, is primarily the education of the power of mind. Plato's dialogues are that system. The dialogues are modifications of many of the patterns in tragedies, as described by Aristotle. Each dialogue includes the pattern of education in the Image of the Cave. Each dialogue also includes all the powers of the soul as described by the Image of the Divided Line. Plato's moral psychology is based on his metaphysics.

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Socrates Complexity and Akrasia

It is often claimed that Socrates’ intellectualism leaves no room for emotions in his explanation of human behavior. Since Plato’s Republic Book IV, everyone has thought that their role cannot be ignored, i.e., bad actions cannot be due solely to defects in our intellectual understanding of what is best for ourselves. Why? Because, even if there were no defects, i.e., even if we had knowledge, we might nevertheless produce bad actions. Knowledge is sometimes impotent.

The usual false explanation of how passions or emotions can overcome knowledge, that is, by causing us to do some sub-optimal action independent of our intellect, or as Terry Penner puts it: that a thought-independent desire is the proximate cause of a particular action, has been dealt with in detail by Penner in that article and I shall just assume it here. So, Socrates has no room for emotions if emotions are to be the proximate cause of our here-now actions. But is this the only way for emotions to play a role in human agency? I do not think so. Consider the following:

If I have knowledge that eating an entire 3/4 pound bag of Doritos in one sitting is bad for me, say, because the pain I
inevitably feel after doing so outweighs the pleasure I get while eating the entire bag, then, according to Socrates, my intellectual state is a complex one. I have a correct understanding of the following: the quantity and quality of pleasure to be gained in the experience of eating an entire 3/4 pound bag of Doritos in one sitting, the quantity and quality of pain to be gained shortly after that experience, the relation between those two, and how that relation contributes to achieving the best life possible for me given the way the world in fact is. All four of these things are, according to Socrates, complex things. Correctly grasping the fourth is the most obviously complex one, but the other three are complex as well. In other words, according to Socrates, I am not merely in complete understanding of some fact, say, the fact that *eating an entire bag of Doritos is bad for me*, where this fact is individuated very narrowly, that is, in the usual Fregean way. Rather, I am in complete understanding of an extremely large number of complex things and how all of these things connect up with each other. This would be a supreme intellectual achievement.

However, I begin to worry that given the complexity of this intellectual grasping, it does seem very plausible to think that my emotions could interfere with achieving and/or maintaining such a state *given its extreme complexity*.

My thesis is that emotions can make such fine-grained intellectual calculations harder to make. It is still the case that Plato was wrong to argue that non-rational desires can bring us all the way to action. But he was not wrong in thinking that non-rational desires, though not the proximate causes of our actions, can still play a non-intellectual role in the production of action. I shall conclude, though, that this clarification is merely a refinement of Socrates’s action theory and not a rejection of it.

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2 Cf. Plato’s *Protagoras* 349-361.

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**Socrates’ Argument for the Division of the Soul and Glaucon’s Conception of Desire**

In *Republic* Book 4, during the argument for the division of the soul, Socrates envisages an objection to his claim that the object of ‘thirst itself’ is merely ‘drink’. The imaginary objector attempts to block the division of the soul by arguing that thirst is a desire for good drink (438a). According to the prevalent interpretation, in trying to dispel the objection Socrates is making a point against Plato’s earlier ‘Socratic’ view of human desire. In this paper, I argue that the prevalent interpretation fails to identify Socrates’ target and to make sense of this important stage of his argumentation (437d-439b).

Resting on the premise that everybody desires good things, the objector argues fallaciously that if thirst is a desire (the object of which has been specified as ‘drink’), it is a desire for good drink. His argument suggests that ‘drink’ as an object of thirst is (necessarily) a good thing. As I argue, this conclusion is precisely what Socrates objects to. If it were correct, claiming that drinking is rejected by reason would involve an absurdity. Socrates does not rule out that when one is thirsty, one also desires good drink. What he rules out is the identification of thirst with the desire for good drink. This identification presupposes the (strict) identity of the desired objects. ‘Drink’ and ‘good drink’ cannot be exactly identical since drinking, when it is desired, is not essentially/necessarily good. Good drink is drink qualified. Furthermore, I argue that the desire for good drink, which is introduced here as thirst modified, is an ‘incoherent’ desire because drinking is bad for the agent in the circumstances. Nevertheless, Socrates cannot assume that drinking is simply bad and bad for appetite. What he aims at showing is that drinking is not essentially good and thus it can be thought to be bad by reason. Thus the desire for good drink can be opposed by reason insofar as it is for ‘drink’ and is constituted by thirst. More generally, Socrates suggests that specifying the opposition in the soul requires that the modifications of thirst be ignored.

The view of human desire that Socrates opposes is not ‘Socratic’ since it involves a confusion between the real and the apparent good. In Glaucon’s speech in Book 2 one can detect a view of human nature according to which the object of desire is identified as *pleonexia* and is always good for the agent (359b-c). Thus desire cannot be willingly opposed by reason. In Book 4 Socrates attempts to gradually alter Glaucon’s ‘sophistic’ conception of human nature and the corresponding conception of the good. Socrates is not in a position to fully distinguish between the apparent and the real good yet. However, the arguments for the division of the soul contribute to modifying his interlocutors’ and the reader’s views about the good by distinguishing what is good according the lower part from what is good according to reason, which, as it emerges, is good for the whole soul.

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Jealousy (phthónos) as a Philosophical Problem

In ancient Greece, and particularly in Plato, the term phthónos, which can be translated, for lack of anything better, by “jealousy”, designates a passion that manifests itself not exclusively in the context of an amorous relationship, between two persons who enter into competition or conflict with regard to a third. This is no question here of skipping what remains the preferred locus of expression for jealousy, but we will show how, for Plato, who here takes up the ideas shared by most of his Greek contemporaries, jealousy takes place in a variety of contexts, particularly religious, political and social, where the object of the competition or conflict is not a person, but a possession. We will then show how this passion, in which pleasure and pain are combined, can also be considered by Plato as the primary obstacle to dialogue, and therefore to philosophical activity.  

3 This text is a thoroughly revised version of a text first published in French in 1996.

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Desire and Beliefs about the Best in Plato’s Phaedo

With respect to bodily desire, the Phaedo evidently imposes a more demanding requirement on the philosopher than we find in other dialogues. Rather than counseling moderation and discipline, the Phaedo requires that the philosopher stay away from bodily desire to the extent possible within embodied human life (64e4-65a2, 82c2-4). Indeed, staying away from bodily desire is included as an essential element of practicing philosophy in the right way (83b5-7). To understand the normative philosophy of the Phaedo, then, we must clarify the nexus between moral psychology and ethics by identifying the nature of the threat that desire poses to the correct practice of philosophy.

Identifying the Threat. We know that desire exacerbates the soul’s incarceration (82e5-6), but how precisely it undermines rational sovereignty remains an open question. In their Socratic Moral Psychology, Brickhouse and Smith suggest that the danger is synchronic belief akrasia: desire has the power to override the agent’s present belief about what is best to do (198-9). When Socrates most clearly identifies the evil that desire causes in the soul, however, it is not belief-override but belief-replacement: intense desires and other strong feelings can force the agent into the false belief that the visible causes of such states are most clear (ἐναργέστατόν) and most real (ἀληθέστατον) (83c5-8). Thus, the gravest threat posed by desire is not motivational but intellectual—it is not akrasia, but being forced into falsehood about the reality of sensible things.

Explaining Belief-Replacement. Once identified, belief-replacement must be explained. In this connection, the text yields three crucial data points about the form, functional role, and phenomenological character of desire:

(1) Desires make statements about reality and what matters (83d4-6).

(2) Desires compel us to acquire their objects (64d8-e1, 66c5-d2).

(3) Desires can be intense or violent (83b8).

To account for (1)-(3), my interpretation posits that desires have content, part of which is imperative and part of which is descriptive. An intense desire for drink, for example, is structured as follows: <Acquire drink! It really matters!>

The imperative content <Acquire drink!> gives desires satisfaction conditions and mind-to-world direction of fit. The descriptive content <It really matters!> gives desires truth-conditions and allows them to make statements about reality and significance.

Belief-replacement occurs when the content of such desires is imposed upon reason and becomes the agent’s own statement about what is most clear and most real. With this statement about clarity and reality among his motivating reasons, the intelligible domain recedes from view (81b4-5), and it becomes impossible to practice philosophy in the right way.

The Irrationality of Bodily Desires. The foregoing account has important implications for Plato’s conception of irrationality in the Phaedo. Bodily desires are irrational not because they are entirely good-independent, but because they are unsaturated by the beliefs of reason about value and what is best. It is precisely because desires make statements about value and
what really matters that they can play their role in belief-replacement.

### Emotions and the Good Life as the Mixed Life in the *Philebus*

The conceptual framework that Socrates uses to discuss pleasure and the good life in *Republic* Book 9 is an extension of the tripartite structure of the soul. Of the three types of lives, only the philosophical life consists of pure pleasures. A similar framework is used in Book 10 to show how tragic poetry is the cause of emotional upheaval and conflict between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Only the soul in which reason rules over emotion and desire can live in harmony and be truly happy.

In the *Philebus*, a different perspective of the soul and its emotional life is offered. This is one based on a framework rooted in the structure of the cosmos in which everything is made up of one and many, and for which there is a limit and an unlimited that can be discerned by the use of a method given to men by some Promethean god (16c-e). In the course of this discussion, we learn from Socrates that pure pleasures of the soul are possible, but for the most part the soul lives a life full of tragedy and comedy and its emotions are mixtures of pleasure and pain.

In this paper, I examine these aspects of the *Philebus* and discuss Plato's treatment of the soul as a blend of intelligence and emotions, where emotions are mixtures of pleasure and pains and the good life is the mixed life. I argue that despite criticisms which may be brought against Plato, in this regard, his efforts to show how a new type of unity emerges from the blending of diverse phenomena and that emotions can be in harmony with rather than opposed to intelligence is beyond reproach and is a highly commendable achievement.

### Pleasure as Complex Pleasure as Temptress

Socrates would not presume to know the names of the gods; but he does know that pleasure is complex. Indeed, it is this conviction that opens the longest sustained examination of pleasure that Plato offers, the *Philebus*’ contest between the claims of pleasure and those of intelligence to make human life good. Pleasure’s multiplicity, it turns out, is itself various, with each sort having different implications for the hedonist thesis under examination, and for the rationalist alternative that should replace it.

In the *Republic*, especially in Book VIII, pleasure is described as ποικίλος, and this multifariousness somehow associated with its nefariousness. The *Philebus* examines this, exploring what exactly the problem is supposed to be with pleasure’s variegatedness, what is the source of it, and what therefore might be a plausible solution to it within a well-lived human life.

This paper traces the unfolding of the complexity claim through the course of the *Philebus*, in order to bring out why this claim is so centrally relevant to deciding the worth of pleasure. I want to know not only why the sorts of variety and embroidered differentiation to which pleasure is liable make it unsuitable as an end, but also how this same characteristic makes it nevertheless possible for pleasure to have a suitable place in a good life. Plato’s account of pleasure discovers internal complexity to the phenomenon as the ground for the indefinite variety of guises in which individual pleasures appear. This, I shall argue, can explain how what we take pleasure in is intimately related to our moral character—rather than merely asserting that it is so. Since the sort of variety characteristic of pleasure arises from its embeddedness within the specific psychological powers we have, it can explain why educating our desires and pleasures is both intelligible and possible, and required.

I contrast this view of the nature of pleasure in relation to our other experiences and capacities with a view that depicts pleasure as essentially a threat to morality, rather than a potential ally. According to the alternative picture, it is primarily pleasure that tempts us away from doing what virtue demands—and the best one can hope for is that such temptation happens not to arise, and that when it does, we are equal to it. Our pleasures cannot be incorporated into an account of moral worth. Of course Plato recognizes that we can experience pleasure as an alien threat. What his *Phileban* moral psychology offers is an explanation of why we could ever experience it as otherwise.
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Listening with a Lover’s Ear: Philosophical Receptivity in the Phaedrus

No other interpretive problem in the Phaedrus has vexed commentators so consistently as how to relate the three erotic speeches in the first half of the dialogue to the discussion of rhetoric and writing in its second half. After arguing that several noteworthy and broadly representative attempts at resolving this problem are unsuccessful, I develop a solution of my own. On my reading, the right-handed erōs of Socrates’ palinode is a motive force whose scope extends beyond the narrowly erotic context. As well as lovers, it animates right-handed auditors and readers, which, I argue, are the proper objects of the account of rhetoric and writing.

I begin to justify this interpretive shift by highlighting two overlooked features of the dialogue. First, whereas Socrates interrogates a group of orators in the Gorgias about the possibility of an art of rhetoric, the Phaedrus is a discussion with Phaedrus, a consummate auditor. Second, the Phaedrus is organized around Socrates’ presumption that Phaedrus enjoys Lysias’ speech because he knows it is a good speech in its form and content – the knowledge that an expert auditor should have. In the palinode, Socrates demonstrates that the content of Lysias’ speech is misleading, and in the discussion of rhetoric, Socrates criticizes the speech’s form.

If these pieces of the dialogue serve the negative function of elenchus – to expose to Phaedrus the weaknesses in his initial beliefs – then the discussion of rhetoric serves the positive function of developing an account of the ideal auditor. The right-handed lover initially has a vision of his beloved as wise, and then goes about cultivating wisdom in his beloved and himself in accordance with this vision. In the same way, the ideal auditor presumes that an orator is wise about speaking, and then goes about cultivating this wisdom in him by holding him accountable for it. The account of the art of rhetoric outlines the sort of knowledge and technical proficiency that the ideal auditor must presume the orator to possess.

One advantage of this reading is that it preserves the sense of several of Socrates’ claims about rhetoric that otherwise appear incorrect. I argue that Socrates’ formal requirements on speeches – that they begin with a definition, and have a clear, purposeful structure – do not contribute to making speeches persuasive, full stop. Rather, these requirements contribute to making speeches persuasive to the ideal auditor, and to the auditor’s ability to bring out the inchoate knowledge that a speech might possess. Likewise, Socrates’ requirement that orators possess knowledge of the things about which they speak need not contribute to their ability to persuade an ignorant audience. Rather, the ideal auditor should presume that an orator is knowledgeable in order to elicit knowledge from him, as Socrates often does with his interlocutors.

Finally, I explain how the discussion of writing can be subsumed under the same theme. This discussion aims at an account of the ideal reader, who interrogates texts and writers in the way that the ideal auditor interrogates orators and speeches.

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Plato Ethicizing the Immortality of the Soul: the Moralizing Project of the Orphic Metempsychosis in Plato’s Works

Platonic works reveals a clear reference to a source, at the same time ancient, religious and Italic, to theories of the immortality of the soul that we can find in a parallel manner in the Orphic literature. It was certainly the case of the motto sōma-sêma. The Platonic appropriation of the allegedly primitive theories of Orphic immortality is marked by moralizing intentions, as the insistence in the hierarchy of the reincarnation and even the original Platonic soteriological etymology for the sōma-sêma motif demonstrates. It is not impossible, however, to conclude that the transposition was mediated by a movement, like the Pythagorean one which, though probably close, both geographically and socially, to the mythology and ritualization of the Orphic telestai, somehow contributes to “Apollonize Orphism” — in the famous expression of Ciaceri (1931-32), that is — as the lectio afterwards also shared by Burkert (1972: 132-133) and Pugliese Carratelli (2001: 17-29) — to intellectualize and aristocratize Orphic traditions.

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Plato’s Account of Akrasia and Courage in the Protagoras

Acts are akratic if the agents know what is best, can do it, do not do it, and rationalize their choices. Akratic agents experience defeat in moral struggle, seem to know their acts are wrong while performing them, and are blamed by themselves and others. In the Protagoras, the Many explain akratic actions by claiming that people are overcome by pleasure or passion (352b-e). Socrates’ explanation is that people temporarily lose sight of which acts are best (356c).

(a) Both proposals deny the existence of akratic acts. According to Socrates akratic agents are confused; they do not meet the know-what-is-best condition. According to the Many, akratic agents are overcome; they do not meet the could-do-what-is-best condition.

(b) Each proposal explains some, but not all of the phenomena. The Many can accommodate the experience of moral struggle and the knowledge of wrongness, but not the blame. For Socrates it is the reverse.

Scholars often deploy the principle of charity on behalf of Socrates, but this is a mistake because Socrates is a character in a work of fiction. The person actually deserving of a charitable interpretation is Plato. Recognizing this allows me to argue that, unlike Socrates and the Many, Plato does not reject the existence of akratic acts. Instead, Plato rejects hedonism (more broadly, the reduction of all values to a common denominator), and the inability to choose.

Plato implicitly advances a third account of akrasia. If there are several incommensurable goods, then sometimes people’s passions neither overpower nor confuse, but instead pose a more appealing alternative to the best option. The agent thinks, “I know that X would be best, and I could do it, but X just isn’t for me because [insert rationalization here], so I’m going to do Y, instead.” This account meets all four conditions, and explains all three phenomena of akrasia. Attributing this account to Plato gives him a plausible view, brings the Protagoras into line with other dialogs, and is supported by textual evidence.

It also sheds light on the rest of the Protagoras. Leaving aside the poetic interlude (339a-349a), the Protagoras has a ring structure with the discussion of akrasia at its philosophic center (351b-358c), successively bracketed by discussions of courage (349d-351a, 358c-360e), the unity of virtue (329c-333e, 361b), the teachability of virtue (318a-328d, 361a-e), and arguably by the two dramatic introductions (309a-310a, 310b-317e) (since the first introduction actually takes place after the rest of the dialog). A thorough interpretation would ripple out from the dialog’s bull’s eye to encompass all four rings plus the interlude. Here I shall begin this project by advancing a novel interpretation of the akrasia discussion and sketching some implications for the courage ring. Like the akrasia reductio, both courage-is-wisdom arguments are designed as teaching tools rather than sound arguments. Plato’s rejection of hedonism reveals a rather Aristotelian definition of courage: dispositions of confidence and fear, rendered moderate by wisdom.

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Intellectualism and the Elenchus

It is argued that the psychology of the Apology, which deserves to be called ‘Socratic intellectualism’, is decisively rejected in the Gorgias. According to Socratic intellectualism, how one is doing with regard to virtue is entirely a matter, not just of one’s beliefs, but of one’s elenctically accessible beliefs (ie beliefs susceptible of detection, critique and modification through the elenchus). In the Apology intellectualism and the elenchus are just theoretical and practical expressions of the same fundamental idea: that such beliefs are the key to one’s character and life. Intellectualism and the elenchus correspond, in the dialogues proper, to the two dimensions of expression that accrue to Plato as author of a dialogue. Intellectualism and its corollaries are doctrines Socrates argues for and to which his interlocutors object; all this goes on at the level of what the characters say. But there is also what Plato shows the reader by enacting different forms of the elenchus, with different results. I claim that the form of elenchus Socrates ascribes to himself in his account in the Apology of his way of life differs importantly from the form he there describes himself as urging upon people in general; and I argue that the form enacted in the Gorgias corresponds to the latter. That is, there is no provision in the Apology for Socrates taking part in the sort of conversation depicted in the Gorgias. The disastrous results of Socrates’ attempts to conduct the elenchus in the Gorgias are therefore not anticipated by the Apology, and indicate insoluble problems with the vision Socrates sets forth there of universal improvement through the elenchus. These deficiencies of the elenchus in its universal application, dramatized in the Gorgias, also follow from the psychology Socrates defends there. He clearly accepts that pleasure and pain play crucial roles in the formation of many of the beliefs about the good on which character depends. But pleasure and pain cannot be integrated into an Apology-style account of virtuous character-formation as an entirely logos-driven process. This is the real significance of Socrates’ denial in the Gorgias that pleasure and pain have a logos, which was the basis of his argument against Gorgias and Polus that rhetoric is not a tekhnê.
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How Satisfying is Conventional Satisfaction?

I consider a problematic passage from *Republic* VI, 505d-e. The passage is central to arguments concerning whether Plato gives up, retains, or revises his earlier commitments (notably expressed in the *Gorgias* and the *Meno*) that we either desire the real good or at least under the guise of the good. My main interest in this passage isn’t as it bears directly on that issue, however, but rather the curious division Socrates makes between things *believed* (*ta dokounta*) to be just or admirable (*kalon*), and things *believed* to be good. He says people can be satisfied with the former but not the latter. So it seems like it’s psychologically tenable to bear a satisfaction relation toward some *dokounta* values, but not others.

I consider various attractive interpretations of what Socrates might have in mind with the expression "*dokounta.*" An especially interesting interpretation based on some things Rachel Barney (2010) has said has Socrates saying that many people can be part-time conventionalists. That view says that we can be satisfied with conventionally (but not actually, independent of our community) just and admirable things, but not with merely conventionally good things. The view has much to recommend it, especially since if we do import a guise of the good thesis, it offers a ready explanation of the psychological difference between those the just and the admirable on the one hand, and the good on the other. Unfortunately, I claim, it clashes with other prominent convictions Socrates seems to have, and seems to think others have, one of which is that *good* is part of the very *meaning* of *kalon* for ordinary people. I argue that it is ultimately difficult to have Socrates attribute this sort of conventionalism to so many people without having Socrates think them as confused as those who deny similarly transparent analytic statements. How much we find this option plausible will depend on exactly how confused and self-contradictory we find Socrates’ interlocutors in the dialogues.

I end by canvassing an option that uses ideas from the conventionalist framework, but avoids having Socrates attribute mass semantic confusion. That option considers the famous description of knowledge and stable belief in the *Meno*, and leverages it in a way still able to make sense of the psychological split between the just, admirable, and good to which Socrates points, but also makes fuller sense of the surrounding passage, including why those who go in for merely conventionally good cannot even reap a benefit from their grasp of the *dokounta* just and admirable. I end by considering whether we still need to assume a guise of the good thesis to understand this passage, or whether we might be able to stay interpretively neutral.

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Purification of Bodily Desire in the *Phaedo*

The moral psychology of the *Phaedo* seems quite bizarre; perhaps this is why it has not received much attention. The standard view of those who do discuss it (e.g., Lorenz and Bobonich) is that Socrates seats many of our desires in our body, not our soul, and so splits our psychological states between two entities that he thinks are quite distinct. In this paper I argue that this misinterprets the way desires work in the *Phaedo*. I present an alternative that sheds light on some of the dialogue’s central ethical claims.

Socrates does say that the body has bodily desires. But he also says that it *fills* (66c) the soul with these desires and that the soul *shares* these desires with the body (83d). I argue that the soul itself can come to possess bodily desires, having received them from the body. When I act on a bodily desire, it is my soul that does so, acting on a desire that it received from my body. If this is right, there is only one seat for the desires that I act on: my soul. This account coheres better with other things Socrates says in the dialogue. For example, he says that we are our souls and that we act on our bodily desires; given this, our soul, not our body, should be what acts on bodily desires.

This account of bodily desires helps us understand the central role of purification in the dialogue. Socrates repeatedly claims that the soul should purify itself of the body. I argue that we should understand purifying here as removing bodily things (including bodily desires) that are present in the soul and are not proper to or good for it. If Socrates believed that only the body, not the soul, possessed these bodily desires, there would be no need for the soul to purify itself of them.

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Socrates thinks that bodily things (such as bodily desires) are not good for the soul because the soul has a proper activity, acquiring and possessing truth, that it must engage in to live the best life. Bodily desires are foreign entities that enter the soul, give it the wrong ends, confuse it, and so stop us from living a good life. The only way to entirely remove these foreign entities is to completely separate our souls from our bodies. But, so long as we are connected to our bodies, we must do our best not to allow these desires into our soul and to remove the ones that are already there. If we do this, purifying ourselves, not only will we be able to better engage in the proper activity in this life, we will also avoid having our soul be too dependent on these bodily elements. Socrates thinks this might let us break free of the cycle of reincarnation and so be able to truly achieve our end: eternal knowledge.

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The Blind Desires of Republic IV

It seems fairly clear that, according to Plato, all human motivation is — in some essential or fundamental way — guided by, fixed upon, oriented toward, or connected to the good. But what exactly is the nature of this connection, as he sees it? One possible interpretation holds that he sees it as a restriction on the admissible contents of our desires: just as we must always perceive objects under various guises — we don't just see the sky, we see the sky as blue; we don't just taste the wine, we taste the wine as sweet — so we must always desire objects under the guise of the good. Though this interpretation has a certain undeniable appeal, my aim will be to show, first, that it is inconsistent with the crucially important tripartition argument of Republic IV; and second, that there is a promising alternative interpretation available here — one that is not only consistent with the argument of Republic IV, but also philosophically and exegetically attractive in its own right. According to this new interpretation, the essential or fundamental connection Plato sees between desire and the good is, at bottom, a normative one, similar in character to the connection he sees between belief and the true: just as it is in the nature of our beliefs to be made correct (or successful) by the truth of what we believe, so it is in the nature of our desires to be made correct (or successful) by the goodness of what we desire.

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Recollection and Innatism

The theory of recollection, as it is presented in the Meno, is generally taken to posit not only prenatal but also innate knowledge. However, assessing this claim is made difficult by the twin facts that there are different varieties of innatism and that different things have been taken to be innate. I distinguish among varieties of innatism, and among different things that have been taken to be innate. I then challenge the view that the Meno posits the sort of innatism it is usually thought to posit. It either doesn’t posit innatism at all; or else its version of innatism is considerably more attenuated than it is generally taken to be. (In particular, I argue against Dominic Scott's view that, according to the theory of recollection, we all have latent innate knowledge of answers to 'What is F?' questions. Interestingly, neither Plutarch nor Alcinous seems to think that Plato holds that view either; nor is it clear that they assume it in their own right.) This leads to a new account of the way in which Plato argues for the immortality of the soul in the Meno. In some ways, his argument is better on my account than it is generally taken to be. For example, one premise of his argument is generally thought to be that one either has knowledge for all time, or else acquires it at some time. It is then rightly objected that these are not exhaustive options; for perhaps one, or one’s soul, doesn’t exist for all time and doesn’t acquire knowledge at some time, but has knowledge for as long as it exists. On a second account, the premise says that the soul either has knowledge for as long as it exists, or else acquires its knowledge at some time. This second account is better than the first one is; but I argue that it is still defective. I suggest a third interpretation on which the premise presents exhaustive options and is better justified by the context than the other two accounts are. But, on this interpretation, as opposed to on the other two, neither disjunct posits innate knowledge. Even on my account, however, the final inference to immortality fails, though I suggest that it fails for a different reason from the one that is usually suggested. I also consider reasons Plato might have to NOT posit innate knowledge.
One of the most controversial claims about pleasure in the entire Platonic corpus is the claim in the *Philebus* that pleasures can be *false*. One charge frequently leveled against Plato’s account of false pleasures is that he uses the predicate ‘false’ in more than one sense. Most of the secondary literature about false pleasures in the *Philebus* has focused on the discussion of false pleasures of anticipation, in which Socrates draws a direct analogy between pleasure and belief; however, Socrates introduces several other distinct types of false pleasure, including mixed pleasures belonging to either the body or the soul. It is far from clear how the argument for the falsity of pleasures of anticipation and a narrow class of related pleasures is meant to extend to the large class of pleasures which are mixed with pain: whereas the former are intimately connected with particular beliefs, mixed pleasures of the body can occur independently of belief and belong to non-rational as well as rational animals.

In this paper, I argue that the predicate ‘false’ (ψευδής) does have more than one sense in the *Philebus*, and yet far from exploiting the inherent ambiguity of the word, or worse, not noticing it, Plato explicitly distinguishes between two senses. In the initial argument that pleasures can be true or false, Socrates draws attention to a structural similarity of pleasure and belief. He shows that some pleasures, like beliefs, have complex intentional content which can represent the world correctly or incorrectly. In other words, just as a person can falsely believe that she will be rich, she can falsely take pleasure in this prospect. In the famous analogy between the soul and an illustrated book, Socrates compares pleasures to paintings in the soul which represent the same content, and inherit the same truth value, as the corresponding beliefs (38e-39c). Thus, the first sense in which pleasures can be false in the *Philebus* is closely parallel to the sense in which beliefs are false.

At *Philebus* 41e-42c Socrates describes a very different sense in which pleasures can be false. He considers circumstances in which pleasure and pain are experienced simultaneously. In such cases, the comparison with pain distorts the pleasure, making it seem greater than it actually is (42b). Instead of straightforwardly identifying these pleasures of overestimation as another species of false pleasure, Socrates claims that they function in the opposite way (ἐναντίον, 43a5). Whereas the false pleasures analyzed so far are preceded by, and inherit their falsity from, false beliefs, the pleasures of overestimation arise independently of beliefs. However, like the illusions of sight to which they are compared, pleasures that are mixed with pain “distort the truth and cause false beliefs” (42a1). Thus, in the case of the false pleasures of overestimation, ψευδής means ‘deceptive’ or ‘misleading’, rather than ‘false’ in the same sense in which beliefs are false.

My aim in this paper is to investigate the significance of hope (*elpis*; *elpizein*) in Plato’s *Philebus*. Thus the following will treat the positive content the dialogue puts forth about and through the issue of hope (*Philebus* 12d3, 32b9-c2, 36a3-c7, 3934-7, 40a3, and 61b8-10). This investigation maintains that Plato attempts to define hope in the *Philebus* as (1) a pleasure of the soul, which (2) may be true or false, (3) is pure, and (4) often involves memory. The essay proceeds chronologically through the *Philebus*’ discussions of hope and makes every effort to treat each of the aforementioned components of the definition separately. I try to make clear not only that hope is mentioned or discussed more than several times in Plato’s *Philebus*, but that it has at least a provisional definition and occupies a significant place in the dialogue. Several secondary sources, including the work of Dorothea Frede, Cristina Ionescu, Alan Mittleman, and Terry Penner greatly aid in my endeavors, though none of this scholarship is solely devoted to Plato’s treatment of hope. Indeed very little scholarship exists that investigates the issue of hope in Plato. Throughout the course of the essay’s main discussion, I will also try to make clear that the issue of hope intersects with aspects of the broader discussion of pleasure in a way that uniquely promotes fruitful inquiry. Topics I have incorporated into this inquiry include: the distinction between expectation (*prosdokia*) and hope (*elpis*), the relationship between pleasures of the soul and memory, the role of false hopes in the argument of the *Philebus*, and true hope for the pleasures of learning.
Plato presents a moral theory in which psychological states like fear (especially the fear of death) are discounted, and even explicitly argued against as tending to give rise to immoral states of character. For instance, the educational program detailed in Bks. 2 and 3 of the Republic requires that various forms of fear are removed by the moral training of the auxiliaries, since fear might lead them to abandon the correct course of action (R. 413b-414a). Similarly, Socrates famously argues in both the Apology and Phaedo that one should fear neither poverty nor death, since this might cause one to neglect one’s commitment to virtue (Apol. 40c-41b, Phd. 67e-68d). From this, it seems reasonable to conclude the following normative ethical statement: excepting the unique case of vice, which can be feared without bad moral consequence, all other fears ought to be regarded as shameful psychological states, which the philosopher / virtuous individual ought to eliminate so far as possible.

Yet this principle would seem to be flatly denied by Socrates’ statement at Euthyphro 12b: “I do not think that ‘where there is fear there is also shame,’ for I think that many people who fear disease and poverty and many other things feel fear, but are not ashamed of the things they fear.” In this passage, Socrates makes the claim that fear and shame are not, indeed, coextensive terms. But how is this claim to be reconciled with the above normative statements about fear and shame expressed elsewhere by Plato? I suggest that at Euth. 12b Plato is giving a descriptive versus a normative psychological claim. Indeed, as a point of descriptive psychology Plato’s point is an impeccable one: it simply is not the case that people always experience shame of the things which they fear. There are many other provide examples of descriptive versus normative psychological claims by Plato in the Republic, Timaeus, and other middle and late dialogues. In this paper, I aim to show the value of distinguishing between normative versus descriptive psychological claims in Plato, and show the value of so separating them for understanding Plato’s account of the soul. I further argue that any account of Platonic psychology which ignores this distinction does so at its peril, and point to several influential interpretations of Plato which make just such a mistake, as well as the distortions which arise from such a conflation between normative and descriptive psychology.

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Rational Souls

Many students of Plato take the view that in certain dialogues held to be “early” Plato sets out a philosophical position which has come to be labeled “Socratic intellectualism.” This intellectualism is taken to involve a concept of human psychology and ethics markedly different from that which Plato himself advances. Socratic intellectualism is the view that human wrongdoing and human happiness are entirely dependent on knowledge of the good that all humans seek. Since all desire the good, if one knows what that is, then one cannot but strive to attain it. Thus, in this sense virtue is knowledge. Intellectualism also informs the theory of desire. Thus, the desires of everyone, including those who are not virtuous, are for the good, that is, for whatever is best for oneself. What differentiates the virtuous from everyone else is that they know how to obtain this. Accordingly, no one can act contrary to what they believe to be best and so ἀκρασία is impossible. By contrast, according to this story Plato rejects most of the tenets of Socratic intellectualism. Plato believed or came to believe that more than knowledge is necessary for virtue; one must be trained emotionally as a precondition for the acquisition of knowledge. In addition, Plato in the middle and late dialogues rejects the unity of virtue precisely because he denies that virtue is nothing but knowledge of good and evil. Perhaps most important, Plato’s tripartitioning of the soul leads him to assert the existence of irrational desires and therefore the possibility of ἀκρασία. He will, then, interpret the doctrine that no one does wrong willingly differently from Socrates. For Socrates, wrongdoing is entirely owing to ignorance; for Plato, although ignorance can lead to one type of wrongdoing, other types flow from the actions of the two lower parts of the soul and from bad bodily constitution or bad upbringing.

In this paper, I challenge the view that Plato has in any way abandoned “intellectualism.” In particular, I shall argue that the tripartitioning of the soul in Republic does not entail the view that our appetites or ἐπιθυμίαι are non-rational or arational and that as such they are a source of human action. Rather, as I shall argue, tripartitioning of the soul leads Plato to distinguish between non-normative and normative rationality. The former is always a feature of any human action owing to the fact that the kind of soul humans possess is rational. The latter is variously deployed in the self-reflective judgments we make in response to our embodied appetites (among other things). The subject of normative rationality unqualifiedly desires the real good itself; the subject of non-normative rationality desires particular apparent goods. Only in the virtuous person do these coincide. Psychic conflict is not between a rational agent and some putative non-rational agent, but within one embodied person conflicted about his personal identity as a subject of rational appetitive desires and a subject of a rational normative desire for the good.
Saramago's A Caverna (2000; The Cave 2002) has been read as an indictment of capitalist monopoly and political totalitarianism. It tells the story of Cipriano Algor, a traditional earthenware potter, who lives with his daughter and son-in-law in an anonymous rural village. He sells his pottery to an enormous shopping complex called 'The Center,' which is located on the outskirts of the nearby city, a kind of microcosm of a modern city where people live, work, and amuse themselves with technological inventions of all kinds, lacking all desire to leave its guarded walls. Because the Center's plastic crockery has made ceramic pottery obsolete, Cipriano buries his useless earthenware in a cave underground, fashions hundreds of clay figurines, and attempts to sell them to the Center. His failure and impending poverty necessitate his move to the Center in whose basement he discovers a cave, which contains the skeletons of six people sitting tethered to a stone bench and facing a wall. Terrified at the thought that these corpses are 'us ... the whole Center, probably the world,' he leaves the Center, stops briefly at his old house, where he buries the figurines, and finally sets out for a better life in an unknown place.

The novel's debt to the allegory of the Cave in Republic VII is detectable not only in its title and epigraph—'What a strange scene you describe and what strange prisoners, They are like us'—but also in its main character’s predicament: Cipriano, trapped in the seemingly real world of the Center, escapes through sudden illumination. Saramago does not import the allegory wholesale but uses features of it in accordance with his own purposes. The Platonic echoes of the story, however, remain largely unexplored. In this paper, I examine some of these echoes by contesting the common assumption that the Center is a sinister dystopia, whereas Cipriano’s village is an Arcadia in need of reclamation. Instead, I argue that both worlds should be rejected, because both purvey ideals of artificiality and imprisonment; in fact, one of them is in some ways a reflection of the other. Cipriano makes earthenware, which is like people ‘because it needs to be well-treated,’ and models his figurines on images of six archetypes in an encyclopedia; both creations are imitations and both are discarded/buried. He also compares himself with God, who created man out of clay, and crafts his figurines in a kiln placed in a room with a wooden bench. The Center creates an artificial reality for its inhabitants, sees itself as godlike in its distribution of ‘material and spiritual goods,’ and contains a cave in which six corpses are chained to a bench. Cipriano’s world of figurines is the doll-like equivalent of the world of the Center: the six models engender hundreds of figurines, and the six corpses represent the denizens of the Center, one of whom is Cipriano himself. His discovery of the cave enlightens and impels him to abandon both Center and kiln, since both manufacture fictions. But whereas Plato’s enlightened ex-prisoner is forced to return to the cave to teach the other captives, Cipriano chooses freedom only for himself and his family and flees his former life forever.

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Political Virtues and Their Powers in Plato’s Republic

In Republic II, Socrates is asked to show that justice (a) is or has a power (dunamis) within the human soul that benefits its possessor; (b) is something good both in itself and for its consequences, and (c) is a genuine good by nature. Socrates’ general strategy involves showing that the account of justice as the virtue of the individual (I-virtue) is the same as the account of justice as the virtue of a city (C-virtue). In this paper, I focus on the latter and, in general, on what it means for something to be a virtue of a city.7

To that effect, I emphasize and explain the idea that, for Plato, virtues are powers, i.e. "a type of things that enables us... to do whatever we are able to do" (Rep. V, 477c). It is because Plato thinks of virtue as power that (i) it makes sense for him even to talk about a city having virtues, and (ii) he is able to develop accounts of wisdom, courage, and moderation as C-virtues compatibly with the less controversial accounts of them as I-virtues, and (iii) in such a way that the accounts are not based on any purported similarity of structure between city and individual.

In addition to ordinary accounts of the I-virtues of wisdom, courage, and moderation as attainable by any individual, Plato suggests differential accounts of the very same virtues as they are found in individuals in their political roles of rulers, auxiliaries, or citizens. For example, the I-virtue of moderation as the ability to control one’s pleasures and desires is a trait that is beneficial to anyone who has it, regardless of social position and role. However, many of the envisioned policies in the ideal city call for differential self-control depending on one’s role. Accordingly, the rulers’ moderation would involve for example the ability to control whatever desires they might have for material possessions. For their part, the producers would display moderation in refraining from pleonexia, i.e. from desiring anything beyond the point at which it would be detrimental to the optimal performance of their work. To the extent that every citizen is expected to control his/her desires so as to be able to fulfill a specific social role, this is a ‘political virtue’ of each citizen. As the citizens attain and act in accordance with their...
political virtue of moderation, the city as a whole has thereby the power to control and minimize internal forces that would undermine its stability and unity, and such power is the city’s C-virtue of moderation.

Similarly, the citizens’ acting in accordance with the principle of specialization is identified with justice as a C-virtue once it is shown that (i) it is a power intrinsic to the city, and benefitting it; and that (ii) thinking of it as the power that is the city’s justice does not run afoul of ordinary intuitions about justice. That’s indeed what Plato argues for, at 433b-434d.

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7 As part of a wider project leading to an interpretation of justice in the individual that meets requirements (a)-(c) above.

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Psychologie des riches et des pauvres chez Platon: Sur la philokerdeia et la philokhrèmatia

La cité juste de Platon se fonde sur la science de son ou de ses dirigeants, c’est-à-dire sur leur savoir philosophique, mais elle repose aussi sur des conditions matérielles précises, requises pour garantir son unité et sa viabilité. Parmi elles, le niveau économique de ses membres occupe une place centrale. Dans la République comme dans les Lois, Platon prend soin en effet de privilégier un juste milieu dans le niveau de richesse des habitants de sa polis, afin que pauvres et riches ne puissent y être en conflit, c’est le cas dans la plupart des cités empiriques. Déterminé par les besoins nécessaires, dont la satisfaction n’outrèse pas les bornes de la juste mesure, ce niveau économique intermédiaire n’est pas seulement présenté comme une mesure de bon sens, mais comme le résultat d’observations sur la psychologie des riches et des pauvres qui, malgré l’abîme social et économique qui les sépare, partagent un même désir de richesse. Dans les deux cas en effet, la partie appétitive de l’âme donne libre cours à sa tendance à être « amie de l’argent (philokhrèmaton) et amie du profit (philokerdeia) » (République IX, 581a5-7), tendance dont la nature a fait « chez la plupart des hommes, le désir le plus fréquent et le plus fort » (Lois IX, 870a2-5).

Que cherche donc l’âme dans la richesse ? Comment se conduit-elle par rapport à elle-même et par rapport aux autres âmes quand elle est dominée par un tel appétit ? Qu’y trouve-t-elle quand elle l’obtient ? Pour répondre à ces questions, je montrerai d’abord comment Platon, loin de stigmatiser les riches et les pauvres et de déclarer la philokerdeia et la philokhrèmatia mauvaises en elles-mêmes, s’intéresse plutôt aux mécanismes qui, très souvent, mettent ces appétits au service de la pleonexia, cette tendance à vouloir avoir plus que les autres. Ensuite, je me pencherai sur la critique que Platon adresse aux sophistes, qui inclut presque toujours une référence à l’incroyable richesse qu’ils ont acquise par leur enseignement. Cette critique permet en effet de comprendre qu’à travers le désir de richesse se joue un rapport à l’être et aux apparences qui donne la clé de la psychologie platonicienne des riches et des pauvres. Dans un dernier temps, j’exposerai comment, dans les Lois en particulier, Platon utilise l’appétit de richesse au profit de l’unité de la cité juste, par l’intermédiaire des quatre classes censitaires qu’il distingue et auxquelles il attache des charges et des honneurs politiques différents.

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Pleasure Power and Appetite in Plato’s Republic

One of the many puzzles raised by Republic’s theorization of the soul concerns the relation between character, as described in Books VIII and IX, and parts of the soul. How are we to understand Socrates’ claim that three characters and constitutions – the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical – are proper to the psychic rule of one part of soul, the appetitive? In contrast to the role of the reasoning and thumoetic soul parts, which are characterized by one kind of life and character, the dominance of appetitive soul is presumed to manifest itself in three ways of life.

I argue that these three characters are separate organizing principles of the soul insofar as each character embodies a particular view regarding the goodness of pleasure, and so also the way to best secure this good. All three characters, as manifestations of the rule of appetitive soul, share three formal features: 1) each is characterized by what Socrates calls, “an insatiable desire for the good”, 2) each is convinced that the good is pleasure, where pleasure is taken to consist in getting what one
wants, and 3) because pleasure involves getting what one wants, the goodness of pleasure is essentially connected to power.

But despite sharing these definitive formal features, oligarchic man, democratic man, and tyrannical man each has a different account of what pleasure consists in, how exactly pleasure is good, and how pleasure secures power for the person having the pleasure. The oligarchic character is money-loving. Pleasure for this character consists in the amassing of profit, and the power that pleasure provides is the power of security. For oligarchic man, the precise locus of pleasure is in consuming, but in the self-affirmation that comes through possessing the power to consume at will. By contrast, the democratic character is freedom-loving, which means that pleasure for this psychic organization consists in a methodical enjoyment of each and every pleasure; the power that pleasure provides is the power of equality in licentiousness. For democratic man, the precise locus of pleasure is in consumption, but it is a regulated consumption, where the beauteous variety of objects enjoyed is central to the enjoyment. Finally, the tyrannical character can be described as domination-loving: the pleasure this character seeks is a pleasure over others, so that the power achieved by this pleasure is the power of violence. For tyrannical man, the precise locus of pleasure is in the taking of pleasure, where this is conceived as taking something from another by force.

These three character formations reveal a criticism by Plato of the claim that pleasure consists simply in the act of consuming. We see in each man’s conception of pleasure that pleasure becomes more and more tied to the act of consuming; I argue that these progressive misconceptions of pleasure explain why, within these three character formations, we see increasing psychic instability. These misunderstandings of what pleasure consists in means the agent is unable to secure the power desired in pursuing and taking pleasure.

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Virtue as δύναμεις in Plato’s Hippias Minor

At times, Plato seems beholden to the view that agents, and not strictly speaking actions, are properly said to be virtuous. In several dialogues, including Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras, he appears to accept the following biconditional relating an agent’s possession of a virtue to her performance of virtuous action: an agent’s token action is ‘virtuous’ if and only if it results from the agent’s exercise of the relevant virtue. Because in these dialogues virtues are understood as entities present in the soul of virtuous agents, this biconditional positions the agent’s soul as the primary object of virtue ascriptions. However, because the biconditional construes virtuous actions as those that result from the agent’s exercise of the relevant virtue, it requires supplementation by an account of the causal relationship between virtue and virtuous action in order to make sense of talk of virtuous actions. Plato supplies the required causal relationship by designating virtues as δύναμεις, i.e. as efficacious powers that, on his account, produce all and only virtuous actions. Thus, an action is virtuous because it is caused by the exercise of the relevant δύναμεως for virtuous action.

This paper presents a reading of Hippias Minor that emphasizes its connection to this conception of virtues as δύναμεις. Though the dialogue ends in aporia, it threatens to undermine Plato’s claim that δύναμεις for virtuous action produce all and only virtuous actions by recasting the efficacy of virtues so that the exercise of a virtue may bring about either virtuous or non-virtuous action; in other words, at least some δύναμεις for virtuous action are causally bivalent. I defend a resolution to the aporia which not only disarms this challenge to the causal efficacy of virtues, but also suggests an account of their role in producing virtuous action which accords to them the causal profile required by this conception of virtue. In particular, I argue that the account of δύναμεις that emerges in Hippias Minor allows Plato to recognize a class of δύναμεις that are uniquely action-guiding, so that, insofar as virtues fall into this class, they possess the causal profile required to support the claim that the exercise of a given virtue can produce only virtuous action. While this resolution to the aporia of Hippias Minor resembles previous interpretations—e.g. those of Penner and Irwin—that posit the psychological impossibility of an agent misusing a given virtue to produce non-virtuous action, it goes beyond these interpretations in drawing on Socrates’ reflections on δύναμεις in this dialogue to motivate this conclusion. I argue that the Platonic account of δύναμεως developed in other dialogues is operative in Hippias Minor, and that the elaboration of that account in this dialogue enables Plato to deny the bivalence of virtues by endorsing a principle of moral psychology, similar to the denial of akrasia of Protagoras 358c6-d4, according to which an agent who, in exercising her virtue, judges that some action is worse than competing alternatives will not, inasmuch as she is in possession of the relevant δύναμεως for virtuous action, perform that action.

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Much recent work in moral psychology (empirical and philosophical) has explored how the emotions have a cognitive component. Plato’s analysis of human motivation is noteworthy because he thinks reason also has an affective component. I argue in this paper that this “erotic” aspect of reason is most on display for Plato in the practice of philosophical inquiry and argument. Almost all of his dialogues depict an encounter between Socrates and some character or another passionately engaged in argument, and during the final hours of his life Socrates comments memorably in the Phaedo on the dangers of hating argument (misologia). Curiously, however, Plato says little in the dialogues about what a proper love of argument (philologia) actually requires.

This is not to say that the topic goes unmentioned. From his earliest portrayal in the Parmenides as an adolescent, Socrates is admired for his “impulse” (hormê) towards argument, which Parmenides regards as “noble and divine” but in need of cultivation (135d). Plato draws an association here between philosophy and the love of argument, yet it would be a mistake to conflate the two entirely. For although Socrates refers to himself frequently in the dialogues as a philologos (Phaedrus, 236e; Theaetetus, 146a) and speaks eloquently about the love (erôs) for argument “constantly revealed under the guidance of the philosophic muse” (Philebus, 67b), he is also aware of the effects of engaging in argument badly. In a well-known passage from the Republic, he describes how an overfondness for dialectical discussion can corrupt those with philosophical natures and compares people introduced to the practice prematurely to puppies who “enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments” (539b).

What, then, does a proper engagement with argument require? I shall claim in what follows that the way in which we approach argument for Plato typically reveals something at a deeper level about our desires and motivations, and that the key to engaging in argument correctly is found in his understanding of erôs. I focus in particular on Callicles and Socrates’ debate towards the end of the Gorgias on the nature and purpose of speech-making. Socrates maintains in this passage that a good speech looks to improve the character of its audience, whereas the purpose of rhetoric lies in “the filling up of appetites, both one’s own and those of others” (503c). Significantly, the rhetorician is criticized here for his desires, not just the fact that he exploits the desires of his audience. Socrates anticipates the point earlier in the Gorgias by characterizing himself as a different kind of “lover” (erôn) than Callicles, one whose aim in speaking is devoted to philosophy itself (481d-482b). Plato does not elaborate further in the Gorgias on what a philosophical approach to discourse requires, yet his views on erôs elsewhere provide us with a solution. I conclude with a reading of the Symposium on which such an approach involves not just (as is standardly accepted) a love of abstract forms, but also (as the Gorgias implies) a genuine love of others.

What Book X’s Division of the Soul Reveals about the Aesthetic and Psychological Theories of the Republic

In Republic IV Socrates famously divides the soul into three parts – reason, spirit and appetite. In Republic IX Socrates distinguishes each part by appeal to its characteristic object (or objects) of desire (580d-581b). Puzzlingly, despite numerous back references to the tripartite theory of the soul (595b1, 602e8-9, 603d3-6), Republic X introduces a bipartite division; the soul is now comprised of a rational part, which forms beliefs on the basis of calculation, and an irrational part, which forms beliefs on the basis of perceptual appearances. How do we reconcile Book X’s cognitive division of the soul with the motivational division proposed in earlier books?

Scholars have dealt with this problem in a variety of ways. Some scholars maintain that Republic X introduces a new soul part, either a “perceiving part” (Shields) or else an “unspecified part” (Janaway). Others argue that Book X introduces a new division within reason; namely, a calculating part and a perceiving part (Murphy and Nehamas). The majority of scholars identify the irrational part with appetite or appetite and spirit, thereby preserving continuity between Republic X and earlier books. The most plausible formulation of this third position construes uncritical acceptance of appearances as both characteristic of spirit and appetite and explanatory of why spirit and appetite are attracted to certain sorts of objects (e.g., sex, money, control, high repute, etc.).

I begin by presenting very strong (and familiar) reasons for rejecting the first two positions outright. Then I turn to the third position, summarizing the considerable and compelling support it receives in the literature (most notably from Moss and Singpurwalla).
Nevertheless, I go on to reject this third position, for a number of reasons. First, whereas Socrates plausibly conceives of all poetry as appealing to appetite or appetite and spirit; he nevertheless maintains that some poetry is good for the soul. Hence, the mere fact that bad poetry appeals to appetite and/or spirit cannot, in and of itself, explain why it corrupts the soul. Second, it is unclear why the harmonious, perfectly virtuous soul is immune to bad poetry, since even the harmonious soul is comprised of appetite, spirit and reason.

In what follows I demonstrate that Book X defines the irrational part as essentially opposed to reason and calculation. Whereas appetite and spirit are capable of alignment with reason (as in the case of the harmonious soul); the irrational part of Book X is not. The irrational part of Book X is identical to corrupt spirit and appetite – i.e., spirit and appetite which have not been adequately educated by reason and habit. This interpretation solves the two major problems enumerated above. Bad poetry, unlike good poetry, strengthens corrupt spirit and appetite, thereby further corrupting the soul. Moreover, because the harmonious soul does not contain corrupt spirit and appetite, bad poetry necessarily does not appeal to it.

My interpretation has some important repercussions for our understanding of both the aesthetic and psychological theories of the Republic. First, bad poetry corrupts only those who are already partially corrupt. Second, corrupt spirit and appetite are motivationally (and perhaps even cognitively) dissimilar to healthy spirit and appetite. Whereas corrupt spirit and appetite necessarily desire that which reason opposes; healthy appetite and spirit either desire that which reason desires or else desire that which reason desires or else desire to follow reason. Also, whereas corrupt spirit and appetite make judgements on the basis of appearances and appearances alone; healthy appetite and spirit are responsive to reason, not just perceptual appearances.

In the final section I explore the power of my interpretation (in contrast to others) to explain how bad poetry interacts with spirit.

My approach shares some similarities with Belfiore’s approach, which hasn’t received due credit in the literature. However, there are several fundamental differences between my view and her view, which I elaborate upon in my paper.

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Choosing Evil

I examine how Plato, Euripides, and Seneca approach the question, ‘why do people do bad things?’ and I argue that the apparent incomprehensibility of intentionally doing something bad when you could do something better is a consequence of our most natural way of explaining human action, in terms of the appearance to the agent that the action in question is, or brings about, something good. Plato regards explanations of human actions according to which they are caused by dispositions that are such as to cause them as translatable into explanations in terms of what seemed good to the agent. Euripides’ representation of a clear-eyed choice of evil in his tragedy, Medea, uses what appears good or bad to Medea to produce (and later remove) our understanding of, and thereby our sympathy for, her actions; by contrast, Seneca’s Medea represents Medea’s crimes as expressions of her character, in order to arouse fear (and not sympathy) for her and her passions.

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Compulsion Persuasion and Just Actions in Plato’s Republic

Plato notes two methods of making people do what they are initially reluctant to do: persuasion and compulsion. In a typical case of compulsion, you do the action involuntarily, because of some threats. In an ideal situation of persuasion, you change your initial mind and find the action now pleasing to do. But construed in this way, persuasion and compulsion are two extremes in the spectrum, and there can be various combinations of the two. So, you can be compelled to do something but do it voluntarily; you are persuaded that you need to do it, so you do it voluntarily; but you still do not find it pleasing at all, so you are compelled to do it. One may call such an action a compulsory-voluntary action.
I argue that Plato acknowledges that just actions are compulsory-voluntary for most people and in some cases of just actions even for the best people. I first argue that ruling in the city is a compulsory-voluntary action for the philosophers. The philosophers are persuaded (by the founders or by themselves) to rule in the city because it is required by justice, but they still do not find the job pleasing at all in itself; they do it “not as something fine but as something compulsory” (540b3-4). Surprisingly, it follows that the philosophers would take ruling-as-a-requirement-of-justice as a third kind of goodness: something that is not choiceworthy in itself but only for its consequences. This is surprising because it implies that the philosophers take at least one just action as a third kind of goodness, even though they must take justice as a second kind of goodness, one that is choiceworthy both in itself and for its consequences. I argue, however, that this is not simply an aberration. For ordinary unjust people just actions are only third kinds of goodness, though justice is a second kind of goodness even for them. (We should note that the division of goodness is agent-specific; what is a second kind of goodness for someone may be a third kind of goodness for someone else.) It is no coincidence that Socrates compares justice and just actions with health and healthy actions, which are taken to be a second kind and third kinds of goodness respectively; just as healthy actions engender health, just actions engender justice.

Plato wants to persuade ordinary unjust people to take justice as a second kind of goodness. But ordinary unjust people cannot take just actions as good in themselves, because doing them is quite burdensome for them. By distinguishing justice from just actions, Plato does not have to persuade them to take burdensome actions as something not burdensome at all. Instead, he gives them the utopian hope for the best constitution of the soul, the source of immense happiness; even if just actions are burdensome, you’d better do them because by doing them habitually you may bring about justice in your soul, if not in this life, in some life afterwards.

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Truth and τέχνη in Plato’s Philebus and Statesman

Plato’s writing about truth, and about various activities, aspirations, and accomplishments around truth, draws heavily on reflections upon τέχνη, which serves him as part model and part foil for the main prize in this area, namely ‘wisdom’ (φρόνησις). We may expect, then, that the two topics will be mutually illuminating, and at the same time mutually distorting. For it is not always obvious in what respects τέχνη is a model for wisdom, and in what respects it is a foil.

There is another problem: neither is it obvious in which respects what is part model, part foil. For the τέχνη of Plato’s literary imagination is not a single thing, and in asking about it we are after a shifting target. Sometimes, content to speak with the vulgar, his characters are not particularly discriminating in what they call τέχναι; other times they want to make distinctions, e.g. between ‘true’ τέχναι, and what merely pass for such in the eyes of the multitude. Again, sometimes the reforms made by these distinctions appear comparatively modest (e.g. even the vulgar distinguish between experts and charlatans); other times they are very radical, transforming the fields affected almost beyond recognition (so that it turns out e.g. that Socrates—and he alone!—practices politics).

The topic, then, is a slippery one; with these problems in the background, I want to work through some passages that (I think) reveal some of the complexity in Plato’s thinking about τέχνη. For reasons of time, I limit myself to the Philebus and Statesman; I argue for the following results. First, for Plato, one part of the very idea of a τέχνη is to be guided by standards; it is this that distinguishes genuine τέχναι, which meet genuine human needs, from sundry impostors, the results of which are bad and the practice of which is evil. Second, although the practice of τέχνη is guided by standards, the standards in question are rough, mutable, and indeed false; their status as standards does not belong to them in their own right, but is due instead to their being so regarded (put another way, it is a matter of δόξα). Third, this aspect of τέχνη is not always in view; in some passages it is disregarded, while in others it is deliberately suppressed. Finally, where it is present, this aspect of τέχνη is traceable to the fact that τέχναι are by their very nature embedded in a social world, the demands of which requires them to be ultimately indifferent to truth (some appearances to the contrary notwithstanding). The result is that, for this reason, τέχνη, considered as a species of ‘reason’ or ‘knowledge’ (νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη), is not entirely genuine or pure; in Plato’s view it is not a kind of part or portion of the genuine article, but rather a simulacrum of true wisdom.
In recent years there has been renewal of interest in Plato’s treatment of the “decent” person (ἀνέρ επιεικῆς) in Republic Book 10 (603e-607b). Verity Harte (2010\textsuperscript{10}), for example, regards the decent person as “the principal target” of the argument of Book 10. G.R.F. Ferrari (2007\textsuperscript{11}) makes the most of the decent person to elucidate Plato’s tripartite psychology, comparing him with the just person in Book 4 and the philosopher in Books 5-7. While basically agreeing with these scholars, I aim to scrutinize Plato’s account of the decent person, focusing on his moral psychology in relation to the Republic’s theme as a whole.

First of all, I shall point out that the tripartite psychology in Book 4, as it stands, cannot apply to the case of the decent person. For the conflict of the decent person in Book 10 is depicted diachronically rather than synchronically in such a way that he does not give way to lamentation in public, but indulges himself in weeping and wailing in private (603e-604a). So this description based on the public-private dichotomy stresses his conflict between two different characters, or rather ways of living, which leads us to think that Book 10’s psychology has much to do with “the choice of lives” theme in the Republic.

Second, Plato’s treatment of the decent person serves to clarify the structure of the poet’s mimesis. The poet succeeds in representing the decent person as “the good person” only in front of the ignorant many who cannot possess a different view or appearance of the good person from the poet’s. The decent person is taken to be “good,” insofar as he can make a clear distinction between public and private. Interestingly, Plato also uses this image of the decent person (cf. 387d ff.), explaining how the young guardians come to play their public role in the ideal city. In Book 10, however, Plato is interested in the whole life concerning both private and public realms (panta ton hautou bion 606e5), explicating the nature of the good person, not the good citizen.

Third, the “greatest accusation against poetry” (605c-607b) shows that even the decent person becomes bad under the influence of poetry. By elucidating the psychological mechanism of this degeneration, we can know it is Plato’s psychology in terms of the nous-doxa contrast in the central books (cf. 476d, 508d) that helps expound “the choice of life” theme in this passage.

Finally, I shall suggest that Plato as a poet-philosopher engages in “politics” by publishing his dialogues, representing his philosopher, Socrates, as the good person who is “thoughtful and calm” (604e) in character.

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**Questioning Socratic Intellectualism: The Presuppositions and Practice of the Elenchus**

This paper challenges the widespread assumption that the Socratic elenchus presupposes an intellectualist psychology. On this view, because Socrates engages with others’ ethical commitments only by interrogating their beliefs, he takes such interrogation to be not only necessary but also sufficient to bring about cognitive and ethical change. In the proposed paper, an exploration of the elenchus as practiced by Socrates in Plato’s works (primarily but not only in the so-called ‘Socratic’ dialogues) will be used to argue that the method does not exclude – and in fact presupposes – the role of habit and the non-rational in moral psychology and so in ethical action and psychological change. The elenchus is not predicated on the absence of such factors, but is rather a tool for prompting change precisely in relation to them. The paper’s argument will be situated in relation to a larger project of bringing Socrates and Plato closer together in terms of their moral psychology: finding resources earlier in the Protagoras for expanding Socrates’ position there beyond a narrow intellectualism, on the one hand, and reading the Republic in light of the role of knowledge in ruling which serves to deny akrasia, insofar as the non-rational parts of the soul can only rebel when knowledge fails to rule.
The Subordination of the ‘gnôthi seauton’ to ‘epimeleia heautou’ in Alcibiades I

Despite its apparent simplicity, the First Alcibiades contains a crucial lesson concerning Plato’s moral psychology. Namely, that the human soul is essentially defined by its capacity to affect itself and consciously to engage in a process of self-transformation.

In order to shed light on this dynamic nature of the psychê as a self-shaping principle, my paper will focus on one central argument: I will attempt to show that Socrates clearly subordinates the knowledge of the self (gnôthi seauton) to the care of the self (epimeleia heautou) in the First Alcibiades. Indeed, contrary to what most interpreters claim, I will argue that a close examination of the text leads to the conclusion that far from being the mode of epimeleia heautou promoted by Socrates in the Alcibiades, knowledge of the self (i.e. knowledge of the soul) constitutes only the preliminary condition of the care of the self as he understands it (which takes a political form). In short, understanding that the soul is a dynamic principle capable of affecting and transforming itself, represents the very condition that makes it possible for an individual to engage in the type of political self-care promoted by Socrates in that dialogue. That radical subordination of the knowledge of the self to the care of the self (as its condition of possibility) is, I believe, the crucial lesson of the First Alcibiades—a lesson that cannot be neglected by anyone who wishes to have an accurate understanding of Plato’s moral psychology.

My demonstration will be threefold. First, I will focus my attention on the metaphor of the eye (Alc. 132c-133c), a metaphor famous both for its unique suggestive power and its deep obscurity. In light of that metaphor, understanding the gnôthi seauton as a condition of possibility of self-care rather than as a mode of care of the self will then enable me to highlight the political nature of the care of the self promoted in the Alcibiades. The political scope of the principle of epimeleia heautou (an idea central in the First Alcibiades but also recurrent in the rest of the Platonic corpus, especially the Gorgias and the Laws) will appear even more sharply once the close link between knowledge of the self and the virtue of sophrosunê is clarified. The elucidation of this connection between the gnôthi seauton and sophrosunê will finally enable me to shed light on the protreptic role played by honour (an especially powerful political type of emotion) in the introductory part of the dialogue.

The paper will be delivered in English.

La subordination de la connaissance de soi au soin de soi dans l’Alcibiade Majeur

Malgré son apparente simplicité, l’Alcibiade majeur permet de comprendre un aspect crucial de la psychologie morale de Platon. À savoir : la capacité qu’a l’âme de s’auto-affecter et de se transformer elle-même.

En vue de mettre en lumière cette nature dynamique de l’âme comme principe d’auto- façonnement, ma communication se concentrera sur une thèse centrale: démontrer la subordination de la connaissance de soi au soin de soi dans l’Alcibiade. En effet, contrairement à ce que prétendent la plupart des interprètes, j’estime qu’un examen attentif du dialogue permet de conclure que la connaissance de soi, loin de constituer le mode de soin de soi promut par Socrate dans l’Alcibiade, en constitue plutôt une condition préalable essentielle. Plus précisément, la connaissance de l’âme en tant que principe actif pouvant s’auto-affecter constitue la condition de possibilité du soin (politique) de soi promut par Socrate (non seulement dans l’Alcibiade mais dans la plupart des dialogues de Platon, particulièrement le Gorgias et les Lois). Voilà, selon mon interprétation, la leçon cruciale de l’Alcibiade, et la raison pour laquelle l’Alcibiade ne peut être négligé pour qui veut comprendre la psychologie morale de Platon.

Ma communication comportera trois parties principales. Dans un premier temps, je baserai ma démonstration sur un examen attentif de la métaphore de l’œil (Alc. 132c-133c), célèbre aussi bien pour sa puissance suggestive que pour sa profonde obscurité. Comprendre la connaissance de soi comme condition plutôt que comme mode du soin de soi permettra, dans un second temps, de dégager et de mettre en relief le sens éminemment politique du soin de soi tel que compris par Platon. Ce caractère politique apparaîtra plus nettement lorsque sera clarifié le rapport étroit entre connaissance de soi et la vertu morale de sophrosunê. L’élucidation de ce rapport entre connaissance de soi et sophrosunê permettra finalement d’expliquer le rôle protreptic central joué par l’honneur (une émotion politique et social très puissante) dans la partie introductive du dialogue.

12 The paper will be delivered in English.
Near the end of the Platonic academy, Simplicius offers a theory in which a degree of tension is required in the soul for virtue, vigilant combat of akrasia or maintenance of enkrateia. Several centuries earlier, Plutarch similarly compares the soul to stretched cords, indicating its flexibility and impressionability, and the delicately balanced necessary amount of tension. Such talk of tension and stretched cords may call to mind Simmias’ analogy of the soul and the harmony of a well-tuned lyre in the *Phaedo*. Plutarch and Simplicius did not think that harmony produced by tension represents the actual nature or existence of the soul, whereas the soul would disappear when the cords are slackened or cut. However, tension as a state of the soul was a useful tool for both Platonists to describe how the parts of the soul hang together. For Plutarch, the soul is pliable, though stretched in a number of directions. The tension is provided by the competing sources of passions and impulses and is the link between the rational part of the soul and the body. Communicated to the thinking part, this tension triggers one to spring into action. For Simplicius, when reason is slackened, it gives the irrational emotions the opportunity to take over, resulting in akrasia. A lack of intensity or tension (atonos) is the cause of a soul’s falling into forgetfulness of the virtue it knows.

Platonists as they were at the end of the day, this concept, for both philosophers was likely borrowed from the Stoic theories of tension of the soul, yet they each uniquely appropriated it into a Platonic framework. For both Plutarch and Simplicius this tension in the soul and in the interaction of the parts of the soul is the key to turn the possibility of akrasia into enkrateia or self-control. This paper will compare this concept of tension in these two writers, looking at possible influences, and how it becomes central to issues such as weakness of will or akrasia and education of the soul towards virtue.

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Socratic *Elenchus* in Plato’s Psychological Hierarchy

This paper aims at shedding light on the character of Socratic *elenchus* as a pedagogical model in Plato’s psychological hierarchy. Socrates is described by Plato as performing *elenchus* (e.g. Apology 21b11–d2), claiming knowledge of his own ignorance (e.g. Laches 186b8–c5 and Charmides 165b5–c2). Socrates’ *elenchus* is based on his belief that if one claims to be expert in an issue, one must have knowledge of it and act on the knowledge. This belief implies that if Socrates is expert in *elenchus*, he must have knowledge of it and perform it on the knowledge. As Socrates professes his own ignorance, his knowledge of *elenchus* amounts to knowledge of ignorance.

In *Laches* 189e3–9, Socrates defines ‘knower as an adviser’ as follows: ‘Suppose we know, about anything whatsoever, that if it is added to another thing, it makes that thing better, and furthermore, we are able to make the addition, then clearly we know the very thing about which we should be consulting as to how one might obtain it most easily and best’ (cf. also *Protagoras* 312d–e). Socrates is thus understood as one who, by adding his knowledge of ignorance to others through *elenchus*, is able to make others realize that they are ignorant of what they believed to know.

Socratic *elenchus*, however, does not produce the same result. Despite the Socratic definition of ‘knower as an adviser’, the interlocutors’ attitudes and reactions to Socrates in Plato’s dialogues mostly appear in different ways from each other, rather than equally admitting their ignorance. Laches and Nicias in the *Laches*, for instance, after encountering Socratic *elenchus*, show different attitudes; the former gets annoyed at Socrates and denies his ignorance of the nature of courage, whereas the latter reflects on his ignorance and promises to take further steps to reach knowledge of it (cf. also Theaetetus’ similar attitude to Socratic *elenchus* in the *Theaetetus* that he makes a promise of further study on the true nature of knowledge).

This characteristic difference of the interlocutors’ attitudes illustrates that Socratic *elenchus*, while aiming at helping people realize their ignorance and thus encouraging them to take further steps towards the truth, has different results depending on their different psychological disposition; that of Laches residing in a state of *pistis* and focusing upon ‘deed’ (*ergon*), while that of Nicias (and Theaetetus) in a state of *dianoia* and caring about ‘word’ (*logos*) (and geometrical objects beyond physical ones). In this respect, Socratic *elenchus* alludes to a pedagogical model in Plato’s psychological hierarchy according to which men (or their souls), depending on their different psychological disposition in four groups (i.e. analogy of the Divided Line), and on the grounds of their care and regard for different objects (i.e. analogy of the Cave), should receive education at various levels and should be allocated to different but appropriate positions in an ideal city, such as philosophical rulers, guardians, and producers (cf. *Republic*, especially Books III–VII).
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On (In)Curability in Plato’s Gorgias

Early in the Polus colloquy of Plato’s Gorgias, an analogy between medicine and justice is employed (464bff). The action of the dialogue portrays Socrates as a practitioner of the craft of justice (and allows Socrates to identify himself in this way—see 521d). In light of the medical analogy, the dialogue suggests that Socrates’ philosophical activity—his practice of the craft of justice—is intended to be curative. But it is possible to read the Gorgias as displaying a Socrates who fails to cure what ails his interlocutors. Insofar as those who practice crafts (technai) should reliably achieve their intended outcomes, Socrates’ failure to cure his interlocutors could be regarded as evidence that (at least prima facie) undercuts his claim to be a practitioner of the craft of justice.

The eschatological account that closes this dialogue asserts that there is a class of individuals whose souls are incurable (525c). If the interlocutors whose souls Socrates fails to cure are incurable, then Socrates’ failure does not undercut his claim to be a practitioner of the craft of justice.

We are faced, then, with a series of questions: (1) Is Gorgias cured? If not, is his soul incurable? (2) Is Polus cured? If not, is his soul incurable? (3) Is Callicles cured? If not, is his soul incurable?

I argue that the dialogue allows for the following responses to these questions: (1) Gorgias is cured. (2) Polus is not cured, and his soul is incurable. (3) Callicles is not cured, and his soul is incurable.

The case of Callicles thus emerges as the crucial one, should we wish to determine if Socrates is indeed a practitioner of the true craft of justice. I argue that Socrates fails to cure Callicles because he seeks to ply his putative craft in reference to a moral psychological view that proves to be inadequate to the task. In other words, in Callicles we find an individual whose moral attitudes and actions cannot be accounted for in terms of Socratic moral psychology.

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Do Lysis’ Parents Really Love Him?

Plato’s Lysis begins and ends by grounding accounts of the friend (philos) and loving (phileô) in the notion of “belonging” or what is “one’s own” (oikeion). Towards the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates queries whether Lysis’ parents love him and concludes that “if you become wise, everyone will be your friend and everyone will belong to you (soi oikeiô), for you will be useful and good, but if you don’t, neither anyone else nor your father will be friend to you, nor your mother, nor those belonging to you (holm oikeiô) [210d1-4]). Towards the end of the dialogue, Socrates claims that since loving and desiring long for what is lacking, and whatever is lacking is something taken away from someone, it follows that “what belongs to us” (oikeion) is the object not only of friendship (philia) but also of eros and desire (epithumia) [221e3-5]). Recent scholarship by Penner-Rowe and Gonzalez seize upon Plato’s use of oikeion in both passages to argue that in the Lysis, Plato identifies the desire of friendship with the notion of the good, or more specifically, with wisdom. Thus Penner-Rowe: “If anyone loves anyone else, it must be because the loved one provides some sort of path to knowledge...this is what will make him ‘belong to’ the one loving.”13 Unfortunately, such an account of friendship seems radically at odds with the varieties of friendship dramatically presented in the Lysis—for instance, parental love for a child, erotic love for a beloved, or Socrates’ own concern with non-philosophical interlocutors such as Hippothales. Although it is true that Socrates often presents radically revisionary accounts of traditional beliefs—for instance, concerning the harming of enemies and benefiting of friends in the Republic or the notion of “the god” in the Apology—both the dramatic and the argumentative structure of the Lysis presuppose accounts of eros, epithumia, and philia which are not reducible to a love of wisdom. Indeed, the Lysis itself explicitly questions whether the non-reciprocated notion of loving manifest in the love of wisdom is an appropriate model for friendship (212d5-9). I argue against the notion of oikeion presented by Penner-Rowe and Gonzalez, and offer by contrast the treatment of oikeion in Nicomachean Ethics VIII-IX as a way of preserving the general phenomenon of loving while not reducing it narrowly to only a path to knowledge.


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Socrates on Being Good

Alcibiades’ speech in the *Symposium* (215a-222a) is notable for its emphasis on the novelty of Socrates’ message. He says that Socrates and his ideas have no equal, and implies that Socrates holds principles so high that they are too hard to understand or to live by. But Alcibiades refrains from telling us which principles, exactly, Socrates taught that are so hard to live by. In this paper I address this issue and attempt an interpretation of the ethical implications Socrates’ profession of ignorance. In general Plato’s Socrates seems to make happiness dependant on the virtues. Yet in the *Apology* (20c-24a) the story of the Delphic Oracle shows that ignorance about the highest values and about virtue is part of the human condition. But then we are left with the question: how can one live the good life if nobody knows what virtue is? To be sure, Socrates never puts to himself the task of attaining or teaching moral knowledge, but insists on being ignorant about it. On the one hand – as Alcibiades suggests – he seems hold to himself elevated principles, but on the other as educator his endeavor was never to inculcate them into others. It is true that he did make an effort to improve other peoples lives, but not by pretending to be a teacher of **arete**. This paper attempts to explain this apparent puzzle arguing that although Socrates thought that virtue is a kind of knowledge, it cannot be taught because each one has to achieve it for him or herself – just as it is not a physician who cures an illness, so too it is not a teacher that imparts virtue. This is a well known point, but its consequences have not been duly fleshed out in the literature, which is mostly focused on how Socrates understands what virtue is, and not on this prior question about one’s attitude towards the virtues and how others can – if they can – be improved, in Socrates’ view. I argue that what Socrates essentially taught was the significance of being thoughtful (**phronimos echein**); and that his main assumption in doing so was that prudence (**phronesis**) and soundness of mind (**sophrosune**) are qualities which open the way and allow for other virtues to flourish, since a **phronimos** or **sophron** person knows what the right thing to do is in each particular circumstance. No human being can be wise and virtuous as the gods are, but each person can and should be as thoughtful as possible. Although Socrates is no teacher of the virtues, he does insist on the fact that reflection and thought on oneself and on one’s actions leads naturally to a virtuous life. Although this point has already been noted in one way or another (e.g., Peterson 2011), it has not received the due emphasis: Socrates was not an ignorant inquirer, but had his own moral beliefs and convictions, and his most basic teaching was just this: know thyself, think for yourself!

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The Embodied Soul of Plato’s Republic: Taking X into Account

My paper joins in the debate over the *Republic*’s psychological theory by making Book X a key passage, despite its having been neglected thus far by both deflationists and realists. On my reading, the first half of Book X, and a crucial break in the argument in Book IV, both point toward new support for deflationism.

The *Republic* describes intra-psychic conflict, and locates the conflicting motivations in different parts of the psyche. On a realist reading, the parts are like homunculi, each possessing not only desires, but beliefs, and goals as well. Further, on the realist account, the parts possess some measure of capacity to reason about how to achieve their goals, and to act as an agent in pursuit of them. A deflationist interpretation agrees that Plato describes internal conflict between different motivations, and locates them in different parts of our psyche. On the deflationist account, though, those parts do not reason, choose, or act—rather the person is the only agent. Most commentators agree that the description in Book IV seems more deflationist, whereas the description in Books VIII and IX seems more realist. Some conclude simply that Plato is inconsistent. Most, though, try to argue that Plato’s picture is consistent, the realists often applying VIII/IX’s language and metaphors to the understanding of IV, and the deflationists doing the reverse. I claim that Plato, in the *Republic*, consistently describes the psychology of human beings in deflationist terms, and reserves realist language and metaphors for the purpose of helping describe idealized character types.

My account hinges on two points. The first half of X presents the soul’s parts very differently from the earlier nine books. Perhaps for that reason, X is typically absent from both realist and deflationist accounts of the psychology of the *Republic*. On my view, though, the Book X discussion, though apparently very different, is actually consistent with the whole account, and is critical in developing a proper understanding of Plato’s notion of the soul. Even those who read the realist metaphors of VIII/IX back into IV will have a difficult time reading them forward into X, where the spirited part does not appear at all, and in its place we have the weaker part that sees a straight stick as bent, and other parts that want to weep and tell jokes. Second, there is an important shift in topic, in Book IV. At 441c the subject of discussion changes from the psychology of individuals in general, to the consideration of idealized character types (a consideration which is completed in Books VIII and IX). Keeping focus
on the two separate subjects of discussion yields a consistent picture of both. The inclusion of X in the account of the psychology of the *Republic* points us toward a deflationist interpretation. Book X’s non-idealized setting, outside the *Kallipolis*, helps underscore the point that real souls are not made up of three and only three homunculi-like parts, but rather a much richer set of complex psychic forces and faculties.

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**Socrates’ Account of Knowledge as an Art of Measurement in the *Protagoras***

In the *Protagoras*, Socrates argues against the vulgar explanation of akrasia as being overcome by pleasure. The many use this explanation as evidence of their view of knowledge: that it is weak and incapable of ruling a person. By contrast, Socrates famously claims that knowledge about what is best always rules the person who has it. Hence no one errs knowingly. Whenever people act in ways that appear akratic, they do this because of ignorance. Their salvation consists not in building up their characters and habituating their dispositions, but rather in acquiring an art of measurement of quantities of value. The possession of this art ensures that one will always choose the best of the available options. The art enables a person to adjust his calculation to compensate for the distorting power of appearance that makes some quantities of value appear greater than they really are. One who lacks the art is always at risk of miscalculating and pursuing the suboptimal course of action. One who possesses the art, Socrates suggests, is self-controlled.

Socrates’ has notoriously little to say about the phenomenology of akratic experience, and most scholars focus on this fact as a deficiency in his account. But Socrates also says little about the application procedure and first-person experience of the art of measurement that is supposed to remedy the akrates’ problem. In this paper, I attempt to explain why this is the case.

I argue that Socrates’ goal is not to create a self-help guide by which the hedonistic masses will learn how to maximize the pleasures and minimize the pains in their lives and thus succeed by their own lights. Rather, the passages reveal an intricate argumentative strategy against Protagoras. It may seem that Socrates’ only motivation to reject the common explanation of akrasia is to demonstrate that the virtue of moderation amounts to knowledge. By contrast, I argue that Socrates’ main goal is to show what it takes to fulfill Protagoras’ twofold academic promise: firstly, to teach his students what they have come to him to learn; and secondly, to teach them political virtue. The discussion reveals that most people are hedonists, who want to learn how to maximize pleasure and minimize pain in their lives. So Protagoras need not tell the lofty myths about human capacity for shame and justice, nor can he simply teach his students the famous relativistic doctrine, according to which each of them is an infallible measure of all things. What he has to do is teach them an art of measurement, or how to be accurate and reliable measures of the only thing they view as good – namely, pleasure. They can apply this art in all sorts of situations, ranging from the pastry shop to the battle field. The art of measurement is the only kind of virtue Protagoras should be interested in transmitting to his students, if he is consistent. I conclude the paper by explaining why Socrates would think this is neither a real virtue nor a real art, and thus, not something worth cultivating.

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**Transformative Goods: The Nature of (Moral) Vision**

At various points (e.g. *Euthydemus* 281; *Apology* 30b) Plato offers an account of goods which one might call ‘transformative’. Transformative goods are both good in themselves and in their consequences: but in both respects in a highly specialised sense. For, I argue, such goods (wisdom, vision, health) represent a transformation of their possessor and they also determine (transform) what things are good for their possessor. I claim that this account of transformative goods is to be found in the *Republic*. If so, however, do we have too many sources of goodness for comfort: either the form of the good is redundant, or it replaces the transformative goods? Through a discussion of the nature of (moral) vision, I suggest that Plato can accommodate both the form of the good and the transformative goods in his ethical account.

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This paper investigates the nature of emotion according to Plato. Most interpreters agree that, in Plato's moral psychology, a well-functioning agent has her emotions under control (e.g. Gollop 2001, Santas 1986, and Nussbaum 1984). For Plato, an agent is well-functioning just in case reason rules in her soul, and it is a necessary condition for reason to rule in her soul that she have her emotions under (rational) control.

Rather than complicate this picture, my paper plugs a hole in the literature. We have scholarship on what Plato thinks about various topics involving emotion and the passions. We do not, however, have a good understanding of what Plato thinks emotions are. This gives us an imperfect understanding of why they need to be controlled or suppressed. This paper attempts to make progress on those two questions.

I start from a thorough examination of pathos in Plato. The word does not mean "emotion," even if we count other "passions" such as pleasure, pain and desire. It often refers, in Plato, to a characteristic, or what a thing goes through (often negative). We should not conclude from this broadness, however, that Plato's view of emotion is a mere extension of his non-psychological conception of pathos (Pradeau 2003). Nor should we conclude that Plato had no particular view about emotion, whether derived from his non-psychological conception of pathos or not (Konstan 2006).

I argue from Plato's varied and broad pattern of use that pathos is, for him, a non-technical term, one that he bends to various theoretical purposes. Two such purposes concern me most. The first is ignorance and false belief, both called pathê in the Theaetetus, Phaedrus and Laws. The second is his choice to characterize love (in the Phaedrus) and other emotions (in the Philebus) as pathê. The first is theoretically prior to the second. Reason and knowledge are valuable: Plato takes this as basic. Ignorance and false belief are therefore pathê because they are misfortunes. Emotions, then, are pathê not because they are experiences (something the subject goes through), but because they involve ignorance or false belief, which makes them negative experiences. This is why reason's ruling in the soul entails emotional control, even suppression. Emotions, therefore, number among the pathê on theoretical grounds and for distinctively psychological (not metaphysical) reasons.

My view explains some crucial differences between Plato and Aristotle. For Plato as for Aristotle, emotions are able to change a subject's judgment, but in Plato's case the change is invariably toward ignorance and falsehood, while Aristotle's view does not require this. Furthermore, the rule of reason on Aristotle's view entails that the subject feel in the right way, at the right time, etc., where this is consistent with strong emotion (sometimes we should be incredibly angry). Plato cannot agree: in fact, at Republic IV he implies the spirited part of the soul can only be "allied" with reason if it is soothed and made docile. No surprise there, on my view.14

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Plato’s Theorizing of Pathê and Emotion

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Plato’s Response to Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Honor Code

Kwame Anthony Appiah, in The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen (2010), has recently offered a strong empirical argument for the claim that a change in how a society distributes honor (and dishonor) can bring about a moral revolution in this society. He argues that “honor and morality are separate systems: they can be aligned ... but they can easily pull in opposite directions” (108). His striking example of how honor and morality pull in different directions is the loathsome practice of honor killing, while examples of how they can be aligned are the cessation of dueling, slavery, and footbinding. Honor, and its associated emotional states (esteem, respect, contempt, shame) are often recruited by societies to sustain social norms. Appiah argues that honor can be likewise recruited to support the norms of morality.

Plato was certainly intent on moral revolution. Ancient Greece in general was composed of societies in which honor was extremely important, raised as it was on Homer’s Iliad. Plato certainly recognized this. Take, for example, his frequent
complaints about how Greek society confers no honor on philosophers; Socrates’ statement at his trial that he, not Olympic victors, should be “honored” (Apol. 36d3) by receiving free meals at the Prytaneum; and the appeal to the common view in the Menexenus, “we consider the life of one who has brought disgrace upon his relatives to be unlivable” (246d5-6). If Appiah is correct, one would expect that Plato would discuss at length the role of honor in the preservation and alteration of moral and social norms. But one does not find such a discussion in dialogues such as the Republic, Gorgias, Statesman. Certainly there are references to honor, for instance, the Timocratic State, but no direct treatment of honor.

In this paper I shall argue that when one looks closely at the dialogues, and especially the Laws, strong support for Appiah’s thesis is to be found. At Laws 711b4-c2 the Athenian says that the ruler who wishes to change (μεταβαλεῖν) the morals (ἠθη) of a state must begin “by praising and honoring certain actions bringing others into disrepute and cause those who disobey to be dishonored.” Throughout the Laws Plato attempts to achieve obedience to the laws of the state by the imposition of honor and dishonor, while these laws promote the best life possible for citizens. After examining the view of moral psychology of honor in the Laws, I argue that this is well supported elsewhere in Plato’s works. For example, Plato locates the response to honor (and dishonor) in the spirited part of the soul. Education puts the spirited part in harmony with the rational part. It follows that rationally dispensed honor will be essential for motivating us to rational, virtuous action.

In short, I argue that Plato would agree with Appiah’s claims about honor and its potential role in morality. I also suggest why Plato is careful not to stress overmuch the moral importance of honor in his works.

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Just Thinking: Timaeus’ Pure Moral Psychology

Timaeus’ divine psychology meets Socrates’ demand in book ten of the Republic for a pure psychology and clarifies the nature, immortality, and morality of the soul. Timaeus adopts Socrates’ tripartition of the soul but discerns a further partition within its ruling part. The logistikon or simply logos, as Timaeus calls it, is the soul’s proper ruler, and it itself consists of a properly ruling cycle of the same and a properly subservient cycle of the different. Timaeus portrays the proper activity of these cycles as cognitional and explains that the moral quality of one’s life depends on their orderly motion. Thus, he implies a set of aretai proper to thinking and prior to and responsible for the aretai of the tripartite soul. After making a preliminary case for the purity of Timaeus’ divine psychology, I extrapolate definitions of the cognitional aretai implied by Timaeus’ account from Socrates’ definitions of the civic virtues in the Republic. Then, I return to the question of the purity of Timaeus’ psychology to consider if Plato might not have had a purer psychology in mind that would abstract from the cycle of the different as Timaeus’ abstracts from the thymetikon and epithymetikon. The cycle of the different opinies, opinion grasps becoming, and the soul becomes. I argue that, inasmuch as moral excellence requires self-knowledge, the cycle of the different is indispensable.

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Curbing the Rational Desire for Knowledge: A Challenge to Tripartition in Plato’s Republic?

Recent scholarship has focused primarily on the appetitive and spirited parts in the tripartite theory of the soul in the Republic. In this paper, I would like to explore a problem that threatens to require a further subdivision within the calculative part into “calculative reasoning” and “calculative desire.”

When the philosopher-king is forced to reenter the cave, he ceases to contemplate the Forms in order to attend to the city as a whole unwillingly (7, 519c4-520e1). The philosopher-king, although unwilling, heeds the command to reenter as a just command to a justly arranged individual (520e1). Since he has a just arrangement of soul in which the calculative part rules over the spirited and the appetitive parts, his calculative part must be in control (4, 442c5-8; 9, 586d4-e7) and be the part that assents to reenter the cave as a just command.

But, since the calculative part has the peculiar desire for knowledge (9, 580d7-8; 580d10-d3) and contemplation of the Forms is the best and most pleasant activity that fulfills this desire, the philosopher-king is unwilling to reenter the cave because his calculative part desires continued and unceasing contemplation of the Forms.

If, then, the calculative part’s desire assents to continue the activity of contemplation at the same time that its reasoning dissents—in order to reenter the cave—then the Principle of Opposites (Resp. 4, 436b8ff.) applies to the calculative part.
Itself. This would look strikingly similar to the application of the Principle of Opposites that was used originally to distinguish the calculative and appetitive parts. The desire of the calculative part would bid (κελεύον) continued contemplation, but the reasoning would forbid (κωλύον) it. If this turns out to be the case, the calculative part must consist in two subjects and must be further subdivided into “calculative desire” and “calculative reasoning,” by the same principle that divided the soul initially between the calculative and appetitive (4, 439c5-d2).

This problem arises because the calculative part has two desires peculiar to it that come to compete with one another when the soul is embodied. The calculative part (a) desires knowledge (best fulfilled in contemplation) and (b) what is best for the soul as a whole. In its disembodied state, the soul can enjoy perpetual contemplation as a purely calculative soul (10, 611b1-e1). It turns out that what is best for the soul as a whole in its embodied state requires some attendance to the lower parts of the soul for the soul’s overall best condition. The attendance and satisfaction of the lower parts of the soul requires some time taken away from the activity of contemplation. In the city as the soul writ large analogy, the philosophers must disengage from perpetual contemplation (the happiest activity for them) to reenter the cave so that they can look after the happiness and best state of the city as a whole.

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Education as an Intervention in the Soul: An Interpretation of the Role of Paideia in Plato’s Republic

One of Plato’s views that is fair to infer from the reading of the Republic is that one cannot expect men to develop and maintain in their souls the fundamental civic virtues, temperance and justice, unless submitted to a meticulous program of moral education which is, at the same time, an intervention capable of producing well-ordered souls. This program, presented in the Republic, is grounded on a refined conception of the human soul: it’s tripartite nature, the dynamis of each element, and how they should relate to each other in a well-ordered and healthy soul. A thorough reading of the Republic and a correct interpretation of the psychology it contains will disclose how the educational program presented in this work can be construed as designed to be an intervention in each of the soul’s elements to produce the good order of the soul as a whole, called “justice”, and also to produce, as a consequence, at least another virtue: temperance. This psychological effect of education must be produced by it’s “elementary” degree, i.e., the one by mousike and gymnastike. This is so because these two virtues mentioned must be possessed by all citizens of a good polis. This view holds not only in the Republic, but is also sustained by other dialogues where temperance and justice appear as a pair. What follows is that a coherent reading of the Republic, as a work concerned with presenting the best city, calls for the extension of the “elementary” education to all citizens aiming at producing in them at least temperance and justice.

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Schizophrenia in Plato’s Laws

Plato’s Laws contains two distinct and incompatible moral psychologies. Notably, in Book V of the Laws, Plato presents a strikingly hedonistic account of human motivation. He claims that all human lives are inevitably bound up by considerations of pleasure and pain in such a fashion that we must always choose the course of action that provides the best balance of pleasure to pain. It is this moral psychology that justifies the Athenian’s exhortation to the lawmaker to teach that the just life is the most pleasant. However, there is another moral psychology in the Laws that is completely incompatible with this hedonistic psychology. For instance in Book III we find the Athenian complaining about the ignorance of someone whose feelings of pleasure and pain are at odds with their rational judgment. In the famous puppet imagery, reason is pictured as a golden string, whereas the other desires are inflexible and callous. This reveals that reason has some special power over the psychological force of pleasure and pain. In Book IX the Athenian decries the irrational pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, insisting that knowledge and reason should control one’s choices. This seeming inconsistency is not a problem for Plato’s moral psychology. But in order to see this, we cannot simply try to resolve the inconsistency by picking one moral psychology and disregarding the other. Instead, it is necessary to look at the disparate moral psychologies as elements in Plato’s non-ideal political thought. It is only through the incorporation of both psychologies that we can properly understand and appreciate the importance of the rule of law and the roles of persuasion and coercion in government according to Plato’s Laws. This paper integrates the two moral psychologies and uses the resulting view to illuminate aspects of the Laws that cannot be fully appreciated without the more complex psychological outlook.
According to Plato, a happy life consists in a mixture of reason and pleasure. As far as the second element of the good life is concerned, Plato has been gradually developing a critique of different kinds of hedonism (Protagoras, Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic). The contextual differences notwithstanding, one common denominator has been to search for the criteria, with the aid of which we can judge pleasures, and the measure, with which we can distinguish between good and bad pleasures.

It is only in the Philebus that Plato offers a complete critique of hedonism and a gradual conversion of the hedonist Protagoras, as well as the most elaborate treatment of the nature of pleasure. One of the most debated subjects in Plato’s elaboration of the pleasure, beside the propositional character of a type of pleasure, is the nature of pure pleasure (50e:5–53c:2) on which I focus on this paper. In opposition to a well-established view, I intend to demonstrate that and how these pleasures are not based on the model of restoration, and how they relate to the impure kinds of pleasure.

For this I will argue that the definition of “restoration of the degenerated natural state” does not concern all types of pleasures but rather restricts itself to the impure pleasures (bodily pleasures, pleasures of the soul, and mixed pleasures of body and soul, 31b:2–50e:4). The pure pleasures, of body and mind, will be shown to function like a limit and measure in the third genus of mixture. While members of the same genus, they differ considerably from the impure pleasures. That they are not mixed with pain provides no explanation for this difference, which justifies the Aristotelian critique (NE 1173a:22f:).

Our living in time and our being conscious of our past, present and future has proven that it is impossible to live in pleasure without reason at all (20e–21e). The nature of pleasure is well embedded in our time dimension. Nonetheless, Plato research has not elaborated on the relation between time and pure pleasure in the Philebus: The experience of the present in a pure pleasure is radically different from the one in the case of the impure pleasures. It is not dependent on any pain which had occurred beforehand, or any anticipation of a future fulfillment, but emerges unexpectedly. Thus such an experience of pure pleasure is not embedded in a chain reaction of steady restorations, which may degrade into immoderacy. Mental pleasures of the Calliclean kind of “filling leaky jars” cannot fall under the pure pleasure in the Philebus.

In his fourfold division, Socrates characterizes the third genus of mixture not only as “becoming toward being” but also as “being that has come to be” (26d, 27b). While impure pleasure is a process of restoration toward the natural equilibrium, pure pleasure emerges as “being that has come to be”, a presence complete in itself.

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Human Desire and Philosophy

In the Gorgias Socrates combines familiar professions of ignorance with a surprising degree of confidence in the truth of certain claims about the good life. Socrates’ claims are not merely true, but irrefutable (473b); they derive from philosophy itself (482a); Socrates, in voicing these claims, practices truth (526d). I argue that the apparent tension between Socrates’ ignorance and confidence should be understood in the context of the quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy, a quarrel that provokes two charges from Socrates. The first charge is that rhetoric aims at pleasure rather than at the good. The second is that rhetoric is unreasoning. I argue that the two charges are intimately connected: rhetoric is unreasoning because it aims at pleasure.

Two points are key to this critique. First the final good that is our end engenders in us an ordered series of desires: we desire various particular goods because of how they ultimately relate to this final end. This ordered series of desires is intelligible, hence capable of rational comprehension and articulation. But it is also possible to misidentify the proper objects of our desire; thus Socrates asserts, contra Polus, that ‘doing whatever we think is best’ and ‘doing what we want’ are not equivalent unless our reflection is accompanied by wisdom. Secondly, pleasure cannot be the final good. Its flux-like nature renders it incapable of generating the requisite ordered structure that marks human desire, and the absence of an intelligible ordered structure would make systematic reflection on our desires impossible.

This last point is not so much demonstrated as it is witnessed to by the Socratic elenchus itself. Philosophic reflection presupposes a subject matter marked by some degree of order and coherence, otherwise there would be no distinctions for systematic analysis to uncover. The rhetoricians submit their beliefs about the good life to philosophic scrutiny; these beliefs stem from desires that presuppose in turn a final good capable of engendering the very order that enables them to be objects of analysis. In participating in systematic reflection the rhetoricians thus presuppose both the ordered structure of their desires and a final good robust enough to account for this order. This is revealed when the rhetoricians are forced to acknowledge that
pleasure is too amorphous to allow for certain distinctions, such as that between good and bad pleasures, to which they are committed given their views on the good life. Socrates’ ignorance and confidence ought to be understood in light of the above. Plato would have us see that while Socrates lacks an account of the final good, and hence is ignorant, he nonetheless knows what any systematic reflection on the ends of our desires presupposes: a good robust enough to account for the intelligible order of our desires. The ordered nature of philosophic reflection presupposes that anything as amorphous as pleasure could not be consistently maintained as our final good; thus it is philosophy, not merely Socrates, who dictates a certain understanding of the good life.

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The Ethical Aspects of an Ontological Problem in Plato’s Phaedo Sophist and Timaeus

According to most accounts, Plato’s Being/Becoming distinction is an exhaustive ontological distinction between incorporeal and unchanging entities on the one hand and corporeal and changing entities on the other. And according to most accounts, on Plato’s psychology the soul is an incorporeal but changeable entity. Hence, it is unclear where soul fits into Plato’s ontology. There are, however, only three main possibilities: the soul could belong to Being, to Becoming, or to some third category. Each of these possibilities requires modification to the common understanding of either the Being/Becoming distinction or the soul. There are three possible ways of modifying the former. The first is to concede that the distinction does not capture all existents (i.e., that it is non-exhaustive), thus allowing for the existence of a third category to which soul could belong. Second, Being could be loosened so as to allow for at least some changeable entities, thus allowing soul admittance. Finally, Becoming could be loosened so as to allow at least some incorporeal entities like soul. There are two possible ways of amending the common understanding of the soul such that it has a clear ontological home. The first is denying that soul is changeable and thereby allowing it into the category of Being. The second is denying or significantly redefining the incorporeality of soul so as to permit its admittance into Becoming.

Plato was well aware of the tension between his Being/Becoming distinction and his metaphysics of soul and examined at least three different resolutions in the Phaedo, the Sophist, and the Timaeus, respectively. In each of those dialogues it becomes clear, however, that the problem is not strictly a metaphysical one. Rather, there are serious ethical implications as well. In fact, it is Plato’s attempt to explain the human condition that leads him in each of these passages to conclude that soul is neither Being nor Becoming but belongs to some largely undefined intermediate category. I first examine the Affinity Argument for soul’s immortality in Phaedo. Therein Plato offers a serious argument explicitly rejecting both the possibility that soul is a Being and the possibility that it is a Becomer. He does so on account of soul’s metaphysics, cognitive activity, and practical activity. Essentially the argument is that because it can function both with and without the body, is capable of both knowledge and ignorance, is capable of both ruling and being ruled, and is capable of both virtue and vice, the soul is neither Being nor Becoming. These considerations show up again in the Eleatic Visitor’s refutation of the Friends of the Forms in Sophist and in the psychogony in Timaeus. In sections two and three I situate these passages within their dramatic contexts, showing their connections with the Affinity Argument and its defense of philosophy as practice for death and dying, and make the case that in each one Plato’s point is that the human life—especially as perfected by the philosopher—is neither choiceworthy nor possible unless soul is an ontological intermediate.

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Rational Madness: Philosophic Mania in Plato’s Phaedrus

In the Phaedrus, Plato makes the striking and paradoxical proposal that the philosophic lover is mad. This proposal is paradoxical because in other dialogues, Plato is critical of mania, and develops an opposition between philosophy as rational and mania as irrational. In this paper, I offer a solution to this tension, centered on an analysis of mania in the Phaedrus as a state of exiting the self. On my interpretation, the philosophic lover of the Phaedrus counts as both genuinely mad and as fully rational.

Burnyeat has attempted to solve this difficulty by arguing that, while the other forms of mania Plato describes in the Phaedrus—ranging from poetic inspiration to the madness of prophets—involves possession from without, the philosopher is superior, since he is possessed from within (unpublished). The difficulty with this proposal is that it does not make clear the sense in which the philosopher is genuinely mad. On Burnyeat’s reading, Plato’s claim that the philosopher is mad emerges as merely metaphorical; however, this claim occurs in the context of a detailed taxonomy of different forms of mania and is, fur-
thermore, central to Plato’s overall argument in the dialogue. Santas, on the other hand, has argued that *mania* is irresistible desire; the philosopher emerges as mad because he has overwhelming desire for the forms (1988). The problem with Santas’ proposal is that it cannot be applied to the other forms of madness; Plato emphasizes that poets and prophets are out of their minds and frenzied, and therefore lack the agency required to desire anything. My positive proposal is that *mania* is a form of ecstasy, of exiting the self.

How are we to interpret the claim that the philosopher exits himself? I have four suggestions. First, Plato metaphorically depicts the philosopher’s recollection of the forms through the re-growth of wings; when he recollects the forms fully, the philosopher escapes embodiment. The philosopher is thus striving to leave behind his bodily self. Second, the philosopher is thought mad because he has no concern for earthly matters and his behavior is deeply unconventional—he exits his social context and, insofar as he is a social being, exits himself. Third, where the other manic types are possessed by the gods, the philosopher is wholly turned to objects outside of himself, the forms. Finally, in Plato’s description of recollection, he emphasizes that only the rational part of the soul ever grasps the forms. The philosopher exits himself insofar as he turns away from the lower parts of his soul and devotes himself to contemplation.

This project not only has significance for the interpretation of Plato’s *Phaedrus*, but also, more broadly, for our understanding of Plato’s psychology. It sheds light on the way in which Plato conceives of the contrast between rationality and irrationality, and the way in which he analyzes the interplay of rational and non-rational parts of the soul in the philosophic life.

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**Harmony and the Soul in the *Phaedo***

Socrates’ Affinity Argument in the *Phaedo* aims to convince us of the immortality of the soul by playing up the similarities between souls, on the one hand, and indisputably imperishable and incorporeal things (Forms), on the other hand. Although it is easy enough to see that the Affinity Argument is somehow unsuccessful, it is hard to pinpoint precisely where it goes wrong. This is because it hard to know precisely what the Affinity Argument says. This much (or this little) is clear: Socrates makes trio of positive assertions about the soul’s attributes. The first is that souls are invisible (79b5-6); next is that souls, *qua* incorporeal entities, apprehend the Forms (79d1-5); last is that souls rule the bodies they inhabit and to that extent resemble the divine (80a1-5). Jointly, these assertions, apparently in conjunction with some principles of kinship or affinity, and perhaps also together with certain logico-metaphysical connections among the attributes Socrates ascribes to the soul, allegedly entitle Socrates to conclude that “it is natural...for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so” (80b8).

My first task is to try to understand what kind of argument this is—whether an argument by analogical induction, or a deductive inference that proceeds by way of conceptual containment claims, or something else. I then discuss Simmias’ rejoinder to the Affinity Argument (85e3-d2). Simmias’ answer, I contend, comprises a negative thesis—a rebuttal of the Affinity Argument—and a positive thesis—his Harmonia Theory about the nature of the soul. The negative thesis shows the Affinity Argument to be unsound. The positive thesis, if correct, shows the Affinity Argument’s conclusion to be false. Socrates’ reply to Simmias (92a7-95a7) addresses only the positive thesis, and it doesn’t do this satisfactorily. After diagnosing the failure of Socrates’ reply, I show that there are a variety of more successful countermoves Socrates might have made. In making this point, I reflect on the ethical and metaphysical ramifications of what we could call the “epiphenomenal psychology” propounded in Simmias’ Harmonia Theory.

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**Choosing What is Good**

To some the argument for subdividing the soul (*Rep*. 436a ff) implies a rejection of the Socratic claim that everyone desires the good—which in turn implies the possibility of *akrasia*. I wish to present another reading that puts the argument into a different context. We shall see that the argument introduces an innovation in moral psychology. The Socratic claim that everyone desires the good depends on an earlier moral psychology in which desire is like a disposition waiting to be actualized; there are no internal obstacles to actualization because there is only one desire. Choice (*hairesis*) is only between competing courses of action (*Prot*. 356e-357e). Without these, there is no need for a distinct moment of choice. However, the argument at 436a introduces conflict between contrary impulses into the soul. When contrary impulses are introduced, how one, as opposed
to the other, passes over into action calls for a different notion of choice. In the argument for subdividing the soul, Socrates carefully constructs this notion by supplementing the terms for desiring (epithumein), wishing for (boulesthai), and wanting (ethelein). Next, since the argument consistently makes the soul—and not one of its parts—the proper subject of choice, the conflicting impulses are seen to be motivations that arise from different parts of the soul. Motivations become effective only through choice. Finally, the soul always chooses on the basis of what it takes to be good, appetite’s indifference to the good notwithstanding. Thus the idea that everyone wishes for (bouletai) the good is preserved because wishing for the good is now choosing the good. This interpretation of Socrates’ argument presents a set of implications about issues related to virtue and vice, such as akrasia in Book 4 and appearances of pleasure in Book 10. However, the implication I will address here has to do with the account of vice in Book 8. Since choice is based on what is taken to be good, it highlights the way that beliefs are action-guiding, i.e., we choose particular actions guided by what we believe to be good. That belief guides action opens up an issue vital to understanding virtue and vice: how stable dispositions to act arise in the first place. If actions are the result of choice and if choice is guided by beliefs, then one way to fix a disposition to act is to adopt a stable belief that consistently guides choices to act. The account of the way a soul acquires a constitution shows the way parts of the soul take on stable dispositions to act. In each case, the stability of the constitution rests on an overarching and stable belief about the good. In vicious souls, stable but mistaken beliefs about the good guide actions and form dispositions. For instance, in the soul of the democratic youth, his false and bold beliefs (e.g., ‘Moderation is cowardice’ and ‘Shamelessness is courage’) establish his disposition to pursue pleasure as the good (Rep. 560b-561a).

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Justice and the Good of Others in Plato’s Republic

In Book 4 of the Republic, Socrates praises justice as a state of psychic harmony which benefits the just person. The just person will select actions in accordance with a Harmony Principle (HP), according to which the right action is the one that will preserve and promote harmony within the just agent’s soul (443e). For some, this focus on the just person’s internal state suffices to convict Socrates of missing the point of justice; from their perspective, justice must issue in a commitment to uphold the good of others. This paper shows how Socrates might respond to this charge. It locates in Books 1 and 4 a description of justice as a particular sort of psychic power, one which expresses itself by forming partnerships and associations, especially the political association of ruling and being ruled.

In Book 1, Polemarchus volunteers the promising idea that justice is concerned especially with action pursued through partnerships. This idea is neglected due to Socrates’ mistaken belief that being a good partner in activity A is the same as being good at A. With Thrasymachus’ intervention, though, the connection is made between justice and the political association of ruling and being ruled. Even as Socrates rejects Thrasymachus’ definition of justice as the interest of the stronger, he accepts the sophist’s association of justice with the project of forming associations, as indicated by his own arguments for the value of justice at 348b-352a.

Book 4 contains Socrates’ account of justice as a power which begins in the individual soul as self-rule, the activity of maintaining all parts of the soul in their own proper function. This internal association provides the basis for associations with other citizens, either by acquiring money or entering private contracts or engaging in politics. Psychic justice expresses itself fully in the just city, especially in the association of ruling and being ruled that exists between the three classes. Socrates can then reply to the criticism that his notion of justice neglects the good of others. A just city is clearly a great benefit for all its citizens. Justice as a power for political association expresses itself in actions whose natural result is the just city. As a result, just actions chosen in accordance with HP have the unintended but non-accidental result of promoting the good of others.

This description of justice and just actions allows for a critical review of John Cooper’s account of Plato’s moral psychology. Cooper draws on Book 7 to argue that the philosopher-rulers’ acquaintance with the forms commits them to maximizing goodness and order in the world as a whole. But descriptions of the philosophers’ action (540a-b, 591b-92a) are best interpreted as restatements of HP: philosophers apply the form of the good not by acting on a principle of maximizing order in the world but by acting on a principle of promoting harmony in their own souls and in their city.

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There has been some tendency recently to try to endow Socratic knowledge of the good and the bad with certain qualities that are not purely intellectual, but also motivational. The idea here is that if Virtue is Knowledge, such knowledge should “guarantee” the ability to “struggle” or “persevere” with – and indeed overcome – such other causes of intentional action as fear or pleasure; while if only belief that is not knowledge were involved, causal explanations of intentional actions appealing to fear or pleasure would be possible, even when the actions take place contrary to what the agent believes best at the instant of action. The same idea appears in Brickhouse and Smith’s notion of “Virtue Intellectualism” (as opposed to what is usually thought of as Socratic Intellectualism). We shall argue that this “Virtue Intellectualism” is no form of Intellectualism at all, being rather the denial that Socrates holds the intellectualist view that all intentional actions are generated by the desire for whatever might be the agent’s own real good, once that is given direction from within the agent’s own web of purely intellectual beliefs.

One way in which we shall examine the opposing view is to explore an implication we shall argue this view has. This is that “No one errs willingly” cannot be construed in accordance with the view of Protagoras 358B6-C3 and Apology 25D1-26A4, that no one errs in their actions except through ignorance. Instead it must be construed in accordance with a more Platonic conception of “No one errs willingly”, wherein people may err unwillingly in their actions not only through ignorance but also through such other causes as epithumia – as Plato allows at Timaeus 86C-E, Sophist 227E-230E, and Laws 731C, 734B, 860D-863E. (Even the later dialogues of Plato deny Aristotle’s claim at EN III.1 that at least some actions done through thumos or epithumia are done willingly.)

One way in which we shall examine the opposing view is to explore an implication we shall argue this view has. This is that “No one errs willingly” cannot be construed in accordance with the view of Protagoras 358B6-C3 and Apology 25D1-26A4, that no one errs in their actions except through ignorance. Instead it must be construed in accordance with a more Platonic conception of “No one errs willingly”, wherein people may err unwillingly in their actions not only through ignorance but also through such other causes as epithumia – as Plato allows at Timaeus 86C-E, Sophist 227E-230E, and Laws 731C, 734B, 860D-863E. (Even the later dialogues of Plato deny Aristotle’s claim at EN III.1 that at least some actions done through thumos or epithumia are done willingly.)

Against the above views, we shall defend what we regard as a more Socratic understanding of “Virtue is Knowledge” and “No one errs willingly”.

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Mythic Story and Erotic Experience: The Nature of the Soul in Socrates’ Second Speech in the Phaedrus

This paper aims at revealing what Socrates’ palinode in the Phaedrus tells us about the nature of the soul, focusing on the erotic nature it attributes to the intellect. lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech blame eros for inciting people to act against what is rational; these two speeches draw upon a concept of rationality in which reason consists in the calculation of one’s material or social advantage. My interpretation of the palinode is that Socrates corrects this view and argues that reason is not just a means to fulfill bodily or social desires, but is itself erotic by nature. Socrates thus praises eros for putting the soul in a state in which it can recollect first, its desire for a order of interest higher than the pursuit of one’s material advantage, secondly, its natural kinship with this higher order, and thirdly, the nature of the realities of this order. To convince us, he needs first to show that the soul is naturally akin to these realities, secondly to explain why it became foreign to them, and thirdly to establish how and why concrete objects of love have the power to reveal this kinship. The first two steps are realized through a story about the soul’s occupations before birth and its incarnation. The myth builds upon the definition of the soul as a self-mover, that is as having a will of its own. The divine soul has a simple and unified will, which makes possible the fulfillment of its desire for knowledge of real being and the ruling of the cosmos according to this knowledge. I argue that this description of the divine soul is the representation of the ideal to which the human soul is subordinate, that is, its nature. Yet the human soul differs from the divine, for its will is divided between two opposite desires, one for what is just and good in itself, the other for its own material advantage. This tension is the reason why the human soul cannot perfectly fulfill its desire to know real beings. Most of the time, the concerns of bodily existence completely obliterate this desire. However, the recollection of the real beings through their sensible images awaken it, what is symbolized by the growth of the soul’s wings. Since recollection is the only access for the incarnate soul to real objects of knowledge, the whole process of learning should be described as erotic: the intellect recognizes images of real beings because they satisfy its desire. Thus, in the experience of love, a rational desire for real beings is uncovered and the whole task of philosophy is to precise the nature of the object of this desire in order to transform it into real knowledge.
Socrates’ defense of erôs in the second of his speeches in the Phaedrus (244a-257b) contains a rich, if difficult, source of information about Plato’s view of the emotions. Scholars have been divided about the philosophical significance of especially poetic portions of the speech, including a pulsating description of the lover’s emotional first encounter with his beloved (250c-252b). Martha Nussbaum makes much of this description and interprets the speech as a whole to serve as a recantation of Plato’s largely negative outlook on the emotions in the Republic and Phaedo. Her reading suggests that Plato adopts what resembles a cognitivist view of the emotions in the Phaedrus, according to which the emotions convey information unavailable to the intellect alone about what has value. By contrast, C. J. Rowe denies that the emotional overflow associated with this encounter makes any valuable epistemic contribution whatsoever and points to passages indicating the confusion of both lover and beloved during the tumultuous early stages of their erotic encounter (250a-b, 255d). My interpretation examines the significance of the emotions in a different way. On my view, Plato either ascribes to the emotions associated with erôs a limited cognitive capacity similar to that of perception or he is a non-cognitivist of some type. In either case, what is especially significant in the Phaedrus on my reading is that Plato acknowledges an important precognitive contribution of certain emotions to rational processes like philosophical inquiry.

Restricting my analysis to the transitional material between Socrates’ first and second speech (241d-244a), I argue that there we find a coherent picture of the contribution of the emotions, which is later developed and expanded in the speech itself. In this section, Socrates recounts what led him to the understanding that he must stay with his companion, Phaedrus, and give a second speech (242c-243e). He describes this in terms of a process of inquiry initiated and guided by emotional disturbances and completed by insight into the cause of the disturbance. Socrates’ brief description of this process is not merely a literary device used to transition into his second speech, I argue, but actually summarizes in a nutshell Plato’s view about the contribution of the emotions to philosophical inquiry.

Responsibility, honor, and justice are permanently connected to the emotions in different ways. For example, a spirited desire motivates the agent to do something that is required by the norms of honor, e.g. to avenge an insult. Therefore, the ‘criterion of success’ is set up by the norm, antecedently to and independently of the desires of the agent. The ‘direction of fit’ goes a different way: not from desire (via action) to the world, but from norm to action as well as to the world. Thus, if one of your appetites goes unsatisfied, all that happens is that you become frustrated, whereas if you fail to meet the demands of honor, your action is wrong and you become the legitimate object of censure – others’ as well as your own. This sanction is of an altogether different sort than the frustration following the non-satisfaction of an appetite: the difference is between the normative and the causal.

Reason loves wisdom and its appropriate task is to rule. At bottom these are the same: Reason aims at truth, i.e. to grasp it and to realize or implement it. This truth is practical truth: what is to be done, what we ought to do – the good. The good is determined by the nature of things, independently of our desires. Thus the good sets up the standard that Reason aims at and that we, in so far as we are ruled by Reason, ought to aim at grasping and implementing. So Reason is normative as well.

This is the key to solving our problem: Both Reason and Spirit are sources of normative motivation, as opposed to Appetite, which is a source of causal motivation. Hence they both entail the understanding that living at the beck and call of Appetite is less than human, that we must always check our appetites and ask whether they ought to be acted upon or not. This is why Spirit can listen to Reason and be its ally against Appetite. The difference is that Spirit merely takes over the norms to be implemented, while Reason has the power to figure this out for itself; Reason is autonomous while Spirit is conventional – but they are both normative.
Shame and Virtue in Plato's Charmides

At Charmides 160d–161b, Socrates and the young Charmides examine the claim that sôphrosunê is the same as aidôs, or a sense of shame. Socrates easily persuades Charmides to give up his thesis, on the grounds that while sôphrosunê is always a good thing, aidôs is ambivalent. The argument has received very little attention from scholars, and commentators who have discussed it are divided as to its merits. (Beversluis (2000) calls it "one of the lamest arguments in the early dialogues" (141); by contrast, Tuozzo (2011) finds the argument unproblematic (164–65).) My aim is to provide a thorough analysis of the passage and explain its importance for understanding the dialogue as a whole.

In the first part of the paper, I offer an interpretation of the argument and give several reasons to think that Charmides' abandonment of his thesis is premature. I shall then try to show that the argument and its conclusion are meant to be taken seriously, but not for the reasons Charmides accepts. Drawing on key details from the dialogue's opening narrative, I argue that Charmides' own sense of shame is the very thing that prevents him from challenging the refutation and gaining a deeper understanding of why aidôs is not a virtue. At the same time, Charmides' aidôs is what attracts Socrates to him most of all, for it makes him well disposed to acquire the genuine virtue that is sôphrosunê. The ambivalence of aidôs, which Socrates appeals to at 160d–161b, is therefore illustrated through the figure of Charmides himself. The young man is already capable of taking a critical attitude toward his own beliefs and inclinations, yet he fails to take a similarly critical attitude with respect to the opinions others have of him.

I conclude by situating Plato's dialogue within the wider context of ancient Greek views of shame. In addition to adapting key themes from the Odyssey—the education of Telemachus, in particular—the Charmides anticipates the treatment of aidôs in Aristotle's ethical works.

Science Pure and Simple: The Possibility and Benefit of Sôphrosunê

Scholars have noted that Socrates' description of his practice in the Apology appears to be inconsistent with statements he makes in his examination of Critias' definition of sôphrosunê as a particular sort of knowledge in the Charmides, which Socrates abbreviates as "science pure and simple" (170b3–4). The claims that such knowledge is neither possible nor beneficial might seem to eviscerate Socratic methodology, which is thought to rely on a strikingly similar sort of knowledge. For this reason, commentators have thought that exploring the relationship between the Apology and the Charmides yields important information about how Plato views the Socratic enterprise and how he thinks it can be improved or superseded, making it relevant to the nature of Socratic elenchus, the development of Plato's philosophical methodology, and the similarities and differences between Socratic and Platonic philosophy in general.

However, the relationship between these two dialogues is not as illuminating as has been proposed. This is because they are not in conflict in the sort of way that would elucidate the issues just mentioned. We should not think that the statements in the Charmides to the effect that 'science pure and simple' is neither possible nor beneficial conflict with the Socratic mission statements in the Apology because there is a distinction between the kind of knowledge discussed in each dialogue.

The distinctive features of 'science pure and simple,' indeed the features in virtue of which it is found to be impossible and unbeneﬁcial in the Charmides, are that it has as its characteristic objects things that are type-identical with it (and directed toward them as such rather than qua something else), and that it renders its possessors incapable in principle of knowing what they or others know or do not know. But this sort of capacity differs signiﬁcantly from the knowledge Socrates claims to have in the Apology, for the latter has as its characteristic objects things of the form "S purports to know that p," "S knows that p," and "S does not know that p," and it does not disallow Socrates in principle, but only as a matter of contingent fact if at all, from knowing things of the form "S knows about domain d speciﬁcally." If this is right, though, the arguments in the Charmides against the possibility or beneﬁt of 'science pure and simple' do not tell against the possibility or beneﬁt of the sort of knowledge Socrates claims to have in the Apology.

The competing interpretations I will discuss fall into three categories: those on which the Charmides completely undercut the Socratic mission as expressed in the Apology (e.g. Richard McKim’s), those on which it undercut a major part of it (e.g. Hugh Benson’s), and those on which it undercut no part of it (e.g. G.R. Carone’s). My view is of the third type, but I will argue, pace Carone, that it is not that the Socratic challenges against Critias in the Charmides fail to be decisive, but rather that they are never intended to apply (and do not in fact apply) to Socratic practice as described in the Apology.
The paper is an investigation of Plato's puzzling statement at the end of the Philebus (65a) that since goodness cannot be grasped in one form, it must be grasped as a conjunction of three, Beauty, Proportion, and Truth. How are we to interpret this statement? One possibility is that these are just three different names for the same thing (cf. Penner, Unity of Virtue), however, I follow Gerson (Beauty, Commensurability, and Truth) in rejecting this possibility. Beauty, proportion, and truth must, I think, be different Forms and signify different things. But then how are they related to each other and especially the good? I argue that while beauty, proportion and truth are different Forms they are nevertheless always found together for Plato, that is, they are necessarily connected and extensionally equivalent.

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Plato’s Consistent Pessimism: Metics and the Parable of the Family in the Laws

Christopher Bobonich’s Plato’s Utopia Recast rekindled interested in Plato’s long-neglected Laws, proposing a significant reinterpretation of both the Laws and the progression of Plato’s political thought. He contends that the Laws defends four crucial premises which Republic denies:

1. At least some non-philosophers are capable of being genuinely virtuous.
2. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing virtue for its own sake.
3. At least some non-philosophers are capable of valuing for its own sake the genuine well-being or happiness of others.
4. At least some non-philosophers are capable of living happy lives.

By the time he wrote the Laws, Bobonich argues, Plato had become much more optimistic about the potential for non-philosophers to both value virtue and become virtuous. Republic’s lower classes are the “slaves of the rulers,” inherently unfit for self-governed virtuous action. Bobonich argues that Plato abandons this position, leading to the Laws’ distinction between “free and unfree” as a matter not of one’s nature but of education; at least some who receive the education of the Laws, even if they are not philosophers, can be genuinely happy and virtuous.

I argue that Plato’s views have changed much less than Bobonich suggests. Although Bobonich discusses the education of citizens in great detail, he fails to devote sufficient attention to the immense class of non-citizens: the metics. Even though metic children receive the same education as the citizens, Plato does not believe that they are capable of virtue. Indeed, as he frames the project of the Laws in what I call the “Parable of the Family” Plato denies the possibility of simply teaching the unvirtuous to be virtuous; instead, the best possible course of action is to “reconcile” the just and unjust under the strict rule of law. Plato accepts that many are unfit for virtue by their very nature (in addition to their upbringing), and composes much of the policy of the Laws to fit this framework.

I argue that the Laws does not represent a significant shift in Plato’s view about the possibility for non-philosophers to be virtuous. Instead, the great shift occurs with regard to citizenship; whereas many citizens in Republic are unfit by nature for virtue, the citizen class of the Laws is made up only of those inclined toward virtue. Plato may have become more optimistic about the proportion of society with some aptitude toward virtue, and education may do a great deal to help non-philosophers find a greater appreciation of virtue, but careful attention to the Parable of the Family and the role of metics shows that, pace Bobonich, nature remains at the center of Plato’s views on virtue. As in Republic, the best those incapable of virtue can hope for is to benefit from the virtuous guidance of their betters. The virtuous can come to comprehend the reasons behind the laws that reconcile just and unjust, but the unvirtuous cannot, remaining very much the “slaves of the rulers” with regard to virtue.
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Why the Athenians defeated the Persians (Laws 111, 699b–c)  

According to the Athenian in this passage, the Athenians who won on this occasion were cowards, who only achieved what they did because they were overcome by fright. The paper sets out to explain this— at first sight— bizarre-looking claim, by relating it to other texts, in Laws, Phaedo and Republic: there are different levels of courage, as there are of the other ‘virtues’, ranging from the downright spurious (as in the Laws) to the fully authentic courage as possessed by the philosopher; or, more strictly, the philosopher who has, per impossibile, replicated the wisdom of the gods.

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Testing for Justice: Innovations in Moral Thought-Experimentation in Republic 2  

The purpose of this paper is to show that Plato’s use of thought-experimentation constitutes a methodological innovation, one that distinguishes him from the Presocratics and Sophists. The context of the Myth of Gyges in Rep. 2 suggests that Plato seeks to present this particular story as an innovative use of literature and myth-making, a use that exploits the internal consistency and moral force of an individual myth. In addition, the version of the myth in Rep. 2 turns out in fact to constitute an innovative use of a literary possibly world. This paper, then, makes the case both that Plato actively presents the myth in Rep. 2 as innovative, and that the use of the myth as a thought-experiment does constitute a genuine and historically important departure from the methods of the Sophists and Presocratics.

Whether Plato is slandering Sophists and Isocrates (Kerferd 1981), appropriating other genres’ devices (Nightingale 1995), or changing the face of Greek thinking and education (Havelock 1963), he consistently presents his theories and methodologies as departures from the status quo. Thus, it should come as no surprise that in Rep. 2 he juxtaposes Glaucón’s thought-provoking presentation of the Myth of Gyges with Adeimantus’ quotidian introduction of myriad out-of-context literary quotations; this juxtaposition draws attention to the fact that Glaucón’s analysis makes careful use of the structure and literary devices of the myth, whereas Adeimantus more traditionally adduces a number of examples in an encyclopedic manner. What is more, Glaucón expands the myth to construct his thought-experiment, an expansion indicative of a deep, subjective understanding of the story as a moral tale and thus also an advance over Adeimantus’ superficial use of myth.

Rescher outlines a significant number of types of counterfactual reasoning that the Presocratics employ (1991), but, as Ierodiakonou points out, he “virtually identifies thought experiments with any type of hypothetical reasoning” (2005, 129). Indeed, none of the Presocratic examples adduced by Rescher quite constitutes a thought-experiment in the modern sense, whereas the Myth of Gyges does; both Wilkes (1988) and Ierodiakonou (2005) acknowledge that the Myth of Gyges functions as a thought-experiment, but neither points out or deeply explores the ways in which it is (self-consciously) innovative. Shields goes further, suggesting that the Myth of Gyges might constitute an excitingly new type of thought-experiment that allows the participant in the thought-experiment to test a single, isolated claim concerning the extent to which justice is a matter of compulsion. The myth turned laboratory allows Plato to identify clearly that Sophistic claim which alone is to be tested and refuted.15

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The Metaphysics of the Decline of Regimes in Republic 8-9  

It is common to treat the central books (5-7) of Plato’s Republic as digressive for the purposes of understanding the structure of Socrates’ larger demonstration that the just life is superior to the unjust life, which spans Books 2-9.16 I claim in this paper that separating the central Books in this way violates the integrity of the dialogue and overlooks the transformation that oc-
cur in the moral psychology when we turn from the account of “non-contradiction” in Book 4 to the account of the decline of regimes in Books 8-9. My argument is that the psychology underlying the account of virtue and vice in Books 8-9 is fundamentally transformed by the discussion of participation introduced in Book 5 and cannot be separated from the concerns introduced by the central books. I first note the textual indicators and structural asymmetries that set the first leg of Socrates’ argument into provocative tension with the second, and I read these signs as calling on the reader to expect the moral psychology underpinning the degeneration of regimes to be transformed by the discussion of forms and participation in the central books. Responding to these signals, I study the partitive psychology of Book 4, according to which the soul is divided into agent-like individual parts at odds with one another, and set it in contrast to the metaphysics of limit and continuum in Books 8-9, according to which four “manners” (τρόποι) of regime are picked out from an indefinite continuum of vices. I argue that the part/whole account of soul in Book 4 is unable to capture the ambiguity of the character-types in Books 8-9. These character-types, and the regimes that embody them, each virtuously embodies one of either wisdom, courage, moderation, or justice, but it embodies these virtues viciously, so to speak, insofar as each takes itself to be complete apart from the whole of perfect virtue. I conclude with the suggestion that the psychology of self-awareness in the Apology better reflects the character of the vices in Books 8-9 than the partitive psychology of Book 4, and that therefore we are witnessing in the Republic account of limit and continuum the development of a metaphysics appropriate to the Socratic practice of awareness of one’s own ignorance.

16 In a recent paper presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Hayden Ausland treats the central books as digressive to the structure of the argument starting in Book 2 and concluding in Books 8-9.

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The Narrative Frame of Plato’s Lysis:

A Socratic Self-Portrait of Moral Psychology and Philosophical Friendship

In this paper, I analyze how the narrative aspects of the Lysis illustrate Socrates’ understanding of the moral psychology both in terms of his self-understanding and in terms of how he views what would morally benefit his interlocutors. As such, a consideration of moral psychology in this dialogue point to a reconsideration of the nature of friendship itself. This paper divides into three parts. First, I briefly describe the narrative structure and setting of the Lysis to establish what I mean by the narrative aspects of the dialogue. Briefly, the narrative aspects include an awareness of who Socrates’ auditor is, or at least the sort of person he might be, the very fact that Socrates is narrating an account of his own philosophical conversation, and that his narrative description provides interpretative tools to help us understand the philosophical elements of the dialogue. I then show that Socrates’ narrative commentary draws attention to Hippothales, Ctesippus, Lysis and Menexenus and how they interact with each other. By describing the emotions, psychological motivations and behaviors of his main interlocutors, Socrates highlights the differences between their active and passive modes of social engagement. These different modes of social engagement illustrate how their capacity for genuine friendship and for philosophical inquiry is shaped by their respective moral psychologies. Second, I demonstrate how Socrates’ narrative remarks highlight his own mental states, his emotional states, and his responses to his emotions. These self-reflective remarks offer a preliminary indication of how Socrates’ practice of philosophy incorporates the emotional as well as the intellectual dimensions of human experience. To explain briefly, when Socrates discloses his mental and emotional states to the auditor, he paints a detailed portrait of the philosopher in action. These details reveal Socrates’ intellectual adaptability, his ongoing interrogative stance and his commitment to sustained philosophical conversation. But more importantly, the narrative commentary shows how Socrates’ interest in eros particularly and the emotions more generally shapes his philosophic practice. By revealing these aspects of his philosophical process throughout his narrative commentary, Socrates provides the auditor with a positive model of friendship, the very quality under discussion in the dialogue. This narrative portrait of Socrates presents an initial challenge to the common view of Socrates as an intellectualist. Finally, I address how the narrative relationship between Socrates and his auditor allows us to interpret the aporetic conclusion of the dialogue in positive terms.

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What Sense of Akrasia Does Socrates Deny in Protagoras and Why Does He Deny It?

Socrates’ denial, in Protagoras, of the possibility of akrasia is usually treated as a source for this distinctive feature of Plato’s earlier, “Socratic” moral psychology. However, as sometimes noticed, the evidentiary value of the relevant passages is not clear-cut. Nowhere in them does Socrates ever specify explicitly what sense of akrasia he means to deny, nor does he really defend his denial. Why introduce his view, only to leave obvious, important questions untreated? And what sense does he deny?
The present paper seeks answers in the context of Socrates’ elenches of Protagoras, and argues that Socrates subordinates his treatment of akrasia entirely to the purpose of refuting Protagoras. In the competitive terms of elenches, Socrates introduces the topic of akrasia only in order to exploit a weakness he identifies in Protagoras’ moral psychology. Further, he limits the sense of akrasia he denies to the immediate needs of this refutation.

The denial’s strategic purpose is to exploit a specific weakness in the moral psychology, which underpins Protagoras’ thesis that courage and knowledge differ radically (349d), and thereby to trap him into admitting the negation of this thesis (360d). The weakness is that Protagoras’ moral psychology cannot account for error in conduct deriving simply from mistakes at deliberation. Rather, every error he considers he ascribes to pathological, non-rational factors, like madness (323b, 350b). Noting this weakness, Socrates enlists an unwitting Protagoras in developing the Measuring Art, as a model of the very factor, deliberation, which Protagoras’ own view ignores. This model’s ostensible purpose is to explain how what Most People call weakness of the will is a contradiction in terms, and actually just poor deliberation. On Socrates’ model, no one makes a bad decision deliberately, but only through ignorance of some facet of the deliberative Art. On this sense of akrasia, Socrates denies only that people, who are thought to commit errors while knowing better, actually know better. This is a quite restricted sense of akrasia. Although Socrates’ denials may be intended to cover akrasia more broadly, in Protagoras Socrates describes and defends only this epistemological sense. But Socrates’ model has also an ulterior, elenctic purpose, which is to depict an act of cowardice as arising, not from the agent being overcome akrratically by fear, but from deliberating without knowing what is and is not to be feared (360b). Once Protagoras has agreed that cowardice is a form of ignorance, it is easy for Socrates to maneuver him to contradict his original thesis, and agree that courage is a form of wisdom, after all (360de). By this moment of refutation, the topic of akrasia has receded completely from conversational focus, yet its force remains undiminished, for it has afforded the introduction of the strategically crucial theme of deliberation, which Socrates has ultimately parlayed into refutation.

This ulterior, elenctic purpose of Socrates’ Measuring Art sufficiently justifies restricting his denial of akrasia to such a narrow, epistemological sense. But does this denial, thus restricted, conflict very much, after all, with Plato’s later moral psychology?

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Plato on Courage

Most recent interpretations of Plato’s Laches have claimed that this dialogue holds a particular place among Plato’s writings in a historical development (Santas, Penner, Devereux) or pedagogical development (Kahn, Wolfsdorf). I argue, rather, that Plato’s account of courage in the Laches is no different from that of his other works (including works that at first sight contradict it, such as the Protagoras and the Republic). I do this by identifying five elements in Plato’s account of courage in dialogues thought to be later, and show how those elements are already at work in the Laches’ core passage where Socrates refutes Laches’ way of understanding courage as ‘prudent persistence (phronimos karteria)’ (193a-d). I also argue that between Socrates’ position in the Laches and his position in the Protagoras there is no actual contradiction.

First, I draw out five elements in Aristotle’s account of courage that can also be found throughout Plato’s corpus. These five elements are the claims that: (1) there are two levels at which the calculations of prudence are carried out, the hedonistic level of pleasure/pain and the ethical level of kalon/aischron, (2) prudent calculations weigh pleasure/pain in accordance with kalon/aischron calculations, (3) true courage includes a habituation to follow reason in making these judgments, (4) true courage includes a habituation to have a reasonable degree of self-confidence, (5) true courage is distinct in character and motivation from both ‘civic courage’ (boldness motivated by honor), and ‘technical confidence’ (boldness based on expertise).

Second, I show how these elements are at work in the Laches. I point to three dramatic moments that set up Laches as a lover of civic courage and a despiser of technical confidence, and show how Socrates uses these tendencies to undermine Laches’ conception of courage as ‘prudent persistence’. Laches mistakenly takes ‘prudent persistence’ to mean ‘persistence with technical expertise’ rather than ‘persistence in a reasonable judgment weighing hedonistic goods in accordance with ethical kalon/aischron judgments’. The purpose of the refutation apparently is to show that (a) this way of interpreting prudence is wrong, and (b) the mistaken position Laches falls back on (that ignorant boldness is courage) is the result of a commitment to the ideal of civic courage rather than to true courage. This latter point is emphasized by a striking resemblance between Socrates’ example of a rash general Laches’ real-life rash deeds which led to his death as an Athenian general at the battle of Mantinea.

Finally, I argue that even though Socrates’ position in Laches 193a-d seems to contradict his position in Protagoras 349e-350c, it does not. Both passages, I argue, make the same point that courage cannot be a matter of mere technical expertise.
Justice, External Goods, and Plato’s Conception of Happiness in the Republic

Plato’s Republic famously argues that justice is essential for human happiness. To that end, Plato defines justice as the state of the soul or psyche where each part – reason, spirit, and appetite – performs its proper function in guiding the life of the person. More specifically, justice is the state where reason rules, spirit is its ally, and the appetites obey. Socrates and his interlocutors take it as obvious that this state is crucial for achieving happiness (444e-445b). Plato’s readers often follow suit: most commentary on the defense of justice focuses on whether Socrates has given a good account of justice; the issue of whether he has given a good account of happiness, on the other hand, is surprisingly neglected. In this paper, then, I focus on this latter issue.

I argue for a novel account of the relationship between justice, external goods, and happiness; and I argue that Plato’s conception of happiness coheres with many of our ordinary intuitions about happiness.

Socratic Motivational Intellectualism

In this paper we survey the different explanations that scholars have recently given for Socratic motivational intellectualism, and show why we prefer a somewhat different account than others have given. The views we survey include what is generally regarded as the “standard” view (that Socrates recognized no role for appetites or emotions in the explanation of human behavior), but also more recently argued explanations by scholars such as Heda Segvic, Gabriela Carone, Rachel Singpurwalla, Terry Penner, Naomi Reshotko, and Daniel Devereux.

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Plotinus’ Interpretation of Catharsis in the Phaedo and the Sophist

The Phaedo and the Sophist present what appear to be two different though not conflicting accounts of catharsis. In the Phaedo Socrates treats catharsis as the purification of the soul from bodily influence; the senses and desires of the body confuse and distract the soul in its search for truth, and must therefore be purged as much as possible if one is to attain wisdom (65e-67d). Socrates claims on these grounds to welcome his death as the ultimate purification.

The Sophist, on the other hand, gives an account of catharsis as an epistemological preparation for philosophy. The Eleatic stranger describes a certain brand of sophist whose task it is to rid one of false beliefs, by means of drawing out contradictions, in order to make possible the search for knowledge (229a-231a). The need to purge false beliefs which are an obstruction to philosophic inquiry is related to Socrates' famed claim to only have knowledge of his own ignorance.

Both accounts present catharsis as a part of the process of attaining knowledge, but they differ in their application; the Phaedo gives an ontological account, focusing on the need for the soul to be freed from the influence of the body, while the Sophist's account is simply epistemological. In On Virtue (Ennead 1.2) Plotinus offers an interpretation of these two accounts which unifies the ontological and epistemological status of catharsis by treating the false knowledge discussed in the Sophist, that which presents an obstacle to philosophy, as arising from the influence of the body on the soul.

Plotinus' interpretation unifies the two accounts by treating the body not merely as a source of confusion, but rather as the origin of a false view of being which underlies all philosophic error. When the body influences the soul’s pursuit of knowledge, it does not merely misdirect and confuse, as common illustrations of the inaccuracy of the senses might suggest; rather, it has the effect of forming certain patterns of thought which can roughly be characterized as materialist. The soul’s experience of the body, and the sense perceptions received through it, make a compelling—indeed, almost irresistible—case for the view that material things are more real than immaterial ones. This materialism cannot be resisted by simply replacing false
opinions with true knowledge; rather, the soul must develop virtue, both by redirecting the desires towards immaterial forms, and by training in dialectic, which overthrows the materialist patterns of thought. This, according to Plotinus, is the full sense of Plato’s catharsis.

I intend to examine Plotinus’ interpretation of catharsis in Ennead I.2, and weigh the textual evidence in support of Plotinus’ claim that his is an accurate interpretation of catharsis in Plato’s dialogues.

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Coming to Care for Virtue

In the Apology Socrates describes his life as consisting of two principal activities: showing others they are not wise (23b), and persuading them to care for virtue (30a, 31b, 36c). Yet these two activities seem at odds. Often Socrates refutes an interlocutor only to have him grow frustrated (Laches), depart abruptly (Euthyphro), or nod perfunctorily (Meno). That is, refutation often hardens interlocutors’ souls rather than motivate care for virtue. One question immediately arises: What conditions must be met for refutation to benefit the soul of an interlocutor?

I believe this question can be answered by first considering the relationship between refutation and persuading others to care for virtue. I will show that, far from being at odds with persuading others to care for virtue, refutation is in service to this task. I will argue that refutation is particularly apt to motivate inquiry because refutation can cause shame (Soph. 230d), and inquiry is the means by which one is cleansed of this shame. Refutation induces shame because refutation reveals that one insufficiently cared for an issue in the past. Had Euthyphro sufficiently cared for piety, then either he would not have held inconsistent opinions about it, or he would have been aware of his inconsistent opinions and so not have declared he knew it. Inquiring after what piety is would reveal a newly awoken care for the truth about it, and thus would cleanse Euthyphro of the shame resulting from refutation. In short, the experience of shame compels one to care for virtue.

This analysis leaves us with a new puzzle, namely: When does refutation cause shame, since so many of Socrates’ interlocutors manifestly fail to feel it? I show that this is foremost a matter of eros. Specifically, one will feel shame from being refuted when one’s beloved witnesses the refutation, and when one’s beloved is such as to think being refuted shameful (Symp. 178c-e). Thus those few times when Socrates succeeds in persuading others to care for virtue — for example, with Alcibiades, Charmides, and Clinias — are times when eros renders the interlocutor vulnerable to feeling shame before Socrates. The upshot is that eros becomes the key factor in a virtuous life: if one goes about eros rightly, then one will, like Socrates, ‘be pleased to be refuted’, as refutation delivers one ‘from the worst thing there is’ (Gorg. 458a), and compels one to go on inquiring.

This project elucidates this relationship by explaining how shame is cleansed, namely by inquiry, which attests to one’s care for virtue.

17 Brickhouse and Smith 1994 think that the desire for virtue is a “natural psychological reaction” to the shame resulting from refutation (25). My project elucidates this relationship by explaining how shame is cleansed, namely by inquiry, which attests to one’s care for virtue.

18 Thus my account of why shame results from refutation differs from McKim 1988, who thinks that what causes shame is refutation’s exposing that one holds a shameful belief.

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The Rotational Model of Mind in Plato’s Timaeus

My essay defends an interpretation of Plato’s motivation for the peculiar rotational model of mind that we find in the Timaeus. In Part I, I argue that by the time he writes the Timaeus, Plato has arrived at the view that the appetitive part of the soul is alogon (incapable of belief formation). As Timaeus explains, this is why it is necessary for reason to address appetite in the ‘language’ of phantasmata; while appetite is allured by the representational content of images with a certain motivational potential, it is itself incapable of measuring the choiceworthiness of the objects of desire represented by the phantasmata that entice it. Reason in its ‘address’ to appetite does not change the motivational potential of these images by changing the beliefs of the appetitive part (since appetite is alogon); rather, it redirects its attention onto more choiceworthy images with a motivational potential opposite to that of irrational appetitive desire. In Part II, I explore in depth the contribution that reason itself makes to this ‘redirection’ of appetite’s attention. I argue that the rotational model is intended to reflect the normativity and holism of the synoptic view of the Forms which is characteristic of dialectical thought (nous) and the motions of the Circle of the Same. I also defend an interpretation of the cognitive content of the Circle of the Different. In part by relying upon a particular reading of the ‘commons passage’ of the Theaetetus, I conclude that the rotational model of the
Circle of the Different is meant to reflect the ‘quasi-synoptic’ grasp of perceptual properties by true opinion (alêthes doxa). In Part III, I further defend and elaborate my interpretation of the cognitive content of the divine orbits by applying my reading to an analysis of Timaeus’ account of the orbital disruption that occurs in our youth (43a6-44c4). I argue that the passage as a whole describes not only the cognitions of earliest infancy, but rather includes the story of the normative cognitive development of a maturing human being. I argue that the different manner in which the two divine orbits are said to move at different stages of our development provides further important clues regarding the cognitive content of the rational part. In particular, it emerges that Plato allows that the degree of rationality required for the exercise of the rational capacity of belief formation falls well below the rationality required for a dialectical grasp of the Forms. Finally, I return to consider the joint contribution that the content of the divine orbits makes to moral deliberation and the oversight of the appetitive part. I argue that in any particular instance of deliberation, the Circle of the Same contributes a dialectical grasp of the Forms (e.g. of Moderation or Pleasure), while the Circle of the Different grasps what (e.g.) Moderation or Pleasure requires in the particular circumstances. I demonstrate that my foregoing discussion of reason and appetite entails that reason does not (or need not) force appetite in its dealings with the mortal part. I conclude that it is abundantly clear that the Timaeus thereby preserves the Republic’s distinction between true virtue and the mere self-control of the motivationally conflicted agent.

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The Structure of Sympathy: the Psychology of Poetic Experiences in Plato’s Republic

In the ‘greatest accusation’ against the poetry in Book 10 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates contends that poetry has enough power to psychologically ‘maim’ even the best of us. The audiences at a poetic performance sympathize with (sumpaschein, 605d3) the tragic heroes’ sufferings and the base part of the soul is nurtured to rule each of them. Similarly, in the case of comedy, if an audience releases the base part and indulges in laughable things, he is induced into becoming a comic poet in his real life (606c). These psychological effects of poetry remind us of the argument about the self-identification of poetic performers in Book 3, in which the young Guardians are prohibited to imitate or enact (mimeisthai) bad people lest that they assimilate themselves with the characters (392c-398b). However, recent scholarship clearly distinguishes these poetic experiences in saying that audiences of poetry are detached observers, while poetic performers are so immersed in the characters that they lose (ethically) critical points of views about the characters during a performance (e.g. Halliwell). In contrast, I insist that there is a psychological parallelism between the self-identification of poetic performers and the sympathy of audiences; the performers are morally influenced by the characters they ‘imitate’ as the models in their performances, while the audiences are influenced by the characters on stage.

First, I analyze the activity of poetic performance. When imitating a character with voices and gestures, a poet conceals himself to become the character (cf. 393c11-d1). This concealment is important in two ways. First, it shows the poet’s calm recognition of what should be concealed even while immersed in the performance (cf. Ion 535e). Second, during the enactment, the person on stage can be analyzed into the character and the poet himself who is veiled to the eyes of the audience. Therefore, the activity of poetic impersonation/enactment can be described in the triadic relationship of the performer himself, the model he imitates, and the character on stage as mimetic product (mimema).

If the activity of the enactment of Book 3 is described in the triadic relationship, then it can be reduced to the argument in Book 10. This is because the mimetic activities ‘as a whole’ (595c8) are described there in a triadic relationship among imitators (including poets and painters), the models they imitate, and the mimetic products.

Next, I focus on the fact that both the imitated models and the mimetic products are called apparitions (fantsmata, 598b3-5, 599a3). Both of these are the same not only because they are ontologically inferior but also because they have essentially the same contents because the mimetic products are derived from the models which appear (phainesthai) to the poets.

Accordingly, I conclude that when a poet enacts a character on stage he is assimilated to a suffering character, which appears to his mind as a model, and the audience sympathizes with the character as a mimetic product, which originates from the model.

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Rhetoric and Psychology: the Power of the Word in Plato’s Menexenus

In the Menexenus, the highly elaborated epitaph that wants to reflect the kalon, overwhelms the soul. A significant result of a content oriented to the code of praise, with the virtue that shines as didactic paradigm, and of a fine style that brings to mind
the poetic production for its uncommon lexical frame and its rhythmic strength. Here, it is not difficult to discover a close relationship between rhetoric and psychology, to place after the refusal of the traditional rhetoric in the Gorgias and before the foundation of the new rhetoric in the Phaedrus. A close relationship that Socrates points out in the discussion with Menexenus before developing his epitaph, in Plato’s fiction a faithful expression, with Thucydides’ epitaph, of the didactic effort of Aspasia (234c-235c). It is not helpful to influence the research with the suspicion, very often put forward by scholars, of shadows, of a double meaning, in the direction of a veil of irony. Here, the dependence on Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen is unmistakable. Socrates confirms that the word, a frightful dynastes, generates divine works, captures the soul and renders it a victim of persuasion. However, it is necessary to make a distinction, with Plato’s diairesis. If shaped by the traditional rhetoric, if immersed in the void of the sophist, the word hides a trickery. On the contrary, the contribution that Socrates discovers for the research is precious: the word that overwhelms the soul with the aid of the new rhetoric is a fertile didactic tool and indicates the paths to knowledge.

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The Pleasures and Pains of Plato’s Philebus

Socrates starts the discussion of pleasure in the Philebus by distinguishing two distinct types of pleasure and pain. He associates pains of the first type with the dissolution of a natural harmony, and pleasures of that type with the restoration of such a harmony. Pleasures and pains of the second type are associated with the expectation of future pleasures and pains of the first type. In the course of the discussion, Socrates refines – sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly – his characterization of these two types of pleasure. Pleasures and pains of the first type occur only when the restoration involves a change sufficiently great to affect the soul (43b-c); furthermore, restoration of the soul’s harmony (52a), no less than that of the body, may produce pleasure of this sort. The second type of pleasures undergoes a somewhat broader expansion. Not only expectations of future pleasures, but memories of past pleasures and belief about present pleasures may also supply the content for pleasures of this type (40d). Furthermore, psychic representations of things other than pleasure and pain may occasion pleasures and pains: the recognition that one has lost something useful is painful (52a).

All the pleasures and pains discussed in the dialogue either fall within one of these two types or are combinations of items from these types. When Socrates first introduces the two types, he emphasizes that they are different; he nowhere suggests that one is a subtype of the other. Nor, on the other hand, does he explicitly offer in his own person an account of pleasure that applies to both of these types. Recent scholarship has shed light on different subclasses of Phileban pleasures and pains; building on this work, I argue for an account of pleasure that covers both of the basic types.

On this account, pleasure, as such, is an awareness of oneself as being in a good condition. In pleasures of the first type, the mode of that awareness is perceptual: when the restoration of a natural harmony is violent enough to affect the soul, the pleasure that arises is the perception of that restoration. The process of restoration to a "noble" condition (cf. 26b), while not as good as that condition itself, is better than the disordered state; perceiving it is perceiving oneself undergoing something good. Like other perceptions, pleasures of this sort are not always veridical; the presence of pains may cause distortions. Most pleasures of the second type are propositional attitudes of oneself as in a good condition. (Some, though, are quasi-perceptual in nature – e.g., those involved in animal desire.) While Socrates emphasizes pleasures whose propositional content is of oneself feeling pleasure, the dialogue does recognize pains (and so by extension pleasures) whose content is oneself in different sorts of bad / good conditions. One benefit of this account: we may account for pleasures of knowing that go beyond those of acquiring knowledge. If philosophical knowledge involves knowing that one has knowledge, then it involves a pleasure of the second type.

19 In different ways, both Frede (1992) and Tuozzo (1996) attempt to assimilate the second type of pleasure to the first.

20 On bodily pains (falling into the first type), see Evans (2007); on false pleasures (which fall into the second type), see Mooradian (1995), (1996), Harte (2004); on the pleasures (belonging to the first type) and pains (belonging to the second type) of knowing, see Warren (2010).

Platonic Eros Moral Egoism and Proclus

The Neoplatonists have been frequently criticized for giving forced interpretations of Plato. However, can this verdict justify modern commentators’ not paying attention to the Neoplatonic views on central problems of Platonic philosophy, such as the accusation of ‘moral egoism’? The issue of Platonic Eros serves as a significant test-case, in order to have an answer to this hermeneutical question. My approach will be based on one of the most systematic late Neoplatonic philosophers, Proclus, and specifically his Commentary on the First Alcibiades.

In this work the Platonic Successor approaches the relation of Socrates and Alcibiades as mirroring the structure of the divine realm. From this point of view which platonically merges ethics with metaphysics, Proclus states more than once that it is an essential feature of the divine lover, who patterns himself upon the god Eros, to elevate along with himself his beloved towards the intelligible Beauty. “[T]he souls that are possessed by love and share in the inspiration therefrom,..., are turned towards intelligible beauty and set that end to their activity; ‘kindling a light’ for less perfect souls they elevate these also to the divine and dance with them about the one source of all beauty.” \[On Alc.,33,3-16; ed. Westerink; transl. O’Neill.\]

However, within this picture Proclus stresses the ‘self-sufficiency’ of the lover. It is true that the Symposium, and perhaps the Phaedrus, too, in some passages, suggest that the lover needs his beloved, because the latter constitutes the means/instrument for the former to recollect the source of real beauty and, thus, ascend to the intelligible, a claim that has given modern Platonic scholars the justification to find ‘ego-centric’ characteristics in Plato’s account. The Neoplatonic scholar, nonetheless, definitely rejects such an interpretation: the beloved cannot constitute—at least such a kind of—means, since the divine lover already has communication with the higher realm. It is precisely this very bond with the intelligible world that enables the lover to take providential care of his (potential) beloved, and hence (try to) elevate the latter, too, to the former’s object of desire.

Further, according to the strong unitarian Neoplatonic reading of Plato, Proclus can ground his view of the relationship between the divine lover and his beloved—a view which defies any change of focus between the Symposium and the Phaedrus––, by drawing exact parallels with the Demiurge’s relation to the Receptacle, and that of the philosopher-king to his own ‘political receptacle’. We would never claim that the Demiurge decorated the Receptacle in order for him to recollect the intelligible paradigm. The same holds with respect to the philosopher-king. Now, whether this scheme of universal correspondence between these three figures does exist in Plato might be an open question. However, the Neo-Platonic Successor gives us an articulated and brave answer against the accusations of moral egoism by Plato’s modern critics. Hence, I hope that this test-case can show why it would be fruitful for Platonic scholars to consider in their discussions Neo-Platonic perspectives, as well.

To Know You is to Love You? Plato Forms and Moral Motivation

Three issues that fall under the heading “moral motivation” arguably first appear in Plato: (1) moral motivation as what justifies why a person ought to act morally; (2) motive as the end or reason for which an agent acts, which affects the nature and/or assessment of what the agent does; and (3) moral motivation as what actually pushes a person to act, which opens the question of whether it is simply the belief or knowledge that something is good or virtuous that is by itself motivating (internalism/externalism). The locus classicus of Plato’s treatment of (1) is of course the Republic, whose central aim is to argue that a person is always better off and happier being just and acting justly (morally). I shall focus, however, on the latter two issues. Scholars have thought that Plato is the first person to worry about the motive or reason an agent has in acting, and to think that only someone acting from the appropriate motive acts in way that is genuinely virtuous. The best motive turns out to be knowledge of the Form the Good. On most commentators’ accounts, knowing the Form of the Good ipso facto motivates one to act and to propagate instances of the Good in the world. So, having the right motive, i.e. (2) above, – the motive that makes apparently virtuous actions genuinely virtuous – fortuitously is also something the having of which automatically motivates the agent to act in the appropriate ways, i.e. (3) above.

I shall critically examine the textual evidence for the claim that Plato is worried about the appropriateness of the motive of an agent when she acts; I shall argue that there is far less evidence for it than first appears, and so, assimilation of Plato’s view to Kant’s on this subject, as has been done by Christopher Bobonich and Christine Korsgaard, among others, is inaccurate in ways that are significant for understanding Plato’s ethics. Furthermore, I shall argue that knowing the Forms, even the Form of the Good, does not have the sort of motivational efficacy typically attributed to it. I defend the claim that knowledge of the Forms by itself does not motivate one to do anything at all (except to continue to contemplate the Forms); and, moreover, that
knowledge of the Forms by itself does not tell a person to do anything. Rather, the motivation for acting virtuously stems from upbringing’s properly molding one’s first- and second-nature motivational susceptibilities. Knowledge of the Forms in fact plays no role in motivating virtuous action; rather, it plays a crucial epistemological role in enabling the knower to identify correctly what the virtuous action is.

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“Platonic Fantasy” or Platonic Insight?: Wisdom and True Virtue in the Symposium

To paint a picture with broad strokes: contemporary virtue ethics has largely avoided appealing to the Platonic dialogues as sources of insight for thinking about (the) virtue(s). One key explanation, I contend, is the worry that Platonic ethics is overly demanding, and demanding in an unappealing way. In particular, Plato is committed to a view that I call the wisdom thesis. According to this thesis—as it appears, e.g., at Euthydemus 279a-281e; Laws XII.967d-968a; Meno 88b-89a; Phaedo 82a-c; Republic VI.500b-d; Symposium 212a—an agent’s possession of wisdom, attained through philosophy, is a necessary condition of that agent’s possessing true (or complete) virtue.

Given Plato’s commitment to this thesis, his views on the requirements for virtuous agency strike some as (i) overly intellectualist and (ii) unpleasantly elitist. Rosalind Hursthouse succinctly presents these worries:

When philosophers start to imply that it is a necessary condition of virtue that the virtuous have reflected long and hard about what eudaimonia consists in and worked out a picture of what is involved in acting well so comprehensive and substantial that it can be applied and its application justified in every suitable case, we may be sure that they are falling victim to what could be called ‘the Platonic fantasy’ . This is the fantasy that it is only through the study of philosophy that one can become virtuous (or really virtuous), and, as soon as it is stated explicitly, it is revealed to be a fantasy that must be most strenuously resisted (On Virtue Ethics, p. 137).

According to Hursthouse, then, we should reject a model of virtuous agency according to which the truly virtuous agent must be (i) a philosopher, (ii) in possession of a substantive understanding of the human good, from which (iii) he or she can (or must) read off the right actions to perform.

In my paper, I examine, as a test case, how Plato develops the wisdom thesis in the Symposium. On this basis, I respond to Hursthouse’s ‘Platonic fantasy’ worry, and argue for the relevance of the wisdom thesis for contemporary virtue ethics. I grant to Hursthouse the absurdity of the model of virtuous agency that she spells out. But I argue that, as a general claim, (i) the wisdom thesis is more reasonable than Hursthouse allows and that (ii) acceptance of the wisdom thesis need not commit one to the sort of view that Hursthouse describes. Second, I argue that the wisdom thesis need not commit one to an invidious elitism in ethics.

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Suicide in the Phaedo

At Phaedo 61c-62c, Socrates tells his interlocutors that, even though philosophers should be ready and willing to die, nonetheless they should not commit suicide. This is in fact one of only two passages in the entire Platonic corpus where suicide is discussed (the other being Laws 873c-d). It is a notoriously perplexing text, both grammatically and substantively. Yet while this passage has received its fair share of scholarly attention, the reasons underlying Socrates’ view—why suicide is morally wrong—remain unclear and largely unexamined. It is my aim in this talk to identify and analyze those reasons. Contrary to what some have suggested, I believe that the discussion of suicide is not a “digression” from the main topic of the Phaedo, nor is it a stand-alone moral issue. Rather, the question of suicide is integrated with the recurring concerns of the Phaedo—the fate of the soul after death, and the value of the philosophical life—and hence is to be interpreted in light of the dialogue as a whole.

Socrates offers two justifications for the prohibition on suicide (62b1-9): first, that “we are in a kind of prison, and must not free ourselves or run away” (the Prison Argument, PA); and second, that “the gods are our guardians and we are one of their possession” (the Gods Argument, GA). Most commentators on the Phaedo have regarded GA as the “real” reason for Socrates’ prohibition of suicide, or have treated it as an “elaboration” of the cryptic PA. But I believe that such a view is mistaken. For one thing, PA and GA are logically and conceptually independent of one another. Moreover, there are good reasons to think that
Plato’s Socrates would have rejected GA, given that it assumes an unacceptably crude view of the nature of the divine. I suggest, instead, that Socrates offers GA as a view tailored to the constraints of the present dialogical inquiry, and would not have expected it to withstand critical scrutiny, at least not if it is understood on a literal level. (I will briefly suggest a non-literal understanding of GA that could pass Platonic muster)

This leaves us with PA, the most intriguing and heretofore unexamined part of the suicide passage. The key question is: why are we in a prison, and why must we not run away? I suggest that the remainder of the Phaedo provides us with an answer. It turns out that we are responsible for our own incarcerate imprisonment, as a result of prior misdeeds. And the only way to be freed from this imprisonment is by a lifetime of philosophical purification and preparation, that is, by cultivating our desire to know the Forms and by seeking to have the soul inquire “by itself”. Yet suicide prematurely terminates this process of self-cultivation, thereby preventing the requisite purification from taking place. In addition, the act of suicide might very well betray the sort of bodily concern that one is supposed to be transcending.

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Akrasia in the Republic: Does It Even Matter?

According to a prevalent interpretation of Plato’s views on akratic action, Plato’s introduction of the tripartite soul in Republic 4 is intended as a rejection of the “Socratic” account of akrasia offered in the Protagoras. According to this traditional line of interpretation, Plato introduces the tripartite theory of the soul in order to acknowledge the possibility that non-rational motivations can sometimes make people act contrary to what they rationally judge to be best at the time of their action.

In my paper I challenge this traditional view in two ways. First, I argue that the theory of tripartition is not motivated by considerations about akrasia, and that the argument for the tripartite soul offered in Republic 4 is not intended to provide any kind of account of akratic action at all. A fortiori, it does not provide a different account of akratic action than the one offered in the Protagoras. Indeed, I argue, Plato never addresses the issue of akratic action in the Republic: it is neither something that he finds particularly troubling nor something that matters to him in the text. In the course of my argument, I examine 430e ff., the one place in the text where Plato’s Socrates does directly address a phenomenon that he calls “being weaker than oneself” – one of the terms prominently used in the Protagoras to refer to putative cases of akratic action. What I aim to show, however, is that even in this passage, Plato is not concerned with explaining akratic action. Rather, his aim is to recast the popular notion of being “weaker” or “stronger” than oneself in terms of a much broader notion of psychic rule that provides the basis for many of the dialogue’s central arguments and discussions. (Most significantly, I argue, the broad notion sets the stage for the account of virtue in Book 4 and for the discussion of psychic rule in Books 8 and 9.) According to my interpretation, it is this broad notion of psychic rule that matters to Plato in the text; the issue of akratic action is simply left to the side.

Second, I challenge the traditional view by arguing that everything Plato does say about the soul in the Republic, including the argument for tripartition, is consistent with the Protagoras’ denial of the possibility of akrasia. This second challenge represents a continuation of arguments offered by a small but growing number of recent commentators (notably Gabriela Carone in her 2001 article, “Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato Change His Mind?”). What is new about my arguments is that they focus on providing a novel interpretation of what seems to be the most significant obstacle to the anti-traditional account – namely, the case of the evidently akratic Leontius and Socrates’ subsequent acknowledgement that on many occasions, “appetites force someone contrary to reasoning” (440a). My interpretation draws on parallel passages from the Laws.

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The Place of Pleasure in Plato’s Philebus

This paper investigates the multifaceted (poikilon) nature of pleasure in relation to both the ethical and the metaphysical dimensions of the Philebus in order to clarify the status of pleasure in the good life. In opposition to the views of some commentators, I argue that pleasure’s goodness is not remedial nor wholly derivative of the goodness of nous or virtue. Pleasure’s goodness is inherent, but not therefore independent. In fact, neither pleasure nor wisdom is either independently worth pursuing as an end or to be pursued only as unavoidably connected with some other good. Rather, pleasure is worth pursuing together with wisdom in the mixed life as the sensory, experiential confirmation of growth in goodness, genesis toward the be-
ing that is our defining and governing nature and hence our proper telos.

In arguing for this position, I first lay out an interpretation of the dialogue’s metaphysical schema, with particular concentration on the genê of the unlimited and the mixture, and I then show how the subsequent analysis of forms of pleasure applies that theoretical framework to human life by distinguishing unlimited from mixed pleasures in order to dismiss the former while accepting the latter into the good life. The dialectical analysis of pleasure shows the unlimited pleasures to be dependent on a false evaluation of the human good together with a distorted relationship between the soul and body: the intense bodily pleasures are judged to be best, particularly when experienced by oneself as the authoritative standard of goodness. But because the physical pleasures are dependent on the degenerating motions that mark the loss of harmony

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Thus we can say that a person who knows but without understanding is like to behave inconsistently since his knowledge is passive and does not result necessary in action. At higher level, however, when knowledge is supported by understanding, we are presented with an active form of knowledge in which case knowing results necessary in action. Socrates aims at the latter kind of knowledge and for this reason instead of speaking about Socratic (ethical) intellectualism I would suggest to call it: Socratic ethical integralism.

In my paper I will argue that intellectualism is false and Socrates is right, for Socrates’ position should not be interpreted as intellectualist. I will argue for this interpretation and consider also some of rare commentaries which seems to side with it.

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Can Socrates’ Position Be Rightly Called Intellectualist?

It is usual to call Socrates’ position intellectualist. In fact, he used to say that to know what is good is a necessary and sufficient condition for doing what is good. This pretty simple position has been attacked ever since because – as their critics claim – it flies in the face of everyday experience. On many occasions, we can see that people know what is good and doing the opposite of it.

A standard criticism of the intellectualism runs as follows:

_When faced with a conflict between reason and desire, some fall and some resist. It is possible (though that astonishing man Socrates did not know it) to say ‘Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.’ (W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, London 1950, pp. 114–115)_

_The main point is to investigate into the meaning of the word knowledge. As a matter of fact, its meaning depends on the degree which we are referring to. People who pretend to know what is good know it, but – it should be added – only superficially, while what Socrates means by knowing is to knowing substantially. Moreover, one can possesses a scientific knowledge but, say, appropriated only theoretically. He lacks experience. We can then say that he knows but he has no profound understanding. The same Guthrie, though without considering Socrates’ stance this time, is well aware of it:

_One cannot know a shuttle is without understanding the work of the weaver and what he is trying to make. To know what a cook or a doctor or a general is | is to know his job, and leads to a knowledge of the particular arté which will enable him to perform it. If therefore we want to learn what is arté as such, the supreme or universal excellence which will enable us all, whatever our craft, profession or standing, to live span of human life in the best possible way, we must first know ourselves, for with that self–knowledge will come the knowledge of our chief end. (W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, t. 3, Cambridge 1969, pp. 462–463 [my emphasis])_

_Thus we can say that a person who knows but without understanding is like to behave inconsistently since his knowledge is passive and does not result necessary in action. At higher level, however, when knowledge is supported by understanding, we are presented with an active form of knowledge in which case knowing results necessary in action. Socrates aims at the latter kind of knowledge and for this reason instead of speaking about Socratic (ethical) intellectualism I would suggest to call it: Socratic ethical integralism._

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I once heard an account from Diotima.