Chapter 7

The Multiple Layers of European Politics
Introduction: The "unevenness of European identity" and politics

It is useful to summarize the basic story of the past two chapters. Only about 13% of the Europe’s population sees themselves as mostly European. A large fraction of the rest of the population (over 50% in some countries) sometimes sees itself as European but mainly has a national identity. Great Britain, Finland, and Sweden are the least Europeanized while the Italy, France, Luxembourg, and Germany are the most. Within these societies, the people who are disproportionately the most privileged members of society; ie. managers, professionals, educated people, and the young, have the strongest European identity.

There are two main reasons that the most socio-economically privileged members of society are Europeanized. First, the European project has given these people work opportunities that enhance their income and therefore they have a material interest in the success of the EU. Second, the European project has given these people the opportunity to travel and interact with people from other countries and they have found this experience to be exciting and interesting. They have come to identify with their counterparts across national borders and view themselves as Europeans. In the last chapter, I showed how managers and professionals have formed associations across borders in great numbers thereby forming an international civil society. I also demonstrated that educational elites have promoted the learning of languages, offered opportunities for young people to spend a year in college abroad, and have now
embarked on an ambitious project to create a "European higher education space". These examples show us some of the many active ways in which individual European citizens interact. One can conclude that a substantial part of the population (albeit a minority) has opportunities to interact with others in Europe and works to promote and engage those opportunities.

This plays out in the media in Europe in complex ways. So, for example, as one might expect, the business press is quite European in its focus. But, even here, business elites read not just the international business press, but also their own national business press. American films and television dominate in Europe. European films and television are mainly consumed by the national audience and are not shown widely in other countries. Popular music is also partially American, but there remain strong national popular music cultures, even in the smaller countries. But, there is some crossover of European pop music. The same is true in books where the national language dominates, although popular works of fiction do travel across borders (both from Britain, but also America).

My analysis shows clearly the unevenness of European social integration. On the one hand, a large number of Europeans have been served quite well by the European project and they are directly connected to it in many ways. This deep engagement with people in other countries makes them think of themselves as Europeans. Others who do not engage Europe for work can travel for pleasure or be exposed to European media if they choose to do so. Almost all Europeans potentially have access to other European channels via cable and satellite. There exists newspapers and magazines that claim to report on European affairs. There is also a European wide youth culture centered on
music and travel. As a result of these opportunities to occasionally interact with citizens from other countries, the majority of citizens across the EU do claim to at least sometimes think of themselves as European. But, the vast majority of Europeans do not routinely interact with others from other countries and they continue to choose to consume national popular culture in the national language. If they absorb any "foreign" popular culture, it is likely to be American. For these people, their occasional encounters with people in other countries produces a more shallow sense of “Europeanness”. They will tend to mostly think of themselves as having a national identity, but under the “right” conditions will express solidarity with people from other European countries. Finally, for older, poorer, less educated people, European identity does not exist. They are firmly wedded to the nation and view the European project with skepticism. About 25% of the people living in Europe remain firmly wedded to the nation.

One of the interesting questions, is what effect does this have on politics, both national but also transnational? There is now an interesting debate in the political science literature on the degree to which a European public space where political discussion on a European wide level occurs (Risse, et. al., 2002; Scheslinger, 1999, for examples). I will review this literature and some of its main results. A large part of the literature is definitional; ie. it depends on what one means by such a public space as to the degree to which one thinks it exists. I argue that the problem with this whole debate is that it is fighting over some idealized view of what a European public sphere might be and then providing selected evidence for its existence or nonexistence. Unfortunately, all of the camps in this literature take a very narrow view of what a European politics might look like. In essence, it postulates that in order for a European politics to exist, it must be
constituted as a layer above a national politics where participants from many European societies are simultaneously debating an issue and responding to one another's arguments (Van de Steeg, 2002).

It turns out that there is very little of this kind of public sphere. (Indeed, this idealized image of democratic politics probably does not describe national politics in most places as well.) But political debates about European issues abound everywhere and work through many layers of formal politics. These can involve Brussels, national governments, regional governments, political parties, and interested lobbying groups and social movement organizations within and across Europe. These politics are generally not oriented towards producing a consensus on a European position, but are instead, like most politics, are confrontational, and interest driven. Political groups of all kinds are looking for an edge and a venue for their grievances. Sometimes European issues play out in a very national interest driven fashion. More rarely, European wide discussions of political issues produce a European consensus.

Public spheres of political debate in Europe are both more complex and more differentiated. There are a variety of mechanisms by which different European publics communicate their policy preferences both to their member state governments and have the possibility of going directly to the EU. These differ across possible issue arenas and across member states. The first goal of this chapter is to conceptually untangle some of these complexities. As Schlesinger (1999) recognizes, there is already a European politics. It takes place in Brussels and involves the member state governments, various lobbying groups which represent mostly the interests of business, but also of some other interest
groups like environmental groups. Brussels is a place where one form of European politics is practiced.

One of the main issues that is ignored in the debate over whether or not a civil society exists in Europe, is the exact division of political issues between the EU and the member state governments. The EU has wide jurisdiction over issues related to trade, commerce, and for those who have the Euro, monetary policy. The governments have kept almost all issues concerning the welfare state including pensions, labor relations, welfare, unemployment insurance, job training, health care, and education as under their jurisdiction. They do so because public opinion polls show that citizens are against governments allowing these kind of decisions to be decided in Brussels (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; 1998). The two other issue arenas that have begun to migrate to Brussels, the environment and cooperation of foreign and security issues, are also issues that citizens feel comfortable belong at a European level. Citizens are generally afraid that changes in these policy domains that would be made at the EU level will be against their interests and so they oppose consolidating these domains at the EU level.

Since much of the politics in any country are more focused on issues of jobs and social protection, it follows that political groups who are interested in these issues will not waste resources going to Brussels to lobby around issues that are not decided in Brussels but instead will engage in national politics. One should not be surprised that most politics reported in the pages of newspapers, as a result, is national. Groups who are organized on a national basis who are interested in the regulation of trade and commerce can still lobby their governments directly or go to Brussels. There is evidence that such groups often do both (Rucht, 2001; Helferrich and Kolb, 2001).
But, like with many things going on in Europe, over time, there have been events that have created moments of transnational politics. I consider how some of these events have played out. On the one hand, there is a great deal of discussion of EU politics in all of the national presses. There is some evidence that European wide politics are increasing. There is also evidence that occasionally, a European wide discussion of political issues takes place across the media of European societies and this discussion results in the evolution of a European wide political position. But, it is more frequently the case that when national groups want to protest EU policies, they do so in an effort to protect themselves from their counterparts in other countries. Thus, EU politics played out within countries are as often competitive between groups across countries (and not cooperative).

One of the most likely way for organized groups within member states to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the EU is through political parties. It is the case that surveys reveal that most citizens of Europe favor their country's membership in the EU and most citizens have a favorable attitude towards the EU. This is reflected in the political stances of the main political parties across Europe. I show that center left and center right parties in France, Great Britain, and Germany have converged on a pro-European stance in the past 40 years. While fringe left and right wing parties have tried to run against the European project, they have never been able to get elected on such a platform. This reflects the overwhelming positive support for the EU from middle and upper middle class citizens across Europe. No political party can build a majority vote in the largest European societies (even in Great Britain) and get elected in the EU with an openly anti-European stance.
European-wide politics does exist. But, they are rarely harmonious and involve a civil society in a Habermasian sense. Instead, they are shaped by the existing political division of labor of the EU and the member state governments. So, most of national political struggle is national. When EU issues are debated within member states, groups are prepared to protest those activities to protect national interests over European interests. Still, on occasion, European wide debate can produce some unusual European coordination and cooperation over policy issues, even issues that seem outside the purview of the EU institutions.

What is European Politics?

Scholars who are interested in the ultimate trajectory of the EU often start out with idealized models of what a European polity might look like. One of the most important features of such a polity begins with Jurgen Habermas' idea (1989) that a democratic society needs a public sphere which is an arena that exists outside of the institutions of the state and where a wide range of views and opinions can be developed in relations to matters of public concerns. Implicit in this idea is that there exists a single public sphere that encompasses all political issues relevant, that all actors in society have equal access to this sphere, and that these activities are oriented towards a single state. This conception of the public sphere has engendered much debate which has questioned all of these assumptions both theoretically and empirically (Calhoun, 1995; Fraser, 1994; Schlesinger, 1999; van de Steeg, 2002). Habermas, himself, has agreed that a public sphere could emerge across countries and could contain disparate actors (1994). He has
also agreed that there might be more than one public sphere (1997). But, he has
maintained that in order for their to be a Europe that is democratic, there must be
communication across groups across societies and groups should have equal access to
such discussions.

Scholars have been interested in the question of the degree to which Europe has
such a public sphere. They have recognized that the existence of the EU poses a problem
for national political discourses and they wonder if it is possible for a European wide
public sphere to emerge. One way in which the EU is critiqued is to note that ordinary
citizens are not directly privy to EU level debates. As such, this implies that the EU lacks
a public space and this produces a "democratic deficit." The critics of the EU assumes
that the EU lacks a public space and considers this a serious source of illegitimacy.

The debate over the European public sphere has been both conceptual and
empirical. Obviously, how one defines such a public sphere is critical to whether one
thinks it exists or not. On the one side of the debate have been scholars who have such a
stringent definition of what a sphere should look like, that it is difficult to imagine how
one could exist. Their basic idea is that Europe must reproduce a public sphere much like
the public spheres that supposedly exist within national boundaries (Kielmansegg, 1996;
Grimm, 1995). Since there is no community of communication on a European wide level
based on a common language and a genuinely European media, there can be no public
sphere. Gerhards (1993; 2000) goes even farther and argues that a European public
sphere needs to be populated with European wide interest groups, parties, and social
protest movements. Such a sphere must be concerned about taking a European and not
national perspective on any given event. With this kind of definition, it is clear from my
discussion in the last chapter, that there does not exist a European public sphere and it is
difficult to imagine how it could come to be so.

The other point of view begins with the critique of Habermas' central ideas. First, it is the case that not all groups in society have interest in or access to the public sphere. Clearly, groups with less resources and capital and who have traditionally been down trodden (women, immigrants, the working class, ethnic and racial minorities) do not have access to power (Calhoun, 1995). This means that even within a given society, it does not make sense to assert the existence of a public sphere. Second, there is not evidence for a unitary coherent public sphere in any existing society. Public issues are inherently fragmented into different communities of interest. Not every citizen is interested in every issue. It is also the case that some issue arenas are more organized than others, and that the ability of groups in arenas to effect public discourse and ultimately legislation, varies a great deal as well (Schlesinger, 2001).

In the context of the EU, van den Steeg (2002) argues that the assertion that a public sphere needs to consist of a single speech community with a single media is also not realistic. Instead, she points out that a public sphere that might exist across societies need only to be discussing similar political issues in reference to each other. In the case of the EU, the consideration of what would constitute a public sphere would require one to explicitly consider the multilevel governance of the EU.

It is useful to consider more closely exactly what does exist in Europe in terms of what people call multilevel governance and how it offers a critique of the public sphere debate. My main point here is that scholars who accept the terms of the public sphere debate begin with trying to make a conceptual distinction about what such a sphere would
look like. Even those who are trying to find a public sphere by using a more realistic definition of that sphere (van de Steeg, 2002, et.al.) still accept the importance of such a sphere. I want to argue that it is more useful to try and conceptually make sense of exactly how political units across the EU interact before one would want to conclude how politics get done in the EU and the degree to which they were democratic or not. The real politics that does go on in Europe goes on at multiple levels with multiple policy spheres, some of which are regional (i.e. subnational), others are national, and still others are European wide.

These spheres reflect which issues are available for debate, discussion, and legislation at each level of government. So, for example, most issues concerning trade have migrated to Brussels and for those countries that have joined the Euro, monetary policy is made in Frankfurt. But, levels of social welfare remain firmly the purview of national governments. As a result, it would make little sense for organized groups interested in social welfare issues to go to Brussels. Instead they would want to organize at the national level. Since many issues in Europe are still the purview of national politics, it makes sense that most politics is still national. But even where issues are European in character, organized political actors often choose their venue to organize and protest. They may protest in the streets, lobby their national governments, and go to Brussels to lobby the European Commission. The degree to which there is a public sphere of politics in Europe is a false question. The real issue is are groups able to find political venues for their protests and expression of their interests to political actors who have the ability to then create policy in response to those groups?
Marks and Hooghe (1999) have argued that the best way to think about the EU is as a system of multilevel governance. What they have in mind is a set of distinct competences given to different levels of government and a pattern of relationships between those levels. So, the EU has a political architecture that defines the role of governments, the Commission, Parliament, and the Court and the procedures by which it reaches decisions. It has also specified the policy domains in which such agreements are possible. In the political processes of the EU, the national governments remain the most important actors. All other powers not specified in the Treaties are still in the purview of the governments. In every society, there are rules that define the relationship between their own Parliaments, political parties, legal systems, and voters. Many European countries have federal structures in place (like in Germany and to a certain degree Spain, Italy, and Great Britain) and these also define competences and relationships as well.

One of the problems of the idea of multilevel governance, is that it does not easily incorporate ideas about how real politics fit into these various levels of governance. So, for example, publics, nonprofit organizations, interest groups, lobbying groups, and the media are not explicitly part of what drives forward governance. Indeed, one big upside of looking at the idea of the public sphere is that it explicitly incorporates real politics into the formation of public policy.

I argue that combining a focus on the multilevel governance system of the EU with a conception of how social movements, interest groups, parties, parliaments, and legal systems fit into making policies, will begin to give us a better sense of how Europe's politics work. So, for example, it is possible for national level groups to lobby their national governments in both their national capitals and Brussels. This means that they do
participate in public debate over issues relevant to them in both places and are not shut out by the lack of a European wide public sphere. Moreover, the governments continue to maintain control over what issues are discussed in Brussels and what kinds of legislation comes out of Brussels. Citizens vote for political parties that share their views on what should and what should not be decided in Brussels. Governments act as the agents for their population. In these ways, the political process of Brussels may lack less of a democratic deficit than many scholars suggest.

It is useful to categorize the kinds of politics in the EU that exist in the EU. Here, I use the typology produced by Imig and Tarrow (2004). Imig and Tarrow (2004) begin their argument by considering how real politics (and by this they have in mind events organized by social movement organizations or other groups) feed into the EU. They identify four possible categories of protest events. Domestic protest is where national groups protest national politics. Cooperative transnationalism involves "parallel protests which make claims on different national targets in cooperative but recognizably separate acts of contention" (2002: 17). Competitive transnationalism is where "private actors from one member state protest against and may target private actors from another member state" (2002:17). Collective European protest is where "groups from different member states combine and take action against the same national or international target". This typology raises several interesting questions. First, which kind of events occur most frequently in Europe? How are they changing over time? do groups organized at the regional, national, or EU level have the ability o effect the policies of relevant governmental decision makers?
Empirical Evidence for a Transnational Public European Sphere

I want to look at three sorts of evidence for considering the degree to which a European politics emerges. The first is represented by the politics that takes place in Brussels. Here, there is quite a well developed political sphere. The main conclusion is that the European governments have created a set of institutions to produce monetary policy and common policies regarding the free movement of capital, goods, and labor. They have begun to cooperate on common foreign and security policy and the EU frequently acts as a bargaining agent for the member states in international arenas. But, governments remain the most important actors in the ongoing negotiations around common issues. They, in this way, represent the national interest in Brussels deliberations. National political opinion thus, gets expressed in Brussels in two ways. First, citizens vote for political parties which represent their interests in Brussels. Second, interest groups, primarily those reflecting the interests of business work in Brussels to insure that changing market rules will be fair.

Second, I want to consider the overall evidence for the degree to which national politics is concerned with European issues. I consider evidence how the major political parties in Germany, France, and Great Britain have reacted to the EU. I show that over time, various parties have tried to take an EU stand. It turns out that such a stand has not worked to provide governments with working majorities. As a result, all of the major center left and center right parties in Europe have converged on a pro-EU stance. Thus,
the national civic publics have consistently approved of their governments cooperating in Brussels on issues of trade and commerce.

But, this evidence does not speak directly to the problem of the creating of a European political sphere where the possibility of having a conversation across societies about policies effecting people in different countries. The ability of groups to organize and mobilize across countries is one possible way in which a more integrated European polity might emerge. I present two kinds of evidence here. First, I consider Imig and Tarrow's study of protest events in Europe from 1984-1997. Here they show that 95% of European domestic protests remain national in focus. This would seem to support the view that a European public sphere has not emerged. But, Imig and Tarrow also show that the number of EU protests have increased over time and by 1997, such protests were almost 30% of the total of such events. This means that when national groups do not like particular European politics, they mobilize to protest them, thereby putting pressure on their governments to act differently in Brussels. While this suggest at least the emergence of some European public sphere, these events are often not cooperative discussions of European issues across countries, but instead the outcome of a national group protesting their government giving in to some EU policy that will negatively effect a local interest group.

The final evidence to be explored, are a set of case studies within and across countries about both competitive and cooperative European level politics. Many of these studies focus on media coverage of events and try to discover the degree to which European media converge around the presentation of issues as being about Europe or instead interpret the issues through a national lens. Here, the evidence is mixed and
mirrors the more general evidence presented by Imig and Tarrow. There are certainly some events in the EU where the political discussions were carried out across national borders and converged on a pro-European theme. There are also events where interest groups across societies cooperated to spread such a point of view. But, events are also often more conflictual as well. The evidence on a mass based European political sphere shows the same kind of fragmentation that our evidence shows on the emergence of various kinds of European social arenas. For certain kinds of issues, such discourse is possible. But, it is as likely that national groups will use national politics to protect themselves and push their governments towards not allowing European wide rules to emerge. Ironically, there is the possibility for national groups to mobilized when European policies are at stake and this can be in cooperation or opposition with people from other countries.

The Political Sphere in Brussels

The scholarly literature has used a great number of metaphors on how to explain the Brussels complex, including: intergovernmentalist bargain (Moravscik, 1994; Garrett, 1996); supranational governance (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998); multi-level governance (Marks, et. al., 1996); pooling of sovereignty (Keohane and Hoffman, 1994); condominia (amongst others, Schmitter, 1998); consociationalism (Taylor, 1996); post modernist state (Caparaso, 1997); regulatory state (Majone, 1994); Europe as a set of policy networks (Peterson, 1989); and fusionist state (Wessels, 1998).

These perspectives point to different features for understanding how policymaking proceeds in the EU. It turns out that many of these features are complementary, not contradictory (although for an exchange which attempts to sharpen
these disagreements, see Moravscik, 1995; Wincott, 1995). The main differences of opinion stem from different views as to how many actors get involved in policymaking and the degree to which policymaking remains firmly intergovernmental as a result. Scholars who favor intergovernmental approaches tend to see governments as the only important actors and common policies only possible when all of the main governments agree. Scholars who work with other metaphors view other potential actors, particularly the European Commission and organized interest groups, as important to the process of negotiation. Intergovernmentalists stress that the process by which policy is made is not consequential for outcomes: the lining up of national interests still is all that counts. Scholars who study the processes of Europeanization think that the process of decision making can bring about unexpected outcomes.

This project is committed to viewing member states as being the central actors, but to see their interactions in the context of Europeanized political fields. This means that interactions between governments is high and the relations are cooperative and competitive. Political processes matter by constraining new governments to previous agreements. They also matter in that governments have to work out what their interests are in a myriad of situations. All of these things make it more likely for governments to work together and find agreements. In chapter 2, I described the mechanics of how the EU worked. Here, I want to discuss the relationships between the member state governments, the EU organizations (i.e., the Commission, the Court, and the Parliament), and the lobbying groups in a more explicit fashion.

Implementing the various Treaties over time produced three main surprises in the way that Brussels works. The political processes that have developed in Brussels to produce legislation could not easily have been predicted by the Treaties. The original organizational design of the EU called for a decision making apparatus that was corporatist in design. There was supposed to be formal interest representation of firms, workers, and governments. But this never worked in practice, and instead, the structure
evolved in a more haphazard fashion. Instead of formal consultation between representatives of industry and labor, a lobbying scene has emerged in Brussels that more resembles American style politics. Here, representatives of various interests directly lobby members of the European Commission and the member state governments. Second, the integrative force of the European Court of Justice can certainly be inferred from the Treaties, but the power it has ended up wielding is greater than probably was expected (Stone and Caparaso, 1998; Slaughter and Mattli, 1991). Finally, there has been quite a lot of policymaking in the domains of the EU. During the 1970s, the Council of Ministers was passing over 200 pieces of legislation and after the Council moved to qualified majority voting, this increased to about 600 pieces of legislation. The creation of such successful supranational governance was a hope of the founders of the EU, but the degree to which this has occurred would have surprised them all (Eichener, 1993).

As discussed in chapter 2, the EU has four major organizations: the Commission, the Council, the Court, and the Parliament. The Commission is the executive arm that proposes and negotiates the directives. The Council is made up of ministers from each country who decide whether or not to accept the Commission's proposals. The states have permanent representatives in Brussels who continuously interact with the Commission. This staff consist of representatives of different ministries for each country. Twice a year, the heads of the governments meet to have Council Summits. Ministers of different parts of each government, for instance, finance, also meet frequently. Each country takes a six month turn as chair of the Council. The Council can suggest, modify, or reject directives.

Once they pass directives, the directives have the force of law. If individual nation states have laws that are in disagreement with directives, they are supposed to transpose the directive into their national law. In 1987, the Council passed the Single European Act. This made majority voting the rule for the Single Market Program. (European Communities, 1987: Garrett, 1994). The Treaty on European Union has extended this principle to other issues (European Communities, 1992).
The Court enforces community law (ie. directives) by listening to cases from private parties, the nation states, and the Commission. The links between national courts and the Court of Justice are extensive (Weiler, 1991). The Parliament is the organization that has changed the most in the various Treaty revisions. During the 1970s, it became directly elected by all European citizens. They now have a vote over the budget and get to comment on directives. In the context of the 1992 program, a complex procedure existed that required the directives to move back and forth from the Commission to the Parliament, before eventual consideration by the Council. The Amsterdam Treaty has expanded the Parliament's power to give them a vote on approving the president of the Commission and a greater say in the processing of directives. To understand more clearly how Brussels works, it is necessary to consider how policymaking actually works in Brussels.

Since the European Commission is responsible for proposing directives, it is useful to consider how it organizes politics. From the perspective of bureaucratic politics, it is in the interest of all parts of the Commission to be trying to expand their purview to new arenas. But, the Commission does not speak with one voice. There are 17 members of the Commission and 23 Directorate Generals (DGs), each in charge of different issues. One can expect that they all have interest in generating legislation. This interest is tempered by two factors: the agenda of the president of the Commission and the interests of the states (Ross, 1995; Peters, 1994).

Each directorate is subdivided into departments. In interviews that I did with various individuals in these Departments, it became clear that they were directly in touch with others within and across the EU. When I asked people how they checked out directives with the states, they informed me that they directly called the person who was in charge of the relevant matter in each of the states. They also were in touch with local experts in the Community. When a directive was proposed, it went out for comment to other relevant actors within the Commission, the Council, and the affected parties.
Industry lobbyists see each piece of legislation well before it reached the stage of passage by the Council and influenced the way in which directives were written.

These complex social relations imply that any negotiations were only undertaken with the knowledge of most of the interested parties. After all, if a directive made its way to the Council and each state had not had an opportunity to respond to it or have their relevant interest groups respond, it stood little chance of passage. Most of the political action, therefore, takes place well before a directive gets to the Council.

The head of one department of DG-III (the Directorate in charge of the Single Market) told me that no one would ever go forward with a proposal without having taken into account all of the relevant interests. If they could see high powered opponents to the legislation, they would certainly back off trying to pass it. He then proceeded to describe a directive that his group had been working on that he thought had no chance of passage.ii

It is useful to ask where the impetus for the substantive fields of new directives comes from. From discussions I had with people involved with the Single Market Program (hereafter SMP) and other directives, I found that directives generally originated with complaints from either states or private business. Representatives from various parts of each nation's bureaucratic apparatus take issues of interest to their constituencies directly to the relevant person in the Commission. Once a set or series of complaints are made, the Commission tries to adjudicate them. First, aggrieved parties are put in touch and the Commission tries to negotiate the situation. If this fails, the parties might up in the European Court. The relevant part of the Commission might consider writing a directive or regulation if the situation arises repeatedly.iii

Businesses involved in exporting are the ones who are likely to have experienced difficulties entering markets in other countries. They take their complaints to the Commission as well. One of the reasons that big business has such an impact on the activities of the Community, is that they are the ones who voice their objections.iv Some have argued that the EU is slanted towards business interests (Streeck and Schmitter,
This appears to be the case because the EU has been most concerned with trade and it follows that those with the greatest interest in that issue will lobby. However, as the EU has expanded its competencies, there is evidence that the EU is now more wide open to lobbying from other quarters as well (Mazey and Richardson, 1994).

This complex political process means there are always a number of political projects being floated throughout the Commission. Some are relatively minor and others are more ambitious. The president of the Commission usually takes up some small number of projects and tries to push them through the Council. Part of the problem, from the point of view of the Commissioners is getting the attention of the president in order to get their project on the agenda.

In order to get a sense of the dynamics of policymaking in the EU, it is useful to start with Keohane and Hoffman's argument that the Brussels complex is best characterized as a place where sovereignty is pooled by the governments, but agreements are enforced by national governments (1991). This conclusion is based on two sorts of facts of which most scholars are in agreement. First, the number of people who work in Brussels is very small. There are only about 2,000 senior staff in the European Commission who are in policy making positions. With so few staff, it would be impossible for the European Commission to do much direct regulation.

Second, the Brussels complex is not a regulatory apparatus like the normal bureaucratic structure of a state because of conscious decisions made by the member states (Majone, 1993). What the people who work in Brussels mostly do is facilitate the production of agreements. Those agreements are then transposed into national law and enforced by national bureaucracies. The pooling of sovereignty refers to the idea that governments agree to negotiate a wide range of relatively detailed issues collectively. The policy domains that I described in the last chapter contain actors from the European Commission, the member states, and interested organized lobbying groups. It is useful to consider the roles that the three groups play in the policymaking process.
There has been a great deal of dispute about the degree to which the Commission can "get its own way" or set the political agenda in a way that the majority or even large a minority of the national states do not want over any given political issue (Pollack, 1998; Ross, 1996; the papers in Wallace and Young, 1997 reflect this discussion as well). To some degree, this discussion misunderstands the role of the Commission in this process. Since, the people who work for the Commission do not know a priori know what the governments or interest groups want or do not want, they are in the position of proposing many things and figuring out as they go along which ones eventually generate agreement. In my interviews, it was clear that people who worked for the European Commission were in favor of more agreements that would create more "Europe". But, they also recognized that attaining those agreements required them to find ways to overcome difficult bargaining dilemmas.

The empirical evidence on these questions is surprisingly clear. If some subset of governments is strenuously opposed to a particular policy initiative, it will not pass. The governments remain the most powerful voices in Brussels precisely because, in the end, they have to agree to vote for directives (Wallace, 1997). The empirical evidence is also clear that interest groups matter a great deal to these processes. Corporations and lobbying groups that represent industry, social movements, or subnational levels of government, play roles in getting the Commission to produce and shape directives.

But this is an incomplete and static view of policymaking in the EU. It suggests that governments and interest groups know what they want, that they meet in Brussels, and the European Commission plays only an arbitrating function. The basic interesting problem of policymaking in Brussels is discovering what is in the interests of governments and organized interest groups. The problem can be thought of in the following way. The member states have committed themselves to certain large scale projects like the single market and the monetary union. But carrying out such projects requires figuring out exactly what they mean and then generating a agreement on a great
number of issues. Someone has to work to figure out which issues are important to those projects and to try and generate agreements.

Moreover, the market creation process also creates unintended outcomes. For instance, to the degree that there is trade across societies, variations in regulatory policies regarding health and safety standards, taxation, or work rules can contribute to competitive advantage. Governments committed to freer markets can become concerned about issues like environmental pollution which their counterparts can use as a competitive advantage to produce more cheaply.

At any given moment in Brussels, there are a large number of proposals being considered for directives. Which ones end up being passed depends on who the opposition is, how organized they are, and the ability of the Commission to find political compromises suitable to most of the parties. The power of the Commission is mostly in making sure issues get aired, do not get lost, and trying to mobilize support for a set of issues. Since a priori, it may be difficult to assess whether or not an issue is a "winner", many initiatives are pushed forward simultaneously. The Commission has tried to help themselves by establishing rules about how to make rules (comitology). It also uses the more general agreements specified in some directives or the Treaties as inputs into new directives.

This creates a less than transparent political process. This is further complicated by the fact that many of the issues involved are technical and involve standard setting and issues of health and safety. Because of the small size of the Commission and the lack of expertise on technical issues, they often farm out technical work to either consultants or committees made up of representatives of business and the governments.

This is where the Commission plays its most important role as collective strategic actor (Peters, 1992). The European Commission has no "interests" except to promote political Europeanization. The people who work for the Commission aggressively try to find arenas for agreement, both in terms of issues that are well understood, but
particularly in new arenas. The basic problem is one of "cultural framing" (Goffman, Snow, et. al.). In order to get governments and interest groups to agree, they must find a way to attach what is going to be done to their interests. So, if governments become convinced that a particular issue is connected to an issue about which they care a great deal, then they are more likely to support a particular policy initiative.

The Commission has no formal power over member states. They only have their ability to convince representatives of member states and interest groups that there are ways of finding politically agreements acceptable to most important players in a particular directive. Their job is to bring together various groups to push forward agendas. The fact that sometimes they are successful and sometimes not successful is not where their potential influence lies. Their influence is in their overall ability to get agreements of any kind and to figure out how to facilitate new agreements.

The relative role of national governments and the representatives of interests groups in these processes is in dispute as well. But, the empirical literature shows that in different cases, different sides predominate. So, for example, in some issue arenas, business is absolutely influential, where in others, representatives of governments hold sway. There are several related issues at work here. First, is the degree to which governments consider the issue important. Governments tend to choose to use their influence to shape issues most of relevance to them (Scharpf, 1996). Similarly, interest groups face similar dilemmas. They must not only work narrowly for themselves, but more broadly with other potential opposition groups and representatives of governments. It is useful to consider how this process works in different empirical contexts. I show how in different situations governments lead the way, governments block action, interest groups make proposals that are adopted, and the Commission keeps processes going that might otherwise die out.

Eichener (1993) has considered this process in great detail in the context of initiatives in the sector of health and safety in the workplace. He argues that the Single
Market set up the possibility for a kind of lack of regulation of health and safety standards at work. In this kind of situation, countries where there was low regulation of health and safety standards would not be interested in having regulations that would raise the costs of doing business. Their labor representatives would weigh in here, on the side of employers in order to maintain jobs. High regulation societies would be forced in such a situation to lose business to lower cost producers, or else lower their own standards, causing what might be called a regulatory "race to the bottom" (what Scharpf, 1996 calls negative integration). But in fact, this is not what happened. European wide standards of workplace health and safety were introduced and they embodied principles of the most highly regulated states, like Denmark and Sweden (which at the time was not even a member of the EU).

The question, is how did the political process evolve to produce higher, not lower regulations? Eichener carefully considers various hypotheses from both the intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist perspectives for this outcome. He concludes that intergovernmentalist perspectives would have predicted lowest common denominator solutions whereby there would have been little or no regulation agreed to. A more sophisticated intergovernmentalist argument could be made that the more powerful EU actors, France and Germany who cared about the issues might be able to push their agendas. This hypothesis was not true as the directives ended up with regulation well above both of those countries.

Eichener's complex answer is that it was the process by which consensus was built around the directives that, in the end, produced winning coalitions. The directives were first of all generated by committees convened by the Commission. These committees were made up of technical experts and representatives of governments from around Europe. These committees felt compelled to find consensus solutions to their problems. The results of these committees work, was directives with a high level of social protection.
Eichener suggests that this worked mainly through a process of framing the issue (1994: p. 39-50). The winning arguments made the following appeal. Low levels of regulation undermined European cooperation by using regulation to make one society the beneficiary at another's cost. By using higher standards, workers were safer and more protected and this would increase the legitimacy of the European project. The higher regulations imposed costs on everyone equally and therefore were viewed as "fair". Eichener argues that the costs of vetoing the legislation were high for all of the governments. Business, surprisingly did not weigh in strongly against the directives. They appeared to have been excluded from the negotiations.

This episode illustrates many of the elements of EU negotiations discussed above; the setting of the agenda by the commission, the use of experts to diffuse opposition, the consultation with many interested groups including governments, beforehand in order to secure their support, and the proper framing of issues to guarantee that fairness and equity were preserved in the outcome.

Scharpf (1996: 19-20) has contested Eichener's account of these events. He argues that blockage of regulations will only occur when there are conflicting interests at stake. Because the negotiations moved forward, this proves that none of the member states were seriously opposed to raising health and safety standards. This kind of objection, is one that is common in the literature (see Moravscik, 1995; Garrett, 1996). One assumes that the existence of an agreement implies the outcome of a rationally interest driven bargained game. The way that scholars usually try to prove this perspective is to reconstruct what the interest must have been on the basis of what the outcomes were (Garrett, 1995).

Now, it is possible that on some issues, rational bargaining does find lowest common denominator solutions. It is also the case that sometimes governments or interest groups have sufficient clout to block agreement as well (what Scharpf calls "bargaining
traps", 1988). But, both of these situations misunderstands the point that Eichener is trying to make.

Eichener is not arguing that the Commission gets governments to do things that are not in their interest. Instead, he is arguing that the process of negotiation using committees, experts, and representatives of lobbying groups helps build a consensus about what are appropriate arguments are concerning what interests are at stake. He is suggesting that the process of negotiation matters precisely because governments figure out what interests they have in a particular case that are relevant. They also hear from various constituencies both within the government (from different ministries) and from organized political groups, in order to arrive at a decision about what is their interest in a particular situation.

Heretier and her colleagues (1996) consider the case of a set of directives oriented towards environmental protection during the early 1990s. Their results support those of Eichener in several ways. First, the Commission played an important role in organizing and framing the environmental issues. But, in the cases of environmental regulation, they also see that governments played a more active and crucial role. Basically, the German and British governments had already a set of environmental regulations in place. They proposed their regulation as the basis of negotiation in a particular arena. Heretier, et. al. show that the "first mover" on a particular directive had the greatest chance of having their approach approved by the other member state governments. In this case, once environmental regulations came onto the negotiation table, governments played leading roles in writing and framing the eventual shape of the directive.

Sandholtz (1998) considers the expansion of EU competencies in the field of telecommunications. Before the Single Market initiative, telecommunications were essentially state monopolies. This meant governments were reluctant to engage in pooling their sovereignty over the sector. Sandholtz argues that over time two things changed this. First, the Single Market produced the idea that more competition in markets was a good
thing. The European Commission used the Single Market to argue that the telecommunications sector was a good place to try and increase European competitiveness. Second, European telecommunications companies were feeling competition from their Japanese and American counterparts. They felt that the only way to compete was to deregulate European markets in order for products to sell products around the rest of Europe and overseas. They were willing to join up with the Commission and go to their governments to push such an agenda.

Together, the telecommunications companies and the Commission were able to convince the governments to engage in writing directives to open these markets cross border. Sandholtz emphasizes that this case demonstrates the entrepreneurship of the Commission. The problem is that he argues that the Commission had tried to get European wide regulation of the telecommunications sector before the Single Market. The pivotal move, in this case, appears to be when the large telecommunications firms themselves came over to the Commission's side. These telecommunications companies then convinced their governments that their interests favored deregulation. The national governments' interests changed when their largest firms shifted and deregulating the sector was put on the political agenda.

The case shows that the Commission actively pursued a European strategy in telecommunications. But it also shows that this strategy worked only when the political project was one that could bring along the telecommunications companies. The Commission did not undermine the interests of governments. Instead, it shows that the interests of government in regulation were shifted here by their largest constituents changing their position in response to a policy initiative that they thought would be favorable to them. Schneider, et. al. (1994) consider the same case and come to much the same conclusion. They place more emphasis on the independent role of the telecommunications companies in this process than Sandholtz. But they conclude that the Commission played an important part in this opening as well.
Pollack (1996; 1998) has selected cases that show more clearly how governments have controlled the Commission's attempts to produce more Europe. He considers the case of regional and structural funds. As part of the Single Market initiative, the member states decided to provide funds to help development in less developed regions. The European Commission moved aggressively in this area to make alliances with regional or other subnational governments. In 1993, the authority of the Commission in this area was up for renewal. During this process, additional rules were set in place to constrain the latitude of the Commission in defining acceptable projects for these awards (1998: 228). Pollack argues that this, and other cases shows that while the Commission has some autonomy, it must be aware that the member states can monitor and constrain its actions.

These few cases should give the reader insight into why the fundamental nature of the Brussels complex is a matter for so much controversy. Depending on which cases one selects, and how one puts together the evidence, one can conclude that policymaking is dominated by states, interest groups, or effected by the entrepreneurship of the Commission.

I think there is more agreement than disagreement here. Who wins and who loses on a particular issue depends on the salience of the issue to various actors, the existence of strong preferences or established practices in some of the member states, the organization and mobilization of interest groups, and the ability of the Commission to help find a common frame and allies who promote the frame. Moreover, part of the European political process is about governments figuring out what their interest in a particular issue really are. For some issues, they may have clear preferences and highly organized interests. For others, the mobilization of interest groups and the Commission around a frame helps governments decide which what their interests are.

Blocking can occur where many states have strong preferences even in the face of strong interest group pressure. Alternatively, compromises can be reached and motivated member states and interest groups can have profound effects on outcomes. Through it all,
the European Commission constantly searches to expand Europeanization. That is has succeeded, suggests that interests are more convergent than intergovernmentalists would have us initially believe. Similarly, one can believe that governments in fact are trying to cooperate. This makes them more open to logrolling and other forms of trade-offs. Alternatively, one can view the politics of Brussels as being more fluid. The process of negotiation can lead to surprising results because it is not clear at the beginning who can be brought in to support some initiative or how strong opposition is. Obviously, all of the above can be true. Policymaking in the EU is a form of institutionalized politics than can be accurately described as a European political arena.

Politics at the National Level

It is clear that there is strong evidence of a heavily institutionalized political sphere in Brussels. There are two related criticisms of this political sphere. The first is that the main interests represented in Brussels are business oriented (Streeck and Schmitter, 1992; Schmitter, 1997). This view is that business uses Brussels as a way to get national policies that go around national politics. These pro-business policies are then implemented to help business and hurt labor and other societal interests. A second criticism of the existence of Brussels is that the decision making that occurs there is "far away" from ordinary citizens. This makes citizens feel as if what is going on there is going on behind their backs and therefore policymaking in Brussels is illegitimate because it does not have enough democratic openness.

It is useful to make some criticisms of both of these points of view. First, the topics with which the governments have chosen to cooperate in Brussels are topics of interest mainly to business. The opening of European markets by the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers is the main accomplishment of the EU. This is a topic inherently of interest to businesses. The issues of European social rights, the rights of labor to organize,
welfare states, pensions, and health care have all stayed under the purview of governments. Member state governments have consistently refused to transfer sovereignty to the EU over these issues. The main reason is that opinion polls show that the transfer of these issues to the EU level is something that is consistently opposed by citizens across Europe (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; 1998). It is also the case that there is sufficient variety in the way in which these issues are handled across Europe, that both citizens and governments would not want to accept someone else's system.

Moreover, business interests are not unitary. Some groups of business will be for market openings and others will be against. When they lobby in Brussels, one finds business groups on both sides of any issues. They are as likely as anything else to prevent legislation passing in Brussels. Finally, on the few social issues that have migrated to Brussels, particularly the environment and to a lesser degree, women's issues, social movement groups have had a great deal of effect on their outcomes. If Brussels is a capitalist plot to undermine the rights of citizens, it has simply failed to do so. More realistically, Brussels is a place where the governments have agreed to cooperate on issues of trade, commerce, and monetary policy, not a place to cooperate on the structure and functioning of their systems of labor relations or welfare states. The European lobbies most concerned with these issues, mostly business groups, have flocked to Brussels to express their opinions.

The issue of the lack of political legitimacy of what goes on in Brussels is what is called the democratic deficit. I have already discussed this issue a bit. It is here that the critics of the EU focus on the problem of the European public sphere. While Brussels may be a public sphere for those so inclined to join the conversation, it does not reflect all of European public opinion. There are several problems with this argument. First, and most important, it assumes that European issues are not part of the political discussion in national politics. It turns out that all of the main political parties in Europe have taken a stand on European issues. The majority of voters have consistently rejected political
parties that are anti-EU (even in Great Britain) and it is now the case that all center left and center right parties in Europe are pro-EU. Therefore, one can argue that in fact, the positions of European political parties toward EU are well known and subject of national debate and voting. This is an issue to which I will now devote some attention.

Ernest Haas argued that in the 1950s, European integration had no salience for voters across Europe (1958). He analyzed the political positions of various parties across Europe and observed little support or opposition for the European project. Haas thought that if the project was ever to go anywhere, it was going to be necessary for this to change. Subsequent research has revealed that most people have almost no knowledge of the EU and its workings (for a review, see Gabel, 1998). But, even here, large and important minorities of people across Europe find European issues salient to their voting. (For an interesting set of arguments that locate support for the EU in national politics, see Diez Medrano, 2003).

It is useful to make an argument about why this might be. It follows from our analysis, that middle and upper middle class voters benefit directly from Europe either materially or because they have formed identities whereby they relate to their peers across societies. These are certainly people who tend to vote and it follows that political parties would want to take political positions on the EU that might attract such voters. While the EU is not going to be the only issue on which voters make up their mind to support parties, it might be one of the important issues (Featherstone, 1988).

(Table 1 about here)

In order to assess how political parties in the largest European societies have evolved their policies towards the EU over time, I present data from a study by Budge et.al. (1999). The data consist of an analysis of the platforms of political parties across Europe. I present data on the major political parties in England, France, and Germany and include the number of mentions in the platforms about the EU and whether or not the mentions are positive or negative.
The data for Germany is presented in tables 1 and 2. All of the three major German political parties increase their mention of the EU over time. During the 1950s, there were almost no mentions of the EU confirming Haas’ argument. During the 1980s and 1990s, these mentions increased dramatically for all three parties. Table 10 shows the degree to which these mentions were positive or negative. With the exception of the 1987 election, the general trend in the table is for all three major political parties to converge around a positive view of the EU. By the late 1990s, the EU was a frequent topic in party platforms and all three parties had converged to a positive position.

Tables 3 and 4 present similar data for Great Britain. Europe was not a salient issue for British political parties in the 1950s. It became more salient in the 1970s as Britain decided to join the EU peaking in the election year of 1974 when Britain was considering entering the EU. It had lower issue salience during the 1980s and higher issue salience during the 1990s. We can see that the Labor and Conservative parties both had a negative stand on the EU and tried to use this to garner votes. In 1974, Labor was negative about the EU and against Great Britain joining the EU while the Conservatives were mainly positive. During the 1980s the political parties switched positions. Labor favored the EU and the Conservatives, led by Thatcher and Major, were against it. After the Conservative Party defeat in 1990s, both parties converged to a pro-EU position.

Tables 5 and 6 present the data for France. Again, Europe had low political salience during the 1950s through 1980s. Beginning with the Single Market, it became a more important issue for all three political parties and in the 1990s, the Gaullist and Socialist Parties had frequent mentions of the EU. French political parties were mostly favorable towards the EU in the 1950s-1970s. But, as the EU became more salient, the attitudes towards the EU shifted. Both Gaullist and Socialist Parties became very positive.
toward the EU. The National Front (a far right wing party) decided to take an anti-EU stand in the 1990s as part of their attempt to find voters.

(Table 5 about here)

In the three biggest EU polities, we see a remarkably similar pattern. Over time, the EU has become a more salient issue for political parties and the center left/center right parties have converged in their support for the EU. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Labor and Conservative party in Great Britain shifted their positions on the EU in order to attract middle class voters. The defeat of the Conservative Party with their strongly anti-EU stance caused them to shift their position in the late 1990s and both Labor and the Conservative Party now favor the EU. German political parties all have supported the EU consistently and no major political party has tried to find voters by being anti-EU. In France, the only political party to try and run on an anti-EU agenda is the National Front. Since their votes have tended to be protest votes against both immigrants and foreign trade, it is not surprising that they have taken an anti-EU stand.

(Table 6 about here)

This brings me to an important conclusion: no major center left/center right European political party in the three largest countries is likely to run against the EU precisely because it is unpopular to do so. Middle and upper middle class voters benefit from the EU and identify with it sufficiently that there has been little percentage in opposing Europe. This conclusion seems to fly in the face of current conventional wisdom that the EU is a very unpopular organization these days. How can one reconcile the apparent unpopularity of the EU with the strong commitment center left/center right parties in the three largest societies have for the EU? I will turn to this question in the conclusion.

A European Political Area?

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Over time, one can observe the creation of different aspects of a European politics. Clearly, the Treaty of Rome and its various revisions have created a functioning public sphere in Brussels. But this sphere has been highly delimited by the desire of governments to maintain control over what issues are on the Brussels agenda. Governments have maintained that control precisely because they depend on public support to implement programs. Political parties on the left and right have pursued middle and upper middle class voters. They have discovered that the EU policies that have been pursued are relatively popular with their citizens. No major European political party has been able to create a majority program on a program of quitting the EU.

But, these national politics do not tell us much about how EU issues play out within member states. It would be useful to know, how salient such issues are in debates and how many groups have organized and protested European policies. Moreover, it would be useful to know how much groups were organized across societies to cooperate or contest EU policies. While I have argued that there is indeed lots of evidence for European politics of all kinds, it is of value to consider how it plays out on the ground.

To get an overview of European protests, it is useful to consider the dataset gathered by Imig and Tarrow on protest events in Europe from 1984 until 1997. Their goal is to use such national protest events as indicators of the degree to which national politics have become Europeanized. They identified 9,872 protest events over this period of which 490 appear to contain elements of EU protest. This means that the vast majority (about 95%) of European protest events concern strictly domestic issues and are directed against national or regional governments. This would seem to be evidence that most politics across Europe remains domestic and there is little European political sphere. I
note that this makes sense as national groups would be mostly focused on the fiscal politics of the welfare state.

But, there are several interesting caveats to this thesis. Over time, the number of EU level protests has increased in frequency and as a percentage of total events. So, in 1997, 147 EU protests took place and these constituted almost 30% of all protest events that year. So, the interest of national groups in staging protests against the EU has increased and the ability to cooperate across societies has increased as well.

Tarrow (2002: 249-50) sees both the possibility and limits of the emergence of a European public sphere. Since many issues of politics remain within the purview of national governments, there is a natural limit to the degree to which national groups will organize for or against EU policies. For the time being, most protest events will be about national issues. This realization is a healthy corrective to the view that member state governments are losing control over their policies (particularly policies related to their welfare states and employment policies) and national publics are being excluded from important national political decisions.

Tarrow also argues that national groups have learned how to cooperate with their counterparts in other countries to protest EU policies in Brussels and at home when they have reason to. But, these protests are as likely to be competitive as cooperative. National protest groups are trying to protect their own turf and are pushing their governments to restrict the EU's ability to affect their privileges. So, for example, the largest number of protest events has come from farmers and fishermen who seek out national protection to preserve their livelihoods. They view their counterparts in other societies in a negative, not a positive way and are not cooperating but competing. The overall imagery one gets,
is that most European politics is domestic politics. When the EU policies are relevant, national groups express their opinions mainly by protesting to their national governments. Given these protest events have increased over time and as a percentage of all such events, this suggests at least part of the national public sphere is given over to European level politics.

The overview provided by Imig and Tarrow is useful to understand the main currents of what is occurring in Europe. But, it is does not much of a feel about particular protests or events and how they pertain to the creation of a European public sphere where there is a European wide discussion of European issues at the same time. Scholars have studied the possible emergence of a European wide public sphere generally by analyzing how news media in different countries cover European issues. Some of these studies have tried to assess the degree to which European news is salient in European media. Others have considered particular political issues and tried to document how they have played out across national media.

Trenz (2004) has done an extensive survey of the types of political articles written in 10 of the main European newspapers (plus the New York Times) during the period September-January, 2000. His results show that there is already a huge amount of European news reported in the media. 35.2% of all articles with a political content across all of the newspapers had something to do with European issues. There was some variation across newspapers with, at the low end, 26.1% of the articles mentioning Europe in La Republica (an Italian newspaper) and 55.2%, at the high end, for the Frankfurter Allemeiner (a German newspaper). He also tried to analyze how the issue in the article was framed. About half of the articles were attempts to report some aspect of
what was going on in "Europe". 20% were mostly concerned with national issues and took up European issues as a backdrop to how European issues were affecting national politics. The rest of the articles conceptualized Europe as an actor. Trenz concludes "On the basis of these quantitative data on extensive newspaper coverage about Europe, it is difficult to uphold the thesis of a persistent communication deficit of the EU (2004: 311).

Trenz's conclusions have been upheld in other similar studies. So, for example, using a different sample of newspapers, a different time period, and some different measures, Koopmans (2004) concludes that between 1990 and 2001, coverage of European issues has increased. He also suggests that the main focus of these articles is either national governments or the Brussels authorities. Most of the content of the coverage refers to either government officials or the European Commission and do not focus on civil society groups. There is also evidence that the dominant themes being discussed and reported in national media seem to vary little across the EU (Kanter, 2002:168; Sievert, 1998; Diez Medrano, 2001).

One of the main issues that neither Trenz nor Koopmans consider, is the degree to which European newspapers are taking one another into account in their coverage. So, for example, are German newspapers referring to French debates and vice versa? And most important for those looking for a European sphere, do those debates end up creating a "European position on a political issue? In order to consider whether or not this is occurring, it is useful to survey several studies that have covered particular events. The main conclusion that can be drawn, is that "it depends". There is evidence that often issues are being discussed simultaneously in the European press. But a European point of
view does not always emerge and frequently, the debate is carried out in terms of protecting some conception of the national interest.

van de Steeg (2002) considers how the issue of European enlargement is carried out across four weekly magazines in Europe from 1989 until 1998. The magazines include Cambio 16 (Spanish), Elsevier (Dutch), New Statesman (British), and der Speigel (German). She analyzes the articles on enlargement with an eye towards the degree to which they reference events or perspectives from other societies. She is also interested in the degree to which the articles take a national versus a European point of view on enlargement. She discovers a continuum of opinion. Cambio 16 is the most Europeanized going so far as to reprint articles from other publications in other languages. The New Statesman and der Speigel are somewhere in the middle. While about half of the articles analyze what people in other countries think about enlargement and take a European point of view, the other half report the events from strictly a national point of view. Elsevier is the only one of the four publications where events are filtered almost entirely through a national perspective with no mention of how other European countries view enlargement. She concludes that while there is some evidence for an emerging European public sphere, there is also evidence that this sphere is uneven.

Rendeiro (2003) undertakes a newspaper analysis of coverage of the European Constitutional convention between Jan. 1, 2003 and February 28, 2003. He does a content analysis of the coverage in two countries, France and Portugal and uses two newspapers in each country, la Liberation and Le Monde in France and Publico and Diaro de Noticias in Portugal. He discovers that all of the newspapers cover the main events of the Convention. He also argues that most of the discussion is not evaluative, but instead
informative. That is, the articles focus on what happens and not on how what happened might effect each country. He concludes that there exists media awareness of European events equally in France and Portugal. He also argues that they both offer similar coverage that does not reflect the national filtering.

van de Steeg, et. al. (2003) report how the European press covered the debate over the so-called sanctions that EU governments used against the Austrian government formed by the People's Party (OVP) and the Freedom Party (FPO) led by Jorg Haider in 1999. They examine how the events were discussed across 13 news papers representing a wide political spectrum in Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, and the U.S. They use the U.S. coverage as a kind of "control" group in order to see if there is a different kind of coverage in the U.S. and Europe. They conclude that the debate across societies became Europeanized and quickly focuses on how Haider did not embody European values of tolerance. The coverage took a moral stance against Haider and he was quickly labeled a "neo-Nazi." In 2000, the EU took concerted action to force the out of the ruling coalition. Van de Steeg, et. al., conclude "We see here the emergence of a community that treats the Haider issue as an affair that concerns "us' as Europeans. In short, the Haider debate was about core principles of a European identity." (2003:15).

Another case where there appears to have been substantial coordination of transnational political groups is the European conflict over genetically engineered foods during 1995-7. The issue was the attempt to introduce genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the production of crops in Europe. At the time, the EU was considering a set of directives oriented towards insuring the safety of GMOs. Kettnaker (2003) presents data on how protests were organized across Europe and aimed at national governments,
the EU, and the corporations that were involved. She shows that the protests were
coordinated across countries, mostly by transnational social movement organizations.
The results of the movement were that the campaign "seems to have deterred food
producers and retailers from the mass marketing of genetically modified food in Europe." (2003:226).

While the Haider debate and the GMO case seem like clear evidence yet of the
emergence of some kind of European political sphere, there is ample evidence that many
European political discussions are not nearly so harmonious and come to such positive
end conclusions. Bush and Simi (2001) examine in some detail the case of protests of
European farmers from 1992-1997. Generally, what they found is that farmers mobilized
at the regional or national level to protest national officials implementing EU regulations.
A typical response was a French farmers' protest in December 1992 where farmers
"blocked the cross-Channel ferry port of Calais, vowing to 'throw the English into the
sea'." (2003:119). Here, there was little agreement between civil society organizations
across national boundaries to cooperate and there was no collective discussion of a
collective European agriculture policy.

Downey and Koenig (2004) consider another case: the media coverage in Europe
of a speech given by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European Parliament
in July, 2003 where he compared a German member of Parliament, Martin Schulz, to a
"kapo" (ie. a concentration camp guard). They examined the coverage in 25 European
newspapers where they examined 782 articles. They discovered that the reporting of the
incident had wide variation within and across country. In Germany, for example, left
wing newspapers defended Berlusconi and right wing newspapers decried him while in
Italy, it was exactly the opposite. Much of the framing of the discussion was about universal values such as primordial ethnic ties. Downey and Koenig conclude that there is little evidence for a "strong" view of Europeanization which suggests the discussion was undertaken in terms of "European values". Instead, the discussion very much reflected the national and political stance of the publication.

It is useful to draw some conclusions about the kind of European political sphere that actually exists within the member states. First, most political discussion within European countries remains focused on the national politics and most political activities organized by national groups are focused on national governments. But, there is lots of evidence that European political stories are also part of the national discourse. The way these stories play out depends very much on the issue in contention and the role of national governments in that issue. There is some transnational organizing occurring of social movement organizations and there is evidence that the frequency of protests against European policies is on the increase. But, there is also evidence that much of this protest reflects national groups trying to get their national governments to protect them from EU policies that undermine their positions.

If one takes a strictly Habermasian view of what a political sphere in Europe would look like, one would conclude that such a sphere does not exist. European politics most of all reflect the jurisdictional differentiation between issues decided in Brussels, in national capitals, and by subnational or regional governments. But contra Habermas, in all of these spheres, political parties and representatives of sitting governments participate and dominate. Interest groups represented by lobbyists and social movement groups present their grievances in whatever venue they can (and sometimes in multiple venues).
None of these politics seem oriented towards evolving rational discourses and consensual politics that involve all citizens, but instead chaotic, anarchic places where groups view for resources, votes, and attention using whatever framing of events will help them. European issues are reported across countries and frequently national media are in dialogue with one another. But, these issues are frequently not debated in a way that will promote European political integration. National (and indeed group) interests provide framing for all political debates. In this way, there are multiple arenas of European politics, just not a single one that the advocates of an idealized democracy and civil society would recognize.

Conclusions

The economic and social construction that has accompanied the growth of the European Union since its inception in 1957 have produced a complex, if explicable politics. The goal of the member states governments has consistently been to create a single market in western Europe, one that would eliminate tariff and nontariffs barriers and eventually open all industries to competitors from other countries. This goal has created a huge increase in cross border economic activity, trade, investment, and the creation of European wide corporations. On the social side, the people who have been most involved in this marketing opening project have been managers and professionals who have the opportunity to travel and work with their counterparts in other countries. These groups have benefited financially, but also have had the pleasure of discovering that people in other countries could be friends and travel and work bring them to new and
interesting places. Meeting people from other societies has been a good thing that encouraged people to see themselves as both similar and different.

At the same time, through all of this process, the member state governments have restricted the issues that the European Union will take up. They have restricted the European Union from intervening into national labor markets, labor relations, and all policies tied up with welfare states. They have done so for two reasons. First, there are huge national differences in such systems, differences that reflect underlying values and preferences that are not easy to harmonize. But, more important, popular public opinion has opposed transferring sovereignty over these issues to the EU for fear of interference in national social models.

These features of the EU and national politics and the growth of Europeanized middle and upper middle class persons have created several interesting levels of politics. First, of course, is the highly institutionalized politics in Brussels where governments continue to dominate, but the lobbying groups, Commission, Court, and Parliament all play roles. Second, national political parties over time have tried to adopt different political positions over time to try and attract voters. The middle and upper middle class voters who have benefited from the EU have generally voted for parties with a pro-EU stance. This has produced a pro-EU platform into all of the main European political parties.

Perhaps the most interesting and subtle effect of all of this economic and social interaction is the creation of interest in European affairs in national political discourse. There is strong evidence that European affairs are covered in national papers and that national groups organize to protest to their governments about EU policies they don't like.
There is also some evidence that on occasion, these discussions can be trans-European and result in policy coordination. But, these discussions more frequently reflect the complex identities of people who live in Europe. Since the majority of 50% of people who live in Europe have predominantly a national identity, it should not be surprising that many European political issues end up appealing to national as opposed to European wide interests. This means that as issues confronting Europeans are discussed within national media, they are more likely to be filtered through national debates and self images as European ones. So while there is certainly a wide awareness of European issues, the ability to produce European policies is going to always be difficult because of the institutional limits on the EU and the conflicting political demands that citizens place on their governments.
Table 1: Germany: Change in Party Attitudes

Social Democratic Party of Germany

Free Democratic Party

Christian Democrats
Table 2: How Much Europe is mentioned in party platforms?
Table 3: Britain: Change in Party attitudes

![Graph showing labor party attitudes over time]

![Graph showing Conservative party attitudes over time]
Table 4: How Much Europe is mentioned in party platforms?

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Table 5: FRANCE: Change in Party attitudes

- **socialist party**
  - 1951: 0
  - 1958: 2
  - 1967: 4
  - 1978: 6
  - 1986: 8
  - 1993: 10

- **Gaullists**
  - 1951: 0
  - 1956: 2
  - 1962: 4
  - 1978: 6
  - 1986: 8
  - 1988: 10

- **front national**
  - 1986: 1
  - 1988: 0.5
  - 1993: 1
  - 1997: -1.5
Table 6: How Much Europe is mentioned in party platforms?

socialist party

front national

Gaullists

This is based on an interview conducted in June, 1992.

This explanation of the process was based on the interviews.

This point was made to me over and over again in the interviews.