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Ethics Discussion Group Lecture: Moral Discourse and a Central Misconception of Metaethics

Eric Campbell, Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore County
Thursday, March 30, 2017
7:00-9:00 PM
Tanner Library, 1171 Angell Hall Map
Moral abolitionists tend to share the view that moral discourse promotes self-deception or otherwise inhibits normatively important forms of self-knowledge. Fortunately, we can ignore abolitionist critiques unless moral error theory succeeds. Or so goes the assumption I term the Central Misconception. It is a misconception because a normative critique of moral discourse need have no truck with moral error theory. And the misconception is central in the sense that it is a primary impediment to recognizing that investigating the value of moral discourse ought to be a more central task in metaethics. I argue that the Central Misconception has served to preclude awareness that a variety of non-error-theoretic views are compatible with—and many are quite friendly to—moral abolitionism. I try to show that even if expressivism or non-error-theoretic subjectivism can defeat error theory, such abolitionist critiques can remain entirely unaffected. Yet more surprisingly, prominent forms of these views unwittingly support abolitionist critiques. I conclude that the Central Misconception has contributed to a widespread andunjustified complacency about the value of ordinary moral discourse.
Building: Angell Hall
Event Type: Lecture / Discussion
Tags: Philosophy
Source: Happening @ Michigan from Department of Philosophy