Energy & Environmental Economics

Abstract:
This paper focuses on how give and take frames are constructed in a linear, repeated public good experiment, how those formulations influence behavior, and how framing effects differ among different types of decision makers. Previous framing studies create frame via a wide variety of techniques, often “stacking the deck” in favor of a framing effect. As a result, it is not often clear what element(s) of the framing design is (are) responsible for the framing effect. The inherent heterogeneity among decision-makers adds another layer of complexity to understanding framing. With few exceptions, framing and heterogeneity among decision makers in public good dilemmas have been examined separately. Where they have been jointly explored, results have been ambiguous. In this research, I establish frames via a factorial design that decomposes frame along two dimensions, the action implicit in the decision (i.e., give or take) and the language used to describe the decision (i.e., neutral or non-neutral). Each of four frames was imposed on a different set of study participants, whose decision-making types were previously determined via a separate dilemma. Among the four types of decision-makers, individuals who were expected not to cooperate cooperated trivially or not at all and demonstrated no sensitivity to framing. Individuals previously assessed as low, conditional, and high cooperators cooperated at distinct and non-trivial levels that declined over the course of the repeated dilemma. Where framing effects were observed, the two dimensions of frame did not uniformly influence every type of decision-maker. Non-neutral language yielded lower cooperation in the give treatment among conditional and low cooperators. Taking yielded lower cooperation in the neutral treatment among low cooperators.